

CENTRAL EUROPEAN MONOGRAPHTES

No 32

**Ferenc Szávai (editor):
BRITISH DIPLOMATIC PAPERS
ON THE BIRTH OF THE NEW BORDERS
OF CENTRAL EUROPE 1918-1920**



HISTORY

GEOGRAPHY

REGIONAL SCIENCE

MANAGEMENT SCIENCE

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FOREWORD¹

The Versailles peace treaty following the First World War swept away four empires, including the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the wake of the German Empire. A new Central Europe was born. How this was to happen had already been planned and prepared during the First World War. The new order was based on national self-determination and support for previously oppressed nations. It also reflected the redrawing of borders. The demands of the new states could only be met by partitioning the territories of the defeated Austria-Hungary. Our aim was to make public the key documents that influenced the British peace delegation and then shaped its official opinion. The necessary research was carried out at the British National Archives in London between 6 February 2023 and 16 February 2023.

Thus, the volumes of Peace Handbooks on Austria-Hungary, the articles in *The New Europe* weekly, and the British National Archives' British Peace Delegation correspondence on the new borders of Austria-Hungary were the main sources of information.

The new Czechoslovak and South Slavic states, Romania under the secret alliance of Bucharest, but the victorious Italy, submitted territorial claims in accordance with the secret London Agreement. The victorious Great Britain made significant sacrifices, in money and in human life, to the success of the victory. Throughout the war, the Foreign Office prepared the ground for a peace in many forums and forms. An important part of this was the Peace Handbooks, which were used to inform the delegates to the Paris Peace Conference on the final British position. The volumes were frequently rotated by British experts.

The British national archives hold the correspondence of the peace delegation concerning the territories of Austria-Hungary. Thus, in the selection of the documentary volume, the volumes of the Peace Handbooks relating to Austria-Hungary, and then some studies from them, are included, as well as some relevant studies from *The New Europe* foreign affairs review. From the British National Archives, we present the documents from before December 1918, followed by the British vision for the whole of South-East Europe and the Balkans in December 1918. Here we find the British position on the future Hungarian borders, largely formulated by Seton-Watson.

This brings us to the official memoranda of the British Peace Delegation on the Hungarian frontiers, dated 8 February 1919, as well as the question of the future

1 The research was carried out in the framework of the research project Great Britain, the United States and Hungary: history, society, politics (1848-21st century) of the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences of the Károli Gáspár University of the Reformed Church in Hungary. Subject number: 20702B800. The research team was led by Dr Ágnes Beretzky, Associate Professor.

Romanian frontiers. These documents include the northern, southern and eastern borders of the future Hungary. But it also deals with the borders of the former Austria and Italy. In Paris, a sub-committee discussed the Czech and Romanian claims, and we thought it important to publish the notes on these. An interesting issue was the Italian claim, which was almost identical to the British final territorial opinion, published on 7 February 1919. The interesting issue here is Wilson's and the other great negotiations on the Italian claim and then its final outcome. Some of the notes of the British peace delegation are given, mainly on the question of the status of the Tyrol and Vorarlberg.

In October 1919, the British Committee of the Supremes sent an extraordinary plenipotentiary envoy to Budapest in the person of Sir George Clark. His committee included Percy Loraine, who in November 1919 prepared a report for Paris on the impact of the future borders on Hungarian public opinion. Summarising this, Percy Loraine sent the material he had compiled to Paris, outlining ten problem areas. However, this was of little consequence as the new borders had already been drawn up.

Among the territorial documents in the British archives is a visit to Paris in the summer of 1919 by the leaders of the then ethnically and power-divided population of Baranya, who declared their belief in belonging to the new South Slav state. Lastly, the ethnic, geographical and historical presentation of Banat's belonging to the region, which also shows the future border between South Slavs and Romanians.

The editor emphasises the selective nature of the documentary, which draws on previously published volumes. Another guiding principle is that the documents published should be read in full and not abridged. Nevertheless, the number of documents available is many times greater than those published in the volume, but the limits of space have guided the ordering principles. The documents in this volume are consistent with my study "Foreign Office and New Europe", published in 2023 in the journal *Central European Review*.

Territorial changes were only possible after the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The most important British documents on the creation of the new borders in Central Europe have been collected, with territorial issues as the defining principle.

I hope that those interested will find it useful.

Ferenc Szávai

Budapest, 10 September 2024

Ferenc Szávai:
**THE ROLE OF GREAT BRITAIN IN THE REMOVAL OF
HUNGARIAN BORDERS 1918-1920, HISTORIOGRAPHY**

Introduction

In this paper, we provide a historiographical overview of the books and studies that present important information on how the “Peace Handbooks” series of British peace preparation activities, the British Border Proposals (two proposals by the Ministry of Defence, the Peace Delegation’s proposal of February 1919), and the activities of the British peace delegation in Paris (Lloyd George’s discussions at the meetings of the Four Greats and the position of British delegates at the meetings of the various territorial committees), influenced the decision to withdraw the Trianon borders of the Hungarian state.

1. The Vulgar Marxist period from 1948 to the early 1970s

Vulgar Marxist historiography, which dominated Hungarian historiography from 1948 until the early 1970s, avoided researching the history of the Trianon Peace Treaty and publishing its possible results. In 1965, this silence was broken by a relatively young researcher, Zsuzsa L. Nagy², a staff member of the Institute of History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Her book was entitled “The Paris Peace Conference and Hungary”³. In her 300-page book, she examined the history of the birth of the Trianon Peace Edict from the perspective of the Károlyi-Berlinkey government and later the Revolutionary Governing Council, i.e. from the explicitly labour movement point of view. But after 1945, Hungarian readers could read here for the first time about the opening of the Peace Conference on 18 January 1919, the Council of Four and its discussions on Hungary. L. Nagy wrote only tersely about Britain’s role in the drawing of Hungarian borders. He emphasised two things: firstly, that the British were primarily interested in the reorganisation of the colonies at the peace conference.⁴ Second, that in the process of establishing a new order in Central Europe, the British peace delegation sought to moderate the extreme French settlementist tendencies.⁵

2 Born in 1930, he was 35 years old when his book was published.

3 L. Nagy Zsuzsa (1965): *A párizsi békekonferencia és Magyarország*. Kossuth Könyvkiadó. Budapest.

4 L. Nagy (1965) 34.

5 L. Nagy (1965) 92.

It is important to point out that Zsuzsa L. Nagy was the first to use the US source publication abbreviated to PPC as a source.⁶ From 1965 onwards, every Hungarian historian who wrote anything about the Paris Peace Conference worked from this publication, which consisted of Volume XII.

2. The first milestone: the book by Mária Ormos, 1984

Mária Ormos had the opportunity to conduct research in Paris in the early 1980s, during the softening Kádár dictatorship. In the archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of War, she examined a significant part of the Hungarian-related documents. This resulted in the publication of her book “From Padua to Trianon 1918-1920”.⁷ The book mainly traces the role of France in the drawing of the borders - which is understandable, since the book is based on material from Paris - and compares it with the British, Italian and US attitudes. To take an example, when Paris took up the plan to invade Hungary by the Entente in the autumn of 1918, it was mainly Britain that vetoed it. Ormos goes on to present the British, Italian and American positions in the course of the later meetings of the Four Great Councils, the meetings of the territorial commissions, etc. He points out that in the meetings of the territorial committees (Czechoslovak Commission and the Committee on Romanian and Yugoslav Affairs), the American-British pair regularly clashed with the French delegation, which took a very hard line with Hungary (the Italians, in favour of one or the other position), in the course of the demarcation of the boundaries. Ormos also describes in detail the position taken by Lloyd George and his speeches in the Council of Four.

To sum up, Ormos has painted a broad picture of the British peace delegation’s activities in Paris. As regards the autumn of 1919, he discusses in a separate sub-chapter the history of the Clerk mission, which played a key role in the Hungarian recovery (the establishment of the Huszar government).⁸

3. The second milestone: the book by Géza Jeszenszky, 1986

Géza Jeszenszky’s book – “The Lost Prestige. The Changing Perception of Hungary in Great Britain (1894-1918)”⁹ - is still an important work in understanding how British politicians’ views on the Hungarian state evolved from the end

6 Paper relating to the relations of United States 1919 the Paris Peace Conference. Washington. 1942-1947. Volume I – XII.

7 Ormos Mária (1984): *Padovától Trianonig 1918–1920*. Kossuth Könyvkiadó. Budapest.

8 Ormos (1984) pp. 353–369.

9 Jeszenszky Géza (1986): *Az elveszett presztízis. Magyarország megítélésének változása Nagy-Britanniában (1894–1918)*. Magvető Kiadó. Budapest.

of the 19th century to the Paris Peace Conference. In the first two chapters of his book¹⁰, Jeszenszky outlines how the Hungarian reform era (1825-1848), the War of Independence (1848-1849) and the creation and operation of the dualist state led to a very favourable image of Hungarians in Britain.¹¹ In the years after 1867, the dualist state was seen by the British as a ‘model constitutional state’, the easternmost bastion of liberalism. However, Jeszenszky points out that from the early years of the 20th century onwards, this positive image changed. This was due to the work of two influential journalists: Wickham Steed (the Vienna correspondent of the Times from 1902 to 1913) and R.W. Seton-Watson. In several chapters, Jeszenszky describes in great detail¹² how both of them, in newspaper articles, open letters and pamphlets, sharply criticised the policies of the dualist Hungarian governments and the behaviour of the Hungarian ruling classes, which they saw as the intolerable oppression of non-Hungarian peoples. A ruthless feudal caste was ruthlessly oppressing the nationalities, they claimed. Jeszenszky assessed the process as a fatal blow to Hungary’s prestige and reputation even before the outbreak of the world war.¹³

Chapter VII of the book is ominously entitled “The Time of Judgment: the World War and the Peace Conference (1914-1919)”.¹⁴ In it, Jeszenszky outlines how, during the war, British foreign policy (and public opinion) was increasingly shaped by the anti-monarchy tendency of Steed and Seton-Watson. In 1916, it also created a new means of disseminating its position as widely as possible: the journal *New Europe*, which provided moral and strategic arguments in support of plans to partition the Monarchy and to satisfy the Hungarian nationalities. In June 1918, they formally adopted the programme for the dismantling of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as a war aim.

In Chapter VIII of the book, Jeszenszky shows that Steed and Seton-Watson can be held directly responsible for the territorial provisions of the Treaty of Trianon. On the one hand, the members of the British peace delegation prepared for the Peace Conference meetings on the basis of materials (Peace Handbooks) in the drafting of which these two individuals played a key role. On the other hand, Steed and Seton-Watson were in Paris during the Peace Conference and British diplomats working in the Territorial Commission, notably Harold Nicolson, regularly discussed with them problems relating to the running of the frontier.

10 Jeszenszky (1986) I. Chapter pp. 7–13.; II. Chapter pp.14–52.

11 Especially Jeszenszky (1986) pp. 42–52.

12 Jeszenszky (1986) II. Chapter pp. 53–111.; III. Chapter pp. 111–155; IV. Chapter pp. 156–195.; V. Chapter pp. 196–249.

13 Jeszenszky (1986) 246.

14 Jeszenszky (1986) pp. 276–286.

It should be noted here that Géza Jeszenszky wrote a sub-chapter on the New-Europe circle in the so-called “Seven Volumes” in 2019.¹⁵ It is also noted here that his book was republished with unchanged text in 2014. Subsequently, Jeszenszky’s book was republished in 2020 - this was the third edition.¹⁶ In it, he added a new chapter to the original text - entitled “It could have happened this way”.¹⁷ In it, he discusses how the leading politicians of the dualist state could have avoided the loss of prestige of Hungary by an alternative nationality policy. Thus the grave decision of Trianon. His thought experiment, however, slips into the category of fantasy when he polemics about what would have happened if the assassination in Sarajevo had not taken place.

4. The third milestone: the book by Lajos Arday, 1990

Lajos Arday’s 1990 book “Map after battle. Hungary in British Foreign Policy 1918-1919”¹⁸ - is considered a seminal work and the best treatment of the subject to date. The book was originally Arday’s doctoral thesis, which he was able to defend with great difficulty in 1977 due to the opposition of the then prevailing Marxist historians. Indeed, he was not allowed to publish it in book form at the time. Thus the dissertation could only be published in 1990. But even then, a so-called ‘red tail’ had to be placed in the footnotes.¹⁹

The book is divided into 5 major chapters. Chapter I – “The Austro-Hungarian Empire and British diplomacy” - starts “in medias rex”.²⁰ The author begins by describing the secret negotiations between Britain and the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918 (Smuts and Kerr’s negotiations in Switzerland) and the memoranda (Drummond’s first memorandum) drawn up in London on the Monarchy’s future role in Central Europe. At this time, it is clear that the British foreign policy-makers, including Prime Minister Lloyd George, were counting on the Monarchy as an important player in the post-war settlement. But Arday also points out that the proponents of the ‘Smash Austria-Hungary’

15 Jeszenszky Géza (2019): “New Europe” kör és tevékenysége. In. Gulyás László ed. (2019) pp. 257-270.

16 Jeszenszky Géza (2020): Az elveszett presztízs. Magyarország megítélésének változása Nagy-Britanniában (1894–1918). Harmadik kiadás. Fekete Sas Kiadó. Budapest.

17 Jeszenszky (2020) pp. 440–467.

18 Arday Lajos (1990): Térkép csata után. Magyarország a brit külpolitikában 1918–1919. Magvető Kiadó. Budapest.

19 Researchers in the social sciences (historians, sociologists, etc.) have used this derogatory epithet to describe the obligatory quotations from Marx and Lenin.

20 Arday (1990) pp. 7–71.

(today the slogan is taken from Beneš)²¹ line - the “New Europe” circle and its two leading figures, Steed and Seton-Watson - were gaining influence in the Foreign Office in the spring of 1918. This finding is fully in line with the findings of the Jeszenszky book already described above.

Chapter II – “Anglo-Hungarian Relations during the Civil Democratic Revolution (October 1919-March 1919)”²² - focuses on the attempts of the Károlyi government to establish relations with Hungary, the Taylor-Beveridge mission and the Hungarian activities of Cuninghame (the Chief Military Commissioner of the British Embassy in Vienna).²³

The most important chapter of Arday’s volume for our present sourcebook is Chapter III - “Britain’s role in the Hungarian frontier withdrawal”.²⁴ In the first half of the chapter, Arday describes the Czechoslovak, South Slav and Romanian claims, and then presents the British War Office proposal of 10 December 1918. In the second part of the chapter, he describes the circumstances in which the British Peace Handbooks were produced and the contents of each ‘booklet’. It goes into detail about the proposals made by the authors of the booklets (including Steed and Seton-Watson) for the running of the frontiers or the partition of Banat.

Chapter IV of the volume, ‘Britain and the Hungarian Soviet Republic’, focuses on the history of the Smuts mission. While Chapter V - ‘British diplomacy as a force for counter-revolution’ - examines the role of British soldiers and politicians active in Hungary - General George Gordon, Admiral Thomas Troubridge and George Russell Clerk - in the establishment of the Huszar government government and its invitation to the Peace Conference and the election of Horthy as regent on 1 March 1920.

5. Fourth milestone: other important monographs on Trianon

In the few years before and especially after the change of regime, the number of books and publications dealing with the peace treaty or parts of it and its consequences increased. The “Trianon Workshop 5.”²⁵ -, which was attended by

21 This was the title of Beneš’s propaganda book published in Paris in 1916. For more information, see Gulyás László: „Zúzzátok szét Ausztria-Magyarországot!” Avagy a Masaryk-Benes-féle csehszlovák emigráció érvrendszerének első szintézise. LIMES 2000/4. Number pp. 35–50.

22 Arday (1990) pp. 72–111.

23 Full name: Sir Thomas Andrew Alexander Montgomery-Cuninghame

24 Arday (1990) pp. 112–187.

25 The „Trianon workshop 5.” was one of the sessions of the 10th Conference on the Emergence and Dissolution of Multiethnic States in Central Europe (Szeged, 2 March 2018).

a significant number of leading historians working on the subject - reviewed the historiography of Trianon and reached the following professional consensus²⁶ on the literature:

**Table 1: The most important books (adaptations) in Hungarian
The most important books on Trianon from 1984 to 2011**

szerző	év	cím	kiadó
Raffay Ernő	1987	Erdély 1918-19-ben	Magvető Kiadó. Budapest
Fejtő Ferenc	1990	Rekviem egy hajdan-volt birodalomért. Ausztria-Magyarország szétrombolása.	Minerva Kiadó. Budapest
Galántai József	1990	A trianoni békekötés 1920. A párizsi meghívástól a ratifikálásáig.	Gondolat Kiadó, Budapest
Jeszzenszky Géza.	1986	Az elveszett presztízs. Magyarország megítélésének változása Nagy-Britanniában (1894–1918”	Magyar Szemle Könyvek. Budapest
Arday Lajos	1990	Térkép csata után. Magyarország a brit külpolitikában 1918–1919.	Magvető Kiadó. Budapest
Romsics Ignác	2001	A trianoni békeszerződés	Osiris Kiadó. Budapest
Zeidler Miklós	2001	A revíziós gondolat	Osiris Kiadó. Budapest
Szávai Ferenc	2004	Az Osztrák–Magyar Monarchia felbomlásának következményei	Pannónia Könyvek. Pécs
Gulyás László	2008	Edvard Beneš – Közép-Európa koncepciók és a valóság	Attraktor Kiadó, Máriabesnyő–Gödöllő
Bryen Cartledge	2009	Trianon egy angol szemével	Officina Kiadó- Budapest

²⁶ In this “workshop”, we only dealt with the processing, a review of the printed source publications will be the task of a future workshop.

Popély Gyula	2010	Felvidék 1914–1920	Magyar Napló-Budapest
Ablonczy Balázs	2010	Trianon-legendák	Jaffa Kiadó. Budapest
Gottfried Barna – Nagy Szabolcs	2011	A Székely Hadosztály története	Tortoma Kiadó. Barót

Sources: *A X. Többnemzetiségű államok keletkezése és felbomlása Közép-Európában konferencia. Trianon workshop 5. szekciójának összefoglalója. Szeged, 2018. március 2.*

Of the books included in the table, Arday and Jeszenszky’s book has already been presented. For the other books, we think it important to record the following in a sentence or two. Raffay and Gottfried-Nagy Szabolcs, as their titles suggest, focus specifically on Transylvania, while Popély deals with the Felvidék. British politicians and soldiers appear only rarely in these works. The books of Fejtő, Zeidler, Szávai, take a broader view of the problem, and thus British politicians whose activities influenced the creation of the Hungarian borders appear in our pages. Of particular interest is the book by the British author Cartledge²⁷, in which he presents a new approach to the Hungarian reader on the fate of historical Hungary and the fate of the Trianon peace treaty. On the one hand, he draws a broad tableau of the causes and consequences of the interest-driven decisions of the victors at the peace conference, and on the other hand, he describes the fate-turning events in the biographies of two Hungarian politicians. In addition to Hungarian politicians, British politicians are also prominently featured in the book. The Britishness of the author is an obvious explanation for this.

Galántai’s book – “The Trianon Peace Treaty 1920: from the Invitation to Paris to the Ratification” - focuses only on the year 1920, as its title suggests. From a British perspective, the role of Lloyd George in the spring of 1920 is repeatedly referred to. He points out that at the meeting of the Council of Heads of Government on 3 March 1920, Lloyd George raised the possibility of renegotiating the Hungarian borders.²⁸

Gulyás’s book deserves a lot of attention because it is much more than just an average Beneš biography. In the course of his first emigration (1915-1918) and his work at the Peace Conference (1919-1920), Steed and Seton-Watson’s anti-monarchy activities (and their relationship with Beneš), the British peace preparations and the work of Lloyd George and the British peace delegation in Paris (in which

27 Sir Bryan Cartledge (born 10 June 1931) British diplomat and university lecturer. He was British Ambassador to Hungary from 1980 to 1984.

28 Galántai József (1990): *A trianoni békekötés 1920. A párizsi meghívástól a ratifikálásáig.* Gondolat Kiadó. Budapest. pp. 108–110.

Beneš regularly became involved with the help of Harold Nicolson) are given prominence.

Romsics has devoted a small monograph to the history of the peace treaty, including, of course, the border disputes and proposals.²⁹

The 100th anniversary of the Treaty of Trianon also brought a huge wave of Trianon publications. More than 100 books were published in those years. These publications were processed by László Gulyás 2023 in two major historiographical studies:

- Historiography for synthesis writing 1.

- How did Hungarian historiography commemorate the centenary of Trianon?

A brief historiographical overview.

An important sub-area is covered in Tamara Telkesi's paper – "The ratification of the Trianon Peace in the British Parliament".³⁰ She describes the heated debates in the British House of Commons (April 1921) and then in the House of Lords (May 1920) on whether Britain should ratify the treaty. We find this curious, moreover, because the British peace delegation played a major role in deciding where the Hungarian border lines should be drawn.

6. Fifth milestone: The chapters on the role of Britain in the "seven-volume" synthesis

In 2019, the Virtual Institute for the Study of Central Europe launched its major series "The History of the Trianon Peace Dictate".³¹ The 6 volumes, which will be published until summer 2024, will have a total of 3 000 pages, more than 10 million characters, written by 70 well-known and respected historians. Volume II.1 of the series³² - "The Paris Peace Conference and Hungary" - is the relevant volume for the present historiographical overview. In this volume, the following sub-chapters were written by Lajos Arday at the request of the Series Editorial Committee:

29 Romsics Ignác (2001): *A trianoni békeszerződés*. Osiris Kiadó. Budapest.

30 Telkesi Tamara (2021): *A trianoni béke ratifikálása a brit parlamentben* Illik Péter – Vizi László Tamás (2021): *A trianoni békediktátum ratifikációja külföldön*. Magyarságkutató Intézet. Budapest. 13–72.

31 Volumes I to V of the seven volumes have been published so far, see the bibliography for their exact bibliographical data.

32 See bibliography.

- “The British vision of a new order for Central Europe”

In this chapter, Arday describes the history of the creation of the Peace Handbooks, the two boundary proposals of the British War Office (14 October 1918 and 10 December 1918) and the British peace delegation’s proposal of 8 February 1919.)

- “Members of the British delegation”

In this chapter, Arday presents the leading politicians of the British peace delegation in short and long paragraphs. But Arday also includes three budding diplomats: Harold Nicolson, A.W. Allen Leeper and J. Headlam-Morley.

Following the decision of the Supreme Council in the first week of February 1919 to send so-called territorial committees to discuss territorial questions and to propose boundary lines, the members of the British peace delegation were active in these committees. Two such committees were set up to deal with the drawing of Hungary’s Trianon borders. The first was the Czechoslovak Commission, whose British members were Sir Joseph Cook and Harold Nicolson. The other was the Committee on Romanian and Yugoslavian Affairs, whose British members were Sir Eyre Crowe and A.W. Allen Leeper.

For a detailed account of the positions taken, the arguments put forward and the results reached by the British members of the above Committees, for example in the case of the partition of Banat³³, see the following chapters in Volume II.1. For information on how the Big Four received these Commission proposals, see the section on “Finalisation of the borderline proposals”³⁴

7. The latest developments

Britain’s role in the drawing of the Trianon borders was most recently (in 2023) explored by the author of this paper in his publication in the *Central European Review* – “The Foreign Office and New Europe”.

33 Gulyás László (2021/b): A szerb és román érvék csatája. In. Gulyás László szerk. (2021/a) 162-163; Gulyás László (2021/c): A Bánság felosztásával kapcsolatos bizottsági viták. In. Gulyás (2021/a) 169-174; Gulyás László (2021/d): A Bánság felosztása és a magyar-jugoszláv határ születése. A Román és a Jugoszláv ügyek Bizottsága. In. Gulyás (2021/a) 167–184; Gulyás László (2021/e): A bácskai-baranyai határral kapcsolatos bizottsági viták. In. Gulyás (2021/a) 177 –179; Gulyás László (2021/f): Hogyan húzták meg a békekonferencián a magyar-jugoszláv határt? In Gulyás László – Sziridopulosz Archimédész szerk. *Trianoni kiskaté: 101 kérdés – 101 válasz.* L’ Harmattan. Budapest. 55.

34 Gulyás László (2021/g): A határvonal javaslatok véglegesítése. In. Gulyás (2021/h) 191-194; Gulyás László (2021/h): Ellentétek a békecsinálók között, avagy a magyar határok újratárgyalásának kérdése. In. (2021/a) 124-130.

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1. DOCUMENT

The role and importance of the Peace Handbooks in British peacebuilding

A Peace Handbooks Issued by the Historical Section of the Foreign Office. Vol. II. Austria-Hungary. Part II. London, 1920. 14. The Jugo-Slav Movement

The Foreign Office had been debating the aims of the war since 1916, and in March 1918 London was still wavering between the positions of maintaining the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and national self-determination, which could only be achieved by dissolving the Monarchy. In the summer of 1918, no decision had been taken, and it was not until the autumn that it was decided that the side that wanted to dissolve the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had won. But at that time, the Foreign Office had no clear idea of where the borders of the successor states would lie after the break-up of the Monarchy, just as it had no concrete position on how to settle the borders of the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire.

In the spring of 1917, in preparation for the Peace Conference, the Foreign Office set up a special section - called the History Section - to provide members of the British delegation to the Peace Conference with information on the history, geography, economics, religion and politics of the countries they would be dealing with. The History Department, under the direction of Dr G. W. Prothero, produced some 162 handbooks (more precisely, booklets). The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was the subject of 14 booklets, which were arranged in two volumes. 1 (1-7), Austria-Hungary Vol. The most important for our subject are the booklets 1-7, which dealt with the following topics: 1. the history and foreign policy of Austria-Hungary, 2. Bohemia and Moravia, 3. Slovakia, 4.

The Admiralty Intelligence Department (Naval Staff) provided valuable assistance in compiling geographical information and maps, and the War Trade Reconnaissance Department set up by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs helped with economic matters. British geographers also played an important role in shaping the British position at the Peace Conference. Among these geographers, we should mention Alan Ogilvie and Marion Newbigin as experts whose opinions had a major influence on the new Central European borders.

It should be noted here that, after the Peace Conference, the Foreign Office decided, in response to a number of requests and inquiries, to make the Peace Handbooks series available for public use, in the belief that they would be useful to those interested in history, politics, economics and foreign affairs. The booklets are published in substantially the same form as they were prepared for the use of delegates at the time. No attempt has been made to update them, as such a procedure would have been time-consuming and excessively expensive.

Source: The Peace Handbooks Issued by the Historical Section of the Foreign Office. Vol. II. Austria-Hungary. Part II. London, 1920. 14. The Jugo-Slav Movement

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4. AUSTRIAN SILESIA
5. BUKOVINA
6. TRANSYLVANIA AND THE BANAT
7. HUNGARIAN RUTHENIA

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9. CARNIOLA, CARINTHIA, STYRIA
10. AUSTRIAN LITTORAL; TRIESTE
11. DALMATIA
12. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
13. THE SLOVENES
14. THE JUGO-SLAV MOVEMENT

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- 18. GREECE WITH CYCLADES AND NORTHERN SPORADES

LONDON
 H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE
 1920

THE JUGO-SLAV MOVEMENT³⁵

Chronological Summary

- 1787. Birth of Vuk Karadzic.
- 1804-13. Kara George and the First Serbian Insurrection.
- 1809-13. The Illyrian Provinces.
- 1815. Milos Obrenovic and the Second Serbian Insurrection.
- 1815. Birth of Bishop Strossmayer.
- 1818. First edition of Karadzic's Dictionary.
- 1848. The Hungarian Rebellion.
- 1867. Foundation of the South Slavonic Academy at Zagreb.
- 1874. Foundation of Zagreb University.
- 1896. Rise of the Party of Pure Right in Croatia.
- 1903. Accession of King Peter to the throne of Serbia.
- 1905. The resolution of Fiume and Zara.
- 1908. Annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
- 1915. Formation of Jugo-Slav Volunteer Regiments in Russia.
- 1917. Pact of Corfu. 1918 (March). Pact of Rome.
- 1918 (October). Creation of the National Council at Zagreb.
- 1918 (November). Conference of Geneva,

35 For the proper understanding of the Jugo-Slav movement it is necessary to have some knowledge of the history, early as well as recent, of the separate Jugo-Slav communities within the Dual Monarchy and outside it. For this the reader is referred to the following books in this series: Nos. 1, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 19, and 20.

Development of the Movement up to the Outbreak of the European War

Introductory

The Jugo-Slav Race. —The Jugo-Slavs belong to the southern branch of the Slav family;³⁶ - they include the Slovenes, Serbs, and Croats, and occupy territory which extends uninterruptedly from southern Carinthia and Styria and southern and south-western Hungary to the southern frontiers of Montenegro and Serbia, and is bounded on the west by the Adriatic and on the east by Bulgaria. On the fringes of this territory there are almost everywhere areas of mixed population where the drawing of an equitable frontier line will be a matter of extreme difficulty, further complicated by the frequent conflict of racial and strategic considerations. But within it the Jugo-Slavs form a population united by blood, by language, and to a certain extent by national tradition, though divided by religion as well as, hitherto, by government. The Jugo-Slavs of Austria were distributed among six provinces,³⁷ while the inhabitants of Croatia-Slavonia were attached to Hungary, though, unlike the Serbs of South Hungary, they enjoy a limited measure of home rule. Bosnia-Herzegovina is under joint Austro-Hungarian administration. Outside the Dual Monarchy the Jugo-Slavs are divided between the independent kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro. As regards religion, the Slovenes are purely Catholic; Serbia, Montenegro, and the Serbs of South Hungary Orthodox. Elsewhere the two confessions are closely intermingled, generally in such a way that no geographical line can be drawn between them. In Bosnia-Herzegovina the Orthodox form the largest, the Moslems the second element in the State; but the Catholic element is also very considerable. In Croatia-Slavonia the Catholics form about two-thirds, the Orthodox nearly one-third of the population. The difference in religion coincides with a difference of alphabets. Orthodox communities using the Cyrillic, Catholic the Latin characters. The common national literature is printed partly in one type, partly in the other; hence both are equally familiar to the educated, and the Latin type is at least very generally taught in the primary schools of Orthodox districts.

The Bulgars. —No account is taken in this paper of the Bulgars, as they have not participated in the Jugoslav movement. Their speech is closely allied to Ser-

36 The Slav family is divided on the basis of language into three groups (1) the eastern, including the Great and Little Russians; (2) the western, including the Czechs, Poles, and Lusatian Wends or Sorbs; (3) the southern, including the Slovenes, Serbo-Croats, and Bulgars.

37 Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, Gorizia-Gradisca, Istria, Dalmatia. The Slavs of the first five are wholly or mainly Slovenes; those of Dalmatia are Serbo-Croats.

bo-Croatian, and that they are largely Jugo-Slav by race cannot be doubted. But they have also a certain admixture of Finno-Ugrian blood; and at present both Jugo-Slavs and Bulgars are intent on establishing complete racial diversity. None the less the Bulgars must be reckoned as a very important branch of the Jugo-Slavs; and it need hardly be said that full account should be taken of their legitimate claims in any final settlement of the Macedonian question. It may be added that a reasonable compromise in this region will be greatly facilitated if the Jugo-Slavs are given secure possession of their natural outlets to the west and north-west. In seeking the basis of a lasting peace in south-eastern Europe these two questions will be found to be inseparable.

The Jugo-Slav Communities of Austria-Hungary

The Slovenes. — Among the Jugo-Slavs of the Habsburg monarchy the Slovenes occupy territories farthest north and north-west, including, besides the southern part of Carinthia and Styria, the whole of Carniola, the northernmost strip of Istria, and a large part of Gorizia-Gradisca. Their chief centre is Ljubljana (Laibach). There is a large Slovene minority in the population of Trieste city, and a considerable majority in Gorizia and Gradisca together. These northernmost Jugo-Slavs have been under German rule for a thousand years, and have followed the fortunes of the Austrian Duchies under the Babenberg and Habsburg dynasties. The vigour of their nationality was so marked that they have preserved their language, identity, and racial cohesion down to the present day. The speech of the Slovenes, though allied to the Serbo-Croatian, is a distinct variety, but intelligible to their Serbo-Croatian neighbours; for some time, moreover, an educational and literary movement has been at work among them, tending towards linguistic assimilation to the latter. From close contact with German and Italian elements in the towns, the Slovenes have been able to attain a relatively high educational standard. They alone among the Jugo-Slavs were affected by the Reformation; and, though the movement was finally stamped out by the Counter-Reformation, it may be said that something of its spirit survives in the temper of the Slovene people.

The Serbo-Croats. — The rest of the Jugo-Slav population of Austria-Hungary is Serbo-Croatian. Serbs and Croats cannot be distinguished racially. They are the descendants of two closely related tribes which in the seventh century entered side by side the Roman province of Illyricum. In spite of the political barriers which have at practically all periods of their history impeded their intercourse, their language is at the present day uniform to such a degree that its extreme varieties, as spoken by the Croats of the Save valley and by the Herzegovinian Serbs of the Narenta, differ less perhaps than the dialects of Lancashire and the Midlands. The difference of name indicates, therefore, rather a “difference” of religion than of race, the Croats being Catholics, the Serbs Orthodox. The cause of the divergence

is to be found in the fact that from the time of Diocletian onwards the Roman Empire was divided for administrative purposes, and that the province of Illyricum fell partly to the eastern, partly to the western half. Hence the Serbs, the more easterly of the invading tribes, found themselves under the authority, more or less effectively asserted, of Byzantium, and ultimately received from that quarter the Orthodox faith. The Croats settled within the limits of the Western Empire, in regions where the See of Rome endeavoured incessantly, and on the whole successfully, to maintain its spiritual authority. Later on, the cause of Latin Christianity in this region was reinforced and its triumph ensured by the rise of Hungary in the north and of Venice on the Adriatic side. Religious antagonism, however, appears on the whole to have been conspicuous by its absence. According to the Jugo-Slav proverb, 'A brother is dear, whatever his faith'; and in fact the tie of blood and language seems to have counted for more than religious differences. The common consciousness of the Turkish peril no doubt made for co-operation, and not less the humane and conciliatory spirit of the Franciscan clergy, who were prominent in the lands where the two confessions were intermingled. In 1390, after the Serbian defeat at Kosovo, the Catholic town of Ragusa (Dubrovnik) offered Prince Vuk Brankovic refuge within its walls, and permission to build there a church of his own faith.³⁸ From the middle of the fourteenth century till the extinction by Napoleon of the Republic of Ragusa, the town paid a yearly contribution first to the Orthodox monastery of St. Michael at Jerusalem, and subsequently to the monasteries of Hilendar and St. Paul on Mount Athos.³⁹ During the Turkish domination the monks of Serbia sought alms for their monasteries in Croatia as well as in Russia, and enjoyed the countenance of the Catholic bishops. To the 'Illyrists' of the nineteenth century the religious distinction appeared unimportant, and in 1848 it proved no obstacle to the co-operation of Serbs and Croats. Bishop Strossmayer and Dr. Franjo Racki, President of the South Slav Academy, both churchmen of high distinction, identified themselves with the cause of Jugo-Slav unity, and maintained friendly relations with the Orthodox clergy.

Rise of the Jugo-Slav Movement

Original Conception of Jugo-Slav Unity. —The JugoSlav movement, being the product of intellectual and ideal forces and having long remained dissociated from political agitation and even from definite political aims, offers peculiar difficulties to the Anglo-Saxon imagination. Nor is it easy to estimate its strength and extent in the early stages when it was no more than the sentiment of a racial unity transcending political and religious divisions. This original conception of Jugo-Slav unity

38 F. Miklosi, *Monumenta Serbica*, pp. 215-16.

39 Both originally Serbian. That of St. Paul is Greek at the present day.

is well expressed in the pregnant sentences exchanged between Kossuth and the deputation of Serbs from southern Hungary who on the outbreak of the Hungarian revolution of 1848 presented to the Diet at Pressburg a petition for the recognition of their national language in the Magyar State.

‘What’, inquired Kossuth, ‘do you understand by a nation? ‘A race which possesses its own language, customs, culture, and enough self-consciousness to preserve them.

‘A nation must also have its own government,’ objected Kossuth.

‘We do not go so far. One nation can live under several different governments, and again several nations can form a single State.

Illyrism.—This conception of Jugo-Slav unity was in part the outcome of the literary and linguistic movement which developed in the first half of the nineteenth century and is associated with the name of Vuk Karadzic. But this movement itself was greatly stimulated by the political ideas to which Napoleon’s creation in 1809 of the Illyrian Provinces had given rise. The new Provinces, which included the greater part, of the Slovene lands, the Croatian littoral, and Dalmatia, were designed to be a French outpost on the high road to the East and a fortress on the flank of Austria; hence Napoleon deliberately aimed at uniting in them considerable Slav populations under a government sympathetic to their national spirit. The abolition of the frontiers which had hitherto divided them and the material and intellectual progress which resulted from the able and enlightened government of the French made on the subjects of the new State an impression which was never effaced. ‘Illyrism’ became the watchword of the next generation of political thinkers; but in their definition of Illyria they included, besides Napoleon’s provinces, all lands inhabited by Jugo-Slavs, to whose ultimate union in some yet undefined form they now began to aspire. The revolt of Serbia and her emancipation from Turkish rule, after a heroic struggle, promoted this ideal at a time when political and religious considerations alone would have favoured the narrower Napoleonic conception.

Vuk Karadzic. —The labours of Vuk Karadzic, the founder of modern Jugo-Slav culture, gave a solid basis to the ideas of the Illyrists. Born in Serbia under Turkish rule and in humble circumstances, Vuk made use of such educational opportunities as he could obtain, first in Syrmia and Croatia, and after the success of Kara George’s first revolt at the newly-established High School of Belgrade. On the temporary overthrow of Serbian liberty in 1813, he withdrew to Vienna, where by a fortunate accident he made the acquaintance of the Slovene poet and scholar, Jernej Kopitar. Kopitar, a native of the lands recently included in the short-lived Illyrian Provinces (1809-13), had been deeply stirred by Napoleon’s political experiment. He was one of the leading representatives of ‘Illyrism’, and his influence on Vuk was decisive. One great obstacle to the spread of Illyrist ideas was the fact that, while one vernacular was spoken by the whole race.⁴⁰ there was no

⁴⁰ With the exception in a limited sense, of the Slovenes. See *supra*, p. 3.

standard literary language, and the debased forms produced under various foreign influences were in some cases unintelligible, or nearly so, outside the district in which they were current. Vuk, strongly interested from the first in the speech and traditions of his people, had already begun to write in the vernacular. Kopitar, struck by its possibilities, saw in their development the best hope of creating a literary language, and urged Vuk to undertake the linguistic studies which were an indispensable preliminary. It is unnecessary to specify here all the works produced by Vuk in the course of fifty years of devoted toil. His great dictionary, whose second edition (1852) satisfied the most exacting standards of western scholarship, fixed the forms of the literary language at the time, and remains a linguistic authority of the first importance. It is also a mine of information on Jugo-Slav folklore, customs, and tradition. The publication of national songs and heroic poetry, collected in the course of extensive travels through Jugo-Slav lands, created a sensation in the Germany of Grimm and Goethe, and attracted attention in more western lands. Among the Jugo-Slavs it revived the consciousness of a heroic past whose great names were the common property of the race and household words on the lips of every peasant. Finally, by his reform of the current orthography and by the construction of an alphabet in Cyrillic characters but on strictly phonetic lines, Vuk rendered to the Serbian section of his people a service of permanent value. The attachment of the Serbs to their alphabet often appears to foreigners exaggerated and sentimental. Sentiment plays a large part in it, for every child who passes through a primary school is taught to revere the name of Vuk; but the alphabet is valued hardly less for its proved efficacy as an instrument of instruction. The strikingly rapid diffusion of education in the kingdom of Serbia has been greatly assisted by the possession of a phonetic alphabet. The labours of Vuk gave the Jugo-Slav movement a definitely western orientation.⁴¹

Serbian intellectual life had hitherto had its chief centre in South Hungary, where it had been largely, though by no means entirely, under narrow Orthodox influences which drew much of their strength from Russia. From the inveterately conservative Orthodox clergy in this region and from the Srpska Matica of Buda-Pest, the oldest of Serbian literary societies, Vuk's linguistic and orthographical innovations met with vigorous though unsuccessful resistance. In Croatia, on the other hand, they found ready acceptance, largely through the influence of the Illyrist Ljudevit Gaj; and through Kopitar and Bleiweis they exercised an influence on the kindred speech of the Slovenes. Vuk himself spent the greater part of his life on Austrian soil, and was the friend of Jakob Grimm and other eminent western scholars.

41 Or, more exactly, confirmed and made general the western tendencies already promoted in Serbia by Obradovic, a Hungarian Serb, and a widely-travelled scholar. Appointed Minister of Education in the kingdom of Serbia by Kara George in 1809, Obradovic created a system of national education, and founded the High School of Belgrade in which Vuk received a part of his education.

The Events of 1848. —The Jugo-Slavs of the Monarchy shared in the outburst of national sentiment which marked the years 1847 and 1848. Had Kossuth and the Magyar revolutionaries shown any disposition to recognize the claims of Croatia or to meet the demands of the Hungarian Serbs in a liberal spirit, Croats and Serbs alike would have abstained from lending active support to the Crown, and the Serbs at least might have cast in their lot with Hungary. As it was, the racial intolerance of the Magyars drove their potential supporters into the arms of Austria. In March 1848 Ljudevit Gaj headed a deputation to the Emperor to plead for the separation of Croatia from Hungary and the erection of an autonomous Jugo-Slav State under the Habsburg Crown. In September, Jelacic, the Ban of Croatia, led against the insurgents an army of 40,000 men, which was soon increased by large numbers of the Hungarian Serbs who had already risen against the Magyars. Alexander Karageorgevic, Prince of Serbia, yielded to Russian and Austrian pressure and remained neutral ; but numerous Serbian volunteers joined the forces of Jelacic, even as Hungarian Serbs had fought in the Serbian war of liberation under Kara George and Milos Obrenovic. Partly by the aid of Russia, partly by that of her Jugo-Slav subjects, Austria triumphed, and Serbs and Croats now looked for their reward. The Banat and Backa were in fact separated from Hungary and declared to be an autonomous Serbian Voivodina; Croatia likewise was made an Austrian Crownland and promised local autonomy. Illyrist enthusiasts thought that their dreams were on the eve of fulfilment. Peter II, Prince and Bishop of Montenegro, a distinguished poet and Illyrist, wrote to Jelacic: ‘Destiny has set you at the head of the Southern Slavs. The eyes of every patriot, of our whole nation, are fixed upon you ; they stretch out their hands to you as to a heaven-sent Messiah.’ In a proclamation he stated that the time had come for the liberation of the Jugo-Slavs from the oppression -of Austria and their union in complete independence with the other members of their race. Such extravagant hopes were naturally doomed to disappointment; but not even moderate expectations were fulfilled. The Voivodina was in 1860 reincorporated in Hungary; the promised autonomy was withheld from Croatia; and in 1868 the dual system was completed by her reunion with Hungary in a position of marked inferiority. Thus neither in 1848 nor in 1866 did the Jugo-Slavs gain any advantage from Austria’s extremity.

The Second Half of the Nineteenth Century

Bishop Strossmayer. —In the second half of the nineteenth century, and especially after the union of Croatia-Slavonia with Hungary, the Jugo-Slav idea was most actively promoted in Croatia, where its most notable champion was Bishop Strossmayer (1815-1905). This distinguished churchman, best known in western Europe for his opposition to the declaration of Papal Infallibility in the Vatican Council of 1869-70, was a remarkable personality. His brilliant intellectual gifts

and wide culture,⁴² his saintly life, and the combined force and charm of his character gave him an influence which extended far beyond the bounds of his diocese. Though he played an active part in politics till 1888, and was a recognized leader of the opposition to Magyar supremacy in Croatia, the movement retained under his guidance its mainly intellectual character. By his foundation of the South Slavonic Academy of Zagreb (Agram) (1867) and of the University in the same town (1874), achievements carried through in the teeth of determined Magyar opposition, he laid the foundations of a solid higher education and of advanced scholarship in Croatia. The University has enjoyed the services of Jugo-Slav scholars of real distinction; and the Academy has published valuable collections of historical documents and standard editions of the older Croatian poets. Research has naturally tended to concentrate on national history, antiquities, and literature; hence its extent and value are little known in western Europe, where the achievements of Serbian and Croatian scholarship alike, as well as the general level of education, have been underrated. The first President of the Academy, Dr. Franjo Racki, set a high standard of historical criticism and also maintained Strossmayer's conception of the institution as a centre of Jugo-Slav and not merely Croatian culture. Strossmayer's liberal nationalist policy found further expression in his relations, always close and friendly, with the Orthodox Eastern Churches. He also encouraged the old Slav liturgy known as the Glagolitic rite, which survived in various parts of his diocese and of the neighbouring lands, and secured for it the sympathy and protection of Pope Leo XIII. Meanwhile, side by side with the educational movement and in marked contrast to it, a definitely political agitation was developing on narrow national, or rather confessional, lines. Since 1868, when the dual system in Austria-Hungary was completed by the assignment of Croatia-Slavonia to Hungary, Croatian discontent had been on the increase. Governed by Magyar officials with a definitely Magyarizing policy, the Croats found their economic development strangled by Hungary's commercial and agrarian jealousy, and their extremely sensitive pride irritated by perpetual attempts to impose on them the Magyar language. Cut off from Austria and in contact only with the Magyars, till the end of the nineteenth century they were anti-Hungarian, but not anti-dynastic. Their ambition was for the reconstruction of the old triple kingdom of Croatia, Dalmatia, and Slavonia as an autonomous federal unit of the Habsburg Empire.⁴³ Unfortunately the Party of Right under Starcevic, which formed the dominant element in the

42 He was deeply interested in historical studies, was the best Latinist in the Council, and spoke and wrote Avith facility in French, German, and Italian. The best English account of Strossmayer is to be found in Dr. Seton -Watson's *Southern Slav Question*, pp. 118 et seq. The bishop's correspondence with Gladstone is given in an appendix of the same book.

43 This conception was subsequently enlarged to include Bosnia-Herzegovina, Istria, Fiume, and the Slovene lands.

Opposition throughout the eighties, desired a State on a purely Catholic basis, and would have withheld religious equality from the large Orthodox element in Croatia. This attitude was maintained by the new Party of Pure Right under Dr. Frank, which on Starcevic's death in 1896 virtually superseded the older group (i.e. The Party of Right), and still more sedulously fostered the hostility between Serb and Croat. This antagonism stultified all constitutional agitation by driving the Serbs into the arms of the Government, which indeed was generally alleged to foster the feud. Till the opening of the twentieth century it exercised a disastrous influence on Croatian politics.

The Occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.—The occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina belongs rather to the history of Austrian foreign policy than to that of the Yugoslav movement. But in the event, the Bosnian question proved to be of crucial importance in its effect on Jugo-Slav sentiment both within the Dual Monarchy and outside it, and must therefore be briefly dealt with here. At the Congress of Berlin the Great Powers had acquiesced in the occupation of these provinces by Austria as a necessary police measure. It is in fact difficult to see what other course could have been followed. The disorders in the insurgent provinces could no longer be tolerated, while the inability of the Turks to suppress them and the atrocities which they committed afforded a more than adequate justification for the abrogation of their rule. Intervention had become an imperative necessity; and Austria, embarrassed by the influx of refugees over the Croatian border and apprehensive of trouble in Dalmatia, to which the rising threatened to spread, had the strongest interest in restoring and maintaining order.

In many important respects her mission was successful. Order was restored, security of life and property established, and the administration of justice reformed. Communications were developed and sanitary conditions radically improved. The Austro-Hungarian administration, however, aimed rather at order than progress, and failed to appreciate the distress prevalent among large masses of the population. It followed in fact a policy of conciliating the Mohammedan upper class at the expense of the Orthodox peasantry, and left the acute land question unsolved. The roads and railways, which were among the most obvious tokens of progress, were constructed at the expense of the province, and largely of the most poverty-stricken elements in it, often with vast outlay, and primarily with a view to Austro-Hungarian strategic advantage, while communications necessary to economic development were refused. Hungary viewed with bitter hostility the possible rivalry of Bosnia as an agricultural State; and the Austro-Hungarian Government followed its usual policy, so often disastrous in critical moments, of placating the Magyars at the expense of the other nationalities of the Monarchy. Education was withheld. 'For my mission', said Kallay, the first administrator, 'one gendarme is worth five teachers'; and the same spirit continued to prevail. The unfortunate result was that the Government failed on the whole to secure the co-operation of the inhabitants

in its best-conceived efforts to promote their welfare, such as the introduction of more scientific methods of agriculture. Discontent among the lower classes grew; and such progressive elements as there were realized that the conditions of the Dual Monarchy made a disinterested administration of the provinces impossible.⁴⁴

The Twentieth Century

The Slovenes. —At the opening of the new century the general situation of the Jugo-Slavs in the Dual Monarchy may be summed up as follows. All alike were dissatisfied with their position of inferiority. This feeling was least marked among the Slovenes, where, economic conditions being relatively favourable, discontent centred round the university question and that of education generally, the prominence of the German and Italian elements in the administration of the mixed districts, and the inadequacy of Slovene representation in the Reichsrat. It was specially acute in the neglected lands of Dalmatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, where distress among the masses was chronic. Bosnia-Herzegovina. —But in the latter region at least dissatisfaction was no longer merely economic. It had spread from the Bosnian peasantry to the more prosperous classes, among whom a national literary movement on a modest scale was beginning to develop. Bosnians of the upper class visited Serbia in ever-increasing numbers, and, as they despaired of progress under Austria-Hungary, saw no prospect of amendment except in union with Serbia, remote as such a solution then appeared.⁴⁵ Attachment to the Habsburg dynasty, which certainly existed in Dalmatia and probably among the Slovenes, had never developed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Croatia's dissatisfaction, as has been said, was anti-Magyar rather than anti-Austrian, The Serbs of South Hungary were no less hostile to the Magyars, and, partly owing to their geographical situation, partly to their Orthodox faith and long-established relations with Serbia, were keenly conscious of their racial identity with the inhabitants of the kingdom.

Czech and Serbian Influence. —The idea of the spiritual and intellectual unity of the Jugo-Slav race had never lost its vitality; owing to the authority of Stross-

44 The economic policy of the Government in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been severely criticized by impartial German-Austrian publicists of authority, such as Baernreither. It must be remembered that in England, owing to the general ignorance of Slav history and languages, the Slav problems of the Dual Monarchy have until very recent years been studied mainly from the official Austro-Hungarian point of view. Cf. *Bosnia and Herzegovina*, No. 12 of this series, pp. 21-24.

45 It had been formulated long before by Strossmayer. When the question of occupation by Austria was first under discussion (1876) he urged in a letter to Gladstone that Bosnia should be placed under Serbian protection. Finally he acquiesced in Austrian rule as a necessity, but with the comment, 'If Vienna, or rather Pest, means to govern the new provinces by Hungarians and Germans and for their profit, the Austrians will end by being more hated than the Turks'.

mayer's name it had gained currency among the Slovenes. An important factor in the development of the political idea was the influence of Professor Masaryk,⁴⁶ exerted directly on the Slovenes (who had many relations with the Czechs) and indirectly, as will be seen, on the Croats. But there was as yet no movement for political cooperation by the separate Jugo-Slav units within the Dual Monarchy, and no political influence from without. From this time onwards, however, events outside Austria-Hungary exercised a decisive influence. The first of these was the accession of King Peter to the throne of Serbia in 1903. During the reign of his predecessor, who governed by autocratic methods and pursued a policy wholly subservient to Austria, there was little but racial sentiment to attract the sympathies of the Jugo-Slav subjects of the Habsburg Empire to Belgrade. The high personal character of the new sovereign⁴⁷ and his consistently constitutional government gave the kingdom a new status in the eyes of sympathizers beyond its borders, and quickened their Serbian sentiments. Hungarian Serbs, though refused passports, found means to evade control, and thronged to attend King Peter's coronation. From 1904 onwards various literary and artistic societies, Slovene, Croatian, Serbian, and Bulgarian, held annual meetings in Ljubljana, Zagreb, Belgrade, and Sofia; intellectual intercourse was active, and the ideas which found their first expression in the Balkan League began to take shape. Most important of all was the revival of confidence and energy in Serbia itself. A wise domestic policy promoted economic development and fostered education of every grade, especially encouraging Serbian students to complete their university education abroad. As prosperity grew and culture spread, the Serbs of the kingdom came more and more to regard themselves as the truest representatives of their race; and as the position of Turkey appeared increasingly insecure, they looked on the emancipation of Bosnia-Herzegovina alike from Turkey and from Austria and its union with the kingdom as certain, if not imminent.

Serbo-Croat Rapprochement in Croatia.—Meantime in Croatia the animosity between Serbs and Croats was dying out. This was partly due to the influence of Dr. Masaryk, whose liberal views and practical policy had for the last few years exercised considerable influence in Croatia,⁴⁸ partly to the perception that union was necessary if the Magyarizing policy of the Hungarian Government was to be resisted. Moreover, the resignation in 1903 of the Ban Count Khuen-Hedervary removed a peculiarly repressive and demoralizing influence from Croatian poli-

46 First President of the new Czecho-Slovak State

47 There is no evidence to connect the Karageorgevic family with the assassination of Alexander.

48 Dr. Masaryk's ideas were first diffused by a group of Croatian students who, having taken part in political disturbances in Croatia in 1895, were obliged to complete their studies at the Czech University of Prague.

tics. In Dalmatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, owing to the miserable economic conditions prevalent, discontent with Austrian rule was growing ever more intense; these provinces seemed to impartial foreign observers to be ripe for revolt.

Resolution of Fiume and Zara.—The proposal for joint political action by the Croats and Serbs of Austria-Hungary came first from the Croat party in Dalmatia. On October 2, 1905, a Conference took place at Fiume between the leaders of the party and the Croat deputies of Croatia-Slavonia, resulting in a resolution demanding reunion of their lands, and setting forth the principle that 'every nation has the right to decide freely and independently concerning its existence and its fate'. A fortnight later the Serb deputies of Dalmatia met at Zara and formulated another resolution, confirming that of Fiume on condition that the principle of equality between Serb and Croat received recognition. Finally, in a Conference at Zara on November 18, 1905, the representatives of both parties made a joint declaration that 'the Croats and the Serbs are one nation', and drew up a petition to the Imperial and Royal Government for the incorporation of Dalmatia with Croatia-Slavonia and for equality of treatment in all matters regarding Serbs and Croats. The Resolutions of Fiume and Zara are landmarks in the history of the Jugo-Slav movement. But their spirit was, as regards the political organization of the Habsburg Monarchy, confined within strict constitutional limits. The reunion of Dalmatia with the rest of the Triune Kingdom had been guaranteed by imperial charter. The aim of the Croat leaders and their Serb colleagues was to achieve this union within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

Relations of Serbia with the Monarchy—The change of temper thus manifested was unwelcome to the Hungarian Government, and simultaneously the Dual Monarchy found itself in conflict with a new and independent spirit in the kingdom of Serbia. The Austro-Hungarian Government succeeded in preventing the formation of a customs-union between Serbia and Bulgaria; but when it endeavoured by economic pressure to oblige 'Serbia to place a munitions contract in Austria-Hungary instead of France, it failed, and the famous 'pig-war' merely embittered Serbian feeling and raised the price of meat in the Monarchy. It was plain that the control which Austria had so long exercised in Serbia was at an end.

Annexation of Bosnia- Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary. —At this critical juncture Baron (later Count) Aehrenthal succeeded Count Goluchowski as Minister for Foreign Affairs (1906). The precise motives which dictated his forward policy in the Balkans and its- full scope are possibly not yet known. To the best-informed observers of the time it appeared that he was actuated largely by the desire to shake himself free from the domination of Germany, and that by the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina he hoped to secure for Austria-Hungary such a position in the Balkans as would give her a leading, perhaps the decisive, role in European politics. But uneasiness caused by the knowledge that Serbia could no longer be coerced probably contributed to his decision. Moreover, a certain amount of secret

agitation was undoubtedly going on in Croatia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina on the one side, and Serbia on the other, in favour of a union with the latter country, though this movement was futile in character and the Serbian Government was in no way implicated in it.⁴⁹ Much could be urged from the Austrian point of view in defence of the annexation. No one could foretell what would be the ultimate consequences of the Turkish revolution for the nationalities under Ottoman sway. An awkward situation threatened to develop immediately, as the Mohammedans of Bosnia, still nominally under Turkish suzerainty, were certain to demand representation in the new Turkish Parliament. Serbia's ambitions were fully awake; and Austria could not contemplate with equanimity even the remote possibility that an independent Slav State with a warlike population might establish itself on such a vital frontier as that of Croatia-Slavonia, where, moreover, it would be in contact with a subject population of its own race, highly discontented with Austria-Hungary sway. Whether even at this eleventh hour a liberal economic policy would have won the attachment of the annexed provinces, and a solution of the Croatian and Dalmatian question on Trialist⁵⁰ lines would have convinced the Jugo-Slavs of the Monarchy that their future would be best assured under Habsburg sway, it is now idle to speculate. For such a course Austria's traditions had not prepared her. The policy of repression in Croatia was intensified. The Serbo-Croat Coalition was inconvenient alike to the Hungarian Government and to Baron Aehrenthal; and, when at the election of 1908 it was found to have ousted every 'Unionist' (i.e. every deputy in favour of maintaining the union with Hungary), the Diet was suspended, and did not meet till 1910.

The Agram and Friedjung Trials. —But it was important to Aehrenthal permanently to discredit the Coalition; and to this motive, as well as to the desire to convince European opinion that Serbia was promoting a revolutionary movement in Austria-Hungary and thus to justify the annexation, must be ascribed the proceedings known as the Agram Treason Trial. Fifty-three Serbs resident in Croatia were indicted by the Public Prosecutor on a charge of conspiracy against the Habsburg Monarchy and of treasonable relations with a revolutionary organization at Belgrade, and thirty-one of them were convicted and sentenced to terms of imprisonment varying from twelve to five years. The trial was a travesty of justice, and the general outcry induced the Government to publish through the historian, Dr. Friedjung (who acted in good faith and was himself deluded), some of the secret documents on which the verdict was professedly based, and which purported to prove the complicity of the Serbian Government in the agitation.

49 This was established by the issue of the Friedjung trial; see *infra*, p. 19.

50 Trialism is the name given to the policy which aimed at the erection of Croatia-Slavonia-Dalmatia as a third autonomous State under the Habsburg Crown and in all respects on an equal footing with Austria and Hungary.

In a further that of an action for libel brought against Dr. Friedjung, these documents were shown to be forgeries, produced in the Austro-Hungarian Legation at Belgrade.⁵¹ The complicity of Count Forgach, the Austro-Hungarian Minister in that city, was established, and that of Aehrenthal himself must be presumed. Neither of these functionaries, however, was called to account. Aehrenthal remained at the Foreign Office and was raised to the rank of Count; Forgach ultimately became Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and as such took a leading part in drawing up the ultimatum to Serbia in July 1914 which was the immediate cause of the European War.

The Balkan Wars. —The irritation of Jugo-Slav sentiment throughout the Monarchy produced by these events led to a closer co-operation between the Serbo-Croats and Slovenes, and to a still further decline in the influence of the Clerical and Trialist Party of Pure Right under Dr. Frank. Public opinion was thus in a highly inflammable state; and the unexpected issue of the Balkan Wars was a spark to fire it. Serbia appeared no longer as an insignificant State at the mercy of its greater neighbour, but as a considerable military Power, victorious in turn against Turks and Bulgars, and with territory conterminous with that of Greece and Montenegro. Premonitory symptoms notwithstanding, the Austro-Hungarian Government was not prepared for the enthusiasm with which the Jugoslavs of the Empire greeted the Serbian successes. The outburst was startling, and was specially marked amongst the Slovenes, whose Serbian sympathies have ever since been strong⁵² and have inspired their markedly homogeneous policy throughout the war.

The Ultimatum to Serbia. —In these circumstances the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand at Sarajevo in June 1914 was calculated to bring matters to a head. The Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, whose terms were so framed as to make war inevitable, was presented on July 23, 1914, and was followed within a week by a declaration of war. Events subsequent to the Outbreak of the European War Austria-Hungary's Treatment of Jugo-Slav Sub-

51 Incidentally, the issue of the Friedjung trial cast the gravest suspicion on the evidence produced at the 'Bomb Trial' of Cetinje earlier in the same year. The accused were in this case alleged to have conspired against the lives of the King of Montenegro and his second son, and to have had in their design the support of highly placed Serbians who regarded the existence of the Montenegrin dynasty as a bar to the realization of 'Greater Serbian' designs. The case for the Crown rested on the evidence of the informer Nastic, who in the course of the Friedjung trial was shown to be in the pay of the Austrian police and to be a person of (to say the least) doubtful veracity. None the less, Austrian writers of repute have continued to use the Cetinje trial as conclusive proof of the complicity of the Serbian Government in treasonable designs, or, at least, of its connivance. So, e. g. Sosnosky, *Die Balkanpolitik Oesterreich-Ungarns seit 1866*, ii, p. 193 (published 1914).

52 'Why do you call us Jugo-Slavs?' said a considerable contingent of Slovenes to the Serbs who were assisting to enrol the Jugo-Slav regiments in Russia. 'Call us Serbs; we prefer it.'

jects In the earlier stages of the war, evidence as to the feeling of Jugo-Slavs in Austria-Hungary and their treatment by the Government was difficult to obtain. However, some amount of information as to internal conditions reached Italy during the period of Italian neutrality, chiefly through the medium of escaped prisoners, and some could also be gleaned from the press in Austria and Hungary. Both sources indicated that the Government was pursuing a policy of repression in its most extreme form, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina. A very large proportion of the educated Jugo-Slavs were imprisoned or interned;⁵³ a severe press censorship was established; the Provincial Diets in Austria in which the Jugo-Slavs were represented were suspended; and, though the Croatian Diet continued to subsist, any free expression of opinion would have laid its members open to the charge of high treason. Decrees passed on October 7 and 13, 1914, deprived of citizenship all subjects of the Monarchy then abroad and suspected of working against its interests. The property of all such persons was confiscated, and their families were deported. On December 8, 1914, the semi-official *Bosnische Post* announced that the same measures were to be taken against all absent Bosniaks, whether suspect or not. Between February 20 and March 23, 1915, the *Bosnische Post* recorded the expulsion from Bosnia of 5,260 families who were removed in a destitute condition to Serbia or Montenegro. The Orthodox clergy were the object of severe persecutions. A decree of the Government of Croatia suspended all the Orthodox parish priests of Slavonia and Sylvania, while it is stated that in Bosnia scarcely an Orthodox priest was left at liberty, and large numbers were hanged. From all sus]pected regions hostages were taken, and executed in the event of anti-Government action in their localities. Trials for treason were numerous.⁵⁴ The information available points to the conclusion that the Government from the first believed disaffection to be general in the Jugo-Slav population.

In 1917 the reopening of the Reichsrat in May and the amnesty granted to political prisoners in July restored some measure of free speech. The proceedings of

53 The Jugo-Slav estimate of 10,000 in round numbers does not appear to be exaggerated. Dr. Tresic-Paviscic, deputy to the Reichsrat for the Dalmatian islands, was imprisoned on the outbreak of the war. When three months later he appeared for the first time before a judge, the latter told him that 5,000 persons had been arrested in Dalmatia, Istria, and Carinthia alone.

54 In June 1916, a Jugo-Slav authority stated that since the outbreak of the war the death-sentence had been passed on over 4,000 civilians in Austria. It was known from official sources that the number of hangmen in the Dual Monarchy had been increased from two to ten. In October 1916 two Magyar papers published the fact that in Vienna the hangman's assistant, sentenced to ten days' imprisonment for being drunk and disorderly, obtained the remission of his sentence on the ground that his services could not be spared for so long a period.

the Government in Dalmatia and Bosnia and the condition of the Jugo-Slav prison camps were denounced in the Reichsrat (October 19, 1917) by Dr. Tresic-Pavicic, deputy for the Dalmatian islands, who had himself been arrested on the outbreak of the war and released only under the terms of the amnesty. The charges were horrifying, and it is not surprising that the speech was suppressed in the Austrian and Hungarian newspapers. At Zagreb the first half was printed, evidently with the connivance of the local authority; and the effect of the statements on public opinion was profound. While the circumstances were obviously not favourable to the compilation of exact statistics, much information was made available by the release of the political prisoners, whose numbers were great. The high character of the Dalmatian deputy and the fact that the Government made no reply to his speech after its partial publication at Zagreb were taken to support the substantial accuracy of the charges. They include that of wholesale massacres of the Serb population in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and give a considerable amount of detail.⁵⁵ In prison camps the alleged rates of mortality were no less startling: 8,000 were stated to have died at Doboï in Bosnia, where a camp had been formed in December 1915, and between 3,000 and 4,000 at Arad in Hungary, while over 8,000 Croats, deported chiefly from Istria, perished in Styria alone. To the members of the Reichsrat Dr. Tresic's statements were known in full; and they intensified the already apparent determination of the Jugo-Slavs to secure their separation from the Habsburg Empire.

Jugo-Slav Agitation within the Dual Monarchy The Jugo-Slav Parliamentary Club.—On the reopening of the Reichsrat in May 1917, the Jugo-Slav deputies, by forming themselves into a single Parliamentary Club had already taken a decided line. Owing to various causes their 37 representatives were reduced to 31.⁵⁶ Of these, 29 united in the Jugo-Slav Club under the presidency of Mgr. Korosec (Slovene); two (Dr. Sustersic, a Landeshauptmann of Carinthia, and M. Jaklic) were favourable to the government at Vienna. On May 30 the Jugo-Slav Club put forward in the Reichsrat a demand that all the provinces of the Monarchy inhabited by Slovenes, Croats, or Serbs, should be united under the Habsburg Crown in a single autonomous and democratic State, free from all foreign domination. The reference

55 General Potiorek, the Military Governor of Bosnia, is stated to have signed 3,500 death-warrants with his own hand; but hundreds perished by summary execution without this formality, or were shot down by the soldiers. The victims included women and children; and the proceedings were marked by traits of a savagery comparable to that of the Germans in Belgium. An abstract of the published portion of the speech may be read in the Southern Slav Bulletin of December 18, 1917.

56 Six representatives had been imprisoned on the outbreak of the war. These were now released and permitted to take their seats. One of these was subsequently disqualified, being condemned for high treason; of the other members, one had fled the country in 1915, and four died within a short time of the opening of the Reichsrat.

to the Habsburg Crown was dictated merely by prudential motives, as was recognized alike by the Jugo-Slav and the German-Austrian press. The Zagreb paper, *Hrvatska Drzava*, immediately stated that, owing to the reference to the Monarchy, the demand of the Jugo-Slav Club could be regarded only as a minimum and provisional programme. All subsequent official pronouncements of the Jugo-Slavs⁵⁷ reiterated the demand for a national and independent State, without qualification.

The Slovenes. —The prominent part played by the Slovenes deserves remark, as also the fact that the chief promoters of the Jugo-Slav movement among them are distinguished churchmen.

Among the most notable personalities in the Reichsrat were the late Mgr. Krek and Mgr. Korosec⁵⁸ and outside it the Prince-Bishop of Ljubljana (Laibach) and the Bishops of Trieste and Veglia. The pro-Serbian sympathies of the Slovenes before the European War have been mentioned above. The German-Austrian press noted in 1917 that in Slovene lands the Jugo-Slav propaganda 'has penetrated to every peasant's hut'. In the same year Slovene women collected from their own sex 200,000 signatures to a petition for incorporation in a Jugo-Slav State which should include all Jugo-Slavs. As the total Slovene population before the war was under 1,500,000, the figure is high. The Slovenes alone among the Austrian Jugo-Slavs were able to carry on a definite agitation, the repressive measures of the Government in Istria and Dalmatia rendering concerted action impossible until a very late stage of the war.

Croatia.—Conditions under Hungarian rule were no less unfavourable to the free expression of opinion than those obtaining in Austria. On the outbreak of the war an overwhelming proportion of the educated class was imprisoned or interned, including, in spite of their parliamentary immunity, members of the Croatian Diet. In a large proportion of cases no evidence was forthcoming against the persons arrested; and under the pressure of public opinion from 1915 onwards many of them were successively released. According to information received, they immediately began to organize a secret revolutionary society, somewhat on the lines of the Carbonari, each member being known to only two of his fellows, and to work through it for the Jugo-Slav cause. The organization is alleged not merely to have completely captured civilian opinion, but to have acquired over the army a hold which contributed largely to the formation of the volunteer regiments in Russia and determined the course of events on the Italian front in the later stages of the war.

57 e. g. Korosec's telegram of protest in the name of the Jugo-Slav Club to the Conference of Brest-Litovsk, January 31, 1918, and the resolutions passed by a gathering of Slovene, Croat, and Serb representatives from both Austria and Hungary in March 1918, which expressly demanded union with the Jugo-Slavs outside the Monarchy.

58 After-wards President of the National Council which on the fall of the Habsburg Monarchy assumed the direction of affairs at Zagreb, and Vice-President in the first Ministry of the United Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs.

The Diet naturally maintained an attitude of reserve. On the whole it confined itself to demanding separation from Hungary, but it abstained from any specific declaration of loyalty. Individual members frequently insisted on the racial unity of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs. In October 1918 the greatly diminished Frank party joined the National Council, the two or three irreconcilables who remained withdrawing from political life. Thus the only political opposition in Croatia to union with the Jugo-Slavs outside the Monarchy disappeared. The national sympathies of Croatian officials were noteworthy and were the subject of complaint in the German Austrian press. The Mayor of Zagreb and eight town councillors attended, on May 16, 1918, a Czech demonstration, which openly demanded complete independence for Bohemia. The censorship has frequently been evaded at Zagreb, as in the case of the speech of Tresic-Pavicic, alluded to above. Great demonstrations attended the tour through Croatia of Count Louis Voinovic, a distinguished Dalmatian author who was arrested on the outbreak of the war, and released late in 1917. At meetings organized in his honour throughout Croatia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia, Jugo-Slav unity and independence of the Habsburgs were openly demanded.

Bosnia-Herzegovina.—Reference has already been made to the severity of the repressive measures taken in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It may be added that desertions to the enemy from Bosnian regiments were specially frequent and were often due to concerted action. The first Bosnian regiment twice passed over en bloc to the enemy and was twice reconstituted. Finally, at Jassy, it went over to the Russians with its Mohammedan Serb colonel at its head.

The Jugo-Slav Volunteers. —A large number of Jugo-Slavs who had fought perforce in the Austrian army and surrendered to the Russians or been captured by them were anxious to join the ranks of the Entente, and in 1915 a Jugo-Slav Committee was formed at Odessa to organize and equip them. It worked under difficulties, for the prisoners were scattered over remote and widely separated camps—a circumstance which increased the difficulty of communication and transport. Nevertheless, between November 1915 and July 1917 volunteers were enrolled to the number of 46,581, of whom the largest proportion was furnished by Bosnia-Herzegovina. The corps saw much service and suffered heavily in proportion to its numbers.

Jugo-Slav Activity outside the Dual Monarchy The Jugo-Slav Committee.—The Jugo-Slav leaders who had escaped from Austria-Hungary in the early stages of the European War had formed themselves into a committee to represent their national interests, and stood for the union of all Jugo-Slavs in a free and independent State. They gradually established 'communications with the majority of the deputies in the several Diets and in the Reichsrat, and had the unanimous support of the considerable Jugo-Slav colonies in America,⁵⁹ Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. In 1915 and 1916, however, the President of the Committee, Dr. Ante

⁵⁹ The Jugo-Slavs in America number about 1,500,000.

Trumbic, a Croat deputy of Dalmatia,⁶⁰ and the other members of the Committee in London were unwilling to break with Russia; and the same attitude was maintained by the Crown Prince of Serbia, who was naturally believed to incline to the ‘ Greater Serbia ‘ solution. The Pact of Corfu.—But on the fall of the autocracy in Russia, closer co-operation between the two JugoSlav sections at once began ; and a most important step towards the union of the peoples was taken when the Pact of Corfu was signed on July 20, 1917, by M. Pasic for the Serbian Government and by Dr. Trumbic. This agreement⁶¹ provided for the union of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in a single free and independent kingdom, on a constitutional and democratic basis, under the Karageorgevic dynasty. Local autonomy, the free exercise of religions, and the maintenance of the two alphabets were guaranteed. The terms of the Pact and the favour with which it was accepted by the majority of the Entente peoples produced an immediate effect on opinion in Croatia. In the first week of August Radic, the peasant leader in the Diet, openly asserted the desire of the Jugoslavs of the Dual Monarchy to be freed from Habsburg dominion and united to Serbia. From this date onwards popular manifestations became frequent.

The Italo-Jugo-Slav Agreement. —The apprehensions of the Jugo-Slavs respecting the supposed designs of Italy had not been removed; and the failure of the Italian Government to accept the Pact of Corfu had increased the tension between the two nations. Italian opinion had been apt to regard Jugo-Slav nationalism as nothing but a Habsburg manoeuvre; and the fear of Italy’s hostility and the extent of her ambitions had made Croats and Slovenes hesitate wholly to renounce the possibility of using Habsburg support against apprehended aggression. The openly anti-Habsburg agitation now pursued by the Jugo-Slav Club under Mgr. Korosec and the popular movement in Croatia and among the Slovenes did much to convince instructed Italian opinion that Italian and Jugo-Slav interests in the Adriatic, far from being irreconcilable, were in the main identical. Pourparlers initiated early in 1918 by Signor Orlando and Dr. Trumbic resulted in an agreement known as the Pact of Rome, signed by Signor Torre representing a large parliamentary committee and by Dr. Trumbic, and adopted as a resolution at the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities held in Rome in April of that year. This document⁶² declared that the unity and independence of the Jugo-Slav nation were of vital interest to Italy, as was the completion of Italian national unity to the Jugo-Slavs; and that the liberation of the Adriatic and its defence against every present and future enemy were of equal importance to both peoples. It pledged both nations to solve territorial controversies according to the principles of nationality and of the

60 Afterwards Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

61 For complete text see Appendix, p. 35.

62 For text see Appendix, p. 39.

right of peoples to decide their own fate, and to guarantee the language, culture, and moral and economic interests of such racial groups of one people as might be included within the frontiers of the other. The effects of the agreement, whose principles were accepted by Signor Orlando, were far-reaching, and most beneficial to the Allied cause. Jugo-Slav suspicions were removed; the last hesitations of Croatia disappeared; and, most important of all, according to well-informed sources, the revolutionary movement now spread with the utmost rapidity in the Austro-Hungarian army and navy, with the result that the march of events on the Italian front was hastened and the triumph of Italian arms in the following October greatly facilitated.

The National Council of Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes. — On the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, a National Council was formed,⁶³ composed of Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes, under the presidency of Mgr. Korosec. This body represented the interests of all the Jugo-Slavs of the Monarchy and was charged with their government until a Constituent Assembly should determine the permanent form of the future State.

The Geneva Conference. — On November 6, 1918, the Serbian Premier, M. Pasic, representing the Serbian Government, and Mgr. Korosec, representing the National Council, together with other representatives from the Serbian Skupstina and the National Council and delegates from the Jugo-Slav Committee in London, met in conference at Geneva. The most important matters dealt with were, firstly, the recognition of the National Council in Zagreb (Agram) as the Government of the Serbs, Slovenes, and Croats of the late Dual Monarchy, which was at once accorded by M. Pasic, representing the kingdom of Serbia; and secondly, the formation of a joint ministry for the kingdom of Serbia and the territories subject to the authority of the National Council in Zagreb. This ministry was to organize the common state of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes pending the enactment of the Constitution by a Constituent Assembly.⁶⁴ On November 23 the Jugoslav National Council in Zagreb passed a resolution transferring the Regency of the United Serbo-Croat-Slovene State to the Prince Regent of Serbia.⁶⁵

The New State Population. — The Southern Slav country — the new 'Jugo-Slavia,' as defined by the Jugo-Slav leaders — extends from Southern Styria and Carinthia to the Monastir region of Macedonia; and the area, will be seen to be fairly equally divided between Austro-Hungarian territory on one side and that of the kingdoms of Serbia and of Montenegro on the other. The Jugo-Slav population

63 Announced in *The Times*, October 29, 1918.

64 For the text of the arrangement arrived at see Appendix, p. 41.

65 For the text, see Appendix, p. 43.

of Austria-Hungary numbers approximately 7,000,000.⁶⁶ The population of the Serbian kingdom and Montenegro, as included within the limits laid down by the Treaty of Bucarest, amounted, before the war, to about 5,000,000. This would give a total Jugo-Slav population approaching 11,000,000; but owing to the mortality caused directly and indirectly by the war the actual figure must be considerably lower. From the standpoint of general European interests, it may be fairly urged that any Jugo-Slav State constituted should be of sufficient size and population to form an effective obstacle to possible German designs on the Adriatic—the ports of which are among the strongest potential seats of maritime power in the Mediterranean—in one direction, and to German control of the highway to Constantinople in the other. A considerable part of this Jugo-Slav region, at present sparsely populated, would, if fair economic conditions prevailed, become one of the main lines of European traffic, and experience a rapid development in wealth and population.

The Economic Liberation of the Jugo-Slav Lands.—Not the least important part of the liberation of the Jugo-Slav peoples of Austria-Hungary is in fact their emancipation from the economic disabilities under which they have hitherto lain. The main lines of railway construction have been laid down to suit the interests of the German, and still more of the Magyar element in the Monarchy. Railways designed to connect Croatia and Dalmatia were left uncompleted owing to the political and economic jealousy of the Magyars. Such is the case with the Lika line, projected to run from Ogulin to Knin in Dalmatia.⁶⁷ So too the Hungarian Government left incomplete the lines planned to connect Karlovac (Karlstadt) with Ljubljana (Laibach) and Croatia's natural markets in the Slovene lands, and to give Zagreb (Agram) a better connexion with Graz and Vienna, though the Austrian sections of both were carried up to the frontier. In Bosnia a section is still lacking to complete the line from Sarajevo to Spalato, which is of vital importance to the economic development of Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁶⁸ At present the only railway connexion is with the considerably more distant port of Gravosa.

Finally, the construction of a line of some 50 miles connecting Ljubljana directly with Gradisca would shorten by five hours the journey from Paris to Belgrade, via the Simplon and Milan, the route which will in future be the natural line of communication with the Near East for Great Britain, France, and North Italy.

Gorizia-Gradisca. —In Gorizia-Gradisca the Slovene population has a considerable majority over the Italian. It consists mainly of peasant proprietors, who are well organized economically, having many co-operative and credit associations.

⁶⁶ Of these some 500,000 or 600,000 inhabit certain districts of southern Hungary, viz. Baranya, Backa, and the western part of the Banat.

⁶⁷ Cf. Dalmatia, No. 11 in this series, p. 41.

⁶⁸ Unless some other port on the Adriatic less inconveniently situated than Gravosa be given railway connection with the backland.

The Italian peasantry are coloni on the estates of large landed proprietors, with a lower standard of living and a decidedly higher percentage of illiteracy than the Slovenes. Only in the town of Gorizia is there an Italian majority, and before the war the Slovene minority was rapidly increasing.

Trieste. —Trieste is the natural port not merely for the Slovene lands, but for what lies behind them— for Austria, and to a considerable extent, which the Peace Settlement may tend to increase, for Bohemia.⁶⁹ This Baron Sonnino recognized in 1881 when he wrote: 'Trieste is the most convenient port for the trade of the entire German region; its population, like every population in the neighbourhood of our eastern frontier, is mixed. To claim Trieste as a right would be an exaggeration of the principle of nationality.'⁷⁰ Nor had his view apparently changed when in April 1915 he formulated in a telegram to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna the conditions of Italy's continued neutrality. As one of these he demanded the complete autonomy and independence of Trieste and its establishment as a free port, with a modest strip of territory starting from Nabresina in the north and including the judicial districts of Capo d'Istria and Pirano in the south.⁷¹ The population of Trieste city in the strict sense shows an Italian majority (in round numbers 119,000 Italians to 57,000 Slovenes and 2,400 Serbo-Croats), but one that was rapidly diminishing, while the suburbs are Slav. The Italians are certainly the most cultivated element in the population and form the large majority of the professional class. In commerce, however, they do not show the same predominance. Of the Austrian mercantile marine registered at Trieste, more than 50 per cent, was in the hands of Jugo-Slavs (chiefly Dalmatian), and only about 30 per cent, in that of Italians. Italian banking institutions represented an aggregate capital of only about 9 million kronen, while the Jugo-Slav *Jadranska Banka* alone had a capital of 31 millions, and there were numerous other Jugo-Slav and two Czech banks. The sea-borne trade of Trieste was primarily with the Black Sea ports, Greece, and the Levant; the Jugo-Slav provinces of the Adriatic came second, Great Britain third, and Italy held only the fourth place. For its supply of labour Trieste depends on the surrounding Slav regions. In these circumstances even Italian men of business viewed the possibility of annexation to Italy with considerable apprehension. shortly before the armistice the Chamber of Commerce of Trieste declared itself in favour of the autonomy of Trieste within the Austrian Empire, while the racially mixed Socialist party, said to represent about a third of the town population, had a few weeks earlier voted for complete independence. In Istria apart from Trieste there are 223,000 Jugo-Slavs,

69 It is also possible, however, that Bohemian trade may gravitate rather to Fiume, as that route avoids the mountain ranges north of Trieste.

70 *Rassegna Settimanale*, May 29, 1881.

71 *Documenti Diplomatici*, xxxii, Article III. For the text of the articles concerning territories in which the Jugo-Slavs are interested, see Appendix, p. 44.

as against 147,000 Italians, who inhabit the western part of the peninsula and are chiefly to be found in the towns, but nowhere form an unmixed population.

Fiume. —Fiume, the natural outlet by sea for the trade both of Croatia and Hungary, has a mixed population in which the Italians according to the latest figures numbered 24,212, and the Serbo-Croats 13,351. It is impossible, however, to separate Fiume from its industrial suburb Susak across the river, whose population included 11,000 Serbo-Croats and 1,500 Italians. Dalmatia. —The total number of Italians in Dalmatia is, according to the latest census figures, 18,000 in round numbers, and according to the extreme and probably somewhat exaggerated Italian claims, 30,000. On either estimate they form a small percentage of the population of 635,000 which is otherwise Serbo-Croat. The Italians are confined to the towns and form a majority only in Zara. The closest relations of the new State will probably be with the Czechs. For twenty years the Jugo-Slavs of Austria proper have maintained with them an active intellectual intercourse. Czech finance has supported Slovene banks in Trieste. The acquisition of land in German Austria has been pursued by the Czechs as a deliberate policy, with the result that a chain of Czech settlements now reaches from Bohemia to the borders of Styria. It seems not improbable that the animosity formerly existing between Austrians and the Jugo-Slavs may disappear with the officials of the late administration, especially as the two populations are in contact only on the northern Slovene border.

2. DOCUMENT

The activities of New Europe, its role in the creation of new borders

The New Europe Vol. I. 19. October 1916. 11 January 1917. London, 1917. Thomas G. Masaryk: Pangermanism and the Eastern Question. (Central Europe —Berlin -Bagdad —World Power)

Alongside the Foreign Office, another group influenced the development of British foreign policy, the so-called “New Europe circle”. The position of this group can be summed up in one sentence. This was the goal of the second leader of the Czechoslovak emigration, Edvard Beneš, who formulated it in his book of 1916.

“New Europe Circle” published the bi-weekly foreign affairs magazine “New Europe”. It was widely read not only in Britain but also in France, Italy and the United States. Many of its contributors held official positions in government, with Headlam Morley, Lewis Namier, George Saunders and Alan Leeper working in the Foreign Office. In effect, the New Europe circle occupied the Foreign Office through them. Steed and Seton-Watson were in charge of the Austro-Hungarian section of Lord Northcliffe’s propaganda department in the enemy countries. It was largely thanks to their efforts that the Czechoslovak emigration was recognised as an allied nation by the Entente before the end of the war.

New Europe had no permanent staff of writers or reporters, although they were not needed, because Seton-Watson wrote most of the magazine under his own name, under the pseudonym “Rubicon”, and in unsigned articles. Whyte, Burrows and Steed were also very frequent contributors, and other important authors were Headlam Morley, who wrote on Germany, Alan Leeper, who wrote on Russian affairs under the pseudonym ‘Rurik’, Salvador de Madariaga, who wrote on Spain, John Mavrogordato, who wrote on Greece, Arnold Toynbee, who wrote on Turkey and the Middle East.

According to the New Europe articles, Austria-Hungary was the state that most frequently violated the principle of nationality in Europe, oppressing its nationalities, an outdated system dominated by aristocrats and soldiers, and should be abolished. This, according to the authors of the paper, is also in the British interest, since by destroying the Monarchy, the pan-Germanic plan devised by Berlin is prevented from being implemented. This ‘Pan-German’ plan is also dangerous for the British Empire, especially in India and other parts of the colonial empire.

In the first issue of New Europe, Seton-Watson explained to readers why the Hungarians were responsible for the war. Both he and Steed had long been convinced that if it had not been for the intransigence of the Hungarians in deal-

ing with other nationalities, the Monarchy could have been reformed and saved. But, according to them, the Hungarian is a nation of a few million, which in its megalomania wants to become a great power by absorbing nationalities. For the Hungarians, it was the dualist system that allowed them to pursue a violent policy of Magyarization.

Most British politicians accepted this diagnosis of a dualist state but believed that if small states were created in place of the Monarchy, they would not be able to stop German expansion. A good illustration of this position is that when Prime Minister Lloyd George, speaking at the Trade Union Congress on 5 January 1918, argued for the survival of the Monarchy. Despite this, articles in *New Europe* continued to call for the abolition of the Monarchy.

Source: *The New Europe* Vol. I. 19 October 1916. 11 January 1917. London, 1917

Thomas G. Masaryk: *Pangermanism and the Eastern Question (Central Europe -Berlin -Baghdad -World Power)*

**The New Europe
A Weekly Review
of Foreign Politics
VOL. I.**

19 October 1916—11 January 1917

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1917
The New Europe**

“THE NEW EUROPE” is a weekly paper devoted to the study of foreign politics and of the problems raised by this war. Its foremost aim is to further and consolidate that entente cordiale of allied publicists, which must accompany the wider political entente, if the Allies are to think and act in harmony, and to help towards the formation of a sane and well-informed body of public opinion upon all subjects affecting the future of Europe. Its highest ambition will be to provide a rallying ground for all those who see in European reconstruction, on a basis of nationality, the rights of minorities, and the hard facts of geography and economics, the sole guarantee against an early repetition of the horrors of the present war.

It will be our endeavour to unmask the great designs of German war policy, to provide the historical, racial and strategic background of problems too long neglected in our comfortable island, and to emphasize the need of a carefully thought-out counter-plan, as an essential condition to allied victory. After our armies have

won the war, our statesmen will have to win the peace, and their task will, indeed, be difficult, unless public opinion is alert, organised and eager to support them in a clearly defined and enlightened policy.

Our attitude, then, will be constructive rather than destructive; our methods will be frankly critical and vigilant, reading the meaning of history out of the brutal logic of facts. An “integral” victory such as alone can secure to Europe permanent peace and the reduction of armaments, the fulfilment of the solemn pledges assumed by our statesmen towards our smaller allies, the vindication of national rights and public law, the emancipation of the subject races of central and south-eastern Europe from German and Magyar control—such must be our answer to the Pangerman project of “Central Europe” and “Berlin-Bagdad.”

10th October 1916.

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Pangermanism and the Eastern Question

(CENTRAL EUROPE—BERLIN-BAGDAD—WORLD POWER)

I.

VERY often we read discussions about the importance of this or the other front; whether this is a war of the West or a war of the East or the South, and on which front the final decision is likely to be reached. The question is not quite clear; it may have a strategical meaning, and in that case it must be borne in mind that the importance of the respective fronts is liable to change in the course of the war. So far, however, as the political meaning is concerned, more is to be learnt from the Germans who started the war than from the Allies, who have hitherto been on the defensive. Now the Germans have stated clearly enough, both before and during hostilities, why they were looking forward to this war, and what they wish its result to be. The meaning of the present war is reflected in the voluminous political literature which propagates the Pangerman programme and the discussions which still centre round it.

Pangermanism means, in its original sense, the unification of the Germans in a Greater Germany ("*Grossdeutschland*"). The German national movement coincides with the kindred movements of the other nations of Europe in the late 18th century.

The various Austrian races, the Bohemians, Poles and South-Slavs, the Magyars, and Italians, began to feel strongly their nationality under the stress of Joseph II.'s policy of centralisation and Germanisation. In the Balkans we see the revival of the Serbs and Greeks, Italy becomes strongly national, and Russia also. In Germany the remarkable literary revival—Lessing, Herder, Schiller, Goethe, &c.—is at once the cause and the effect of German nationalism, which was soon strengthened by the war with France; Napoleon's attempt at a continental Empire aroused the opposition of all the nations. In Germany, Fichte, Arndt, Jahn and others became the spokesmen of the national feeling, which from that time grew and developed.

It was natural that the Germans, divided into many larger and smaller states, should proclaim the unity of the German nation, just as did the Italians and all other divided

nations. It was Herder who, in the name of the national principle, first proclaimed the nations as the natural organs of humanity, opposing thus the nation to the state, which to him was an artificial organisation. In fact, the formula of Herder is the expression of the modern national feeling and idea, which has developed since and with the Reformation, and from the 18th century became a strong political, social, and cultural force in general.

But the term "Pangermanism" was soon conceived in a wider sense, and the unification of all the Teutonic nations was spoken of, *i.e.*, also of the Scandinavians, Dutch, Anglo-Saxons; this programme stood as the ideal of a small part of the German intellectual class; it was not till late in the day that it attained practical importance, especially with regard to the question of German relations with Holland and the Flemings in Belgium.

The Germans, by their history, were confronted with the task of how to consolidate uniformly the various greater and smaller states of Germany; of the greatest importance were, of course, the relations between Austria and Prussia. Austria and Prussia were the greatest states; Austria was at the head of the German Empire, but Prussia was more German than Austria, and her policy was more national. The relations of Austria and Prussia were therefore of vital importance for the Pangerman politicians, and the attempt to regulate them lies at the root of the whole history of Germany from the 18th century up to 1870.

Next to that, from the national point of view, the question of German minorities in Russia and other neighbouring or more distant lands loomed large. Pangermanism did not limit itself to the demand for the unification of the Germans in the diaspora; its advocates soon began to demand the annexation of the neighbouring non-German lands and nations, which contained German minorities. In the first place, they proclaimed the political and economic conquest of the Slav nations, among which most of these German colonies were to be found. Thus, as time passed, the successes of the Pangerman programme, and especially the re-establishment of the German Empire under the leadership of Prussia, modified the original national programme into a political programme of the state. Pangermanism reached its highest point during the reign of the Emperor William II., growing into the political doctrine or German Imperialism, which proclaimed, in the first place, the need of economic and political union between Germany and Austria-Hungary, and of adding the Balkans and Turkey to this union. This plan is expressed in the watchword "Central Europe," which involves a further programme for the annexation of the Baltic and of some purely Russian provinces of Russia, and would thus provide an opportunity for reconstructing Poland under German leadership. Further, this plan enlarges Central Europe by taking in Holland and Belgium, Switzerland, and Scandinavia. The relations to be maintained between these countries and Germany are formulated in various ways by various Pangerman politicians. A kind of Customs Union is being demanded, but it is evident that, as a matter of fact, many Pangermans have in their mind also a political and military union, if not annexation pure and simple; and this applies especially to the lands in the immediate neighbourhood of Germany.

The essential point of the Pangerman "Central Europe" scheme, is of course the close union of Germany and Austria-Hungary; but this union once achieved, the Balkans and Turkey must be welcomed as intimate members of "Central Europe," which thus swells into an Union of Central Europe and the Near East. Berlin-Bagdad is merely the loudest watchword of this plan. It means that Germany, or rather Prussia, is determined to become an Asiatic power, like Russia, Britain and France. Pangermanism, at first the national plan of uniting all Germans, developed into the far-reaching scheme of a renewed German Empire, solving by its existence and organisation the old Oriental question.

II.

The earlier Pangermans proclaimed the consolidation of the German nation; their successors of today advocate the programme of world power. Especially since the renovation of the German Empire the Pangermans adduce so-called historical rights. The German Empire, they say, can claim the territories of the old Germano-Roman Empire, i.e., not only the Bohemian lands and Austria in general, but also Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, and parts of Italy and France.

But the Pangermans also demand the annexation of non-German territories on grounds of "Real-Politik." Germany, they argue, needs colonies, needs a hinterland. They point to the growth of population, to the great number of emigrants, which weakens the German nation; they adduce the fact that Germany, who in 1871 had only 41,000,000 inhabitants, now has 68,000,000. Anxiety concerning their daily bread forces them to extend their frontiers; Germany requires more land to cultivate, and must therefore simply take it. Hence the demands for the annexation of the sparsely populated Russian territory even as far as Odessa, for the annexation of Holland and her colonies, the necessity of possessing Antwerp, &c. "Need recognises no commandments" say not only Bethmann-Hollweg, but the other Prussian professors as well. Oversea colonies have been demanded by German politicians ever since the war against Napoleon. Lagarde pled for a German colonial policy as early as 1848, and though on many points he disapproved of Bismarck, yet he welcomed the Chancellor's inauguration of a colonial policy (1884). It is well known that Treitschke conceived German history as the history of a great colonisation.

Geography also strengthens these "real-political" arguments: Germany must have better "natural" frontiers, especially against Russia; the nature of the soil forces Germany to covet the frontier territories of Russia. On similar grounds the German geographers try to prove that Austria is a natural geographical unit; history as well as politics, according to the lore of these students and politicians, is based upon geography, geology, etc. ("Geo-politics").

The votaries of Pangermanism appeal to German inclination for war: war is positively adored, and with that goes the worship of militarism. They tell us that Germans and

Teutons are naturally gifted with the necessary constructive statesmanlike ability; in the Slavs this ability, according to them, is lacking, therefore the Slav states were founded, and subsequently annexed, by the Germans. But not only the Slavs, the French and other nations also were—according to these theorists—formed by the Germans, just as even Christ Himself was of German origin. In a word, the whole world is and must be German. Pangermans do not disguise the lust of power and the greed of imperialism; they proclaim German aristocratism, social, political, cultural, racial, and linguistic, and carry it mercilessly to its extreme logical results—*Imperare, Regnare*, over all the nations and lands.

This Pangerman relapse into the law of brute force was facilitated by various scientific theories. Darwinism, for instance, was utilised to argue the rights of big and powerful nations; while Nietzsche's Darwinistic "Uebermensch" (superman) and "Herrenvolk" (ruling race) were especially accepted in a Pangerman sense. The will to power was proclaimed as the will to "World-Power." Marxist historical materialism also strengthened Pangermanism, by its demand for large economic territories, and by its materialistic and purely economic conception of politics. In this war the German Socialists have accepted the Pangerman ideal.

The Pangermans became intoxicated by the successes at Germany in science, industry and finances, art and literature (take, for instance, the importance of Wagnerism), philosophy and culture in general. The superiority of German culture, became an excuse, and even a justification, for dominating less educated nations—in short, for ruling the whole world.

Beside these inducements to world-power, the Pangermans were admittedly stimulated by England's example. It was England that inspired the building of a great navy; it was England's industry and commerce which incited them to competition in the world's market; it was the British Empire which roused Germany's envy and political emulation. The example of Russia, her colonisation in the East and her progressive expansion in Asia also influenced the political imagination of the Pangermans.

In France and England the folly of regarding the Pangerman movement as Utopian is only now becoming clear. The Utopia of yesterday often happens to be the reality of to-day. In every political plan which considers the distant future there is a Utopian element; but Pangerman political literature has been evolved in close connection with German history, science, and philosophy, while modern German philosophy since the 18th century is in the main historical—a philosophical interpretation of the national development. From Herder, Fichte, Schilling, Hegel to Lagarde, Hartmann, Nietzsche, German philosophy is the philosophy of history. Kant alone is not historical. The nature of German philosophy will be understood if we remember that German science and German history are either Pangerman or lead up to Pangermanism. In fact, the leaders of Pangermanism build their theories upon German philosophy, history, and economics, and employ all the sciences which deal with men and society. Commercial geography, political economy, and statistics, each contributed its quota. The Germans studied very

attentively the growth of their population; and the fact that it had almost doubled since the foundation of the Empire, induced not only theorists, but also statesmen to do some hard thinking, and to face facts. The systematic promotion of industry and commerce, colonial policy, the Morocco and Kiaou-Chau designs, the building of a strong navy, social legislation and social reforms, the agitation for a Customs Union of Central Europe, and a very careful scientific comparative study of other nations in all these questions (take, for instance, the historical studies of Mesopotamia, the interest shown in old Babylonia), these are the serious foundations of the Pangerman platform, German chemistry is thoroughly national, even Pangerman, and the chemical industry has been systematically developed. Even biology sewed direct national needs, through the study of the all-important food problem, which was treated not only as a social but also as a scientific question; while German agriculture was conducted on a purely scientific basis. In short, the Germans applied science to every department of practical life.

That German policy, in following the Pangerman scheme, was not in the least Utopian, has been amply demonstrated in the Balkans and in Turkey. A Hohenzollern was enthroned in Roumania, an Austrian vassal in Bulgaria, and German princesses went to Greece and Montenegro! List, the well-known economist, was one of the first to speak of a Central-European Customs Union—the earlier Zollvereins showing the political effectiveness of such an economic policy. List, who directed Germany to the Far East, and Moltke, are proclaimed by the Germans as the first and weightiest authorities for Berlin-Bagdad. One of the earlier propagandists of a Customs Union under the leadership of Germany, Paul Dehn, directed Germany to the East and South-East and preached the economic union not only of Germany and Austria, of the Balkans and Turkey, but also of Switzerland, Belgium and Holland. Dehn speaks of “Weltwirtschaftspolitik” and “Welpolitik,” these ideas becoming the stock ideas of Pangerman policy.

William II. officially inaugurated the Pangerman imperialistic world-policy, Very soon one of his ministers, Bronsart Von Schellenhof (Minister of War 1883–89), voiced the Pangerman scheme of Central Europe; the Kaiser himself rejoiced over Germany as a “Weltreich.” William II, was not only a pupil of Lagarden, but at the later Pangerman philosophers and historians, notably of Houston Chamberlain; he himself went to Constantinople and to Asia Minor in order to strengthen the German financial and economic penetration of the Orient. Pangerman Central Europe was practically extended to Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf, and the Union of Germany and Austria-Hungary was augmented by Turkey, these three states forming the real Triple Alliance long before the Dreibund was broken off. Berlin-Bagdad became under William II. the general watchword. The Germans took up the previous plans for opening up Mesopotamia by means of a railroad; English engineers had already formed such a plan in 1875, the French and Russians followed. The Germans joined in and soon acquired concessions for building railroads (the line Haidar Pasha-Angora is German). Within a year of William II.’s visit to the Sultan in 1898 the line to Bagdad was approved and the aid of the Deutsche Bank and other financial institutions secured. My present object is not,

however, to tell the story of German penetration in Asia Minor, but simply to show that the Pangerman plan is anything but Utopian.

Even long before the war Pangerman imperialism dominated not only intellectual circles, but also wider classes of the population of Germany and Austria-Hungary, and supplied them with their political education. It is simply not true that only a few people participated and cooperated in Pangerman propaganda. The number of such writers is very great; Pangerman books and pamphlets had and still have today a very large circulation and run through many editions. The Pangerman plan of "Berlin-Bagdad" has been upheld by men like Moltke, List, Rodbertus, W. Roscher, Lassalle, Lagarde, C. Frantz, Windhorst, &c. Pangerman ideas were propagated by energetic societies and clubs, notably the Allgemaine deutsche Verband (Pangerman League), 1890, Mitteleuropaeischer Wirtschaftsverein (Central European Economic Union), 1904, and Vorderasien-Komitee (Asia Minor Committee), 1911; the latter was founded by Hugo Grothe, and among its Trustees are to be found such names as Ballin, von der Goltz Pasha, Karl Lamprecht, Hans Meyer, Cornelius Gurlitt, Dr. v. Jacobs (President of the German Levant Line), and R. Willing. The Pangermans expressed explicitly and in plain language what the others expressed implicitly; they have *dared* a political plan of international bearing. But they spoke in the name of all Germany, and I cannot understand how anybody can speak of men like Lagarde, not to mention Treitschke, Bernhardi, and many others, as political dreamers! And why should a Utopia be only theoretical? Can a war, or practical work not sometimes be Utopian? And is only a victorious war *non-Utopian*?

After the successes of 1870 Pangerman imperialism grew more and more chauvinistic and aggressive: at the same time a peculiar, wild mysticism gained the ascendant in the ranks of the Pangermans. I refer to the adherents of the theory of "pure Germanism," and of the inequality at the various human races—a theory which by an irony of history was worked out by the French politician and diplomatist Gobineau. The older German anti-Semitism found in Gobineau its philosophical, or quasi-philosophical, basis, and this anti-Semitism was also to a high degree mystical; mystical also was Wagner and his host of followers, who conceived Pangermanism from the standpoint of Art. But so far from Pangermanism being less effective or less political because of its mystical strain, this is, on the contrary, a positive proof of its force. Besides, it is not only mystical, but in a high degree religious. The founder of modern Pangermanism, Paul de Lagarde (of French origin!) is a very strong personality; being a theologian, he endeavoured to construe a purely national German religion. The religious tinge is also strongly noticeable in the writings of Jahn and Constantine Frantz. On the whole, modern German theology is highly national, with its devotion to Luther and its retracing of the Lutheran Reformation to German sources. As against the Poles and other Slavs Protestantism is declared to be *the* national religion, and in the same way Pangermanism in Austria has been bound up with the "Los von Rom!" movement.

And again I must emphasize, that this mystical and religious side is far from being a weakness, considered from the political standpoint; we have to examine not only the

truth and intrinsic or real value of the Pangerman scheme and movement, but also its motive power.

III.

Pangermanism is not of German origin only, it comes also from Austria, though characteristically enough its best known apostles are Prussians or at least North Germans. In fact Austria was inspired by Imperialist and Pangerman ideas at an even earlier date than "Prussia-Germany."

Austria was for centuries the head of the German Empire, and imperialism is essentially an Austrian product. Even as the Eastern March (Ostmark) against the Avars, Magyars and Turks, Austria already had an aggressive and imperialistic mission and gradually developed into a world-power, on which the sun never set. Since Rudolf of Habsburg, the monarchs of Austria with but few exceptions have been Emperors; having the largest German territory, Austria enjoyed great influence in Germany; and this influence became decisive, when Austria with Bohemia and Hungary formed a federative union in order to resist more effectually the Turkish menace to Hungary and to Vienna, the Imperial residence. Later on Austria was opposed in Germany by Prussia, whose growing ascendancy was accentuated by the Reformation, Prussia being Protestant, Austria anti-Protestant. Prussia gathered around her the other Protestant states of the North, while Austria relied on Bavaria and Catholic South Germany.

The Austrian federation (German-Austria, Bohemia, Hungary) was based on a sound idea—the union of a number of peoples of varying race and religion in one greater state; but the Habsburgs changed the original federation of independent states into an absolutist and centralised Empire. Maria Theresa completed the centralisation begun by her predecessors; but leading as it did to brutal Germanisation, this contributed materially to awakening the national feeling of the Czechs, Magyars and other nations. Nevertheless, the Habsburgs felt so confident, that they gave up the dignity of Holy Roman Emperor, assuming the new title of Emperor of Austria. Yet the Congress of Vienna created the German Confederation under the presidency of Austria—in a secret treaty concluded some months before the opening of the Congress Austria joined England and France to check Prussia and Russia). This position, more effective than the abandoned imperial title, brought Austria and Prussia into close connection: and the two states led the reaction against the modern democratic and national movements through-out what is known as the "Metternich Era." This close connection strengthened Austrian imperialism and Pangermanism, and it was the Austrian Minister Schwarzenberg who formed the plan of "a seventy millions Empire." But it was this very imperialism which revived the old antagonism, until Austria, defeated by Prussia in 1866, was obliged to withdraw from Germany. Four years later her successful rival assumed the German Imperial crown.

The defeat of Königgrätz was followed by years of apparent consolidation. In 1867 the Dual System was created; in 1871 an agreement with Bohemia was attempted, and

Austria seemed to be recovering her old historical foundations, as a federation of Austria proper, Hungary and Bohemia. But Francis Joseph broke his plighted word; instead of being crowned King of Bohemia, as he had promised, he reverted to the old policy. Vienna refused to learn the lesson of 1866 and 1870. Acting upon the old approved formula “Divide et Impera,” Austria became Austria-Hungary: one part of the Empire was delivered over to the Germans, the other to the Magyars, and their combined influence interrupted the negotiations of Vienna with the Czechs. Austria-Hungary—no longer Austria—gave up her antagonism against Prussia, and Austro-Hungarian and German imperialism were soldered into a Pangerman Central Europe.

IV.

Bismarck, the founder of Prussian Germany, devised a very effective policy towards Austria to induce her to accept the new German Empire and its leadership. King William in 1866 would have asked from Austria a territorial indemnity; Bismarck resolutely opposed such an idea, and eventually prevailed. He understood official Austria very well, and realised that she dreads exposure above all else and is content with outward appearances.

At the Congress of Berlin (1878), and still more so through the secret Dual Alliance of the following year (which in 1882 expanded into the Triple Alliance), Bismarck clearly revealed his intention of using Austria-Hungary in Germany’s interests. Austria was pushed towards the Balkans, and her imperialist ambition was flattered by the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bismarck declared that Germany would not sacrifice the bones of even a single Pomeranian grenadier in the Balkans. Our present purpose is not to discuss how far Bismarck’s Eastern policy was genuine, but to show how he won the confidence of the ruling class in Vienna. He declared that Germany would fully respect the independence of Austria, and more than once explained his policy by the argument that Prussia, and indeed Germany, could not stand such an increase of her Catholic population as the annexation or the German provinces of Austria would involve.⁷²

Bismarck even shook off the radical Pangermans of Austria who demanded the annexation of Austria and organised the Los-von-Rom movement; and political naïveté might rest satisfied with such an attitude. As a matter of fact Bismarck in that way spared Francis Joseph’s personal feelings; but at the same time he won over Hungary to his side through the medium of Andrassy, and Hungary’s influence on the foreign policy of Austria became more and more decisive. Bismarck’s “Realpolitik” was clever enough to pay with mere words and yet buy real things: and he always contrived to hide his Macchiavellian tactics by a well premeditated imitation of the truth. He secured Ger-

72 In 1910 Germany had 40,000,000 Protestants and 24,000,000 Catholics; with German-Austria the numbers at the Catholic population would be increased to upwards of 30,000,000, and in the event of the further addition of Bohemia, to more than 40,000,000.

many by the alliance with Austria and Italy; but he re-insured Germany at the same time by a secret treaty with Russia. He denounced the Pangermans, but he advised Austrian Pangerman students to learn Slav languages, so as to be able to dominate the non-German nations. He did not even oppose the establishment of the Czech University in Prague, calculating that Bohemia, growing reconciled to his Austrophil policy, would fail to notice his efforts to exterminate the Poles.

The Pangerman platform is not opposed to Bismarck. The spiritual father of modern Pangermanism, Lagarde, did not preach the formal annexation of Austria-Hungary. He would have been content if Austria became a colony, a hinterland of Germany, and if Trieste and the Adriatic were placed at Germany's disposal; for Trieste secured the waterway to Constantinople, to Asia, and to Africa, while Austria as a colony assured the land route. Lagarde, being no diplomatist, revealed his plan for the non-German nations of Germany and Austria without circumlocution; he threatened to make short work of the Czechs and Poles, and even of the Magyars. In short, to Prussia Pangermanism means above all else the possibility of squeezing the Austro-Hungarian lemon in Germany's interest.

The radical faction at Pangermans demanded the direct and formal absorption and annexation of Austria-Hungary or at least of Austria, leaving Hungary independent for the time being. These stalwarts were mostly Austrian, and it was especially against them that Bismarck's Austrophil pronouncements were directed. Bismarck's aim was the same, but he favoured different tactics; and it is very significant that the great War has converted them to the Bismarckian policy. One of their Austrian leaders, the Deputy Iro, proclaimed this conversion in a striking pamphlet (*Oesterreich nach dem Kriege*). In spite of the Austrian victories (!), he openly declares that "we Germans in Austria are no longer able to hold out by our own strength," and therefore Austria-Hungary must be preserved by Germany's aid and for her benefit. Herr Iro accepts Bismarck's policy as Pangerman, and argues that it is in the vital interests at Germany and at the German race to sustain Austria-Hungary as their faithful outpost.

Great Austria has always had the effectual backing of Germany, and the latter's attitude to the annexation of Bosnia in particular removed any lingering distrust which Austria might still have harboured in view of the direct rapprochement between Germany and Turkey. If Bismarck declared that the Balkans were a matter of indifference to Germany, he did so with the knowledge that Austria-Hungary was pursuing a German policy in the Balkans, but William II. soon corrected Bismarck and concluded a close, though at the time only informal, alliance with Turkey. Vienna, her suspicions allayed by the ostentatious devotion shown by William II. towards Francis Joseph, kept her eyes shut, and became a loyal outpost of Germany in the Orient.

Of no less importance to Germany are Trieste and the Adriatic. The purpose of the Triple alliance was to protect Austria from Italy; but this fact, which was admitted by Bismarck himself, did not prevent Germany from cultivating direct relations with Italy and pursuing an effective economic policy in the peninsula.

It is quite natural that a certain tension should survive between Prussia and Austria: Vienna cannot forget her vanished glory and the position she once occupied in Germany: while Berlin is well aware of this sensitive side of impoverished but aristocratic Austria, and realizes that Vienna still looks upon Prussia as a parvenu. But Berlin needs Vienna, and Vienna needs Berlin. Great Germany can easily afford to tolerate Great Austria, as was clearly demonstrated by the personal friendship between Francis Ferdinand, the chief exponent of the Great Austrian idea, and William II., the leader of Great Germany. This war has completely atoned for the year 1866, and to-day Vienna can already tolerate Hindenburg as the supreme commander at her army—that army, which according to Austrian politicians, and Francis Joseph himself, was the very soul and essence of Austria’s defence. In a speech in the German Reichstag in 1888 Bismarck explained the origin of the Triple Alliance and the value of Austria to Germany: “without Austria” he said, “Germany would be isolated and closed in between Russia and France We cannot even imagine Europe without Austria. . . .”

V.

Today there cannot be the slightest doubt that the present war, alike in its origin and in its development, is purely Pangerman. Germany was from the first fully aware that she must defend Austria-Hungary in her own interest. There is a decisive document proving this assertion, namely, the Memorial submitted to the German Reichstag on August 3rd, 1914, in which Herr Von Bethmann-Hollweg expounded the true Pangerman theory concerning Austria, and treated the anti-Austrian manoeuvres of Serbia as a distinct menace to German interests. The Chancellor feared the extension of Russian and French help to Serbia and the Slavs in general, and argued that Germany could not allow Austria to be undermined. Germany must protect the position of the German race in Central Europe (not only in Germany!). Austria, weakened by the Slavs, would cease to count as an ally of Germany, who could not hope to hold her own against her enemies in east and west without the help of a strong and reliable Austria. This was the reason adduced by the Chancellor for giving Austria an entirely free hand, supporting her policy and treating her enemies as Germany’s own. It is superfluous to assert that in this he spoke for the Kaiser, for to support and save Austria has but one meaning: *Travailler pour le roi de Prusse!*

As the war progressed, the Pangerman plans took practical form. First, Turkey, and, a year later, Bulgaria, unreservedly espoused the cause of Germany and Austria-Hungary. The occupation of Serbia and Montenegro corresponded with Great-Austrian aspirations, while the conquest of Poland, the Baltic provinces and parts of Russian territory is in accordance with the plans of Great Germany. German-Turkish attempts on Egypt are only the continuation of the Berlin-Bagdad plan. On January 16, 1916, the first express started from Berlin to Constantinople. During the war, the plan Berlin-Bagdad has been emphasised by men like Lamprecht, Franz von Liszt, Dirr, and many others. Of espe-

cial interest is Koehler's book, "The New Triple Alliance," which has been extolled in Germany as a solid, realistic, and practical plan for the future of Germany and Europe, and which has gone through a number of editions. Its author demands, for the present, the closest possible union of Germany with Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey; Germany, the Western Slavs (including the Ruthenians), and Islam must unite in a new Triple Alliance. Koehler's plan is, so to say, a codification of all that the Central Powers, under the leadership of Prussia, have attained as yet; the Pangerman plan Berlin-Bagdad is, in its broad lines, already a reality.

The later phases of the war confirm this diagnosis. That Germany is now fighting for Austria-Hungary is clearly shown by her efforts to arrest the second defeat of the Austria-Hungarian army by the Russians, and, still more recently, by the German thrust against Roumania. Germany, in defending Austria-Hungary, is defending herself and her Pangermanic Oriental plans.

Prussia-Germany is substantially a continental state, and the Pangerman plan is conceived accordingly. "Central Europe," extended to include Turkey, is aimed, in the first place, at continental Russia, alike as an European and an Asiatic power. Russia's aim, on the other hand, is Constantinople, but, just as for Russia the road to Constantinople lies through Berlin and Vienna, so for Germany and Austria it lies through Petrograd. The Pangerman politicians shaped their plans at a time when the antagonism of Russia and Britain presented the chief problem of world politics, and offered the best prospect of achieving the Pangerman plan of "Berlin-Bagdad." Russia's defeat was to be the first stage.

In the German declaration of war, in the Kaiser's speech from the throne, and in Bethmann-Hollweg's Reichstag *exposé*, the war is represented as a war against Russia, Serbia and Pan-Slavism; and the German strategical plan corresponds to this political programme. It was only when England's declaration of war followed that the Pangerman politicians and publicists turned their rage against her. They had, it is true, for years past, proclaimed Britain as Germany's eventual enemy; but they thought that the antagonism between Britain and Russia was so strong that the former would leave free play to the economic and even political designs of Germany. England's official policy, her goodwill towards the growth of German overseas colonies, especially in Africa, and the apparent favour with which England regarded German expansion in Turkey—all this went to suggest that she saw in Germany an ally against Russia, even in Asia. And even when recently Britain came to terms with Russia, Berlin did not give the matter much thought, and went on with its policy of "Berlin-Bagdad."

As a matter of fact, Prussian designs in Turkey date as far back as Frederick the Great, but the first man to formulate them clearly was List, the economist, who was followed by W. Roscher, Rodbertus, Lassalle, Lagarde, and many others. During the last few years Germany has sunk a great deal of capital in Asia Minor, and has built numerous schools and hospitals. That the Germans seriously regarded Turkey as their inheritance is shown, not merely by the construction of the Bagdad railway across Asia

Minor, but also by the plans for river regulation and the building of canals towards the Black Sea, which have been discussed so diligently during the war. In my opinion, the actual plan of Germany might be expressed even more fittingly by the watchword, "Berlin-Cairo." The Germans did not merely concern themselves with the Bagdad Railway, but also pushed on the Aleppo-Medina-Hodeida branch. This forms an essential part of their African policy: the Moroccan treaty, the Congo investment, their acquisition of the right of priority in the Belgian Congo for themselves against France, are clear indications that Germany wanted to consolidate her possessions in Equatorial Africa. This central colonial empire would play the same *rôle* against the North and South of Africa as Germany, by her own central position, played against the East and West of Europe. From their East African colony, too, Germans would then have a direct oversea route to Persia, India and beyond. The war has provided fresh proofs of this African plan of Germany's; and official England appears to have regarded this as more dangerous than the German plans in Mesopotamia, though in neither case did Downing Street place any obstacle in Germany's way.⁷³

The German plan, as expounded during the course of the war, has steadily progressed in the direction indicated. The weakening of Russia and the Slavs must be the first step, but the final stage is to be the overthrow of Britain. It is interesting to note how German politicians—notably Rohrbach, one of the foremost Pangerman writers, and Prince Bülow in the new war edition of his book on German policy—in their discussions of the future settlement, set themselves to woo and flatter

73 In this connection reference must be made to the curious Treaty concluded on the eve of the war between Germany, England, and France. So far as I know, the first public reference to it appears to have been published by Rohrbach ("Das Grössere Deutschland," August 15, 1915). "Now that everything has changed, we can openly say that the Treaties with England, concerning the frontiers of our oversea spheres in Asia and Africa, had already been concluded and signed, and that nothing remained but to make them public. We were frankly astonished at the concessions made to us in Africa by England's policy." In Turkey, he adds, Germany was given concessions in the matter of the Bagdad railway, of Mesopotamian petroleum springs, and Tigris navigation beyond all expectations ("ueberraschend"); and altogether, England was quite willing to recognise Germany as her equal both in Africa and in Asia. In view of this treaty, Rohrbach draws the conclusion that only the Russians stood in Germany's way, and that it was necessary that they should be weakened. He believes that England frankly desired peace. On the side of England, the treaty is briefly alluded to in M. P. Price's "Diplomatic History of the War" (Nov., 1914). Sir Harry Johnston, whom the Pangermans quite unfairly treat as the forerunner of their Berlin-Bagdad scheme, supplements his interesting article in the *Geographical Journal* for April, 1915 ("The Political Geography of Africa before and after the War"), by maps showing that the Germans, without any war, would have secured most of Asia Minor and Mesopotamia, and, in Africa, by the annexation of a greater part of the Belgian Congo and part of Angola, a great consolidated colony from Kamerun to East Africa. Lake Tanganyika would have formed the connecting link between Germany's western and eastern possessions.

France, and how they emphasise the antagonism of the West against Russia, in the fond hope of winning Britain's secret assent. These discussions generally lay stress upon the need for retaining Poland and other Russian territories. Indeed, the official *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, in defending the German Chancellor against his junker critics, insists that Russia must be pushed back beyond "the rivers," and that Germany must have shorter frontiers in the East; while, in the West, it contents itself with the demand that Belgium must be freed from foreign anti-German influence. In an interview after his nomination as Generalissimo, Hindenburg, while giving vent to his "personal" antipathy against England, spoke of the danger which threatens Germany from the East. There can be no doubt that German policy is primarily concerned with continental aims: the absorption of Austria-Hungary and the conquest of the Balkans and Turkey. With this end in view, Germany must prevent Russia from reaching Constantinople, and must weaken her to the utmost of her power. Once Germany has achieved "Central Europe," the time for a blow at Britain would soon come. Germany with Austria-Hungary, the Balkans and Turkey at her disposal, has a free path to Egypt and India, and nothing could then stop her march into Holland and Belgium and the maritime North of France, if occasion should arise. Once Berlin-Bagdad and Berlin-Cairo became a reality, the power and riches yielded by this Central Europe would perhaps even render the fight against Britain in Europe superfluous; moreover, the progress of aeronautics and the development of the navy would facilitate the invasion of England, if that were still required. The possession of Trieste, Salonica, and Constantinople would assure to "Central Europe" dominion over the Adriatic, Ægean and Mediterranean; Turkey would secure to Germany access to Africa and India, and Britain would collapse in pitiful isolation. States are often undone by what has made them great, and, in that case, the amphibious German would swallow up the British fish.

On the other hand, a certain section of the Pangermans, led by Count Reventlow, is sounding the trumpet against the "Vampire," and would be ready to make peace with Russia, apparently assuming that she would even give up Poland and some parts of the "German" (Baltic) and Ruthenian provinces, if she could secure Armenia, parts of Persia, and an access to the Persian Gulf.

It is interesting to observe how both the Pangermans and the official politicians and publicists have two irons in the fire, but it must suffice for the moment to have shown that the war is the logical continuation of Pangerman policy, and that Berlin is already prepared to put only the first half of the Pangerman scheme into practice.

The first decisive step in this policy, its first political achievement, out of which the final aim will follow almost logically, is the absorption of Austria, the preservation of Turkey and Constantinople, and the consequent weakening of Russia and the Slavs. If Berlin succeeds in creating "Central Europe," the aim of the war is attained, even if, at the worst, some time should elapse before the completion of the Constantinople-Bagdad and Constantinople-Cairo routes.

If successful, Prussia-Germany would become an Asiatic and African power like Russia, Britain and France: nay more, she would become the greatest World-Power. Pangermanism is a programme for the final solution of the Eastern question. The Great War is a daring attempt to organise Europe, Asia and Africa—the Old World—under the leadership of Germany.

THOMAS G. MASARYK

3. Document

**The New Europe Vol. I. 19. October 1916. 11 January
1917. London, 1917**

R. W. Seton-Watson: The Roumanians of Hungary

Source: The New Europe Vol. I. 19. October 1916. 11 January 1917. London, 1917
R. W. Seton-Watson: The Roumanians of Hungary

The Roumanians of Hungary

ROUMANIA'S entry is the crowning proof of a fact which is still too often overlooked by Western public opinion, but which, none the less, goes to the root of the whole European problem as raised by the Great War, and, even more so, of the settlement which must follow it. In a single phrase, this is not only a German War, but also a Magyar War. Nay more, it is as much a Magyar War as it is a German War: for the Magyars have done more than any other people to create that electrical atmosphere in South-Eastern Europe which produced the fatal explosion. The essential factor in Roumania's attitude, ever since she attained her own unity and independence, is that she has been forced to witness the spectacle of 3,500,000 of her kinsmen in Hungary subjected to one of the grossest tyrannies which the modern world has known, and defending themselves desperately and at great disadvantage against the systematic efforts of the Magyars to undermine and destroy their national spirit. Some years ago the distinguished Roumanian statesman, M. Take Ionescu, tersely expressed to me the feeling which is shared by all thoughtful Roumanians. "If I thought," he said, "that the Roumanians of Transylvania could ever conceivably become Magyarised, I should give up politics altogether. It would not be worth while for us Roumanians of the kingdom to go on living. We should have no future." Almost one-third of the entire race is threatened by Magyar policy, and it is obvious that no country in the world could regard such a situation with equanimity.

The history of Transylvania is, in many ways, unique in Europe. After forming the backbone of the ancient Dacia, it was fought over for centuries by tribe after tribe of barbarian invaders moving westwards. It was not till the end of the 11th century that the Magyars extended their sway to what came to be called Erdély, Ardeal, Transylvania—"The land beyond the forest." Their kings, finding the country thinly populated after the ravages of centuries, encouraged Magyar and German settlers by the grant of special charters and concessions. The Transylvanian constitution crystallised round the so-called "Brotherly Union" of 1437, concluded

between the three privileged “nations,” the Magyar nobles, the Székelys or Frontiersmen of the eastern Carpathians, and the Saxon townsmen. When Hungary was conquered by the Turks in 1525, the principality of Transylvania survived under native Magyar princes, paying periodical tribute to the Turks. Parallel with the Turks from the South came the Reformation from the German North, and Transylvania became the scene of a remarkable experiment of religious toleration at the very moment when the wars of religion were at their height in the West. In 1571 the Estates recognised the four confessions—Catholic, Calvinist, Lutheran and Unitarian—as equal before the law.

Unhappily, in this seemingly ideal picture, there was one significant omission. Side by side with the three dominant races there was the silent mass of serfs, the Roumanian autochthonous population, who, in spite of their superior numbers, have never obtained recognition as a nation, and whose religion—the Orthodox or Eastern Faith—was excluded from the benefits of religious toleration. Alike during the period of Transylvanian independence (1526–1691) and the succeeding period of autonomy under Habsburg rule, the Roumanians have always occupied the position of real political helots, and have never lost an opportunity of asserting their claims of civil and religious equality. Just as in 1791 the memorable petition known as “*Supplex Libellus Valachorum*” was completely ignored by the Diet, so their great assembly on the “Field of Liberty” at Blaj (Blasendorf), in 1848, was a signal to the dominant race to rush through the Diet a law proclaiming the union of Transylvania with Hungary, in defiance of Roumanian and Saxon opposition. The fatal attitude of the Magyars, in refusing point blank to the Roumanians, as to the Slavs, those national rights which they claimed for themselves, ranged all the other races on the side of Austria and the Habsburgs in the terrible civil war which followed. Its evil traces still survive in memories of peasants shot and hanged wholesale without trial for their loyalty to the throne, and castles sacked and burned in revenge for centuries of oppression. When, after ten years of black reaction, constitutional government was revived in Austria in the early sixties, there was a brief interlude of honest dealing, the Roumanian nation and language being at last placed on an equal footing with the Magyar and the German, and the Roumanian Orthodox Church receiving a definite charter, under its own hierarchy and elective assembly. This alarmed and angered the patriots of Budapest, and among the foremost concessions extracted from the Crown, as an earnest of the Austro-Hungarian *Ausgleich* of 1867, were the dissolution of the Transylvanian Diet, the consequent annulment of its concessions to the Roumanians, and the ratification of the forced union of 1843 by a new Diet, which was specially “packed” for the purpose, and which overrode the vigorous protests of both Roumanians and Saxons.

Since 1867, then, Transylvania has been merged in Hungary, and the Roumanian population has shared in the benefits conferred by a constitution which the Magyars are never tired of comparing to the British. To the Roumanians, as to the

Slavs of Hungary, the chief pledge of political liberty has been the law of 1868 guaranteeing "the Equal Rights of all Nationalities." But this law, though for years past it has been held up to the uninformed outside world as a pattern of unexampled tolerance, has all the time, as a result of the deliberate policy of the entire Magyar ruling caste, remained a dead letter in the most literal sense of the word. It would be easy to take the document, paragraph by paragraph, and, by comparison with official statistics and the admissions of leading statesmen, to prove that, in all matters of administration, justice, education. etc., its provisions have been deliberately disregarded in favour of a ruthless policy of Magyarisation. For example, there are no state schools, secondary or primary, where the language of instruction is Roumanian, and though the Roumanians have been able to maintain their own denominational schools, this has been in addition to their liability to the state, and by the almost unaided efforts of a very poor community. The scandalous Education Laws introduced in 1907 by that false prophet of constitutional liberty, Count Apponyi, were designed above all to effect the forcible Magyarisation of the denominational schools, the last stronghold of the nationalities. The Magyar point of view was brought out very well some twelve years ago during an education debate, when the well-known dramatist and newspaper proprietor, Mr. Rákosi, declared that the proper educational policy was to allow no teaching of any kind for three years in any schools attended by non-Magyars, except! and He was followed singing Magyar speaking, good educational policy by Bishop Firczák, who said: is in the interests of the state, but its first requirement is of the reciting "A that it should be Magyar in all its parts. The second requirement is that it should have a moral and religious basis." The order is absolutely significant and characteristic.

It is, however, on the political side that the oppression of the Roumanians has been most glaring.

Thanks to the great reputation and influence at Court of Archbishop Shaguna the Roumanian Orthodox Metropolitan, their church autonomy was respected, and thus there was at least one valuable point of defence against Magyar aggression. But even Shaguna felt himself politically helpless, and after the Ausgleich coined the famous phrase, „Flere possim, sed iuvare non” (I could weep, but help I could not). His despairing followers committed the grave mistake of adopting a policy of abstention, and for years the Roumanians were unrepresented in the Hungarian Parliament.

In 1881 the irreconcilables met under the historian Baritiu, and founded the Roumanian National Party, whose chief demands were the fulfilment of the law of nationalities, the restoration of Transylvanian autonomy, and universal. They were attacked with the utmost bitterness suffrage. by the Magyars inside and outside Parliament, and, as press persecution grew, their committee addressed a petition to the throne, recounting their grievances in a masterly way The Hungarian Government, in its fury, not only (1892). prevented Francis Joseph from receiving

them, but actually “ the whole committee to trial for incitement brought “ against the Magyar nation; and Dr. Ratziu and eight others were sentenced to a total of 29 years’ imprisonment.

The Memorandum Trial awakened echoes throughout Europe, especially in Roumania. Its victims, in a spirited and defence, rubbed in the fact that it was not a question of law, but of mere brute force, declared themselves to have acted as mandatories of the Roumanian people, and denied that “a whole people can be brought to justice. By your spirit” of mediaeval intolerance, ”they added, by a racial fanaticism which has not its equal in Europe, you will, if you condemn us, simply succeed in proving to the world that the Magyars are a discordant note in the concert of European nations.”

The Hungarian Government did not stop here. A month later it formally dissolved the Roumanian National Party as a disloyal institution, and denied the right of the Roumanians to form a party on national lines; and though events have rendered the literal enforcement of such a policy impracticable, it still represents the views of all representative Magyar statesmen. The present Premier, Count Tisza, in a famous speech in 1910, argued that, “at the moment when our Roumanian fellow-citizens form parties on the basis of nationality, they are already denying the political unity of the Hungarian nation.” “Individual nationalities,” said another Premier, the late Baron Bánffy, “have no rights, only individuals have.” Of course, not everyone in Hungary is so crude or so frank as a well-known Budapest newspaper which, in commenting on the Memorandum Trial, expressed regret that the good old practice of affixing the heads of traitors to the gates could not be employed against the prisoners. But language scarcely less violent could be quoted ad nauseam from almost all the prominent public men of Hungary for a generation past.

Count Andrassy, when Minister of the Interior eight years ago, defined the policy of the state as “kindliness and justice to the masses of the nationalities, but pitiless prosecution of the agitators who lead them” ; and, next morning, a leading daily added the comment, “We, the Magyar nation and Magyar society, are not satisfied with so little. We wish to Magyarise Hungary completely.”

In short, in the words of Coloman Széll, one of the most moderate Premiers of modern Hungary, and the favourite pupil of the great “The Deák, unitary Magyar state is the highest aim of Hungarian policy, and every statesman must be irreconcilable in pursuing it. Hungary must first be preserved as a Magyar land, and then it must be cultivated, rich and progressive.”

At the elections of 1906, the Roumanians, abandoning the old policy of abstention, managed to secure fourteen seats in Parliament, but this was only a momentary oversight on the part of the Magyars; and in 1910 their number was reduced to five, as the result of one of the most corrupt and terroristic elections of modern times.

It is difficult to convey to Western readers an adequate impression of the electoral methods employed in Hungary, especially in the non-Magyar constituencies. Apart from an elaborate system of gerrymandering, the absence of the ballot, and the narrow of state is set ness of the franchise, the whole machinery in motion to prevent the election of candidates whom the Government regards as undesirable.

Cases could be cited where veterinary orders have been issued on the eve of the poll, forbidding horse traffic in the constituency; or where the only bridge over a river has been suddenly declared unsafe and closed for traffic; or where station-masters, by order, refuse to issue tickets to Roumanian voters; or where electors have simply been shut up in an inn under lock and key till all was over; or even where a candidate has been arrested as a suspicious character, his papers taken away, and he himself detained in gaol for two days and not allowed to communicate with his friends.

I know of two instances in 1910 where a „dummy” candidate has been announced by the returning officer at the last moment, bearing the same name as the opposition candidate, and where the scale has then been turned by crediting votes for the latter to his imaginary namesake! On one occasion the chief administrative official of a large constituency said to the opposition candidate, a non-Magyar friend of my own, „Even if 90 per cent, of the electors go in your favour, you still won't be elected.”

Doubtful constituencies are flooded with troops and gendarmes, who are used to brow beat the peasantry, and, when necessary, to isolate them from their leaders. In many cases a cordon of troops is drawn round the town or village where polling is taking place, and the opposition is kept waiting outside in the wind and rain, or in the summer heat, while the Government party has the run of the town, and of the inns, with free beer and wine and other inducements.

Sometimes such treatment goads the Roumanians to fury, and they resist; then the gendarmes fire only too freely, and more than one blood bath has resulted.

In 1910 it was officially admitted by the Hungarian Government that “only” 194 battalions of infantry and 114 squadrons of cavalry were employed at the June elections to “preserve order”—in other words, to prevent the non-Magyars, and even to some extent the Magyar opposition, from exercising their just political rights. Thanks to the help of friends who knew every cellar and backdoor in a certain Hungarian country town, I succeeded in getting through a triple cordon of infantry, cavalry and gendarmerie, and witnessing with my own eyes such an election.

On that occasion it was only the action of the non-Magyar candidate in withdrawing from the contest, that averted serious bloodshed. He had an overwhelming majority of electors marshalled on the outskirts of the town, but the cordon had strict orders not to admit them. The only exception made was for the men of two particular villages, and of them the returning officer made short work, either dis-

qualifying them altogether or crediting their votes to the Government candidate, whose hopeless minority was thus conveniently swelled into a triumphant majority.

For even when he has reached the poll, the elector's dangers are not at an end. Magyar returning officers are capable of transferring votes to the wrong side, losing the papers, allowing Government agents to vote three or four times over or to impersonate a dead man, and, indeed disqualifying on almost any trumped-up grounds. The law of Hungary actually provides in detail for cases where the returning officer declares a candidate elected who has not received an absolute majority, or infringes the law "with the object of falsifying the result" (I quote the exact words). Such are only a few of the methods of a constitution which the Magyars are never tired of comparing with the British.

Much could be written of the systematic persecution of the Roumanian Press; of how, in twenty years, over 350 Roumanian "intellectuals" were sentenced to over 150 years of imprisonment and enormous fines for so-called "incitement against the Hungarian nation"; of how public meetings are prohibited wholesale, Roumanian societies dissolved, Roumanian school books and song books pro scribed, the Roumanian colours forbidden, Roumanian funds confiscated or arbitrarily diverted to other uses, Roumanian boys expelled repeatedly and in growing numbers from schools and seminaries, simply because they refuse to submit to the ban upon their language. But enough has already been said to prove that the political system under which the Roumanians of Transylvania and Hungary have hitherto lived is one of the grossest tyrannies which modern Europe has ever known, and that it would justify our new Allies a hundred times over in seeking to set free a race whose deep and virile national consciousness has survived all attacks.

While Roumania's motives in joining the Entente are mainly national, Germany, on her side, has many reasons of a different kind for straining every nerve to crush Roumania. On the Lower Danube lie the stakes—the key to victory or defeat. Germany has to show her loyalty to her hard-pressed Allies, Hungary and Bulgaria, and her unlimited capacity for helping her, and, at the same time, to prove, if she can, that the Entente is incapable of saving yet another small nation from the fate of Belgium and Serbia. She hopes also to gain access to a country full of corn and oil, whose rich products would immensely ease the situation of the Central Powers. But, above all, Germany has to maintain at all cost the connections with Turkey—the great land route to the Near and Middle East. Roumania's victory means a deathblow to Hungary as the vampire battering on subject races and the end of Bulgaria's dream of Balkan hegemony—in other words, the two first essential stages towards the isolation of Germany; for that isolation can only be achieved by reducing the Austro-Magyars to submission.

Roumania's defeat, on the other hand, means the consolidation of the Berlin-Bagdad line, the control of the great Danubian thoroughfare and of the Black

Sea, the possibility of outflanking the Russian armies, and threatening Kiev and Odessa through Bessarabia; the indefinite postponement of a Russian land advance upon Constantinople and of the opening of the Straits ; the widening still further of the gap between our Balkan front and Russia; in short, the indefinite prolongation of the war as a whole. Germany's attitude to Roumania is the best proof of what she thinks of the importance of the Near East. It is fortunate that this time the states men of the Entente are fully alive to the danger and realise that their honour and credit are at stake.

But if this final effort at German aggression is to be effectively crushed, our measures must be imperative and drastic; there must be no half answers or delays such as too often obscured the situation at Nish and at Athens. Belgium we could not save, Serbia we would not save, Roumania we must save.

R. W. Seton-Watson

4. Document

The British Foreign Office's evolving ideas on the future borders of Central Europe. Materials from the British National Archives: The Frontiers of Czecho-Slovakia. General Staff, War Office 14th October, 1918. The National Archives – Kew London - Foreign Office (TNA FO) 371. 3136 452. 203973.

In parallel with the work in the Foreign Office, the British War Office took a position on the borders of the nascent Czechoslovakia in a secret and confidential document on 14 October 1918. The memorandum supported the territorial claims of the Masaryk-Beneš duo, such as: German districts of north-western Bohemia, German districts of the Bohemian Forest, the Trautenau Triangle, Austrian Silesia and neighbouring districts, Slovakia. The text proposed future borders for Czechoslovakia, which were to be drawn according to ethnographic and strategic criteria. But the proposal stressed that ethnographic conditions should be subordinated to strategic objectives. In other words, the memorandum considered *'the drawing of a good line of defence'* and *'the protection of railway nodes'* as the basis for the settlement, and not ethnic division. Accordingly, the proposed boundary east of Ipolyt-Losonc essentially coincided with the present one, while in the west it would have been drawn a good 50 kilometres north of Trianon.

Source: The National Archives - Kew London - Foreign Office (TNA FO) 371. 3136 452. 203973.

THE FRONTIERS OF CZECHO-SLOVAKIA

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1.-ETHNOGRAPHIC AND STRATEGIC CONDITIONS.

There is substantially no dispute as to the ethnic boundaries, but the erection of Checho- Slovakia is a definite challenge (1) to the unity of the Magyar State: (2) to German Austrians, Neither race will over willingly acquiesce in this State. It is also reasonably certain, judging by what has been done by the Czechs in the past and during de war, that Germans will be the badly treated by them wherever that is possible.

A settlement proposed by Benesh himself comprises (1) close connection with hand (2) corridor to the Jugo-Slav area-Budweis-Linz-Klagenfurt; (3) inclusion the 2½ million odd Germans in the surrounding territories. With regard to (1), much would depend on whether the Polish area in the south-east corner of Silesia is added to an independent Poland. This would give a route Prague-Pardubitz-Neustadt-Czestochova-Lodz, and might enable Czech industries to be delivered from their outlet in the Elbe Valley to the Vistula and Danzig, thus giving Czech-Polish through route. Even so this would be unsatisfactory as the outlet would be the Baltic, and Danzig is surrounded by German territory. But the importance of Czech-Polish combination against Germany would be very great. (2) It is also very difficult to run Czech goods to the Adriatic by the suggested "corridor." There appears, therefore, to be no solution of the difficulty of preserving a neutral or friendly line for the export of Czech goods into non-German territories. With regard (3) it is probable that the security of Bohemia by the protection of the mountain walls of the Erz-Gebirge, Iser-Gebirge and Riesen-Gebirge is essential,

1. The most important German area passes between the Austrian frontier and the line roughly indicated by the following points Pollaun-Reichenberg-Hirschberg Gastdorf- west of Laun-Leinmeritz-Jechnitz-Manetin-Wscherau-Ronsperg. This is thickly populated and almost wholly German with great industrial developments. Bohemia deprived of this would lose much wealth and population and geographical barrier of the Erz-Gebirge.⁷⁴
2. The strips of the Böhmer-Wald adjoining this area, from about 12 miles south of Klattau to about 20 miles south of Budweis, are about 80 miles in extent and about in 10 average depth. These are not densely populated or wealthy or important, and their disposal is a matter of pure indifference. There should however, be a bridgehead to protect Budweis, which might follow the Moldau from Wallern to Krumau, thence Schwenitz and Gratzen.
3. The Arnau-Trautenau-Braunau salient, just south of the Riesen-Gebirge, is

⁷⁴ A compromise could be obtained here by taking the heights of the Kaiserwald-Karlsbad-Eger-River-Laun-Mittel-Gebirge Hills thence south of Hirschberg to strike point 1120 in the Riesen-Gebirge, this excluding the bulk of the Germans.

German densely populated. This is obviously of importance in defence and be retained by the Czechs.

4. So also should German areas between Zittau and Troppau in Austrian Silesia. The German Territory just south of Oppeln and immediately west of obtained here by taking the heights of the Kaiserwald-Karlabad-Eger could be this should become Polish ethnic lines and also for strategic reasons. The pass of Nachod They of the most vital for the protection of Bohemia, which was invaded from hem in this should become Polish in 1738 and 1860. There is much to be said for strategic rectification here, though this is Glatz area which is strongly German. Note: If the lesser frontier indicated in (1) is accepted by the Czechs, it would given them more claim to annex the almost wholly German part of Austrian Silesia.
5. The northern frontiers of Slovakia are good as based on the Carpathians and extending to the Lupkov Pass. There they might turn south along the bill crests to Ungvar, including some Ruthenian elements. The southern frontiers of Slovakia and Moravia present great difficulties. An extensive railway system is based on Budapest, which at many points breaks into the hills and prevents any good defensive line. Probably the best line would be to provide for the protection railhead (east to west):-Kassa-Pelsőcz - -Losoncz-Nyitra-Galgocz-Szered-Nagy Szombat-Lundenburg-Nickolsburg.
From Nickolsburg the course Thaya might be followed to below Znaim and thence to Zlabings. of the From Zlabings the old provincial boundary can be followed to Gratzen, where we unite with the frontier outlined in number 1. Many of the points outlined in (5) are ethnically German or Magyar, but in this case expediency must be the best guide, and no great extent of alien territory Along this southern frontier is or will be included

2.-HISTORICAL JUSTIFICATIONS.

The justification for uniting Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia historically of the feeblest description. In the 9th Century a Czech gentleman called Svatopluk ruled the over and the medieval kingdom Slovakia, and of Bohemia included Moravia. appear, however, that the three districts have been united before. There certainly have, however, been occasions when the King of Bohemia ruled German as well as Czechs subjects, the most eminent of these being Charles IV., who was Holy Roman Emperor in the 14th Century.

The German conquest of Bohemia in 1620 showed that the Czechs had a genuine national spirit, only subdued eventually by arms and by the forcible transplantation of German colonialist. Various promises were made at different times

by Austrian Emperors, including Francis Joseph, to restore the ancient Bohemian Kingdom. Such restoration certainly never implied the separation of Czechs from Germans in Bohemia. The latter must therefore accept the situation, though stipulations for the protection of their language, &c, might possibly be made at the Peace Conference.

3. CONCLUSION.

Whatever the difficulties, it seems impossible to-day not to give the Czechs the right to construct a state of their own, in view of their achievements and our public promises. The advantages are that the Czechs are unquestioned in their vigour and devotion to the Entente, in their capacity for self-government and economic development. In view of the difficulties of uniting Czechs to Moravians and Slovaks, the Austrian Emperor on the borders of these peoples must accept the situation and unite with them. Subject to the changes indicated, the ethnographic features must be the basis of the settlement.

GENERAL STAFF, WAR OFFICE
14th October, 1918

5. DOCUMENT

Letter and Memorandum by L.S. Amery to A.J. Balfour [TNA PRO FO 371/3136 No. 177223/W3] 22 October 1918

On 22 October 1918, Captain L. S. A. Amery submitted a memorandum to Balfour entitled "The Austro-Hungarian Problem". In it, he argued that the question of Central Europe could only be solved by a federal solution. In other words, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy should not be abolished, but reorganised and federalised. Otherwise, Amery argued, there was a danger that the region would become balkanised, with the emergence of small states. At the Foreign Office, several experts - L.B. Namier, then H. Nicolson - discussed the memorandum and gave their opinions. Their conclusion was clear: they rejected Amery's concept and proposed instead a reorganisation of the region on the basis of a continued nation-state.

Source: Letter and Memorandum by L.S. Amery to A.J. Balfour TNA [PRO FO 371/3136 No. 177223/W3] 22 October 1918

Dear Mr. Balfour,

President Wilson's setting of the Czecho-Slovak claim in the forefront of his reply to Austria has suggested the enclosed notes, which bring out some of the difficulties of the question. His action may have been quite right at the moment, but I can't help feeling that when it comes to the Peace Conference we shall have to face the Middle-European situation in a constructive, and not merely in an anti-German spirit. Otherwise we shall simply turn Central Europe into a new Balkans.

Yours sincerely, L.S. Amery

6. DOCUMENT

Memorandum by L.S. Amery The Austro-Hungarian Problem 20 October 1918 [TNA PRO FO 371/3136]

Source: TNA PRO FO 371/3136 No. 177223

Memorandum by L.S. Amery The Austro-Hungarian Problem 20 October 1918

President Wilson's declaration that the Czecho-Slovak National Council should be the judge of what will satisfy its aspirations — that is in effect what his reply to Austria amounts to — has probably put an end to all question of an armistice with either Austria or Germany. The similar demand on behalf of the Yugoslavs might conceivably have been yielded by both Austria and Hungary, inasmuch it involves no subjection of German or Magyar population to a foreign rule, and no serious impairment of the territorial integrity of Hungary proper. But the satisfaction of the Czecho-Slovak demand is something which neither Germany nor the Magyars are likely to agree to without a further struggle.

It is necessary to realise precisely what the Czechoslovak demand comprises. It consists firstly of the demand that the Czechs shall be set up as an independent sovereign state in the whole of Bohemia and Moravia. This involves the subjection to Czech rule of over three million Germans living mostly in a compact belt of territory on the borders of Bavaria, Saxony and Prussian Silesia. It is a claim based, not on ethnographical "self-determination" but on historic, economic and strategical — in other words what are now called "Imperialistic" — grounds. The Czechs are no more prepared to accept a Bohemia without the German districts, than the Irish nationalists are prepared to accept Home Rule without Ulster. The second part of the Czech claim, namely that the northern regions of Hungary, where the Slovak speaking peasants are in a majority over the Magyar upper classes, should be cut off from Hungary and attached to Bohemia, is based on precisely that ethnographic principle which the Czechs reject in Bohemia.

President Wilson's support of the Czecho-Slovak claim, involving as it does the subjection of a large German population to what they would regard as an aggressive and intolerant alien Government, bent on de-nationalising them, is calculated to unite all Germans, whether in Austria or Germany, in uncompromising resistance. It is equally calculated to put an end to any ideas that may have been entertained by a section of the Magyars that Hungary might secure peace by detaching herself from Austria, and will convince them that their only chance of saving their independence now, or regaining it hereafter, lies in the German alliance.

But, whether President Wilson's reply to Austria causes the breaking off of negotiations or not, it will be necessary to face the Austro-Hungarian problem eventually, and to decide the principle on which we are going to settle it. To settle it on

the principle of simply using our victory to satisfy the ambitions of our friends will inevitably create a state of unrest and instability which will sooner or later lead up to another war. There can be no talk even of a League of Nations if the Czecho-Slovak claim is granted as it stands.

There are two principles on which we might attempt to create a lasting settlement. One is the ethnographic principle. On this basis German speaking Bohemia would either be allowed to join Germany, or form part of German Austria, as suggested in the Emperor Charles's recent proclamation. Hungary would then be carved up, the north-western part going to the Czecho-Slovak state, the north-eastern to the Ukraine, the eastern to Rumania, the south to Serbia, the west to German Austria, and an irregular block in the centre being left to the Magyars. But the new Czecho-Slovak and Magyar states would obviously be incapable of a really independent existence, either from the economic or the defence point of view. They would have to enter into some sort of close federal union with their neighbours. In the case of Hungary the union might be with Yugoslavia and Rumania, or with Yugoslavia, German Austria and Czecho-Slovakia. In the case of Czecho-Slovakia its geographical position would make it practically impossible for it to be in any federal system which did not include either Germany or German Austria. In other words the ethnographic solution leads us back to the necessity either of creating a new Austro-Hungary, though not necessarily a Hapsburg Austro-Hungary or one based on German-Magyar supremacy, or else of creating a new Danubian confederation, including Magyars, Yugoslavs, Rumanians and possibly Bulgars, leaving Czecho-Slovaks and German Austrians to attach themselves to Germany.

The other, and probable more practical basis is to take history and economics as well as ethnography into account and create states capable of a greater degree of real independence, making special provision for the "cultural" rights of minorities. On that basis one might break up the present Austria Hungary into four states (excluding Galicia and Bukovina which would be divided between Poland, the Ukraine and Rumania): viz. Bohemia, including German Bohemia and Moravia, but excluding the Slovak districts of Hungary; German Austria comprising all the German speaking districts not in Bohemia or Hungary; Hungary as at present but minus Slavonia and Croatia; the latter together with the Slovene districts of Austria, Dalmatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia would form the new Yugoslavia. Even these states, however, would still have to enter into federal relations with their neighbours, though possibly not quite so close as under the other scheme. And the necessity for this would be strengthened by sentimental considerations. A Bohemia which included German Bohemia could only command the patriotic interest of the German element if it was politically closely linked up with German Austria and Germany - just as South Africa can only enlist the unanimous patriotism of its population of both white races if it remains in the British Commonwealth. Hungary similarly could only hope to reconcile its Rumanian minority if it entered

into some intimate and permanent pact with Rumania. To satisfy Czecho-Slovak sentiment it ought also to be closely associated with Bohemia and so with German Austria and Germany. On this basis then a position of permanent stability and prosperity could best be secured by a new Danubian Confederation comprising German Austria, Bohemia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumania and probably also Bulgaria. Such a confederacy would no longer be under German Magyar domination. But the presence in it of a large German element would make its close association or even economic and defensive alliance with Germany almost inevitable in the long run. An alternative but probably less satisfactory solution — especially for the Czecho-Slovaks — would be to let German Austria and Bohemia join the German federation — to which they both once belonged — and let the others set up as a separate Danubian Confederation.

The essential thing to realise is that whatever basis is taken for the creation of new units in the area now covered by Austria-Hungary, they cannot really be independent units. To attempt to create artificial sovereignties, especially on the basis of “spoils to the victor”, is only to create a new and more troubled Balkan Peninsula. The wisest course is to aim at securing the fairest and most workable rearrangement on national lines, but at the same time actively to encourage the idea of a new union, preferably one which would include the whole of the present Austro-Hungarian Empire (excepting Galicia and Bukovina), and Rumania, Serbia and Bulgaria as well. In such a union the different nationalities would find the solution of their nationalist rivalries and an ample field for prosperous development. That such a union would largely work in cooperation with Germany is also a fact which we should accept with a good grace. The co-operation will be of a very different character from the league between Hapsburg and Hohenzollern in the past.

The fact is that “Middle Europe” is an inevitable and necessary outcome of this war whatever the actual issue of the struggle or the terms of peace imposed by the victors. In the long run the economic and defensive factors which make the whole of this region a natural unit in the present conditions of the world, are bound to prevail over the exaggerated nationalism — German, Magyar, Serb, Bulgar, Czech — which has been at the root of this war. There is no possible solution which can wholly satisfy that nationalism, any more than there is any possible solution which can wholly satisfy Irish nationalism. But nationalism, at any rate in the exaggerated form in which it is represented by the class of parliamentarian whose political life consists in working it up, is not a permanent factor. The German variety of it is already in process of being cured by defeat. The wave of Bolshevism which threatens to submerge Ukrainian and Polish nationalism as soon as the support of German bayonets is withdrawn, might conceivably obliterate all the minor nationalisms of Austria-Hungary, even before this war is over, in the more elementary, and possibly more permanent, struggle between Bolshevik and Anti-Bolshevik. In any case the various nationalities of Central Europe are also interlocked, and

their racial frontiers are so unsuitable as the frontiers of really independent states, that the only satisfactory and permanent working policy for them lies in their incorporation in a non-national superstate. We can delay but we cannot prevent the eventual coming of that superstate.

To commit ourselves unreservedly to nationalism at the Peace Conference, and to ignore the inevitable coming of the larger non-national super-state, would be to commit precisely the errors which our grandfathers committed at the Congress of Vienna, when they settled Europe on the basis of legitimism, on which the war had been fought and argued, and not on the basis of the new nationalist forces which the war had called into being. A League of Nations based on the principle of nationalism might soon find itself as much of an anomaly and an obstacle to progress as the Holy Alliance in its day. In any case a lasting League of Nations cannot be built up on a chaos of independent sovereignties of every sort and size. The reduction of the present total of states to a limited number of groups, federations or "super-states" is an essential stepping-stone towards any higher integration. For the purposes of the war we have rightly backed up Czecho-Slovaks, Yugoslavs and every anti-German and anti-Austrian movement we could find. But for the purposes of a lasting settlement we must regulate the satisfaction of these national aspirations by the need of creating, or recreating, a larger supernational unity in Central and South-Eastern Europe.

20/10/18

L. S. A.

7. DOCUMENT

Lewis Namier's note on Captain Amery's memorandum. [TNA PRO FO 371/3136]

Source: TNA PRO FO 371/3136 No. 177223

Lewis Namier's note on Captain Amery's memorandum

Captain Amery appears to have been somewhat prematurely disturbed by the political conditions which will evolve from the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He sees a multitude of States arise and fears that their future political and economic rivalries may lead to a Balkanisation of Central Europe. He then urges that the only remedy for this danger exists in some form of federal union or unions.

One wonders whether he clearly visualises the fact that the disruption of Austria-Hungary will not add to the number of States in Europe, but merely render their frontiers more reasonable, and that the entire problem which he has raised reduces itself to that of the Czecho-Slovaks and Magyars. Jugo-Slavia will take the place of Serbia whilst Transylvania will go to form a Greater Roumania, and neither of them will constitute a new problem for the future. The emergence of Poland and the Ukraine is due, not to the disruption of Austria-Hungary, but to the collapse of Russia, and the dangers which are to be apprehended as between these two States do not arise out of East Galicia alone, nor can we expect them to be solved by any kind of confederation between these two States.

As regards German Austria, it must be remembered that the great mass of German Austrian opinion has now come to regard the disruption of the Empire as an unpleasant amputation perhaps, but at least as an accomplished fact, and their eyes are turned with a feeling of something akin to relief away from the hereditary incubus of a Slav or Magyar connection to their congenital home in Germany. It is unthinkable that the German Austrians could contemplate reuniting on equal terms in however loose a form with their former Slav compatriots. They might perhaps agree to a reunion if a predominant position were conceded to them in the new federation, which would then be but the old Austria under a new name. To its recreation the other nationalities have no reason whatsoever to agree, nor would it be to our interest for, so far from restoring the balance against Germany, an Austrian federation under German leadership would merely increase the difficulties caused by the collapse of Russia. There remains, therefore, only Hungary and Bohemia, and it is indubitable that the problems which will arise between these two will be acute and pregnant with future friction. It should be observed, however, that we are at present entirely in the dark as to what is happening either in Hungary or Bohemia, and that it is impossible at the present stage to forecast what will emerge from the

present acute confusion in both countries. It would surely be wiser for us to form no settled policy, or even opinion, as regards the future status of these countries and their relations towards each other and their neighbours until they themselves have evolved some national principle and are in a position to provide us with a definite scheme representing the views of some more or less permanent organism. It is surely unnecessary and imprudent to embark on conjectures as regards the future Central European Federation when the political leaders in the States of Central Europe are not as yet certain in regard to their own wishes.

As regards the Czecho-Slovaks, however, there are certain principles which have a less remote application.

At present they confuse the claims of legitimacy, of paramount interests and of self-determination, and combine a plea for their historic and strategic frontiers in the west and north with a plea for their ethnographic frontiers in the south and east. The incorporation of Germans in the Czecho-Slovak State will be a weakness to it, and the Czechs in their own well understood interest should avoid as far as possible the inclusion of German districts in their State. If in some particular districts, as seems to be really the case, the paramount strategic and economic interests of the Czechs, though contrary to the national principle, are such as cannot be disregarded, we must make clear to them that the doctrine of self-determination, not being merely an excuse for anti-German map-making, overwhelming reasons will have to be adduced for any infringement of that principle whomever this may concern. In a word, it would be unwise to allow ourselves to be frightened by the kaleidoscopic changes in the map of Europe into attempts to recreate federations which might prove unnatural and contrary to the wishes and real interests of those concerned.

Self-determination will inevitably lead to much confusion and rivalry, but the League of Nations should do much to localise the danger and eventually to stabilise the situation.

7/11/18

L.B. N

8. DOCUMENT

Harold Nicolson's notes on Captain L. S. Amery's memorandum on the Austro-Hungarian problem, dated 22 October 1918. [TNA PRO FO 371/3136]

Source: TNA PRO FO 371/3136 No. 177223

Harold Nicolson's notes on Captain L. S. Amery's essay on the Austro-Hungarian problem, dated 22 October 1918

Captain Amery's remark that in Bohemia and Moravia the Czechs base their claims on an historic basis, whilst in Slovachia they change to that of ethnography is incontestably correct. With this kind of shifting of ground in accordance with the one that suits them better we meet in every single one of these small nationalities. It is in the same way that the Poles claim Posnania on grounds of ethnography and everything they can get hold of in the east on grounds of history. I certainly agree that such a procedure is by no means legitimate, but it must be admitted that in the case of the Czechs there is some sense in it and more justification for it than in most other cases. Certain parts of German Bohemia are absolutely essential to the Czecho-Slovak State, and if after this war international relations continue on a basis which makes strategic or economic securities necessary, the Czechs cannot possibly admit an ethnographic partition in Bohemia.

On the other hand, their claims to Slovachia are not merely claims to a wider frontier — they involve the very existence of an entire nation, the Slovaks. This, I think, is a question which deserves some attention: whether the disregarding of a certain national claim affects merely a branch of the nation or the nation as a whole. Should even a few million Germans be included in the Czecho-Slovak State, there will still exist in the world a powerful political German nation which in every respect renders the life of those not included in that German State more tolerable. Should, however, the ethnographic Slovak claim in north-western Hungary be disregarded, the Slovak nation would not exist anywhere in the world at all.

Still, should it prove possible to cut off certain parts of German Bohemia from the Czech State and unite it to Germany, I think this should be done even though the Czechs might violently protest against such an "amputation".

As to Captain Amery's far-reaching and no doubt interesting speculations about the future of the different nationalities, I do not believe it would be of much profit to enter into them in the abstract. Jugo-Slavia and a Great Roumania can exist on their own even better than the small Serbia and the small Roumania have hitherto existed. The Austrian Germans will determine their own fate, and it is hardly profitable for us to discuss what they should do whilst they themselves probably do not

yet know what they intend to do. It is just for this reason that I feel it to be so futile to develop at the present stage plans for the future Danubian Federation.

So that in the last resort the questions raised by Captain Amery may be reduced to two: (1) to the question of the Czecho-Slovaks (2) the question of the Magyars — what frontiers are to be given to these two nations, ethnographic or historic? And what is to happen to their States once they are constituted within such frontiers?

The problem of the bigger super-national units which Captain Amery raises in his paper hangs closely on the question of the League of Nations, and I do not presume to pronounce any judgment upon it. But these are two questions of interest which emerge from the paper and which we had better consider in a fundamental manner: (1) Are we in the peace settlement going to practise equal justice and with an even hand apply certain principles for which we profess to stand or are we going to take the view that in all doubtful cases our enemies — the Germans and Magyars — have to suffer? (2) Have the new States which we propose to create to be created on bases strategically and economically such as were required previous to this war, or is the League of Nations going to become something real which will change the face of European politics just as the introduction of a municipal or Government police has made it possible for people to do away with iron shutters in their houses?

[Unsigned]

9. DOCUMENT

Memorandum prepared by the Political Intelligence Department (Foreign Office. Extracts) [TNA PRO CAB 29/2] Foreign Office, December 1918. South-Eastern Europe and the Balkans South and South-Eastern Europe

On 13 December 1918, the Foreign Office produced a memorandum on the borders of Central and South-Eastern Europe. The memorandum strongly reflects Seton-Watson's views, and thus shows that by this time the Foreign Office was dominated by the New Europe circle.

The memorandum starts with the question: what is Hungary in the present situation? The answer is that until the political situation in Hungary is fully clarified, it is difficult for Britain to take a position on a state whose future territory, nature and intentions are currently unclear.

The memorandum summarised the essence of British policy to be followed as follows. The recognition of the Czechoslovak Government obliged it to accept the separation of the Slovak population from Hungary. In the case of the Yugoslavs and the Romanians, the government did not go as far as this, but expressed and showed its interest in the unification and independence aspirations of these two peoples. The Memorandum stated that the unification of the Yugoslavs was practically achieved. In the case of the Romanians, political events have postponed it, but they cannot prevent it for long

The Memorandum took Seton-Watson's position as a starting point for drawing Hungary's borders and sought to establish the following principles: the main priority was to take account of the interests of Czechoslovak, Romanian and Yugoslav states. For the delimitation of the frontiers of these new states, frontier commissions should be set up, consisting of representatives of the two countries directly concerned and delegates appointed by the Peace Conference or the League of Nations.

In order to diffuse friction between peoples (races), it may be useful to establish certain grey zones, which are generally considered to be a matter of dispute between the parties and which should be kept under international control until the boundary commission has made a decision. This is the only way to avoid intense propaganda, intrigue and "incidents". Three such large "grey zones" would have to be established on the territory of the Kingdom of Hungary:

1. between Hungarians and Slovaks;
2. between Hungarians and Romanians;
3. between Hungarians and Yugoslavs.

Source: The National Archives - Kew London. [PRO CAB 29/2] Foreign Office, December 1918. Summary of the British position on South-East Europe and the Balkans (See also the annex on page 46).

Memorandum prepared by the Political Intelligence Department (Foreign Office. Extracts) [PRO CAB 29/2] Foreign Office, December 1918

SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE AND THE BALKANS SOUTH AND SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

Synopsis of British Desiderata General

1. To obtain a just and permanent settlement based on the principles of nationality, self-determination, security, and free economic opportunity.
2. To frame this settlement in such a way as (a) to leave no avoidable cause for future friction in South-Eastern Europe, and thus to prevent as far as possible a combination between Italy, Bulgaria and Rumania against Greece and Jugo-Slavia, (b) to liberate the main economic routes and outlets in such a way as will draw the trade of Central Europe to the Mediterranean, while at the same time laying the foundation for a future Customs union.
3. To make full provision for the rights of minority nationalities in the new States.
4. To include the whole settlement in the Final Act of the Congress, thereby to give it the sanction, if not the actual guarantee, of the League of Nations.
5. To permit no secret understandings and agreements between the countries of South-Eastern Europe, and to secure that public opinion in these countries realise that the settlement is imposed by the League of Nations and will be permanent.

Specific Desiderata

Bulgaria (see p. 5).

1. In the event of Serbia and Rumania obtaining union with their co-nationals, the Allied and Associated Powers to secure, in the interests of a pacific settlement, the return to Bulgaria of the districts of Ishtip and Kochana and of at least certain portions of the Dobrudja taken from her in 1913.
2. Bulgaria might also eventually and on fixed conditions obtain in Turkish Thrace at least the towns of Adrianople and Kirk Kilisse, if not the Enos-Midia line.

Jugoslavia and The Kingdom of Serbia (see pp. 13 and 19).

1. Serbia to unite, either (preferably) under the Karageorgevitch dynasty or in

the form of a republic, with the Jugo-Slavs of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire.

2. Serbia to come to an amicable arrangement with Rumania in regard to the joint frontier in the Banat.

3. The people of Montenegro to be given an opportunity to opt for inclusion in the new Jugoslavia.

4. As regards the Adriatic, we are ourselves bound to maintain the Italian Treaty of 1915.

Greece (see p. 27).

1. Greece to establish an enclave in Anatolia centering round the purely Greek districts of Smyrna.

2. An arrangement to be come to between Greece and Italy in regard to the Dodekanese Islands,

3. An arrangement to be come to, if strategically possible, between His Majesty's Government and Greece, in regard to the cession of Cyprus.

4. Greece to obtain all the Aegean Islands, and, in the event of (1) above proving impracticable, the inclusion of t of the "Greek" portions of Thrace,

the 5. The inhabitants of Southern Albania, south of the Voiussa, to be allowed to opt for inclusion in Greek territory.

Albania (see p. 11).

1. The status quo to be maintained subject to (a) the establishment of an Italian protectorate, Italy being mandatory of the League of Nations. Nations, (b) of an Italian enclave at Valona, and (c) of self-determination for North Epirus.

2 The future constitution of Albania to be based on the cantonal system, if necessary under an Italian prince.

Rumania (see p. 20).

1. Populations of Austria-Hungary within frontiers suggested to be to be accorded right of union with Rumania.

2. The frontiers of the new State to be drawn as far as possible on ethnical lines, and not on those of the 1916 Treaty

3. An amicable arrangement with the Jugo-Slavs as to the Banat frontier.

4. Cession to Bulgaria of at least certain portions of Dobrudja taken in 1913, but excluding Silistra.

5. Self-determination for Bessarabia.

Bohemia (see p. 33).

Recognition of Czecho-Slovak Republic within frontiers discussed in the explanatory memorandum.

Italy (see p. 32)

1. The Trentino, with the strategical frontier of the Brenner, to be ceded to Italy.
2. As regards the Adriatic, we are bound by the 1916 Treaty, and must abide thereby. It is to be hoped, however, that the Italian Government will anticipate the objections which may be raised at the Congress, and recognising the necessity for future friendly relations with Jugoslavia, will agree to a modification of the Treaty.

Economic

1. Following to be free ports:-

Constantinople

Kavalla

Salonica

Fiume

Trieste

Smyrna

2. Transit franchise on following routes to be guaranteed to States interested:-

Constantinople –Sofia–Nish. Kavalla–Uskub (when constructed).

Kavalla–Philippopolis (if constructed).

Salonica–Uskub

Salonica–Monastir.

Trieste–Austria lines.

Fiume–Hungary lines.

Smyrna–Aidin

The above desiderata will entail the insertion of the following main provisions in the treaties to be concluded with the former enemy States: -

Treaties**1. Austria-Hungary**

(a.) The authorities who are recognised as the successors to the former Austro-Hungarian Government to renounce all claims to the territories inhabited by the liberated peoples as defined within the frontiers recommended, and to recognise the right of these peoples to determine their own future status and governance. A Joint Commission to be established to delimitate the new frontiers.

(b.) The successors of the late Austro-Hungarian Empire to undertake to enter into treaties with the States formed by, or representing, former Austrian subject races in regard to such questions as national minorities, concessions and State succession. These treaties to be submitted to, and approved by, the Congress at Paris, and to be embodied in the Final Act of that Congress. The question of the future

responsibility of the liberated peoples for the Austro-Hungarian war and pre-war debts to be referred to a Mixed Commission.

(c.) Provisions for the maintenance and safeguarding of British commercial and private interests, concessions, claims and contracts in former Austro-Hungarian territory.

2. Bulgaria.

(a.) General undertakings providing for the safe guarding of British commercial and private interests claims, contracts, &c.

(b.) Bulgaria should defer specifically to the decision of the Allied and Associated Governments the question of the future Bulgarian frontiers.

3. Turkey (treated at length on separate paper on British desiderata in Turkey).

(a.) Turkey to renounce all claim to the territory beyond the Enos-Midia line. (b.) To allow Greeks of Smyrna district to exercise self-determination.

4. Subsidiary treaties will also have to be concluded with Jugoslavia, Rumania, and Greece in regard to their succession to the servitudes and responsibilities of former Austro-Hungarian, Turkish, and Albanian territory.

5. A special Convention will also have to regulate the future of the Danube Commission.

**EXPLANATORY MEMORANDA
INTRODUCTORY**

1. In discussing the problems of geographical and political reconstruction of the various States of South-Eastern Europe, the principles that have been kept in sight in the accompanying memoranda in so far as they may contain recommendations for determining our attitude at the coming Ponce Conference are those laid down by President Wilson in the eleventh of his Fourteen Points, viz., “that the relations of the several Balkan States to one another should be determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality, and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan States should be entered into.”

2. These principles undoubtedly offer the best prospects of permanent pence in South Eastern Europe, and as such are the most desirable and advantageous from the point of view of British interests.

3. It was hitherto the policy of various Great Powers such as Germany, Russia,

and Austria Hungary to sow discord and dissension among the small States in South-Eastern Europe, with the object of preventing their union and the erection of a barrier against their own grasping designs. It should, on the contrary, be our object to give these States unity, independence, and strength. This object can probably scarcely be carried through without some opposition.

In Italy, for instance, Yugoslav unity is regarded in some quarters with apprehension; similarly, in France doubts exist whether Balkan unity will be altogether to French advantage in economic matters. But the influence of the British and United States Governments should be sufficient to override these objections and to realise the principle of the "Balkans for the Balkan peoples." The first step towards this is, of course, the encouragement of a good understanding between these peoples themselves. Such encouragement has already been given and has borne good fruit.

The Serbians and Roumanians, the Serbians and Greeks (not to speak of the Serbians and Yugoslavs) are already well on the way towards an understanding. 4. In the matter of territorial divisions too pedantic a formula should not be followed based wholly on racial and linguistic affinity, but so far as possible the desires of the inhabitants themselves should be ascertained, though economic considerations, and in some cases urgent political or strategical necessities (e.g. the Vardar railway in Macedonia), should not be left out of account. The Powers should impress upon the various States that it is in the interests of all to pursue a liberal policy in regard to certain ports and trade routes in which more than one Power has an interest, such as Trieste, Fiume, Salonica, Kavalla, Constantinople, and the Venice Belgrade-Constantinople and Belgrade Salonica routes. [990-12]

5. The one direction in which His Majesty Government find themselves precluded from directly supporting wholly justified national claims is along the eastern littoral of the Adriatic, where their freedom of action is fettered by the Agreement of London signed with the Italian Government in April 1915.

6. From the point of view of nationality the claims of Italy on this coast are totally inadmissible; nevertheless there can be no question but that His Majesty's Government are rigidly bound by their signature of the Agreement not to oppose the Italian demands, although it might well be argued that the Italians themselves have failed to abide by some of the provisions of the Agreement.⁷⁵ Whilst, however, His Majesty's Government are so bound, there seems no reason why they should support the Italian claims at the Congress—a policy which would alienate from us both Yugoslav and United States sympathies — and it might therefore be best to warn the Italians that, whilst we adhere absolutely to our signature, we feel compelled to point out to them that the violation of the nationality principle will be flagrant should they persist in their claims, and that this violation is likely to entail dangerous consequences in the future. Moreover, it should be made clear to Italy that circumstances have undergone considerable alteration. At the time when the treaty was made the object of Italy was

⁷⁵ E.g., the case of Albania

to secure strategic protection both against the menace of a still existent Austria Hungary and against the danger of Russian control over the Slav populations of those parts. Further, there was then no question of the formation of a united Yugoslav State, nor had the Yugoslavs by then shown, as they have since shown incontestably, their almost unanimous determination to construct a united independent Jugoslavia. This fact, of which sympathetic note has been taken by President Wilson, and which the Italian Prime Minister has recognised as in accordance with the interests of Italy, leaving out of account altogether for the moment the sympathetic support accorded to it by the British and French Governments, should be taken seriously into consideration by the Italian Government.

If the object of the Italians be merely to secure strategic security in the Adriatic, they should be content with such key positions as Pola, Lissa, and Valona. Possibly more moderate opinions may yet prevail in Italy.

His Majesty's Government were at one time also committed under a Treaty of Alliance to support excessive territorial demands put forward by Rumania, but subsequent events have enabled His Majesty's Government to resume their freedom of action in this instance, and to approach the question from the standpoint of the peoples concerned.

The whole question of Italian claims is dealt with in a separate memorandum.

BULGARIA.

INTRODUCTORY.

1. Strictly speaking, Bulgaria is not entitled to any consideration from the Allies; it would, nevertheless, be poor policy on the part of the latter to allow themselves to be swayed by this fact, and to penalise Bulgaria territorially for the part taken by her in the war, for the simple reason that it would leave in the Balkans a centre of discontent which would most certainly result in a disturbance of the peace at some future date. It should rather be the aim of the Conference, whilst being careful not to offend our Balkan Allies, so to adjust matters that Bulgaria will not only not be left under a sense of injury and resentment, but that there may be some prospect of her gradual reconciliation with her neighbours.

2 Chauvinism and Nationalism have hitherto been the causes of Bulgaria being a source of unrest. The former, which was due to the megalomania of King Ferdinand and the ideas of some of his statesmen regarding Bulgarian hegemony in the Balkans, will, it is hoped, disappear with the altered circumstances of the balance of power among the various States, Nationalism found its expression in a constant agitation in support of claims to the possession of certain regions in Macedonia, Thrace, and the Dobrudja. It remains for the Conference, if possible, to devise a settlement which will allay this agitation.

Macedonia

See Map. I.

Under an agreement concluded between the Balkan Allies in 1919, a portion of Macedonia was divided as between Serbia and Bulgaria into the “contested and uncontested zones”, that is to say that, in the former Serbia contested the Bulgarian claims to preponderance the Bulgars among inhabitants, while in the latter she admitted the preponderance.

Through these zones, roughly from north-west to south east flows the River Vardar, along the right bank of which runs the railway from out Serbia through Üsküb to Salonica - a most important artery for the Serbians.

Supposing no the ground of justified nationality claims, the whole of the uncontested zone to be ceded to Bulgaria, Serbia is not only out off entirely from Salonica, but as the uncontested zone extends south to the Greek frontier Serbia is also entirely separated from Greece, unless some unpractical arrangement be made for bringing together the Serbian and Greek frontiers by partitioning Albania — an unjust proceeding.

Under the circumstances, Serbia, who seized the whole uncontested zone in 1918, and is now again in occupation of it, has not unnaturally always resisted the cession of the uncontested zone to Bulgaria, and her reasons for this resistance are so good that it is scarcely fair to override them.

Possibly, however, a compromise may be devised. The one proposed is that Serbia should cede to Bulgaria that part of the uncontested zone which lies east of the Vardar, the Bulgarian frontier being so follow line of the Vardar up to the arranged junction of that river with the Pchina, and then rejoining the present Bulgarian frontier by following the course of the River Kriva, This would leave to Bulgaria the towns of Ishtip, Kochana, and that part of Veles on the left bank of the Vardar; whilst Serbia would retain Üsküb and Monastir, by which she sets great store.

Of course, the objection immediately raised by the Serbians would be that the occupation by the Bulgarians of the left bank of the Vardar renders the Üsküb - Salonica Railway, which runs close along the south bank, useless. But this objection could be met by the Allies undertaking to assist Serbia with the construction of a railway from Üsküb via Tetovo (Kalkandelen) to Monastir, which is already linked by railway with Salonica.

Such a railway would give Serbia two lines at her disposal to Salonica in peace time, and appears to offer very great economic possibilities by future connections with the Greek railway system and with Vallona.

Bulgarian protests against Serbia occupying a large part of the uncontested zone might be met by suggesting that the Serbian and Bulgarian Governments should agree to facilitate the migration from one territory to another of those of inhabitants who do not who do not wish to remain under foreign rule, and that the properties of these inhabitants should be bought at a fair valuation. An experiment

of the kind in the matter of transplanting populations was made in Thrace, and showed itself to be successful.

Of course, for the sake of fairness towards our ally. the cession of territory they are hereby called upon to make should be contingent on the Serbians obtaining also complete access to the Adriatic Sea, and it would probably be necessary in the interval of the new rail- way being built that the Powers should undertake to guarantee the security of the Üskub-Salonica Railway

Another solution for the Macedonian question, viz., the establishment of an autonomous State under the League of Nations, has been proposed, but this meets with violent opposition on the part of the Greeks and Serbians, and seems unpractical for other reasons.

2. Serbo-Bulgarian Frontier.

As regards the eastern frontier between Serbia and Bulgaria, it is not expected that any claims will be See Map I. raised involving more than minor delimitation. It is possible that in the north-east the Serbians will claim a rectification of frontier such as will bring them to Vidin, and in the south-east both Serbia and Greece may wish to alter the Strumitsa enclave.

As regards these points, we can only wait until Greece and Serbia have formulated their views, when their respective claims can be judged on their merits. It is possible. however, that as regards Serbia, a compromise can be effected by the cession to Bulgaria of the Piroto enclave to which the Bulgarians, ethnically speaking, have some claims.

3. Thrace

See Map V.

It may be expected that Greece will desire to extend her frontier to the east, so as to include not only the districts south of the Arda accorded to Bulgaria by the Treaty of Bucarest, but also the former territory of Turkey (in Europe) north of the Enos-Midia line. From the Greek point of view there would be some ethnical justification for this claim, since there is, or rather was, a considerable Greek population resident in these districts, especially upon the coast. There are, however, Bulgarian colonies at Adrianople and Kirk Kilisse, and as a result of the deportation and massacres of the last five years the whole district has been to a certain extent cleared of its Greek population. It is understood that the Greeks would be prepared, in the event of their obtaining this territory, to allow Bulgaria a frontier which would give the latter Adrianople and Kirk Kilisse, and at the same time to provide for Bulgarian access to the Aegean by means of transit rights and the constitution of Dedeagatch as a free port.

The cession of Thrace to Greece would, however, be open to the following objections:-

(1) Even under the guarantees above noted, the occupation of Dedeagatch by Greece would cut Bulgaria off from free access to the Aegean, and would thus perpetuate Bulgarian resentment.

(2) It would leave Greece with an extremely vulnerable frontier, a continual temptation to Bulgaria.

(3) It would bring Greece into direct contact with the zone of the Straits, and would certainly lead to unrest and irredentism among the numerous and powerful Greek elements at Constantinople and Rodosto. This could only tend to complicate the task of the High Commissioner.

The whole question is one, however, which will depend largely upon whether Greece is given an enclave in the Smyrna district and on the extent to which Bulgarian claims in Macedonia are recognised.

A point to be noted is that, whatever the future disposal of Thrace may be, the Power occupying Adrianople should be obliged to dismantle the fortress.

From a political point of view, it is urged that the satisfaction of Greek aspirations in the Smyrna district will offer less disadvantages than their expansion in Thrace.

The question of the suggested Greek enclave in the Smyrna district is dealt with fully in the memoranda devoted to the eventual settlement of Turkey.

4. The Dobrudja

The return to Bulgaria of that portion of the Dobrudja which was taken from her by the Treaty of Bucarest is to be recommended. The frontier should, however, be rectified so as to leave Silistra to Rumania, and should be dependent upon the latter Power uniting with the Rumanians of Hungary and Bukovina. This question is treated in more detail under "Rumania."

II. - INTERNAL

1. It would be premature at this stage to indicate any settled line of policy regarding the future government of Bulgaria. We should, however, insist on the abdication of King Ferdinand being maintained, and should welcome any Bulgarian movement for placing their institutions upon a broader democratic basis.

2. In any territorial readjustments which may be made it must be strictly laid down that the linguistic, religions, cultural, and scholastic rights of all subject nationalities must be fully safeguarded and guaranteed.

In the event of any German officials being brought to justice for cruelties committed in occupied districts the same procedure should be followed with regard to Bulgarians for their cruelties towards the Serbians.

III-ECONOMIC,

Our main economic desiderata in Bulgaria will be dealt with in a separate paper covering the whole of the Balkans.

It is necessary, however, to note in this paper that we should secure for Bulgaria the constitution of Salonica as a free port, with traffic facilities on the railways leading from that port into Bulgaria. A similar condition should certainly be applied to the port and future railway of Kavalla, and, in the event of its cession to Greece, of Dedeagatch. These guarantees, together with the opening of the Black Sea and the Straits, should afford Bulgaria all necessary economic outlets.

ALBANIA

THE three solutions proposed to replace the now obsolete settlement of Albania, arranged by the Ambassadors Conference in 1913, are:

Partition

1. The partition of Albania between Greece and Serbia, under which Albania would be reduced to a small Moslem State under Italian protection with a capital at Durazzo. Under this arrangement Serbia would annex what remains of northern Albania up to the line bounded on the south by the River Shkumbi, and on the west by the River Mati and the Gaben mountains, and Greece would annex southern Albania up to the River Slikumbi, leaving Italy to occupy Valona,

See Map

with a hinterland as shown on the map. This solution, which is both a violation of the doctrine of nationality and totally unacceptable to Italy, is best dismissed.

2 That Albania should be left with the frontiers as decided by the Ambassadors Conference and the Protocol of Florence, but that Serbia and Montenegro should in the north receive Albanian territory as far as the Drin, and Greece annex in the south the territory included between the Voiussa and the Valona enclave. This solution is open to the same objection as (1), especially in so far as regards the annexations by Serbia and Montenegro.

3. The third solution, which appears the most desirable, is that the northern Albanian frontier should remain unchanged subject to minor rectification, whilst

See Map II.

Greece should annex the districts of northern Epirus up to the Voiussa, excluding the Valona enclave, and that an Italian protectorate should be declared over the State of Albania.

This solution is by no means perfect. It fails to include in Albania the Albanian colonies of Ipek and Djakova; and, in the second place, the Greek claims to southern Albania are based rather on cultural bonds than on ethnical justifications. The Italian enclave of Valona cannot, of course, be justified, except on grounds of strategic necessity.

In justification of this solution, it may be urged, however, that the principle of self-determination would probably result in the union of southern Albania with Greece, whilst the exclusion of Ipek and Djakova may be remedied by a guarantee, after full examination of the question by an international commission, that the northern Albanian tribes shall retain their rights, not to their markets in these two places, but to their only grazing grounds situated within Montenegrin territory.

Internal.

All competent observers of the Albanian question are agreed that the internal security of the country can only be maintained by placing it under the protection of a Great Power, and that the Power naturally indicated is Italy. As, under our treaty with Italy, we agreed only that she might establish her protectorate over the small autonomous State of Durazzo, we may possibly urge our support of her claim to establish a protectorate over the whole country as an inducement to her to relinquish some of her pretensions on the Dalmatian coast. But it remains to be seen what attitude Serbia, Greece, and even France adopt towards the proposal for an Italian protectorate.

The internal organisation of Albania is probably best based on the cantonal system, as being the only one likely to reconcile conflicting tribal and religious differences. Once the principle of an Italian protectorate has been accepted, however, internal arrangement must be left to that Power, and there is no reason why we should raise any objection to an Italian prince, such as the Duke of the Abruzzi, being given the throne.

In assenting, however, to the establishment of an Italian protectorate, it is of importance that we should make it quite clear that the Italian Government are acting merely as the mandatory of the League of Nations, and that the League reserve for themselves a right of revising the agreement should this later appear necessary. The neutralisation of the Albanian coast and of the Corfu channel should also be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations and Greece should be required to give undertaking as regard minorities and cultural freedom in regard to the territories of the northern Epirus.

JUGOSLAVIA AND SERBIA

The Jugoslav Question.

The most complicated and at the same time the most important of racial and territorial questions in South-Eastern Europe is that connected with the Jugoslav peoples. It is the most difficult, both because internally, here more than anywhere else, we have to face incompletely conciliated rivalries, based on difference of religion and culture, and even alphabet, and, still more, on geography and his-

torical developments both ancient and recent. A still greater difficulty arises out of the conflicting claims of other races, particularly the Italians, with the Jugoslavs, and more especially from the official obligations of the British Government to the Italian Government in this connection. At the same time its very difficulty makes this question perhaps the most important of all those arising in South-Eastern Europe. Failure to solve it will perpetuate all the jealousies and political intrigues, out of which, it must never be forgotten, the European War directly arose. Success in solving it is essential for the solution not only of the Austro-Hungarian problem as a whole, but of the Balkan problem bound up with it. In this solution, it may respectfully be urged, His Majesty's Government and British opinion, together with the influence of the United States, alone can play a pre-dominating and successful part.

The Yugoslav Race.

The Jugoslavs, or, in more detail, the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, as they are officially named in the Pact of Corfu, stretch over practically the entire north-western area of the Balkan peninsula, taken in its greatest expansion up to the Alps. They are indisputably of one race: linguistically the only division that can be made is between the Serbo-Croats, forming the great majority of the race, and the Slovenes, but this linguistic difference is not nearly great enough to prevent the freest intercommunication between these two branches of the race. A more important difference is that of religion. The Serbs of Serbia, Montenegro, the former Kingdom of Hungary, Bosnia Herzegovina, and southern Dalmatia, belong to the Greek Orthodox Church; Croats of the Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia, Dalmatia, Istria, and elsewhere are Roman Catholics, as are the Slovenes. Historically this difference has been fundamental, and at the present day it is not altogether to be disregarded, although the idea of racial unity has to a very large extent swamped it, and a great number, not only of the Roman Catholic clergy, but of the Hierarchy, especially among the Slovenes, are the foremost protagonists of Yugoslav union,

Jugoslav Territories⁷⁶

The area inhabited by the Jugoslavs may be described stretching, approximately, as follows: Beginning in the north-west the line runs from Gradisca to the west of Villach; then south of Klagenfurt and north of Marburg to Radkersburg; then south-east just over the Hungarian frontier to about Mura Szerdahely; thence along the line of the Drave to where it flows into the Danube, just east of Esseg; north from there following the Danube upwards to Baja; east, on a line gradually bending south to the Theiss, west of Kikinda; then south-east running through the Banat again to the Danube to near Belobreska; from here east to

⁷⁶ For more detailed examination see Annex 1 on p. 40.

Orsova, and thence south, it follows more or less the frontiers of Serbia. Leaving out for the moment the question of the racial affinities of the Macedonians and the non-Yugoslav elements in the populations of Serbia and Montenegro, we may pick up the Yugoslav frontier again on the Adriatic at Dulcigno. Following the line of the coast, this frontier runs almost to Pola, but included within it are all the islands off the Dalmatian coast. From Pola the line, running more or less straight north to just east of Trieste, concludes this very rough outline of the Yugoslav racial frontier.

Its Historical Divisions.

This huge stretch of territory, comprising a population of roughly 12 millions, has, by the accidents of history and the designs of Austro-Hungarian policy, hitherto been divided into an incredible number of separate administrations. Leaving aside the free Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro, we find that Bosnia-Herzegovina, occupied by Austria-Hungary in 1878 and annexed in 1908, was under the control of a Minister responsible to the delegations of the two Parliaments of the Dual Monarchy. In Austria itself the province of Dalmatia contained a Yugoslav majority of 95 per cent: Carniola contained practically the same percentage of Slovenes; Slovenes are to be found in large numbers in southern Carinthia, south-eastern Styria, and the Küstenland province; Croats occupied eastern and central Istria. The Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia, attached for centuries to the Crown of St. Stephen, and since 1868 more and more subjected to direct interference on the part of the Hungarian Government, contained an almost purely Croat population. In the former Kingdom of Hungary. Serbs formed a predominant nationality in the south-west of the Banat, in the neighbouring district of Bačka across the Theiss, and considerable minorities in the district of Baranja, in the angle formed by the Drave and Danube. The Yugoslav race was thus apportioned unevenly between at least eleven administrative divisions. It is not proposed here to trace the history of how these divisions have been replaced, first by the idea and then by the foundation of one Yugoslav administration overcome the divisions artificially created. To the Yugoslav leaders felt, as shown in the Pact of Corfu, the necessity of emphasising the need for complete union of the race, not in any federal system, which would allow the old rivalries to continue, but in one united State wherein all three branches of the race should enjoy an absolute equality. It is indisputable that the method adopted was the only possible solution. The internal difficulties to be faced may for the moment be omitted from consideration, but it is clear, that it is essential to the success of the attempt that the frontiers drawn should roughly comprise the Yugoslav race unmutilated, and should allow it every facility compatible with the welfare of its neighbours,

Proposed Frontiers.

Seo Map III.

As regards these boundaries, British policy will have to be shaped differently in different localities, according to circumstances. We have, for instance, a free hand in respect to the frontiers between the Jugoslavs and the Austrian Germans, Magyars, and Bulgars. Likewise, as regards the Roumanian frontier, we are now free from the obligations in which the Treaty of August 1916 involved us. On the other hand, as to frontiers between Italy and the Jugoslavs, we are still fettered by the Agreement of London of April 1915.

1. The German Frontier. Starting from just north-west of Villach this frontier roughly could follow the line of the Drave (or the line of hills to the north of it) as far as the Marburg Graz Railway (which it would cut to the south of Stracs), and pick up the Drave again at Legrad, where the Mur joins it. Between Marburg and Legrad the racial line extends to the north-east in triangular form, and how far the frontier could be allowed to run will, of course, depend largely on geographical considerations, between Luttenberg and Legrad the Mur is a suitable frontier.

2. The Hungarian Frontier.— This is roughly formed by the line of the Drave to its confluence with the Danube, though, as we have seen, in Baranja Slav populations are found to the north of the Drave. The line of the Danube may again be used almost as far as Baja. From there to the Theiss, just west of Kikinda, an artificial line must be drawn in which geographical and economic considerations must be taken into account. Both in the case of the German and Magyar frontiers, due notice must be taken of the fact that German and Magyar minorities will be left within the frontiers of the new State; Germans, especially in the Gottschee district of Carniola, and scattered around Esseg and throughout Bačka, as well as in the Serbian Banat; Magyars in very large numbers in the north of Bačka. These minorities must be considered as coming under the head of minorities demanding favoured treatment under international arrangement.

3. The Rumanian Frontier.— Under the Treaty with Rumania of August 1916 the whole of the Banat was to pass to Rumania. Apart from people of wholly officialised mentality, it is now realised by Rumanians that this is not only unjust, but impossible. The result of unofficial or semi-official conversations between competent and moderate representatives of both sides has been to arrive at an arrangement by which the greater part of the county of Torontal and the south-west corner of Temes shall be incorporated in Jugoslavia. The rest of the Banat, with the possible exception of the extreme north-west corner, where there is a Magyar majority, shall unite with Rumania. No arrangement can be reached on purely racial lines. Not only are there very large German, and not negligible Magyar, minorities throughout the Banat, for which, as we have seen, special provision must be made, but Serbian and Rumanian populations are in many cases inextricably interlocked.

Serbian and Rumanian populations are in many cases inextricably interlocked. Therefore one, in reaching an agreement between the two peoples, the two principles that have been borne in mind are (1) the necessity of making such a frontier as will be economically workable, and (2) that a just proportion shall be made between the Serbs left under Rumania and the Rumanians left under Jugoslav rule.

The gist of the accord arrived at is that the Jugoslav frontier shall run from some point on the Theiss such as Ada, in a south-easterly direction, taking in the greater part of the county of Torontál, to a point See Map III. on the Danube west of Báziás. The Serbian point of view still is that the south-east corner of the county of Temes, including Weisskirchen, should be given to them, while the Rumanians insist that the railway from Temesvár to Báziás is essential to them. It is, however, unlikely that there will be any real difficulty this, the Rumanians would be perfectly willing recompensate Jugoslavia in Torontal for the small district round Weisskirchen, which they would give up. It may be taken then that the unofficial agreement which has been reached presents a very good basis for the case we would support. No Serbian or Rumanian responsible Minister could obviously yet put forward such a basis of agreement in public, and if urged by us they might formally protest, but this is an unimportant formality, and we are fortunately in the position of knowing that by pressing a solution such as has been described we should be likely to secure acquiescence on both sides.

4. The Italian Frontier.

All that the Italians on purely racial grounds are entitled to on the eastern shore of the Adriatic is: (1) the district of Aquileia up to the town of Gorizia and Gradisca; (2) the city of Trieste, (3) western Istria as far east as a line running more or less due south from Trieste to Pola. (2) and (3) are claimed by Jugoslav extremists, but it may be taken for granted that the idea of their not falling to Italy is absolutely out of the question. Serious difficulties only arise with the additional territories claimed by Italy on grounds of strategical necessity, historical connection, and, more especially, the Treaty of London of April 1915. This latter treaty handed over to Italy not only practically the whole of Istria, not only the bulk of the Adriatic islands, but the northern half of Dalmatia, though, except in the town of Zara, the population is overwhelmingly, in fact practically entirely, Jugoslav. In a preliminary memorandum suggestions have been put forward as to the manner in which our obligations to Italy, which we are loyally bound to maintain, can be reconciled with our moral obligations to the new Jugoslav State, and our wholehearted co-operation with President Wilson's policy. All that we are here concerned with is the lines of an arrangement which, supposing it could be reached, would alike satisfy all the justified demands of the Jugoslavs for securing in as full a measure as possible complete union of their peoples, and give Italy every military and naval guarantee of security which she can be considered justified in asking for. Intelligent

opinion in Italy has long recognised that the attempt to annex northern Dalmatia is bound to failure in the long run: that it would involve Italy in hopeless political and military complications, and that a persistence in this wild scheme would make any attempt at friendly relations with the Yugoslavs and their Allies quite impossible. Let it be supposed then that Italy is willing to abandon this claim, which can be justified on no ground, either racial or strategic, in return for compensations, territorial or economic, to be secured for her elsewhere (there seems little doubt that extensive concessions in Asia Minor would be regarded as more than adequate compensation). The whole of Dalmatia, including all the islands off the coast, except such points as, for instance, Lissa and Lussin, which may fairly be claimed by Italy as necessary naval bases, would pass to the new Yugoslav State. Italy will, of course, in any case have Trieste, though it is to be hoped that she will be strongly pressed to declare it a free port, and to allow the freest commercial access to it to the Slovenes and Germans of the hinterland. (Trieste and Fiume alike fall into the category of the ports internationally provided for.) As for Istria, on racial grounds the Yugoslavs are justified in claiming the eastern half, but if the Italians abandon their claim to Dalmatia, it is possible, even probable, that the Yugoslavs would have to submit to the loss of practically the whole of Istria, running up to the line of Monte Maggiore. This would leave, however, at least an adequate line of defence for Fiume, which is bound to become the chief port of Jugoslavia.

From the point of view of naval security Italy could rely on the possession of Trieste, Pola, certain islands such as Lissa and Lussin, and further south she will undoubtedly annex Valona. In possession of these five keys of the Adriatic it would be fantastic for her to pretend that any danger to her security would threaten from the side of the Yugoslavs. Moreover, these latter will not possess a fleet capable of menacing Italy at least for this generation. In fact, the Yugoslav view seems to be that the Adriatic should be neutralised, and that, so long as they possess no fleet themselves, there is no *raison d'être* for an Italian fleet in this sea. It is unlikely that the Italians can be persuaded to acquiesce in this view, but at least it may be tactfully pressed on them. Further, in dealing with this question, alike from the territorial and strategic point of view, it must be remembered that the Italian protectorate over Albania, to which, with certain reservations, it is suggested we should agree, may fairly be considered on our part as being an additional compensation for the abandonment by Italy of territorial claims under the Treaty of London, to which she is not entitled on either of the two grounds we have laid down.

The Position of Serbia and in Jugoslavia,

It has not been attempted in this Memorandum to go into detail with regard to the position of Serbia in the new Yugoslav State. We have seen that by the Pact of Corfu all the three branches of the Yugoslav race were to enjoy complete equality

in a unitary State, the only semblance of special treatment for Serbia being the recognition of the Karageorgević dynasty as rulers of the new kingdom. The Greater Serbian idea and Serbian local prejudices have in some cases died hard, [000-12] but for practical purposes we may regard them as dead. It would be absurd to imagine that every historical and religious prejudice has disappeared. There will most certainly time to time a recrudescence of local rivalries, but there is no reason why, with proper support from the Great Powers, the new Yugoslav State should not work well. Whether the capital will remain at Belgrade or be transferred either to Agram or, as has been suggested, to Spalato, is a matter for future decision.

KINGDOM OF SERBIA

The main questions affecting the future of Serbia have already been demit with under the headings of Jugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania It remains to discuss (1) the Serbo-Greek frontier and (2) the future of Montenegro, As regards (1), we can well await the result of the conversations which have taken and will take place between Monsieur Venizelos and Monsieur Pashitch. It is possible that an arrangement may be come to between Line two Prime Ministers which will entail the cession to Greece of the Doiran and Gjevvgjeli enclave.

See Map 1.

Montenegro.

(2) The future disposal of Montenegro presents greater complications. On the one hand, it is in the obvious political and economic interest of Montenegro that she should be incorporated within any State which may emerge from the union between Serbia and the Yugoslav provinces. Such a solution would, we have little doubt, be welcome to the Montenegrin people, and would be in accordance with the doctrines of self-determination and nationality. This arrangement will, however, meet with the fiercest opposition on the part of the King of Montenegro and his supporters. It is true, indeed, that the King of Montenegro merits little from his former Allies, and that the gravest suspicion exists that he betrayed his country to Austria, and that he has, during the earlier part of this year, been in communication with the enemy. At the same time, it may possibly be considered scarcely equitable to deprive him of his throne, and to suppress his dynasty without allowing him at least an opportunity to plead his case.

Under the circumstances, it might be advisable to ascertain the wishes of the Montenegrin people by some impartial international commission, on which the King of Montenegro's interests would also be represented. Presumably such a commission would decide overwhelmingly in favour of the union of Montenegro with the new Serbian State, but we should be leaving the King of Montenegro with a justifiable grievance were he prevented from putting forward his own case. It

might, however, be made quite clear to King Nikita that even if he were to return to Cettinje, the Powers would not be prepared to continue in his favour the subsidies which he previously received from Russia.

I-ECONOMIC,

The Belgrade Fiume Railway, the Belgrade- Salonica Railway, and the possibility of connecting the Serbian with the Bosnian railways will place Serbia in an advantageous position economically.

This question is further dealt with in the section devoted to economic desiderata in the Balkans.

Rumania The Rumanian Question The Treaty of August 1916 recognised as Rumanian not only the whole of Transylvania, the Banat, and practically the entire Bukovina, but a very considerable area of Hungary proper (the greater part of it, indeed, Rumanian in character), and in many points allowed Rumanian demands to be in excess of what they were justified in putting forward on racial or any other grounds. This treaty, it has been ruled by His Majesty's Government, is no longer binding since the conclusion of peace by Rumania with the enemy Powers, and we are thereby relieved from obligations the execution of which would undoubtedly have caused intense difficulties with the Yugoslav, Magyar, and Ukrainian populations of Austria-Hungary. Quite apart from this fact, the basis of the treaty, viz., acknowledgment of Rumania's right to annex certain parts of Hungary, was radically wrong even in the eyes of the Rumanians of Hungary themselves; as we have seen, it is not annexation but free union which they will support.

Its Difficulties

The Rumanian question is in certain respects more difficult than the Yugoslav question. No territorial line can be drawn in Hungary which will not, in uniting Rumanian territory with Rumania, at the same time enclose a very considerable and in some cases compact Magyar and German population. The Rumanian territories are not, as are the Yugoslav territories, inhabited by people almost exclusively of one race, nor are they bounded by natural frontiers such as we have seen in the case of Jugoslavia. It goes without saying, therefore, that the frontier line must be largely an artificial one, and secondly, that the question of the minorities of alien race passing under Rumanian rule must be carefully noted as one for special international arrangement.

Rumania's Annexations under the Treaty

The territories handed over to Rumania by the Treaty of August 1916 included the whole of the Banat, following the line of the Danube and the Theiss from Orsova to Belgrade, and thence to Szegedin. From there the line went north-east in rath-

er arbitrary fashion, passing through, to take the chief points, Hodmezővásárhely Bekescaba, just east of Debreczen, up to the Theiss again at Vasaros-Nameny; thence following the line of the Theiss through Huszt to Maramaros-Sziget, and soon after that turning north, and subsequently north-east, it enclosed the whole Bukovina except the small angle of it beyond the Prut.

Justified Rumanian Claims

In the greater part of this area, indeed, the Rumanian population is in a considerable majority. In Transylvania, even according to Hungarian statistics (notoriously falsified against the Rumanians), the Rumanian percentage is 55 per cent; while the minority is a mixed one of Magyars, Germans, and other nationalities.⁷⁷

Suggested Arrangement

The arrangement suggested in regard to the Rumanian-Jugoslav frontier on the Banat has already been dealt with in the section devoted to Jugoslavia, (see p 15). There is little doubt that a friendly agreement can be reached between the Jugoslavs and Rumanians over this. The sole part of the Banat which theoretically ought to be excluded from this arrangement is the extreme north-west comer in the angle formed by the Maros and Theiss, which is purely Hungarian in character, and faces the Hungarian city of Szegedin. Whether the Jugoslavs and Rumanians can be brought to leave this district to Hungary remains to be seen, but the attempt ought, perhaps, to be made. North from this, the line of the frontier between Rumania and Hungary should certainly run east of that drawn by the 1916 treaty. In the districts of Ugosca, Szatmar, Szilagy, Bihar, and Arad, certain sub-districts assigned to Rumania should be reconsidered. These have been tabulated in the memorandum by Dr. Seton-Watson hereto annexed,¹ and it is therein suggested that a "grey zone" between Magyars and Rumanians should be created, including certain of the districts named. Even when this has been done it is, of course, clear that, though the territories joined with Rumania would contain a considerable and adequate Rumanian majority, amounting even according to the Hungarian statistics, to 57.5 per cent., the Magyars would possess, again according to their own figures, 27.7 per cent., and the Germans 11.5 per cent. The actual figures of the population according to the Hungarian census of 1910, would be for the whole territory united with Rumania 4,789,175, of which 2,756,211 would be Rumanian, 1,333,509 Magyar, and 552,023 German. These are obviously very considerable

⁷⁷ Some of the counties just to the west of Transylvania are equally Rumanian in character. Szilagy, for instance, possesses, according to Hungarian statistics, a Rumanian percentage of 59; Arad has about an equal Rumanian percentage. But in certain parts, for instance, the county of Csanád and the parts of the county of Békés allotted to Rumania under the treaty the population is really practically purely Magyar, and the Rumanians have no racial claim.[990-12]

minorities and must be given an important place in the consideration of the question of racial minorities in general. The Transylvanian leaders express themselves as perfectly willing to allow cultural autonomy to these minorities, providing for the use of their language in primary schools. For the Szekler counties, where the population is almost entirely Hungarian, a measure of administrative autonomy may be obtained.

Bukovina

Under the Treaty practically the whole of Bukovina passed to Rumania. This, of course, cannot be justified on racial grounds. According to the last figures to hand the Rumanians in Bukovina numbered 273,254, while the Ruthenian-speaking population was 305,105. It is contended by Rumanians that great number of those Ruthenian speakers are of Rumanian race, and on historical grounds the province is purely Rumanian since it formed an integral part of Moldavia up till 1775, when it was ceded without any right by Turkey to Austria. Basing ourselves, however, on the facts of the present day, it is difficult to discover any justification for the Rumanian claim to the whole Bukovina. The Rumanian population, moreover, lives in proximity with Moldavia. Its chief centres are Câmpolung, Rădău Ti, and eastward from there. If some geographical line is sought as frontier, possibly that of the Seret might be chosen. The point at which the frontier between Rumanians and Ukrainians might be placed on the present Hungarian frontier is about Hnatiasa, north-west of the Kirli-Baba Pass. This would give roughly half of Bukovina to Rumania, but it would leave in Ukrainian hands the more fertile half, including the capital Czernowitz, the present seat of the Rumanian Archbishopric and a centre of considerable historical importance in the eyes of Rumanians. There is little doubt that Rumanians will press very strongly for the whole of Bukovina, or at least as much of it as they got under the treaty. Many of them are at present indifferent to their future relations with the Russians and Ukrainians; it none the less seems important that these future relations should not be ignored, and that no settlement should be made such as would prejudice friendly relations between these two neighbouring peoples.

Bessarabia

Since last April Bessarabia has been united with Rumania, from which it had been taken away by the arbitrary act of Tsar Alexander I in 1812. The conditions under which the act of union was made and its workings since then have been the object of special memoranda. There is no doubt that enthusiasm for union was to begin with confined to a few intellectuals; even the Rumanian peasants were indifferent, and all the other national minorities were opposed to it. None the less, union with Rumania seems the natural and wisest course to obtain the solution of the Bessarabian question. There is a considerable Rumanian majority in Bessara-

bia. According to the official Russian statistics of 1891, out of a total population of 1,641,599, 66 per cent, or 1,089,995 were Moldavians, while the other nationalities Ukrainians, Jews, Bulgars, Germans, and Russians-formed respectively only 13.6, 9, 6.25 and 2 per cent of the population. In 1913 the total population was estimated at 2,588,400, and if the same percentages obtain as in 1891 the Rumanian element may be put at 1,725,600. (Other opinion is inclined to reduce the Rumanian majority to about 60 per cent.) There seems in any case little doubt then that, on the basis of race, Bessarabia as a whole is directed to Rumania for her political connections. Moreover, a good geographical frontier is obtainable on the line of the Dniester. Apart from the Jews, who are to be found everywhere in the towns minorities of other races are chiefly distributed in the north-east corner, i.e., the department of Khotin, where the population is very largely Ukrainian and down in the south, the region known as the Bujak, where Ukrainians, Germans, Bulgars, and Russians are scattered in blocks all over these districts. In the case of the latter, the Bujak, obviously nothing more ought to be demanded than the maintenance of cultural rights, such as will form a subject for international consideration. In the case of Khotin, the Ukrainians will probably demand union with their brothers across the former Austrian and Russian frontiers. This seems both politically wise and geographically feasible, and for the reasons which have been mentioned in discussing the Bukovinan question we should appear to be justified in pressing this solution in a friendly way on the Rumanians. It is to be expected, however, that the Rumanians, to whom Bessarabia has always been an Alsace-Lorraine, will argue very strongly for the union of the whole of the province with Rumania with which it has now been united for nine months.

Transylvanians and Bessarabians

It cannot be argued too strongly that, alike in the case of the Rumanians of Hungary and the Rumanians of what was formerly Russia, there can be no question of our appearing to allow, or of the populations accepting, out-and-out annexation by Rumania. The time for this has passed, and for Transylvanians and Bessarabians alike (in the case of the latter they have made their independent standpoint perfectly clear both at the time of their union with Rumania and since) union must depend on the free choice of the accredited representatives of the people.

Such a preliminary choice can be made by the existing representatives: in Bessarabia the present Diet, in Transylvania the National Council, into which the executive of the Rumanian National Party of Hungary seems to have developed. It is clear that Bessarabians and Transylvanians alike will play a great part in the reconstruction of the new Rumania. Possibly they may not demand conditions of entry into the Rumanian State, but what they will undoubtedly demand is the recognition of the fact that they enter that State as free agents, not as annexed subjects. While no such acute differences as have arisen between the Serbian Government

and the Yugoslav Committee ought to arise between Rumania and the Transylvanians, grave danger is to be foreseen of a similar situation being created should politicians of so old-fashioned a type as M. Brătianu come into power again and put forward the Treaty of 1916 as the basis of Rumanian unity.

Rumanian Representatives at the Peace Conference

It is important that the delegations from Rumania shall be so constituted that it will be, and be accepted as, fully representative not only of the Rumanians of the Rumanian kingdom but also of the Rumans of Hungary and Bessarabia.

Relations with Russia

The importance of Rumania's future relations with her Russian or Ukrainian neighbours should not be overlooked. Present antipathies must not be allowed to prejudice future relations. In assenting to and encouraging the union of Bessarabia with Rumania it should be made perfectly clear that our action is not dictated by any anti-Russian feeling or neglect of Russian interests, but that the object for which we are working is the renewal of a friendly understanding between Russia and Rumania on a proper basis.

Dobrogea.

By the Treaty of Berlin, Rumania obtained Dobrogea from the Kilia mouth of the Danube down to a line starting just east of Silistra and reaching the Black Sea south of Mangalia at Ilanlik. By the Treaty of Bucarest, 1913, the frontier was pushed forward to include the departments of Silistra and Dobrich. The former area is now predominately Rumanian (55 per cent.). The Bulgars themselves only claim about 15 per cent of the population, the rest of which consists of Turks, Tatars, Germans, and Russians. It may be taken for granted that there can be no dispute as to this area returning to Rumania. With regard to New Dobrogea, the part annexed in 1913, conditions are very different. According to the Bulgarian statistics of 1905 this area was inhabited by about 130,000 Turks, 120,000 Bulgars, and only 6,000 Rumanians. The Rumanians assert that these figures are not reliable. What is clear is that the chief element in the population is Turk, and the second element Bulgar. and no other race forms any important part of it. The Bulgars are chiefly to be found in the eastern parts, especially in and around Dobrich, the Turks in the western half as well as scattered throughout the whole. It would seem an act of wisdom as well as of justice on the part of the Rumanians to consent to the return of the whole or of a great part of this province to Bulgaria. The proposal which has been made by authoritative Rumanians is that rather more than half of the province should be ceded. It is claimed that Silistra, which is not a Bulgarian city, should remain Rumanian, and that the frontier line should start from the Danube at some point to the west of Silistra and reach

the Black Sea at Cape Kaliakra. This would leave in Bulgarian hands not only Turtucaia, which is a Rumanian city, but a great part of the Turkish districts of New Dobrogea and the Bulgarian towns of Dobrich and Balchik. The exact line of this frontier must, of course, be a matter for a delimitation commission, but the important point to insist on is (1) that the Act of 1913 should be re-vised in favour of Bulgaria, and (2) that this revision should give to Bulgaria as far as possible the most Bulgarian points of Dobrogea.

Other Rumanian Populations.

Sight must not be lost of the fact that beyond the frontiers we have here suggested for Rumania there will be a considerable number of Rumanians living under foreign administrations. In the Timok Valley, the north-east corner of Serbia, for instance the Rumanians claim that there are 300,000 people of Rumanian race. No demand on the Rumanian side is being made for the union of these people with Rumania. But some measure of cultural autonomy such as has been hitherto denied them by the Serbian Government should be obtained for them by a friendly understanding between the Serbians and Rumanians, between whom there must in the question of the Banat and elsewhere be a good deal of give and take.

In Macedonia, south-eastern Albania, and Epirus are large Koutso-Vlach communities. It is claimed that those under Greek rule have adopted a pro-Greek orientation, with few exceptions. This is not certain, and the cultural rights which Greece has pledged herself to accord them should again be noted by the international authorities deputed to deal with this question in general. Similarly, in what will remain Jugoslav Macedonia and in Albania cultural autonomy should be secured for the Koutso-Vlachs.

Lastly, beyond the Dniester in the former Russian Governments of Kherson and Podolia there are very large Rumanian populations which Rumanian estimates put at something between 400,000 and 1,000,000. While there can be no question of their political union with Rumania, similar cultural possibilities should be secured for them as are conceded to Ukrainians remaining under or passing under Rumanian rule.

Two other questions remain for discussion which are of more than Rumanian bearing: the future of the Danube Commission and the position of the Rumanian Jews.

1. The Question of the Danube. As this question is being considered, together with those of other important European rivers, as part of the whole problem of ways of communication, it is not proposed to deal with it here beyond noting the fact that Rumanian feeling will only with great difficulty accommodate itself to any future control of the river and its mouths by a Commission of the Great Powers on which it has only a nominal influence. It cannot, of course, be claimed that the Lower Danube is a purely Rumanian affair, but it may perhaps be urged that Ruma-

nia should in the future be granted a more clearly recognised place in determining Danubian questions than hitherto.

2. The Jewish Question. It had been recognised for some time past by moderate opinion in Rumania that in Rumania's interest it was necessary to solve the Jewish question in the form of complete emancipation. In June 1917 M. Take Ionescu, with the consent of the then Prime Minister, M. Brătianu, publicly gave this promise in the Chamber on behalf of the then Government. This promise was some months ago noted by Lord R. Cecil as constituting the basis on which His Majesty's Government would wish to see the Jewish question in Rumania completely solved by the initiative of the Rumanian Government. The British Government have no wish to impose or to help in imposing on the Rumanian Government a solution in the style of that imposed by the Germans at the recent Treaty of Bucarest. Acting on this principle, an attempt was recently made both from the Rumanian and Jewish side to arrive at an understanding which would enable both parties to feel that the question had been settled by themselves without outside interference before the assembling of the Peace Conference. Unfortunately, this agreement, after being in sight, just failed in reach ratification. From Jewish side it is no threatened that the issue will be raised internationally. This is greatly to be deplored, both as constituting an apparent interference with the internal affairs of Rumania and as rendering the Jews there still more unpopular by their appearing to have owed their emancipation to foreign assistance. It is to be hoped before the issue is publicly raised that some accommodation may be reached.

GREECE

I.- TERRITORIAL

The questions affecting the northern and eastern frontiers of Greece have been dealt with under the heading of Bulgaria, Albania, and Serbia. There remain to discuss the questions of the Ægean Islands, the Dodecanese, Cyprus, and Mount Athos.

1. Ægean Islands.

The Ægean Islands were ceded with three exceptions to Greece by the recommendation of the Ambassadors Conference, but the Ottoman Government had, up to the outbreak of the present war, refused to recognise this decision.

In the final peace negotiations with Turkey, the formal cession of these islands should be demanded with the inclusion of Imbros, Tenedos, and Castellorizo. In view, however, of the importance of safeguarding the passage of the Dardanelles, the islands of Imbros, Tenedos, Samothrace, and Lemnos should be neutralised under the guarantee of the League of Nations Full provision should also be made for the rights and properties of the Moslem minorities in all ceded islands.

2. The Dodekanese.

The future disposal of the Dodekanese may be the source of difficulties between Greece and Italy. Under our treaty with Italy we agreed to recognise the Italian annexation of these islands and, although this arrangement is in complete violation of the doctrine of nationality, it is not one which we can now cancel in our own initiative.

The question is intimately connected with Greek and Italian aspirations in Asia Minor. If the Italians are to establish themselves in the Adalia region, they can argue with some force that strategic necessity will justify their keeping the Dodekanese. Should, however, Greece acquire Smyrna and district, she can likewise contend that on strategic as well as ethnical grounds these islands should be restored to Greece.

Being dependent mainly on the decisions which may be reached in regard to the future partition of Asia Minor, the matter is further dealt with in the section devoted to Turkey.

The position of the Greeks is that these islands should in justice be ceded to Greece, and that if the Italian Government can show good strategic reasons for having a base in these waters, they should be allowed to retain the island of Astropalia as a naval base.

3. Cyprus.

In 1914 His Majesty's Government notified the Greek Government that they were prepared to cede Cyprus to Greece. It is true that the conditions under which the offer was made have undergone a considerable change, but our obligations to M. Venizelos as well as our proclaimed adherence to the principles of nationality and self-determination may render it extremely difficult for us to refuse any longer to entertain the idea. At the same time, whilst from a purely political point of view the cession of the island may seem desirable, strategical considerations connected with the naval control of the Eastern Mediterranean have to be taken into account, more especially, perhaps, the future disposal of the port of Alexandretta. It should be noted that if Cyprus is eventually given to Greece, the latter Power should undertake not to allow any third Power to establish themselves in the island. Possibly an arrangement with Greece regarding the retention of a British naval base either in Cyprus or at Suda Bay in Crete might be sufficient to meet our naval requirements.

It should be noted that under the Anglo-French agreements of April and May 1916 we undertook not to cede Cyprus to a third Power without the consent of France and Russia.

4 Mount Athos.

Some difficulty was experienced at the time of the London settlement in 1913 in regard to the disposal of Mount Athos, when the Russian Government supported the claims of the Bulgarian and Serbian monasteries for territorial autonomy.

The present Congress should assign the peninsula to Greece leaving them to come to same arrangement with Serbia and Bulgaria in regard to Slav monasteries.

II.-INTERNAL.

(1) Great Britain is directly identified with the internal affairs of Greece as being one of the guaran teeing Powers under the Treaty of 1863. The history and scope of this obligation is given in the Appendix on page 29 of this paper.

The position of semi-tutelage under which Greece is placed by this treaty is resented by Greek public opinion and carries with it no corresponding advantage to British policy. The measures which we were obliged to take against King Constantine in 1916 were justified by considerations other than our treaty rights as a guaranteeing Power, and it is recommended that this perpetual servitude placed on Greece in 1863 should now, with the consent of Denmark, be abolished.

(2.) As regards the future régime in Greece, M. Venizelos has merited our complete confidence and support. He considers that Greece is not yet ripe for republican institutions, and he wishes for the present to maintain the existing régime of King Alexander. So long, therefore, as M. Venizelos remains in power little anxiety need be entertained as to the internal conditions of Greece, or her relations to this country Should the Greek people desire eventually to establish a republic, we need raise no objection.

(3) In return for the abolition of the control implied in the guarantee of 1863, it is urged that the Mixed Financial Commission at Athens should be retained but reconstituted so as to exclude representatives of enemy Powers, and to include a Greek and United States representative. The four Powers represented on the Commission would then be Greece, Great Britain, France, and the United States of America.

III. ECONOMIC.

The Greek Government should be pressed to declare Salonica and Kavalla as free ports. The general economic questions affecting British interests in Greece are discussed in the paper on economic desiderata in South-Eastern Europe.

APPENDIX TO SECTION ON GREECE.

Note as to our General Obligations under the Treaty of 1863. The nature of the guarantee which the protecting Powers (France, Russia, and Great Britain) afforded to Greece by the Treat Treaty of 1863 cannot be rightly understood without considering the Treaty of 1832, placing Otho of Bavaria upon the Greek throne, and the events which preceded it.

Greece came into existence as an independent State through the support which the Powers afforded to the Hellenic people in their efforts to throw off the Turkish yoke; and the protection afforded by the treaties of 1832 and 1863 was primarily protection and guarantee against Turkey.

In 1826 Greece, then in rebellion against the Porte, invited His Britannic Majesty to interpose his good offices in order to obtain the reconciliation of the country with Turkey His Majesty's Government consulted the Russian Government as to the lines upon which a settlement should be effected with Greece, and came to an agreement with that Power on the subject.

In 1827 Great Britain, France, and Russia entered into a treaty, under which they were to offer their mediation to the Porte with a view to effecting a reconciliation with Greece. The arrangements for that purpose were to be agreed upon by the contracting parties, and guaranteed by such of them as might deem it expedient or possible to contract that obligation.

In 1825 matters had advanced somewhat further. and the three Powers, Great Britain, France, and Russia, agreed that Turkish authority must be limited to suzerainty, and to the nomination of an hereditary chief authority for Greece.

In 1830 the three Powers agreed that Greece should form an independent State, and that the Government should be monarchical and hereditary Each of the three Courts was to retain the power conferred upon it by Article 6 of the Treaty of 1827 of guaranteeing this arrangement.

By 1832 Greece had established her claim to be independent of Turkey, and the three protecting Powers, authorised for the purpose by the Greek nation, offered the throne of Greece to Otho of Bavaria. This treaty provided that Greece, under the sovereignty of Prince Otho of Bavaria, and under the guarantee of the three Courts, should form a monarchical and independent State, according terms of the protocol to the of 1830, which had been accepted both by Greece and by the Porte. Article 8 contained the definite stipulation that the Crown should be hereditary, and pass to the direct and lawful descendant of Prince Otho, in the order of priority, with provisions for the event of failure of issue. In 1863 Otho was ejected by a revolution, and the representatives of the three Powers were constrained to recognise that the order of things established in 1832 had not consolidated itself under the dynasty which the Convention of 1832 had placed on the throne To mark their obligation to Bavaria they determined to invite a Bavarian representative to take part in the discussions as to the future of Greece. This offer was declined, and at a further Conference, held in London on the 27th May, 1863, the three Powers agreed that the impossibility of carrying into execution thence- forward the stipulations of Article 8 of the Treaty of 1832 resulted from an event which was beyond their control, and for which they were in no way responsible. They agreed further that the three Governments, while released from their trust by circumstances unprovided for by the Convention of 1832,

could not indefinitely defer the time when it was fitting to replace Greece under a system conformable to the monarchy, which it was their interest to maintain in the new State. They also placed upon record that the recent event Greece could not affect their firm resolution to watch over the maintenance of the repose, the independence and prosperity of Hellenic Kingdom.

Greece, meanwhile, it may be added, had agreed on the 31st March, by a vote of the Second National Assembly at Athens, to proclaim Prince William of Denmark as constitutional King of Greece, under the name of George I. At a further conference at the Foreign Office on the 5th June, 1863, the three Powers decided upon the arrangements to be taken to give effect to the wishes of the Greek nation, and invited the Danish Minister to take part in the deliberations. On the 3rd August of the same year the three Powers entered into a treaty between themselves. to which Denmark also was a party, making provision for carrying out the arrangements arrived at in the preceding June. It is under article 3 of this treaty. that the guarantee now in question was given, viz.. "That Greece, under the sovereignty of Prince William of Denmark and the guarantee of the three Courts," was "to form a monarchial, independent, and constitutional State." The treaty, however, contains no provisions corresponding to article 8 of the 1832.

The Powers were in reality doing no more than giving a formal effect to the wishes of the Greek nation, and made various arrangements to facilitate the acceptance of the throne by King George.

In the same way that the protecting Powers found in 1863 that the much more stringent terms of the 1832 Treaty imposed no obligations upon them to maintain the Bavarian dynasty upon the throne contrary to the wishes of the Greek nation, so now they would be entitled to maintain that the terms of the 1863 Treaty imposed no obligation upon them to continue the Danish dynasty upon the throne of Greece contrary to the wishes of the people. The guarantee was, in fact, not a guarantee to Denmark to maintain a Danish dynasty, but a guarantee to Greece to maintain against Turkish aggression the form of government which her people had then selected. Furthermore, the guarantee given in the Treaty of 1863 was not merely that Greece was to be monarchial, but also that it was to be an independent and constitutional State. There is no reason to attribute to the first of these three epithets an effect which would override the second and third. If Greece is to be independent and constitutional, the right of the Greek people to change their form of government must be recognised; it is an essential part of the right of every independent State to adopt what form of government it pleases. The terms of the Treaty of 1863 do not, therefore, oblige the three protecting Powers to maintain a monarch in Greece contrary to a clear expression of a determination on the part of the Hellenic people to establish a republic.

ITALY

Introduction.

The main questions which are likely to arise between His Majesty's Government and the Italian Government have already been dealt with exhaustively under such headings as Jugoslavia, Albania, the Adriatic, Greece, the Dodecanese, Asiatic Turkey, and Africa. The questions affecting Italian indebtedness, in respect of war loans and other supplies will be dealt with under the general paper on Allied indebtedness, which is being prepared by the Treasury. It remains only to discuss the frontier promised to Italy in the Trentino.

The Trentino.

The accompanying map shows this frontier as, arranged under the Agreement of the 26th April, 1915. The ethnical frontier separating the purely Italian districts of the Trentino from the German-speaking portions of Southern Tyrol, which is marked on the map in green, does not accord with the political frontier promised to Italy under the treaty. The same applies to the district of the Julian Alps north of Istria, where the Italians have insisted upon the strategical, as opposed to the strictly ethnical, frontier.

This delimitation concerns us only in so far as it constitutes a violation of the principle of nationality.

We are, of course, committed to it by our signature; but we are presumably entitled to inform the Italians that, whilst we consider ourselves rigidly bound by our word to them, we regard it with some apprehension. Its only excuse is if the Italian Government are able to show urgent strategic necessity for including the Brenner Pass in their northern frontier. The same may be said, in a lesser degree, of the line which follows the crest of the Julian Alps.

In any arrangement which may eventually be come to, it will be essential to secure that the German minorities left within Italian territory are accorded full cultural and linguistic privileges.

THE CZECHO-SLOVAK STATE

Introductory Summary

1. THE population of the three Czech provinces, Bohemia, Moravia, and Austrian Silesia, amounts to over 10 millions, of Slovakia to about 2,250,000. If certain feasible frontier rectifications are carried out in the Czech provinces the population of the future Czecho-Slovak State will amount to about 12 millions, of which 8,300,000 will be Czechs and Slovaks, almost 3,500,000 Germans, and about 150,000 Magyars. Some 600,000 Czecho-Slovaks would remain outside the

boundaries of that State, in Lower Austria and Vienna and in small enclaves in the Magyar plain.

2. By far the greater part of the German minority in the Czech provinces, and especially in Bohemia, inhabits districts contiguous on Germany or German Austria, but the frontier between the Czechs and the Germans cannot be drawn on a purely ethnical basis. Bohemia is a unit, which for geographical, strategic, and economic reasons must not be broken up only in the extreme south do some frontier rectifications seem possible. In Moravia the German and Czech settlements are interlocked to a very much greater extent than in Bohemia, and again in the south alone do some small frontier rectifications seem admissible. There seem, however, to be no valid reasons against dividing up Austrian Silesia, approximately in accordance with nationality,

3. The Czechs have been throughout the war our most devoted and most efficient Allies in Eastern and Central Europe, and in the very process of their recent revolution have proved themselves a nation capable of carrying on an orderly government in the most difficult circumstances. It is due to the Czechs, and it is also to our own interest, that they should be given the necessary conditions for organising a national State of their own. Under the peculiar conditions of Bohemia and Moravia it will not be possible to attempt a plebiscite, or the Czechs might lose districts essential to their national existence. Frontiers will have to be settled by agreement, and the Congress will have to pronounce final decisions as far, at least, as the main outlines of the settlement are concerned. The proposed frontiers are discussed in greater detail in the main body of the report.

4. It is obvious that the inclusion of a considerable German minority in the new Czecho-Slovak State is likely to create serious difficulties which, however, cannot be avoided in any other solution. The difficulties which will arise will have to be solved by an agreement between the two nationalities, and the Allied Powers can do much in the way of mediating between them. Czech schemes of a clearly aggressive anti-German or anti-Magyar nature should be discouraged, as the Czecho-Slovak State, containing a large German minority and being more than half-surrounded by German territory, cannot safely embark on any such policy, at least, not until Russia has recovered.

5. Russia has always been, and must remain, the pivot of Czech policy. The Czechs are determined to work for Russia's recovery, and seem admirably suited for that task. Both politically and economically they are likely to prove a valuable link between the Anglo-Saxon Powers and Russia.

6. No re-federation between the Czecho-Slovak State and German Austria is possible, as it would imply an indirect connection with Germany. Nor can the Czechoslovaks federate with the Magyars so long as any trace is left of the old Magyar imperialism and the old Magyar oligarchy. An alliance between the Czecho-Slovak State and Poland seems desirable, but can hardly be secured unless

the Poles abandon altogether their aggressive imperialist schemes against Russia, and give up their anti-Russian attitude.

7. The Czecho-Slovak State is, and must always remain, completely land-locked, and it will be, therefore, of special importance by every possible means to guarantee the Czech economic interests with regard to the navigation of the Elbe and the Danube, and their transit on the railways leading to the North Sea, Baltic, and Adriatic ports.

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1. Population of the Czecho-Slovak State.

The following are the figures of the Austrian official census of 1910 for the three Czech provinces:-

	Total number of Austria Subject present on dec. 31. 1910	Czechs	Per cent	Germans	Per cent	Poles	Per cent
Bohemia	6,713,000	4,240,000	63,2	2,468,000	36,7		
Moravia	2,605,000	1,869,000	71,7	719,000	27,6	15,000	
Silesia	741,000	180,000	14,3	326,000	43,9	235,000	31,7
Total	10,059,000	6,289,000	62,5	3,513,000	34,9	250,000	2,5

The Czechs claim that in the predominantly German districts of Bohemia about 700,000 Czechs were compelled to register as Germans, e.g., workmen afraid of otherwise losing their employment. There is reason to believe that the allegation of undue pressure and fraud having been committed against the Czechs is true, but the figure seems vastly exaggerated.

According to the official census of 1910, 122,000 Czechs inhabited Lower Austria, of whom about 100,000 were concentrated in Vienna. As far as Lower Austria and Vienna are concerned, it is notorious that pressure was exercised and frauds were committed with a view to reducing the Czech minority. The real number of Czechs in Vienna is estimated at between 200,000 and 300,000, whilst another 100,000 live scattered in the province of Lower Austria.

The Slovak country in North-Western and Northern Hungary does not correspond to any existing administrative division. It comprises practically the whole of eight "comitats"^{1*} or counties, and the northern parts of another eight "comitats."²⁺ It has been calculated that the population of the Slovak country, with its frontiers drawn in accordance with nationality, would include about 2,000,000 Slovaks, 150,000 Magyars, and a slightly smaller German minority. The exact figures cannot be ascertained, because the Magyar statistics have been notoriously unfair to the non-Magyar nationalities. A minority of about 235,000 Slovaks inhabiting enclaves would be left in Magyar territory. The Poles claim the northern parts of the Slovak counties of Orava and Spis to be ethnically Polish, and different estimates of the Polish population in these districts are put forward, some of them as high as 100,000.

This seems a gross exaggeration. Moreover, the dialects spoken by the Polish, Slovak, and Ruthene mountaineers inhabiting these districts approach each other fairly closely, and there is little likelihood of there being any marked Polish national feeling in Orava, which never since the beginning of the eleventh century was part of Poland.

The total number of Czecho-Slovaks within the late territories of Austria-Hungary amounts to about 8,900,000, and of these it will be found possible to include about 8,300,000 in the future Czecho-Slovak State. If no frontier rectifications are made in the three Czech provinces in favour of the Germans, the alien minority will consist of about 3,500,000 Germans and 150,000 Magyars.

2. Distribution of National Minorities in the Czecho-Slovak State.

More than 80 per cent of the Germans in Bohemia -i. e., well over 2,000,000-inhabit predominantly German districts bordering on Germany or German Austria. According to the official Austrian statistics the Czech population of these districts

* Orava (Arva), Liptov, Trenčín, Turec, Spis (Zips), Sarys (Saros), Zvolen (Zolyam), Nitra

+ Pressburg, Bars, Hont, Nograd, Gömör, Abauj-Torna, Zemplín, Ung

forms less than 10 per cent. of their population. Even making allowance for probable statistical frauds, the problem of these German districts of Bohemia remains very serious. Especially serious is it in the country round Eger (the western corner of Bohemia in between Saxony and Bavaria), where, according to the Austrian official census of 1910, a population of over 800,000 included but 20,000 Czechs.

In Moravia the German and Czech settlements are interlocked to a very much greater extent. Only just over half of the Moravian Germans inhabit territories contiguous on Germany or German Austria, and even within these districts almost 28 per cent. of the population was registered as Czech (all the figures are given subject to allowances to be made for misstatements in the Austrian census). In the north the German districts contiguous on Germany or the German part of Austrian Silesia have a population pop of 400,000, of which about two-thirds are German and one-third is Czech; in the south the predominantly German districts bordering on Lower Austria have a population of about 120,000, of which about one-seventh was registered at the census as Czech.

Of Austrian Silesia the western part is German, the central part Czech, and the western part Polish. The three political districts west of Troppau (Freiwaldau, Jägerndorf, and Freudenthal) are purely German, and have a population of about 174,000 inhabitants. The town of Troppau is almost entirely German, but the surrounding rural district is predominantly Czech, and their joint population consists of about 60,000 Germans and 34,000 Czechs. The extreme eastern part of the section of Troppau (the district of Wagstadt) and the extreme western part of the section of Teschen (the district of Friedeck) are Czech (total population 130,000; 70 per cent. Czech, 19 per cent. German, and 11 per cent. Polish). The three remaining districts of Teschen (Teschen, Bielitz, and Freistadt) are Polish (total population about 310,000; 70 per cent. Poles, 19 per cent. Germans, and 11 per cent. Czechs).

The problem of the Germans in the Czech provinces, stated at its worst, is this that of the 3,500,000 Germans about 2,750,000 inhabit predominantly German districts, bordering on Germany or German Austria; that on about five-sevenths of the immensely long border which the Czech provinces have in common with Germany and German Austria the population on both sides is German.

3. The German Problem in the Czecho-Slovak State.

As a rule, the fact that a fairly clear ethnical boundary could be drawn would be considered an advantage. It is not so in the case of Bohemia, for Bohemia is most essentially a unit which, for geographical, strategical, and economic reasons, must, not be broken up; in this case the ethnic division seems to suggest a course of action which must not be adopted. The Bohemian Mountain bastion is one of the most striking features on the map of Europe, its unity is almost as clearly marked as that of an island. Moreover, the German minority in Bohemia is not concentrated in one part of the country, but holds almost the entire mountain fringe south-west,

north-west, and north-east, from the Danube to the Oder. Should all the German districts of Bohemia and northern Moravia be separated from the Czecho-Slovak State its position would be practically untenable. Moreover, this German mountain fringe contains Bohemia's most important industrial and mining districts the Czech plain is predominantly agricultural, and of the industries which there are in its towns, a large part depends on the mountain fringe for its raw materials. It is essential that the two should remain united. Either Bohemia must be included in German land or the German parts of Bohemia must remain part of the Czech State. But if Bohemia were part of Germany branch institution, such as Austria was or any Danubian federation under the leadership of Vienna would be bound to become, the Czech nation would not exist among the nations of Europe, whereas the inclusion of the German fringe of Bohemia in the Czech State does not inflict any serious injury on the German nation. This, apart from numbers, is the answer to those who ask why the right of the Czechs to self-determination should be preferred to that of the Bohemian Germans.

Nor is it fair to draw an analogy between the mountain fringe of Bohemia and the Carpathian frontier of Hungary, and say that if the Czechs refuse to abandon the German districts of Bohemia they forfeit their claims to the Slovak districts of Hungary (1) If Slovakia remained part of Hungary the entire Slovak nation would be refused a political existence, which obviously does not apply to the Germans and Bohemia. (2) In the Czecho-Slovak State, if certain admissible frontier rectifications be made, the alien element will hardly amount to one-third of the population, whereas if the Carpathian frontier were left to Hungary, in Hungary proper (excluding Croatia) the Magyars would form at the utmost half the population. Their own statistics, which give them 60 per cent. of the population of Hungary, are notorious forgeries. (3) Slovakia is not economically bound up with Hungary as German Bohemia is with Bohemia. (4) Lastly, the Magyars have had their chance, and so far from conciliating the non-Magyar nationalities, have alienated them by the most brutal persecutions; should the Czechs engage on a similar policy towards the Germans the settlement would undoubtedly have to be reconsidered.

On the other hand, it is obvious that the inclusion in the new Czecho-Slovak State of a large German minority inhabiting districts contiguous on German territory is extremely inconvenient, if not downright dangerous, to the Czechs, and that everything should be done to reduce, wherever possible, the German population of the future Czecho-Slovak State. It would seem that the three western, purely German, districts of Austrian Silesia could be detached without the slightest damage to the Czecho-Slovak State, and that this should be done, especially as it is not proposed to assign the adjoining German districts of Prussian Silesia (Ratibor and Leobschütz) to Poland. Further, frontier rectifications in southern Bohemia and southern Moravia seem feasible, and even elsewhere minor changes might be carried out without injuring the economic and strategic interests of the Czecho-Slovak

State. Yet all these frontier rectifications together will not make any very appreciable change in the situation, nor could they reduce the German minority in the three Czech provinces to less than 8,000,000, if it now amounts to anything like the 3,500,000 registered in the official Austrian census returns. The German problem in the Bohemian provinces cannot be solved except by an agreement being reached between the two nationalities. The economic interests of the Bohemian Germans themselves point towards the maintenance of the union, but it is impossible to say as yet to what extent these interests will counteract the Nationalist tendencies among them. The Bohemian and Moravian Germans are speaking in rather softer accents than they were wont to do, but that may be due to temporary helplessness; they have been beaten, and are on the brink of starvation, whilst it is within the power of the Czechs to supply them with the much-needed food. But will they continue sufficiently long in that comparatively humble mood, and will the Czechs succeed in using the opportunity with a view to establishing some possible *modus vivendi*? Should it prove impossible to reach it, German Bohemia will remain a storm-centre in Europe as long as politics are discussed in terms of nationality, and it will probably be found beyond the reach of statesmanship to devise any solution for the problem.

The Allied Powers on their side cannot do anything more but mediate between the two nationalities and discourage the extreme Czech Nationalists, some of whom seem to imagine that any claim or combination, if merely anti-German, should prove pleasing to the Allied Powers. Yet it is not for us to work out any detailed scheme of frontier rectifications to be allowed to the Germans, as this would require a minute knowledge of local conditions such as only the parties directly concerned possess. The two nationalities will have to put forward their claims, and we must stand by the Czechs wherever they can prove paramount interests, and must not allow these interests to be overridden by an absolute claim to national self-determination. On the other hand, we must make it clear to the Czechs that the right of nationality acknowledged by the Allied Powers is not meant to be exclusively a means for anti-German map-making.

The Czechs have been throughout the war our most devoted and most efficient Allies in Eastern and Central Europe. They have shown energy, self-control, and statesmanship it is really they who destroyed Austria. They have proved magnificent organisers, and in the very act of taking over the administration of their country, in the order which they have hitherto managed to maintain in it, they have fully proved their ability to carry on good government even in most difficult circumstances. They are likely to prove to us the greatest asset in Central and Eastern Europe. It would be most deplorable should they leave the Peace Conference disappointed and with a feeling of having been abandoned to the Germans or Magyars.

In the peculiar conditions of Bohemia and Moravia it will not be possible to attempt a plebiscite, or the Czechs might lose districts essential to their national

existence. Whatever frontier rectifications are conceded to the Germans will have to be made by agreement, and the Congress will have to pronounce final decisions as far at least as the main outlines of the settlement are concerned.

4. Czech Claims to Territory outside the Czech Provinces and Slovakia.

The Czechs put forward certain claims for frontier rectifications in the district of Glatz (Prussian Silesia), and in the districts south of Nikolsburg in Lower Austria. In view of the very considerable extent of ethnically German territory which will have to be included in the Czecho-Slovak State, these claims can hardly be considered, especially as in the districts which the Czechs claim in Lower Austria they are certainly not in a majority.

Early in the war the idea was put forward by Professor Masaryk of a territorial connection to be established between the Czechs and the Jugo-Slavs through German and Magyar territory. The distance which separates the Czechs from the Jugo-Slavs amounts to about 100 miles, and their enclaves in that territory are practically negligible. Such a "corridor" through these territories would seem of small practical value; in time of war it would probably be found strategically untenable; in time of pence economic relations between the Czechs and Jugo-Slavs can, if necessary, be safe. guarded by means other than a direct territorial connection. Lastly, even on political grounds it would seem unadvisable to press that demand under the new conditions created by revolution. Such a violation of Gorman and Magyar national rights would re-create a common cause between the Germans and the Magyars, whereas at present there is at least some hope that the complete breakdown of Magyar imperialism, and, which is still more important, the overthrow of the Magyar oligarchy by the revolution, may in time obliterate the memory of that common interest which up till now had rendered the Magyar-German connection indissoluble.

Recently another idea of the same kind has been mooted in Czech and Rumanian circles, namely, to make Czecho-Slovak and Rumanian territory meet in north-eastern Hungary. There the distance between them is slightly smaller, though yet about 60 miles. The intervening territory is mountainous and densely wooded, and it would seem doubtful whether one slope of a high mountain range without the plain below (which is Magyar) would be of any real value as a connecting Link Bither in peace or war. The country which intervenes between the Slovak and the Rumanes is inhabited by Little Russians (otherwise called Ruthenes inhabited by Little Russians (otherwise called Ruthenes or Ukrainians), who in these districts, however, have shown so far but weak national tendencies. Where they exist they are of the "Russophile" rather than of the "Ukrainian" type, i.e., the people consider themselves an integral part of the Russian nation, and not a separate nationality. There is just a possibility of these Ruthenes s voluntarily choosing to join the Slovaks should the Ukrainian Separatists prevail in East Galicia and the Ukraine, and

prevent, even if only temporarily, their union with Russia. But anyhow, the Czechs are perfectly decided not to do anything in this matter which might cause friction between them and Russia.

5. The Slovak-Magyar Frontier.

The frontier to be established between the Magyars and the Slovaks is dealt with in detail in the memorandum by Dr. Seton-Watson annexed to these papers.

6. The Slovak-Ruthene Frontier.

The frontier between the Slovaks and the Ruthenes of north-eastern Hungary (unless the latter joined the Slovaks) will have to be settled in conjunction with the frontier established between Polish West Galicia and Ruthene (Ukrainian) East Galicia. The towns of Przemysl and Sanok in Central Galicia lie within the uncertain zona between these two nations. Whichever side gets these towns and the railway line connecting them will have to be given its prolongation to the Carpathian mountain pass of Lupkow. The claims which the Ruthenes (Ukrainians) could raise on ethnic grounds, even to territory west of the Lupkow pass, will have to be disregarded in any case, as their territory forms merely a very narrow projection in the mountains between the Poles and the Slovaks. The frontier between the Slovaks and Ruthenes will thus have to start in the north, either between the Lupkow and the Dukla or between the Lupkow and the Rozstoki passes. It is suggested that from here it should run south-west by south until it reaches the Magyar border, leaving Ungvar on the Ruthene side.

7. The Czech-Polish Frontier.

It is suggested that the existing frontier between Austrin and Hungary should remain the frontier between Polish West Galicia and Slovakia. Most of it follows the main mountain ridge and watershed and offers from the geographical point of view the most convenient boundary. The Polish claims to frontier rectifications in Orava and Spis may be disregarded, just as the Ruthene claims west of the Lupkow pass. We are here dealing with mountainous country, where geographical features seem of greater importance than the anyhow rather uncertain nationality of its sparse population.

In the Teschen section of Silesia the Polish-Czech ethnic boundary roughly coincides with the eastern frontier of the political district of Friedeck. The Czechs claim, however, the important railway junction of Oderberg and the part of the Oderberg-Kaschau railway included in Austrian Silesia, which falls into the ethnically Polish portions, as indispensable to them for strategic and economic reasons.

8. The Czech and German Austria

The Czechs are perfectly decided not to enter into any close connection, constitutional or otherwise, with German Austria, and for good reasons; they fear Aus-

tria's connection with Germany. At the same time, they desire the Allied Powers to prevent the Austrian Germans from joining Germany. This demand seems unreasonable, contrary to our principles, and any attempt on our part to intervene would probably be futile. Moreover, if Germany and the Austrian Germans are not allowed to settle the question now according to their own wishes, on the day when this happens the problem of German Bohemia is likely to be unrolled once more. The inclusion of German Austria in Germany might, on the other hand, prove not altogether disadvantageous to the Allied Powers; it would restore the balance between the Protestant north and the Catholic south in Germany, and it would prevent the German "Ostmark" on the Danube from ever reconstituting a federation under German leadership.

9. The Czechs and Russia.

The position of the Czecho-Slovak State, more than half-surrounded by Germans, will undoubtedly be difficult, especially until Russia recovers. Russia has always been, and must remain, the pivot of Czech politics, for reasons of sentiment as well as of Realpolitik. The Czechs will therefore work steadily and with all their strength for the recovery of Russia, and they seem admirably suited for it. They further propose to try to displace the Germans in Russia, especially in the economic sphere. If they succeed they will be a most valuable link between Russia and the Anglo-Saxon Powers, with which they propose to keep in the closest touch, political and economic. In north-east Hungary the Czechs will now obtain a direct frontier with Russia, for, sooner or later, the Ukraine and East Galicia are bound to re-federate with Great Russia. It seems decidedly to the advantage of the Allies that this connection should be established on a secure basis.

10. The Czech and the Magyars.

It is difficult to speak at the present moment of the future relations of the Czecho-Slovaks and the Magyars. Up to now the Magyars have been to the other nationalities inhabiting Hungary a "master nation" in the fullest meaning of the term. They were their masters not only politically, but also socially. They owned the big landed estates in Slovakia, formed a large proportion of its capitalist class and intelligentsia, and held the posts under the government. They despised the Slovak peasant nation and were hated by them in turn. Even the liberation of the Slovaks from Magyar rule, political and social, will not close up the abyss between them, unless the Magyar nation is profoundly transformed by social revolution. Should they remain an essentially aristocratic nation, there can be no amity between them and their peasant neighbours, their late nerfs. But if social revolution sweeps away the Magyar oligarchy and a peasants' and workmen's government takes its place, the Magyars will be able to approach their neighbours in a very different spirit. Until then between the freed Slovaks and their late masters must remain cool, to say the least.

11. The Czechs and the Poles.

The Czechs wish for an alliance and co-operation with the Poles, but should the Poles, by realising any of their imperialist claims against Russia, get involved in a standing feud with her, a Czecho-Polish alliance would become practically impossible. The Czechs clearly recognise this fact and do not hesitate to state it openly. They fully understand the meaning and know only too well the consequences of Polish imperialism at the price of dominion over the Ruthenes of East Galicia the Poles in Austria had abandoned the Czechs and Jugo-Slavs to the Germans. An alliance between Czechs and Poles will hardly be possible unless a profound change occurs in the attitude of the Poles towards Russia. Whilst the Czechs see their interest and safeguards in Russia's recovery, the Polish upper classes look upon Russia's weakness as their security and chance. Polish imperialism is deeply rooted in the economic interests of the Polish upper classes and permeates their mentality, and nothing short of a social upheaval in Poland can destroy it.

12. Commercial Access to the Sea by Rivers and Railways. The Czecho-Slovak State is, and must always remain, completely landlocked, and not even federation with its immediate neighbours, other than the Germans or Russians, would give them a continuous territorial access to the sea. It will therefore be of special importance by every possible means to guarantee the Czech economic interests with regard to the transit on railways leading to the North Sea, Baltic, and Adriatic ports, and to the navigation of the Elbe and the Danube. Aussig on the Elbe and Pressburg on the Danube are certain to become river ports of the very first importance.

GERMAN AUSTRIA

1. Territory and Population of German Austrin.
2. Frontier Rectifications.
3. German Austria, the Czecho-Slovaks, and Jugo-Slave.
4. Union with Germany.
5. The Austrian National Debt.

1. Territory and population of German Austria.

GERMAN Austria consists of the provinces of Lower and Upper Austria, Salzburg, Vorarlberg, the northern Tyrol, most of Carinthia, and northern and central Styria. Their joint population amounts to less than 6 millions - it cannot be fixed with precision, as several areas are disputed. About one-third of its population is concentrated in Vienna.

Of the 6 million inhabitants of German Austria, at least 5 ½ are German. There is a considerable Czech minority in Vienna and in the province of Lower Austria. The Austrian official census of 1910 put it at 122,000 only, but these returns were

notoriously unreliable, and the Czech minority in reality amounts to something nearer 400,000. In all the other provinces together the non-German minority will hardly exceed 60,000, unless the disputed parts of Carinthia, consisting mainly of the districts of Klagenfurt and Villach, are assigned to German Austria. Their population consists of about 130,000 Germans and 80,000 Slovenes. In Tyrol and Vorarlberg a marked movement in favour of separation from Vienna has made itself felt during the last few weeks, but it would seem doubtful whether this can lead to any practical issue.

2. Possible Frontier Rectifications.

According to the Austrian census of 1910 the three Czech provinces, Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, contained a German minority of over 34 millions. The Czechs challenge the accuracy of these statistics and, to all appearance, with good reason (the matter is discussed in greater detail in the report on the Czecho-Slovak State). Of the predominantly German districts in Bohemia and Moravia, however, but very few border on German Austria, and their total population is less than 300,000, of which about one-sixth is Czech. Even of these districts only some can be separated from the Czecho-Slovak State, and their union with German Austria will add but little to its population. No other German districts if detached from the Czech provinces could be united to German Austria, but would have to go directly to whatever State or States there may arise in what has hitherto been Bavaria, Saxony, or Prussian Silesia.

Claims have been raised in the National Assembly of German Austria to the German fringe of Western Hungary, i.e., the county of Wieselburg and the Western districts of the counties of Odenburg, and Eisenburg, on the Eastern border of Lower Austria and Styria, between the Danube and the Raab. These claims seem, however, to have received only half-hearted support for political reasons the Austrian Germans may feel disinclined to take part in what will be described by the Magyars as the partition of Hungary. If pressed, the claims should be considered:

- (1) because they are ethnically justified;
- (2) because they would add but little to German Austria;
- (3) because they would disturb German and Magyar relations and would render the Magyars more amenable to compromise with the Slavs.

Thus, whatever feasible frontier rectifications are made in favour of German Austria, its population could not rise far beyond 6 millions.

The frontiers of German Austria, as against Jugo-Slavia and Italy, have been discussed in the reports dealing with these countries.

3. German Austria, the Czecho-Slovaks, and Jugo-Slavs.

The Austrian Germans would have gladly refederated with the Czecho-Slovaks and Jugo-Slavs, in other words, recreated Austria. About the middle of October

1918, the German-Austrian Socialists invited these two nations to enter into negotiations with a view to such a refederation. Neither of them was willing to do so. They desire complete independence, and do not want any further experiments in constitutional community with the Germans. Obviously, in any federation centring round Vienna, the Germans would be leading, especially in view of the support which they would derive from Germany. A branch of a nation of 75 millions, settled on a contiguous territory, cannot be swallowed up or politically neutralised by nationalities none of which exceeds 13 millions.

It is clear that the constitution of a Danubian federation with German Austria for a centre is directly contrary to our interests, and in the long run would merely amount to a resurrection of Austria under a new name.

4. Union with Germany.

By now the Austrian Germans have given up the hope of effecting such a reconstitution of Austria; many, perhaps most of them, do not wish it any longer. On the 12th November, 1918, the National Assembly of German Austria unanimously voted a new Constitution, which declares German Austria a component part of the German Republic. In spite of the unanimity achieved in the Assembly, opposition against such an inclusion may be expected from clerical Roman Catholic centres, from the Jewish haute finance, and, lastly, from the strata of Viennese population, whose economic existence will be endangered if Vienna changes from the capital of an empire into a provincial border town. Yet such opposition is bound to remain hopelessly ineffective where there is no possible alternative. The ambitions or interests of those who are opposed to the inclusion of German Austria in a German Republic would not be satisfied any better by the continued separate existence of German Austria- in fact, even for them, this would be the worst of all possible solutions. They would share neither in the greatness nor in the trade of Germany, and yet would little of their own. Unless some kind of Austria is reconstituted, which is contrary to our interests, as well as to the interests of the Czecho-Slovaks and Jugo-Slavs, the Austrian Germans are bound to join Germany.

We cannot exterminate the Austrian Germans; we cannot make them cense to feel Germans. They are bound to be somewhere. Nothing would be gained by compelling them to lead an existence separate from that of Germany. Such unforced separation would merely stimulate German nationalism, but could not prevent co-operation between the two bronchos, nor their final reunion. Lastly, the Inclusion of German Austria in Germany is not altogether disadvantageous from our point of view, it would restore the balance between the Catholic south and the Protestant north and help to check Prussianism in Germany.

The idea of preventing the Austrian Germans from joining Germany, even if both parties concerned wish it, has therefore to be dismissed, both on grounds of principle and of expediency.

5. The Austrian National Debt.

The State personality of Austria, which arose out of the German provinces of Austria, continues in them. It is they who inherit the debts and claims of the State, unless accepted or successfully demanded by another State. The Czechs agree to take over their due share of the pre-war debt, but refuse to pay for a war which they opposed all along, which was contrary to their interests and in which they have never fought voluntarily, except on the anti-Austrian side. The same argument will probably be put forward by the Jugo-Slavs and Italians also. The Poles and Ukrainians would not be justified in using it, because most of them were in favour of war against Russia, and the Poles have never voted against the Austrian War Credits.

These two nationalities will, however, be able to put forward a considerable claim for deduction from their share of National Debt, because of the war damages suffered by Galicia; these damages should naturally be borne by the State and not by the province alone on which they happened to fall.

Lastly, Poland, the Ukraine, Serbia, and Rumania will have to be compensated for damages caused by the Austro-Hungarian armies again, it will probably be found simplest to do so by deducting the amount due to them from the share of the National Debt to be borne by the territories which they will take over from the late Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The Austrian National Debt would be too heavy a burden even for Austria within its pre-war frontiers. If most of it is thrown on to German Austria alone, the position will become utterly impossible. If German Austria is united to Germany the latter will receive a small accession in land and population, but with it its National Debt, a heavy addition to Germany's own financial burden.

ANNEX I THE FUTURE FRONTIERS OF HUNGARY

(Note by Dr. R.W. Seton Watson.)

THE future frontiers of Hungary can only be drawn in accordance with the principles—

(a.) That Czecho-Slovak, Rumanian, and Jugo-Slav unity are the bases upon which the new States of Bohemia, Jugo-Slavia, and Rumania are to rest.

(b.) That special linguistic guarantees in church, school, and law court must be assured to all racial minorities living within the newly-drawn frontiers of each of these States.

For the delineation of the frontiers of these new States it will be necessary to constitute boundary commissions, consisting of representatives of the two countries directly concerned and delegates appointed by the Peace Conference, or by the League of Nations, if already constituted. With a view to allaying inter-racial

friction in the meantime it may be helpful to establish certain “gray zones,” which are generally admitted to be matters of dispute between parties, and which should be administered under international control until the boundary commission shall have completed their enquiries. Only thus would it be possible to avoid intensive propaganda and intrigue and the “incidents” which this would inevitably provoke. On the territory of Hungary it would be necessary to establish three such “gray zones”:—

- (a.) Between Magyars and Slovaks;
- (b.) Between Magyars and Rumanians;
- (c.) Between Magyars and the Jugo-Slavs.

The problems of the future frontier between Hungary and the Ukraine, and between Hungary and German-Austria stand somewhat apart, since economic and geographical considerations play an even greater part in these two cases than in the three principal cases already specified.

(A.)—The Magyar-Slovak Frontier

(a.) In Slovakia there are seven existing counties (Komitat-Megye) which are incontestably Slovak—the only noticeable minorities being German rather than Magyar, and then only amounting to a very small proportion. These seven counties (for convenience we adhere throughout to the Magyar names) are Trencsen, Turocz, Arva, Lipto, Zolyom, Szepes, Saros. With regard to them there can be no discussion, and they should from the first be regarded as integral parts of the Czecho-Slovak Republic.

(b.) The border counties between Slovaks and Magyars are nine in number (from west to east): Pozsony (Pressburg), Nyitra, Bars, Hont, Nograd, Gombr, Abauj-Torna, Zemplen, Ung. These nine, however, fall into two categories:—

1. Counties which are in the great majority Slovak, but from which certain amputations can and should be made in favour of Hungary.

2. Counties which are distinctly mixed, and where the line of demarcation cannot follow purely ethnographical lines. To the latter belong Hont, Gombr, and AbaujTorna.

In the case of the two south-western counties — Pressburg and Nyitra — special circumstances must be considered. The city of Pressburg, which according to Magyar statistics contains 32,700 Germans, 31,700 Magyars, and only 11,600 Slovaks, is indispensable to Bohemia as providing it with a suitable Danubian port. The whole district to the north, as far as the very suburbs of the town, is purely Slovak. Its possession by Bohemia is further necessary in order to ensure the regulation of the river March, a problem of first-rate importance to Moravia and Slovakia.

Just east of Pressburg the Danube divides into two channels, and most of the rich territory lying between the two, known as the “Grosse Schütt”, belongs to the county of Pressburg, and its population is overwhelmingly Magyar. It is to be expected that the Czechs will claim this island, in order to obtain a certain stretch of the Danube as their southern frontier. Thus the first point for decision-by a boundary commission will be whether the frontier should follow the southern and main arm of the river, or the northern and small arm.

In the case of the county of Nyitra, all the northern and central districts are Slovak, but there is a small, purely Magyar district in the south, round the small town of Ersek Ujvar, which Hungary would be entitled to claim. On the other hand, this would leave the mouth and about 15 miles of the lower reaches of the River Vag — otherwise a purely Slovak river — in the hands of Hungary. The Czechs are certain to put forward the view that the whole river to its mouth in the Danube (which coincides with the reunion of the two arms of the main river) must be included in Bohemian territory.

If, however, this latter claim were admitted, it would be necessary to extend the Danubian frontier of Bohemia as far as the mouth of the River Garam, thereby including portions of the counties of Komarom and Esztergom, whose populations are almost exclusively Magyar.

From the river Garam, north-eastwards as far as the Carpathian frontier between Hungary and Galicia, the new frontier Magyars and Slovaks will inevitably disregard the boundaries of the existing frontiers; it will be necessary to find a compromise between the natural ethnographic line of division, and a geographical line corresponding approximately to the division between mountain and plain (it being obvious that a certain portion of the foothills, and in particular the outlying spur of the Tokay [Tokaj] hills, must remain in Magyar hands).

To sum up, the “gray zone” between Magyars and Slovaks would be composed roughly as follows:—

1. The Grosse Schutt.
2. The district of Ersek Ujvar, in the county of Nyitra.
3. The portions of the counties of Komarom and Esztergom, lying north of the Danube.
4. In the county of Bars, the sub-district (Jaras) of Leva.
5. In the county of Hont, the three sub-districts of Ipolynek, Szob, and Vamosmikola.
6. In the county of Gömör, the sub-districts of Rimaszecs, Putnok, and Rozsnyo.
7. In the county of Abauj-Torna, the sub-districts of Kassa (Kaschau) and Tüzer the town of Kassa being assigned to the Slovaks.
8. In the county of Zemplen, the sub-district of Nagy Mihaly.

It is suggested that everything to the north-west of this strip of territory should

be regarded as indisputably Slovak; and everything to the south-east as indisputably Magyar.

It is to be born in mind that the small Magyar minorities in the districts described as indisputably Slovak will diminish by a natural process, owing to the disappearance of the numerous imported Magyar officials. The proportion of real Magyar populations in these districts is very small; even among them a considerable number are really magyarised Slovaks. Meanwhile it will in any case be necessary for the Slovaks to sacrifice very considerable colonies which are situated in the indisputably Magyar territory of Hungary, e.g., numerous wealthy villages scattered along both banks of the Danube between Esztergom (Gran) and Budapest, and also the large Slovak oasis of Bekes-Csaba in the great Hungarian Plain.

B)—Magyar-Rumanian Frontier

The "gray zone" between Magyars and Rumanians would run from the River Tisza (Theiss) in the north to the River Maros in the south, and would contain roughly the following territory:—

- (a.) In the county of Ugocsa, the sub-district of Tizantul.
 - (b.) In the county of Szatmar, the sub-districts of Szatmar and Erdöd.
 - (c.) In the county of Szilagy, the sub-districts of Tosnad [Tasnad], then Szilagy Cseh, then Szilagy Somlyo, and Kraszna.
 - (d.) In the county of Bihar, the sub-districts of Ermihaly Falva, Szekelyhid, Margit[t]a, Szalard, Nagy Varad (Grosswardein), including the town of this name, Cseffa, Nagy Szalonta, and Tenke.
 - (e.) In the county of Arad, the sub-districts of Kisjend, Vilagos, Elek, and Arad.
- To the west of the zone there are isolated Rumanian settlements, but the overwhelming majority of the population is Magyar.

To the east of this zone there are considerably larger Magyar settlements, even apart from the solid block of Szekel population (numbering roughly 500,000) which occupies the extreme south-eastern corner of Transylvania, and cannot under any conceivable circumstances be excluded from a united Rumanian State.

It is to be remembered that nowhere has the falsification of the census been carried to such lengths by the Magyar authorities as among the Rumanians of Transylvania; and therefore it may be safely assumed that in the event of an impartial census anything between 10 and 20 per cent, would fall to be deducted from the total Magyar figure. Moreover, in addition to those Rumanians who have been fraudulently included in the census as Magyars, there are large numbers of other Rumanians who have yielded to political and personal pressure, and enrolled themselves as Magyars in order to curry favour with the local authorities. Under a new regime all these weaker brethren will once more come out as Rumanians. A further percentage falls to be deducted in view of the large (indeed quite needlessly

large) numbers of Magyar administrative officials in Transylvania, who will automatically tend to migrate back to Hungary proper.

(The best indication that there is something wrong with the Magyar statistics is to be found in the following fact: The entire Orthodox and Uniate population of Hungary is either Roumanian, Serb, or Ruthene, with the exception of a few thousand who have been Magyarised. None the less, though the total Rumanian, Serb, and Ruthene population in Hungary is given in the Hungarian statistics as 3,800,000, the total Orthodox and Uniate population is given as 4,300,000. The half-million unaccounted for are presumably non-Magyars who have been included in the racial census tables as Magyars.)

None the less, even on the most favourable assumption, it will probably be necessary to include between 600,000 and 700,000 Magyars in Greater Rumania. For them it will be necessary to produce a definite charter, assuring to all certain definite linguistic rights in church, school, and law courts, and to the compact mass of Szekels perhaps a definite measure of local autonomy, similar to that which the Saxons of Transylvania are entitled to claim.

(C.)—The Magyar-Jugo-Slav Frontier

Starting from the Western frontier Between Austria and Hungary, the new Jugo-Slav frontier against Hungary at first follows a clearly-defined course — namely, the river Mur to its junction with the Drave, and then the river Drave to its junction with the Danube. The only districts to the north of this line which could conceivably be claimed by the Jugo-Slavs are—

The district of Mura Szombat, running along the Austrian frontier north of the Mur; and (b.) That portion of the county of Baranya lying in the fork of the Danube and Drave to the south-east of Pecs (Fünfkirchen).

The former can only be considered in connection with the question of the so-called “Corridor” between Jugo-Slavia and Czecho-Slovakia, which it is not proposed to discuss here. Unless such a “Corridor” were created, this district must obviously remain with Hungary. The latter is largely inhabited by Serbs, but the disadvantages of creating yet another artificial frontier are so great, that it would seem better to retain the river frontiers as far as possible.

In the case of the Banat, Serbian and Rumanian claims may for the moment be regarded as identical in so far as the frontier against Hungary is concerned. (The question of the future Serbo-Rumanian frontier in the Banat must be reserved for special treatment.)

The northern frontier between Serbia-Rumania and Hungary can only be the river Maros, from a point near the town of Arad westwards. The only portion of the Banat which could be treated as a “gray zone” between Serbia-Rumania and Hungary is the extreme north-west corner lying in the fork of the rivers Maros and Theiss, and facing the Magyar city of Szeged. This triangular piece of territory

corresponds almost exactly with the two “Jaros” of Török-Kanizsa and Nagy-Szent-Miklos, or, from a geographical point of view, with the course of the Aranka River (an old channel of the Maros). It will undoubtedly be contended by the Magyars that this triangle is predominantly Magyar, and is necessary to the development of Szeged as the second city of Hungary.

Between the Banat and the Baranya lies the Bacska district, which must in any case be regarded as the principal “gray zone” between Magyars and Jugo-Slavs. This zone may fairly be regarded as identical with the large county of Bacs-Bodrog, which contains a mixed Magyar-Serb-Slovak-German population.

Foreign Office, December 13, 1918.

HUNGARY

What is “Hungary”?

Until the political situation in Hungary is fully cleared up it is difficult to discuss our dealings with a State as to the future extent, character, and intentions of which we are at present in the dark. A National Council was set up, under the presidency of Count Karolyi, on the 30th October, when the last attempts of King Charles to form a Coalition Government had failed. On the 31st October the King entrusted Count Karolyi with the formation of a Government. The declared object of this Council and Government was a complete break with Germany and Austria and a policy of Hungarian independence.

The possibility of maintaining the dynasty was at first contemplated, but this seems now to have been abandoned and a republic decided on. Realising that a great part of their Jugoslav territories have been lost for ever, Count Karolyi’s Government did not hesitate to recognise the separation of Croatia from the territories of the Crown of St. Stephen, and to insist on their willingness to live in cordial relations with the new State.

With regard to the nationalities in Hungary generally, however, Count Karolyi has not adopted a similar policy. He claims that the Slovaks, Ukrainians, Rumanians, and Serbs of the Banat and Bačka must remain in the Hungarian State as integral portions of it. This claim was at once strongly repudiated by the Slovaks, who have pronounced themselves in favour of an independent Czechoslovak State, and have summoned the Czech armies to their aid against the Hungarians. Similarly, the news now comes to hand that the Rumanians have set up a National Council, denounced their connection with Hungary, and appealed to an international decision based on self-determination. Their leaders have already arrived in Iași to ask for union with Rumania. As to the attitude of the Jugoslavs of Southern Hungary there can be no question. Their representatives have already declared in favour of Jugoslav union. The position of the Ukrainians of North-East Hungary is for the moment obscure.

British Policy

The attitude of His Majesty's Government and the Allied Powers towards these different nationalities varies in the particular cases. Our recognition of the Czechoslovak Government commits us to acceptance of the separation of the Slovak population within territories yet to be determined from Hungary. In the case of the Jugoslavs and Rumanians we have not gone so far, but we have both declared and shown our interest in the aspirations of these two peoples to union and independence.

The union of the Jugoslavs has practically been achieved. In the case of the Rumanians, political events have postponed but cannot long prevent it. It may, then, be taken for granted that the only "Hungary" which His Majesty's Government can recognise is roughly that portion of the former Kingdom of Hungary which is inhabited by compact Magyar majorities.

Suggested Frontiers

Under "Jugoslavia," "Rumania," and "The Czechoslovaks," some suggested frontiers with Hungary have been submitted. There remains only (1) the question of the 400,000 Ruthenians of Northern Hungary which will be treated under Czecho-Slovaks, and (2) Hungarian frontier with German Austria. As regards (2), a demand has now been put forward by Vienna for the incorporation in German Austria of the compact German populations in the north-western corner of the new Hungary (Counties of Wieselburg, &c.).

The new Hungarian Republic from which these territories have been detached will be a land-locked State. The chief problems, then, which will confront us are (1) the access of this territory to the sea, and (2) its relations with its neighbours.

(1) Access to Fiume is a vital interest to Hungary. Fiume must be included in the list of seaports which will be the object of special consideration as passing into the political possession of a Power other than that to which its economic importance is vital. Like Trieste, Salonika, Danzig, and others, international arrangements must secure for Hungary, in the case of Fiume, every facility for transit of goods and export. Similar facilities should be given to Hungary on lines already built, or yet to be built, through Jugoslav and Rumanian territories towards the Aegean and the Black Seas.

(2) To secure the friendly acquiescence of the Jugoslavs and Rumanians to such an arrangement it is necessary that we should have positive guarantees that the old regime in Hungary is for ever abolished. It will be difficult to secure through Count Karolyi, for instance, any confidence on the part of the newly constituted National States, for his declared policy, both in the past and in the present, is the complete incorporation of the other nationalities in a Magyar State. There must be clear recognition on the part of the Hungarian Government, whatever they may be, that there can be no further question of attempting to preserve the integrity of the

Kingdom of Hungary as Count Karolyi is even now urging. When this has been secured, the case for concessions on the part of the Jugoslavs and Rumanians will be enormously strengthened. These concessions will be: (1) the economic facilities already referred to, and (2) the assurance of full personal and cultural liberty for the Magyar populations necessarily included in the Jugoslav and Rumanian States. Especially in the case of the Szekler counties of Transylvania, as has been already noted under Rumania, some measure of administrative autonomy seems not only just but feasible.

10. DOCUMENT

The official memorandum of the British peace delegation on the new borders of the former territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, 8 February. Future Frontiers of Austria and Hungary (Excluding Galician frontier). Recommendations submitted by British Technical Delegates. PARIS. February 8th, 1919. TNA FO 608/5/19. 1645.

The British peace delegation did not draw up its border proposals until three weeks after the opening of the peace conference (18 January 1919). Crowe wrote: "This memorandum contains our final proposals, having examined the subject with the experts of the American delegation, with whom I am glad to say - we were in general agreement on almost all points." The memorandum is divided into three major parts. First, it proposed Romania's borders, broken down as follows:

- Dobruja
- Bessarabia
- Bukovina

- North-western border of Romania. This name meant the border to be drawn in Transcarpathia (i.e. the Romanian-Czechoslovak border), which the memorandum stated should be drawn in such a way that there was a direct link between Romania and Czechoslovakia, and that the Hungarian state should not be allowed to wedge itself between the two countries.

- The western border of Romania. This name meant the Romanian-Hungarian border, on which the Memorandum stated that, for railway reasons, Oradea and Arad should be annexed to Romania, despite the fact that both cities were majority Hungarian.

- Banat, on which the Memorandum stated that the region should be divided between Romania and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and that the interests of the Hungarian population living there should be disregarded.

- The Timok Valley, a Serb-majority area, is inhabited by a significant number of Romanians, the memorandum said.

On the other hand, the memorandum proposed a border between the Kingdom of Serbia-Croatia-Slovenia and Hungary. It stated that the border in Bačka should run along the ethnographic line, and that the Danube-Drava angle should remain with the Hungarian state.

Thirdly, the memorandum proposed the border between Czechoslovakia and Hungary (i.e. the Slovak-Hungarian border). The memorandum stated that:

- "Hungary may be left with the purely Hungarian island, the 'Grosse Schüttinsel', i.e. the Csallóköz.

- The 35 km long stretch of the Danube between Komárom and the mouth of the Ipoly should be annexed to the Czechoslovak state on an economic basis.

- The Slovak-Hungarian border from Szepsze to Vásárosnamény does not run along the ethnic border, but this is the only way to provide a direct rail link between Romania and Czechoslovakia without the Czechs having to build a new railway line.

Three things should be pointed out here. First, the above proposal ran counter to the part of the Ministry of Defence's proposal which argued that the Danube-Drava angle should be annexed to the South Slav state. Secondly, the memorandum had omitted the part on the establishment of the so-called grey zones, which had been discussed at length in the Foreign Office memorandum of 13 December 1918. Thirdly, there was no proposal in the memorandum concerning the Austro-Hungarian border, from which we can conclude that the British did not want to change its line.

In conclusion, the British peace delegation's proposal to draw the border lines was based on ethnic, economic, geographical (especially the railway lines) and political considerations.

Source: TNA FO 608/5/19. 1645. The British Technical Peace Delegation's complex proposal for the future borders of Austria and Hungary.

FUTURE FRONTIERS OF AUSTRIA AND HUNGARY (excluding GALICIAN frontier)

Recommendations submitted by British Technical Delegates.
MEMORANDUM.

8 FEB 19 AM

FUTURE FRONTIERS OF AUSTRIA AND HUNGARY (Excluding GALICIAN frontier)

Recommendations submitted by British Technical Delegates.
PARIS.

February 8th, 1919.

Frontier between Austria and the Jugo Slavs.

(1) Recommendation.

The Jugo Slav frontier should run from the Italian Treaty frontier on Mt. Terglou in a north easterly direction so as to reach the Drave just east of Villach. From there along the Drave, (leaving Klagenfurt to Austria) to a point about 10 kilo-

metres west of Marburg. From there, leaving Marburg to Jugo Slavis, north east to the Mur, and then along the Mur till it crosses the frontier into Hungary.

(2) Argument.

The above constitutes a good compromise between ethnical and natural boundaries.

Frontier between Austria and the Provinces of Bohemia and Moravia (Tchecho-Slovakia)

8 FEB

(1) Recommendation

It is recommended that the present administrative boundaries of Bohemia and Moravia be maintained.

The Tchech claims for exceeding this administrative boundary at Gmünd and Themenau do not merit support.

(2) Argument.

The advantage of maintaining the present administrative boundaries outweighs the disadvantage of thereby leaving a considerable German-Austrian minority in Tchecho-Slovakia.

Frontier between Austria and Roumania

1. Recommendation. It is recommended that the entire province of Bukovina be united with Roumania.
2. Argument. A The Roumanians and Ruthenes each form about one-third of the population of this province, which was till 1778 an integral part of Moldavia and in which the basis of cultural institution is Roumanian. Unfortunately so line of division can be drawn between Roumanian and Ruthenes population in such a way as not to destroy the economic unity of the province. The Ruthenes are politically little developed and under proper guarantees no hardship should ensue to them by union with Roumania.

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Frontier between Hungary and Romania.

1. Recommendation. It is recommended that from Vásáros-Namény, the point at which it is suggested the frontiers of Hungary, Roumania and the autonomous Ruthene shall pass province of the Czecho-Slovak State shall meet, the frontier down the river Szamos to Csenger, then south-west, leaving Tasnád in Roumania and Szekelyhid in Hungary, east of Bihar, west of Gross-Wardein, east of Cséffa, west of Nagyszalonta, east of Kötégyan, west of Otlaka, east of Kürtös, west of Arad to reach the river Maros at Magyarpécska, thence along the line of the Ma-

ros to its confluence with the Theiss and down the Theiss as far as Ada, the point at which it is suggested the Roumanian, Jugo-Slav and Hungarian frontiers shall meet.

2. Argument. Though on ethnic grounds the upper waters of the Theiss - roughly the region between and including Nagybánya and Göncz is almost purely Magyar, it is considered essential to establish the frontiers between Roumania and Hungary, between and Roumania and the Ruthene autonomous province of the Czecho-Slovak State, in such a way as to secure direct railway and economic communication between the two latter states independent of Hungarian control. As regards the line passing from Csenger, on the Szamos, as far as Gross Wardein, the frontier should be drawn, with consideration as far as possible of racial distribution, due regard being had for railway and economic connections. It is recommended that the two pivotal points of Gross Wardein and Arad shall be assigned to Roumania; though these towns a change of regime would soon increase their Roumanian character. Their surrender by Hungary to Roumania is important, both as a symbol of the new order of things and as part payment for the heavy loss inflicted by the Magyar Government on the Roumanian population through the war. The frontiers recommended would pass just west of Gross Wardein so as to leave in Hungarian hands the neighbouring railway junctions necessary to it, and rather more to the west of Arad, so as to include the towns of reasonable economic sphere of that town.

As regards the frontier between the Banat and Hungary, it is not suggested that the north-west corner of the Banat should be assigned to Hungary, although the Magyars are in a relative majority there. As to whether this corner will pass to Serbia or Roumania will depend on the decision of the controversy between these two nations, but in any case, the Maros and subsequently the Theiss should here form the boundary between either of them and Hungary.

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Frontier between Hungary and the Kingdom of the Serbs Croats and Slovenes.

Recommendation.

It is recommended that starting either from Ada on the Theiss (or if the north-west corner of the Banat be ceded to Serbia rather than Roumania, starting from Perjámos on the Maros) the frontier between Jugo-Slavia and Hungary shall run down the Theiss to Ó Becse, at which town it shall leave the Theiss and strike nearly due west across the Bačka to meet the Danube at Kis Köség, passing in its course north of Bács-Fekete-Hegy and Zombor. From Kis Köség it is recommended that the frontier shall run down the Danube to the Drave-Danube confluence, and thence along the line of the Drave as far as the confluence of the river Mur with it. From that point it shall follow the line of the Mur till it reaches Radkersburg at the former Austro-Hungarian frontier.

Argument

(i) As regards the Banat, this is a matter for decision between Serbia and Roumania; and the Magyars being numerically only fourth among the races inhabiting it cannot be considered to have any claim for continued possession of it.

(ii) As regards the region known as Bačka between the Theiss and the Danube, the line suggested is roughly the line of racial distribution, due regard being also paid to the railway and economic connections of the country.

(iii) The Jugo-Slav populations in the angle between the Danube and the Drave are not included in these recommendations/

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recommendations within the Jugo-Slav State, as their numbers and distribution do not warrant this and geographical and economic reasons are strongly against it.

(iv) The rest of the frontier between Hungary and the Jugo-Slav State should follow the line of the Drave and the Mur, which in both the natural geographical frontier and also adequately represents the ethnic division between the two peoples,

Frontier between Hungary and Slovakia.

Recommendation.

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The frontier of Slovakia should run from Pressburg along the little Danube to Komárom, then along the main Danube to Szob. From west of Szob the frontier should follow the right bank of the R. Eipel to a point south of the important Junction of Losoncz. From there the line proceeds in a north easterly direction leaving with the Tchecho-Slovak state the towns of Rimaszombet, Pelsócz, and Torna, and in Hungary Putnok, Hidvég-Arno, Gonca to Hungary. From north of Góncz the line descends in the south easterly direction to meet the suggested Rumanian frontier at Vásáros-Nameny, leaving to Hungary Sáros-Patak and Kis-Várda, but incorporating in Tchecho-Slovakia Sátoralja-Ujhely.

Argument.

(1) An between Pressburg and Komárom it is convenient to follow the little Danube and thus leave to Hungary the purely Magyar Island of the Grösse Schutt,

(2) The 35 (odd) miles stretch of the main Danube accord- ad to the Tcheks between Komárom and the mouth of the Eipel is assigned to them on economic grounds and particularly in order to give them a free Danubian outlet for their traf- fic down the R. Waag their only navigable waterway.

(3) From there, the frontier designated is ethnically more justifiable than that claimed by the Tchechs. It has the advantage also of leaving to each country the essential economic railways.

(4) From Sepsi to Vásáros-Namény the frontier runs counter to ethnical distribution, but the line suggested will assure a through route between Rumania and Tchecho-Slovakia without

without imposing upon the Tchechs the necessity of building a new railway.

Eyre A Crowe

Harald Nicolson

A. W. A. Leeper

British Delegation, Paris.

February 8th, 1919.

11. DOCUMENT

Memorandum. Future Frontiers of Rumania. Recommendations submitted by British Delegates on the Inter-Allied Commission. Paris. February 8th, 1919. TNA FO 608/5/19. 1645.

Source: Memorandum. Future Frontiers of Rumania. Recommendations submitted by British Delegates on the Inter-Allied Commission. Paris. February 8th, 1919. TNA FO 608/5/19. 1645.

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MEMORANDUM.

FUTURE FRONTIERS OF RUMANIA.

Recommendations submitted by British Delegates on the Inter-Allied Commission.

PARIS.

February 8th, 1919.

BRITISH DELEGATION.

PARIS

COMMISSION ON ROUMANIAN CLAIM

BRITISH RECOMMENDATIONS.

General Statement.

The following recommendations as to the territorial frontiers of Roumania are based on an examination of the claims put forward by the Roumanian Prime Minister, Monsieur Bratianu, for the acceptance of the Peace Conference. The frontiers claimed by Monsieur Bratianu are those accorded to Roumania under the Treaty of August 1916, together with (1) a corner of Bukovina north of the Prut excluded from Roumania under that Treaty, and (2) Bessarabia. Except in so far as they must be taken as statement of Roumanian claims the frontiers accorded under the Treaty are not considered in these recommendations as forming the basis of a settlement. The lines of this settlement, as it is here suggested, are determined solely by ethnical, economic, geographical and political consideration

COMMISSION ON ROUMANIAN CLAIMS.

BRITISH RECOMMENDATIONS

Bessarabia.

It is recommended that the Peace Conference shall recognise the union, already accomplished, of Bessarabia with Roumania, subject to the reservations made below, as an application of the principle of nationalities and as in accordance with the interests of the peoples concerned.

Argument:

Bessarabia was, up till 1812, an integral portion of Moldavia. In December 1917 its Representative Assembly declared its independence, and in April 1918 voted on its own conditions for union with Roumania.

The population, according to the only statistics available, is between 60 and 66 per cent. Roumanian (13/4 millions). the many other nationalities the Ukrainians come first with west 1/6th of the population. Only in the extreme north of is province (Khotin) is there a compact Ukrainian majority, int this could only be detached in such a way as to ruin the merle and railway communications of the province with Roumania and Bukovina and to destroy the national geographical Stutter formed by the Dniester.

Conclusion:

It is therefore recommended that the free union of the entire province with Roumania shall be recognise by the Peace Conference, subject only to the reservations:

1 That the basis of Bessarabia's separation from Russia a reunion with Roumania shall be the ethnic principle not the Military occupation or conquest of the country by Roumania

BRITISH DELEGATION.**PARIS****8 FEB 19****at the expense of Russia.**

2. That so far as possible nothing shall be done to prejudice the economic or other vital interests of Russian relations with Roumania in this connection.

3. That the national minorities in Bessarabia, whether Ukrainian, Jewish, German, Bulgar or others shall be secured of their full cultural and local autonomy by inter- national guarantee.

COMMISSION OF ROUMANIAN CLAIM**BRITISH RECOMMENDATION****Bukovina.**

It is recommended that the whole of Bucovina be re united with Roumania within its natural geographical and historical frontiers.

Argument.

Up till 1775 Bukovina formed an integral part of Moldavia from which it was annexed by Austria. The whole basis of cultural life in Bukovina is Roumanian. The population of about 800,000 18 composed of some 280,000 Roumanians, 300,000 Ruthenians, 100,000 Jews, 65,000 Germans etc. In the northern corner and north-west and western areas of Bukovina the Ukrainians are in a clear majority,

but all the economic and railway communications of the province are towards the Roumanian frontier, and except for minor territorial rectifications it would be impossible to partition the province on a purely ethnic basis without severe economic prejudice to all concerned. Further there is no religious difference in Bukovina between Roumanians and the Ukrainians, both being orthodox, and the Ukraine population is little developed whether culturally or politically. Lastly the nature frontier follows the historical boundaries of the province and little advantage would be obtained by disturbing it. It is therefore recommended that the whole province should be allowed to re-unite with Roumania in accordance with the resolution of the National Council of Bukovina (claiming to represent five-eighths of the population) subject only to the reservation that nothing shall be done to prejudice the cultural and local rights of the Ukrainians, whether German or other minorities, or their economic relations with the Ukraine.

**COMMISSION ON ROUMANIAN CLAIMS.
BRITISH RECOMMENDATIONS**

North-Western Frontiers

It is recommended that the line of the Rumanian frontier is the forth and forth-West towards the Ruthene and Magyar-speaking countries from the point at which it leaves the frontier of Bukovina, Galicia and Hungary, pass in a north-westerly direction to the Theiss at some point south of Rahó and thence along the northern bank of the river to some points north-west of Máramaros Sziget, from which it shall run north-west to the neighbourhood of Velete and thence westward to Vásáros-Namény. Thence it shall run south-east along the line of the Szamos as far as Csenger and from Csenger in a south-westerly direction towards Gross-Wardein (Nagy Várád), leaving Nagy Károly to Hungary.

Argument

This recommendation is based on the supposition that the Ruthenes of Hungary will form an autonomous province in the Czecho-Slovak Republic, and that in such a case it is exceedingly desirable, alike economically and politically. to safeguard direct communication of the Checho-Slovaks with Romania by the railway passing from Csép. It is calculated however that if such a frontier be drawn, about 100,000 Magyars in these regions will be incorporated in either the Czecho-Slovak or Roumanian State. In the interests of the international communication established, however, and possibly in the economic interests of the population concerned this recommendation has been made, but in the event of the Ruthenes of Hungary not forming part of the Czecho-Slovak State, this recommendation cannot be put forward and in that case the alternative recommendation would be made. That but the frontier pass from Velete on a slanting line south-west towards Gross-Wardein leaving Erdőd and Margitta to Roumania.

These two alternative recommendations are made with a reservation that the Roumanian authorities assure and guarantee to the Magyar or Ruthenian populations concerned full cultural and local rights as already promised by the other provisional Transylvanian Government to their other nationalities residing within their jurisdiction.

COMMISSION ON ROUMANIAN CLAIMS BRITISH RECOMMENDATIONS

Western Frontiers

It is recommended that the western frontier of Roumania as towards Hungary should not follow the line of the Treaty, but should pass further east in such a way as to include within Roumania Grosswardein and Arad reaching the River Mares about Pécska.

Argument

The frontiers granted Roumania under the Treaty would include within Roumania an exceedingly large Magyar border population, and there seems no adequate strategic or economic reason to justify this. The ethnical frontier between the two peoples passes, roughly, east of Grosswardein and Arad, but these two towns, though possessing considerable non-Roumanian majorities, must be regarded

(a) as extremely important symbols of the future relations of Roumanis with Hungary;

(b) as strong potential Roumanian centres, once a large official and officially connected Magyar population has been replaced, according to natural processes, by a similar Roumanian population.

It does not seem possible for ethnic reasons to include within the frontiers of Roumania the whole railway line connecting the two cities through Békéscsaba, and therefore the direct railway connections between them must be urgently studied and, if possible, made.

with These recommendations are made under the reservation, authorities accord to the considerable Magyar that Roumanian national minorities their full cultural and local rights, as already promised by the provisional Transylvanian Government to the national minorities within their jurisdiction.

COMMISSION ON ROUMANIAN CLAIM BRITISH RECOMMENDATIONS

Banat

It is recommended that if it prove impossible to secure Serbian acceptance of the union of the whole of the Banat (so desirable for natural, geographical and strategic reasons) with Roumania, that the frontier between Romania and the Yugo-Slav State shall leave the Theiss at Ada and run either (a) due east to about

Szekélfháza, er (b) directly south-east to Dette, and from either of these points practically due south to the junction of the Karas with the Danube.

Argument

From the geographical point of view the Banat is a unit with natural river frontiers; to unite it as stole with Roumania would seem the easiest way of establishing definitely settled relations for the future between Roumania and the Jugo-Slavs.

Further the Banat in such a mosaic of nationalities, except in the purely Roumanian eastern part, that it is impossible to draw any clear ethnical frontier.

On the other hand, for historic, sentimental and economic reasons, Serbian feeling is so strongly attached to the western part of the Banat, that the solution just mentioned would be an impossible one for the Jugo-Slavs to accept.

Therefore, in the probable event of such a solution Moving Impossible an artificial frontier should be drawn which, while leaving in Roumanian hands more than two-thirds of the Banat, would give to Serbia the parts geographically connected with her.

A further alternative suggested in this connection would be a frontier running practically due north from the Danube, just west of the Temesvár-Bazida Railway, to the Maros at Pécska. In this case it would be possible to leave to Hungary the extreme north-west corner of the Banat, where the Magyars are in a slight relative majority, and the frontier between Hungary and the Serbian Banat in this direction might be formed by the River Aranka. This would however deprive the Roumanians of the possession of one bank of the Maron deem to its confluence with the Theiss, to which they attach very great importance. On the other hand it would be a frontier less open to strategic objection than the one here proposed.

Conclusion

It is recommended that in the probable event of the insisting Serbians demanding a partition of the Banat, the frontier line between the two countries should be drawn from Ada on the Theiss by one or other of the two lines suggested to reach the Danube just west of Bázíás. This recommendation is made subject to the reservation that the Roumanian and Yugo-Slav authorities grant to the other nationalities, whether Roumanian, Serbian, Magyar or German, included in their respective jurisdiction, full cultural and local rights.

8 FEB IS AM

COMMISSION ON ROUMANIAN CLAIM

BRITISH RECOMMENDATIONS

Timok Valley

The number of Roumanians inhabiting the north-east corner of Berbia in variously calculated at 300,000 (Roumanian estimate) to 140,000 (Serbian estimate).

In the event of the partition of the Banat on ethnic ground, Roumanians propose to raise the question of the union of these inhabitants of the Timok Valley with Roumania.

It is to be deprecated that this question be placed on the same footing as that of the Serbian inhabitants of the Banat, though the danger must be foreseen that in the event of the partition of such a natural unit as the Banat, the Timok question may in the future be raised in an acute form. While up to the present, owing to the preferable social conditions prevailing in Serbia to those in Roumanis, there has been no serious irredentism on the part of the Timok Romanians, this irredentism may arise as a result of social reform in Roumania particularly as it is impossible for the Peace Conference not to grant the Roumanian request for guarantees of full cultural and local rights to the Roumanians of Serbia, the result of which may well be the growth of a national Roumanian consciousness.

It is recommended that the attention of the Serbian Representatives be called to the serious danger likely to arise in their future relations with Roumania in such a contingency and while the Timok question cannot be placed on the same footing as the question of the Serbian Banat, it cannot be regarded as unconnected with it.

The Roumanian claim that the Timok Roumanians shall enjoy the full cultural and local rights accorded to Serbians in Roumania is justifiable.

COMMISSION ON ROUMANIAN CLAIMS BRITISH RECOMMENDATIONS

Dobruja

It is recommended that, after the satisfaction of Roumanian claims, at a moment judged suitable by the Allied Powers, is shall Insistently be urged upon the Romanian Government that a re-adjustment of frontiers with Bulgaria in southern Dobruja is in the interest of the population concerned, and the future good relations of Roumania and Bulgaria.

It is recommended that the frontier to be delimited in such a contingency should leave the Danube west of Tutrakan and run practically due east taking note of natural geographical features to reach the sea at the pre-1913 point just south of Ilanlik.

Argument

The cession of territory by Roumania to Bulgaria, if carried out, will probably be the one instance in this war of as Allied Power being asked to cede territory to an enemy power. Romanian opinion would naturally be sensitive at such a request. On the other hand Roumania has no ethnical claims to this part of the Dobruja, which is entirely Turkish or Bulgar, except in the two towns of Putrakan and Silistra, which for purposes of strategic defence should, in any case, be retained by Roumania.

In the interests of future relations between Roumania and Bulgaria a new frontier should be drawn in the south ern Dobruja. Moderate Roumanian feeling it, may be taken, would not oppose the cession of territory south of the line suggested, but the time and way in which the Allied Powers should urge upon Romania the desirability of making the cession must be carefully considered.

It is therefore recommended that at such time se Romania claims elsewhere have been fairly satisfied the desirability of freely ceding to Bulgaria the territory south of a line drawn from Tutrakan to Ilanlik should be urged in a friendly but insistent way upon the Roumanian Government.

Eyre A Crown
A. W. A. Leeper.
Paris
February 8 1919.

12. DOCUMENT

A Papers of Peace Conference of Paris – Council of Ten, organisational structure. Composition and discussions of the regional subcommittees:

The Question of Banat. Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, 31 January, 1919, at 3 p.m. Paris, January 31, 1919, 3 p.m. Papers to the Foreign Relation of the Unites States, 1919. (1942–1947). The Paris Peace Conference. Volume III. (PPC) Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/26

Negotiations on the assignment of the territories of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to the successor states took place in several forums. Finally, territorial subcommittees discussed each specific claim. These were preceded by negotiations on the Polish, Banat and Czech claims.

The Commission for Romanian and Yugoslav Affairs was composed on a parity basis, with two delegates from each of the four great powers, and the composition of the Commission was as follows: Jules Laroche, Louis Aubert (France), Sir Eyre Crowe and Alexandre W. A. Leeper (British Empire), Dr. Clive Day and Charles Seymour (USA), Count Vanutelli Rey and Giacomo de Martino (Italy).

The Committee met from 8 February 1919 to 18 March 1919, during which time it held 14 meetings. The meetings dealt with three major groups of issues in the drawing of the borders: 1. the Hungarian-Romanian border (i.e. the creation of the Transylvanian-Partinian border), 2. the division of Banat between the South Slavic state and the Romanian state, 3. the drawing of the border between Baška-Baran-Baranja-Drava.

Two British members were members of the Czechoslovak Commission (CSB), sent by the Supreme Council: Harold Nicolson and Sir Joseph Cook (he was Australian). The Czech territorial claims were presented by Benes on 5 February 1919 in the M. Pichon Hall of the Quai d'Orsay. The first meeting of the CSB was held on 26 February 1919, but it was explicitly an inaugural meeting, i.e. no substantive work took place. The CSB had two tasks to solve: on the one hand, it had to draw the Hungarian-Slovak border and, on the other, it had to decide on the Ruthenian question, i.e. the fate of Carpathia. Salvago Raggi finally backed down, and the CSB annexed the region to Czechoslovakia, thus settling the Ruthenian question.

In contrast, the drawing of the Slovak-Hungarian border took several committee meetings (2 March, 3 March, 4 March, 5 March, 7 March, 8 March, 13 March, 14 March). One of the main points of contention was the fate of Csallóköz and

Komárom, a dispute that had already unfolded at the meeting on 2 March: the French wanted to annex the area and the town to Czechoslovakia, the US wanted to leave it with Hungary.

At this point, General Le Rond spoke up and stated that France supported the British position, i.e. that Csallóköz should be given to Czechoslovakia. This effectively split the committee into a British-French and an Italian-American group. This created a stalemate on the question of the Csallóköz.

Subsequent meetings were devoted to resolving this stalemate, and finally, at the meeting on 13 March, the Franco-British position won out, and Czechoslovak interests also prevailed in the delimitation of the border from Komárom to Ung.

These decisions were finalised at the meeting on 14 March and submitted to the territorial commission, which approved them without change on 24 March 1919. It was then submitted to the Council of Foreign Ministers, which adopted the proposal on 8 May. The process was concluded by the decision of the Council of Four on 12 May 1919, thus creating the Trianon Czechoslovak-Hungarian border.

Source: The Question of Banat. Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, 31 January, 1919, at 3 p.m. Paris, January 31, 1919, 3 p.m. Papers to the Foreign Relation of the United States, 1919. (1942-1947). The Paris Peace Conference. Volume III (PPC) Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/26

PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE, 1919, VOLUME III

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/26

BC-19

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, 31 January, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, January 31, 1919, 3 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

President Wilson

Mr. R. Lansing

Mr. Miller

Mr. A. H. Frazier

Col. U. S. Grant

Mr. C. L. Swem

BRITISH EMPIRE

Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George

Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour
 Mr. H. Norman
 Lt. Col. Sir Maurice Hankey
 Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau
 M. Pichon
 M. Dutasta
 M. Berthelot
 M. de Bearn
 Capt. Portier

ITALY

M. Orlando
 Baron Sonnino
 Count Aldrovandi
 Major Jones

JAPAN

Baron Makino
 Viscount Chinda
 H. E. M. Matsui
 M. Saburi
 M. Kimura

PRESENT DURING DISCUSSION OF POLISH QUESTION

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Major Gen. F. J. Kernan
 Mr. Lord
 Capt. Ewell

BRITISH EMPIRE

General Botha
 Sir Edward [*Esme*] Howard
 Captain Brebner

FRANCE

M. Noulens
 Gen. Niessel

ITALY

M. de Martino

PRESENT DURING DISCUSSION OF BANAT QUESTION

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Prof. C. Day
 M. C. Seymour

BRITISH EMPIRE

Mr. H. Nicolson

M. A. Leeper

ROUMANIA

M. J. Bratiano

M. N. Misu

SERBIA

M. Pachitch

M. Trumbitch

M. Vesnitch

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1.

Poland and Czecho-Slovak Contention **M. CLEMENCEAU** introduced M. Noulens, the Chairman of the Committee appointed by the Great Powers to proceed to Poland, and called on him to submit to the Council the conclusions which had been reached.

M. NOULENS said that the Council was well acquainted with the reasons which had led to the appointment of the Commission on Poland. That Commission had been requested to examine and report on the situation in the Teschen District, which [Page 819] had led to serious conflicts between the Czecho-Slovaks and the Poles. It appeared that the Czecho-Slovaks, contrary to the agreement made by their local authorities with the local authorities of the Polish nation, had entered the territory of Teschen in question and had seized the railroad from Teschen to Jablunkau. As a result of these operations, the Czecho-Slovak troops had occupied the mining region and made prisoners of various Polish citizens: they had even arrested certain Polish delegates, who were on their way to Paris. The Czechoslovak delegates had been asked to explain the reasons which had led to the aggressive operations. The Czecho-Slovak delegates had explained that the Teschen District in reality formed part of Czechoslovakia for ethnological, geographical, historical and economic reasons, but in addition their Government had been forced to occupy this territory to prevent the spread of Bolshevism, which was rampant in the Polish provinces. The commission on Poland had at once set aside historical and ethnological reasons, and had endeavoured to arrive at a provisional solution, which would put a stop to the conflict between the Czecho-Slovaks and the Poles. The Czecho-Slovaks had been asked whether they would consent to the immediate withdrawal of their troops from the railroad, leaving the final settlement of the question to the Peace Conference in accordance with the proclamation recently issued by the Great Powers here and in accordance with the agreement entered into by the local Czech and Polish authorities. The Czech delegates maintained

that the authority of Mr. Masaryk and Mr. Kramarcz would be compromised by the acceptance of this proposal, which would be in opposition to the popular will. The Czech delegates had also maintained that the Poles were incapable of maintaining order in the mining districts, and that as a result Bolshevism would spread into Czecho-Slovakia. Therefore, whilst declining to accede to an unconditional withdrawal of their troops, the Czecho-Slovak delegates had expressed their readiness to agree to the withdrawal of both the Polish and Czech troops provided the contested districts were occupied by three Allied battalions. This was considered to be a sufficient force for the maintenance of order.

The commission on Poland had expressed no views on this latter suggestion, feeling that the proposal should be submitted to the Great Powers for discussion.

The Commission had then proposed that the Czecho-Slovak troops should occupy the mining regions and the railroad north of Teschen, while the Poles should occupy the southern part of Teschen, adjoining Galicia. In other particulars, until the final decision was reached by the Peace Conference, the *status quo* would be maintained, in accordance with the agreement of the local authorities of the 25th [5th?] of November, 1918. These proposals could only be accepted [Page 820] with serious reservations by the Czecho-Slovak delegates. They feared that as a result of the direct contact of the troops of the two nations along the railroad, disturbances were bound to occur, and they made the counter proposal that Teschen should be occupied by one battalion of Inter-Allied troops with a view to separating the two contestants.

Summing up, Mr. Noulens held that if the Allies occupied the contested territory with three battalions, the whole difficulty would be solved; even if only one Allied battalion could be spared for the occupation of Teschen, a satisfactory solution would have been attained. If, on the other hand, neither of these solutions were practicable, he thought perhaps the Czecho-Slovak and Polish delegates might still be brought to agree to the arrangement above proposed for the occupation of defined areas by the Poles and Czechs respectively. There was, however, another solution, which he felt was worthy of consideration, namely, that an Inter-Allied commission be sent to Teschen, to remain there permanently until the final settlement of the question by the Peace Conference. This Commission would be required to supervise the execution of this agreement, and to study the statistics and data which would form the basis of the ultimate decision. This proposal had been suggested by Mr. Piltz of the Polish delegation. This Inter-Allied Commission should also be charged with the duty of controlling the exploitation of the mining region, and of insuring a sufficient supply of mining products to the Polish people. The Czecho-Slovak and Polish delegates had both accepted this proposal, and it was agreed that the Czecho-Slovaks, having control of the mining region, should furnish coal and a proportion of their manufactures, especially munitions and arms for the campaign against the Bolsheviks, to Poland. The Czecho-Slovak Govern-

ment should be requested to allow the free passage by rail to Poland through this territory of arms and munitions.

Finally, the Czecho-Slovak delegates had declared that orders had been issued to stop the further advance of their troops in the Teschen district and for the immediate release of all Polish prisoners recently taken.

(M. Noulens then submitted the text of the recommendations made by the Commission, which read as follows:—

“The undersigned Delegates representing the Great Powers deem it their duty first of all to recall that the nationalities who have undertaken the engagement to submit the territorial questions which concern them to the Peace Conference are, pending its decision, to refrain from taking as a pawn or occupying the territories to which they lay claim.

[Page 821]

“The Delegates take note of the engagement by which the representatives of the Czech Nation have declared that they were definitely stopping their troops on the line of the railway which runs from Oderberg to Teschen-Doblowkas [*Jablunkau?*]. They similarly note that the representatives of the Czech and Polish Nations have agreed to admit that, pending the decisions of the Peace Conference as to the definite assignment of territory the railway line and mining regions which are at the present moment in the hands of the Czechs shall be handed over to Inter-Allied troops representing a force of three battalions, if the Associated Governments so decide.

“In case this solution be not adopted and always remembering that this is a provisional arrangement, the part of the railway lines to the north of Teschen and the mining region would remain in the occupation of the Czech troops while the southern section of the line starting from and including Teschen down to Jablunkau and Dublowkas [*sic*] would be entrusted to the military control of the Poles. In this case it would be desirable that the city of Teschen should be occupied by an Inter-Allied battalion.

“The undersigned consider it indispensable that a Commission of Control should be immediately sent to the spot to avoid a conflict between the Czechs and Poles in the region of Teschen. This Commission, apart from the measures that it will have to prescribe, will conduct the investigation on the basis of which the Peace Conference may form its decision in fixing definitely the respective frontiers of the Czechs and Poles in the contested zone.

“In order to seal the Entente between two friendly nations which should follow a policy in full accord with that of the Great Powers, the Delegates register the promise of the Czech representatives that their country will put at the disposition of the Poles all its available resources in war material and will grant to them every facility for the transit of arms and ammunition.

“The exploitation of the mines of the Karwin-Ostrawa district will be carried out in such a way as to avoid all infraction of private property while reserving any

police measures which the situation may require. The Commission of Control will be empowered to supervise this and if necessary to secure to the Poles that part of the output which may be equitably claimed by them.

“It is understood that the local administration will continue to function in accordance with the conditions of the pact of the 5th November, 1918, and that the rights of minorities will be strictly respected.

“Pending the decision of the Peace Congress, political elections and military conscription will be suspended in the principality of Teschen.

“No measure implying annexation of all or of a part of the said Principality either to the territory of Poland or of Czecho-Slovakia taken by interested parties shall have binding force.

“The Delegates of the Czech Nation engage to release immediately with their arms and baggage the Polish prisoners taken during the recent conflict.”)

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether the Czecho-Slovaks had consented to the furnishing of a proportion of coal and manufactures [Page 822]to Poland, and to the free passage by rail of ammunition and war material for Poland.

M. NOULENS replied in the affirmative.

GENERAL BOTHA stated that whilst the Czecho-Slovaks had been producing 1,400 tons a day from their mines, the Poles were only getting 1,200 tons a day. The former claimed that Bolshevism had made such progress among the Polish mining population that it had appreciably raised the price of labour and reduced the output.

M. CLEMENCEAU, after consulting the representatives of the Great Powers, said that the third proposal was accepted. This proposal meant the sending of a commission to Teschen, to maintain order and to control the distribution of coal, etc.

(It was agreed:—

(1)

That the part of the railway lines to the North of Teschen and the mining region would remain in the occupation of the Czech troops, while the southern section of the line starting from and including Teschen down to Jablunkau-Dublowlkas [*sic*] would be entrusted to the military control of the Poles.

(2)

That a Commission of Control should be immediately sent to Teschen for the purposes set forth in the recommendations submitted by the Commission for Poland.)

(The Members of the Commission for Poland then withdrew.)

2.

The Question of Banat **M. CLEMENCEAU** then introduced the members of the Roumanian and Serbian delegations, who would present their cases in regard to the question of the Banat.

M. BRATIANO read the paper presenting the claims of Roumania to the Banat (See Annexure "A").

M. VESNITCH stated that he had not a written memorandum to present, because he had only been informed of this meeting at eleven o'clock that morning. He had heard, with regret, that the Roumanian delegation based their country's claim in part on the secret treaty of 1916. When this treaty was being negotiated, Serbia was fighting on the side of the Allies, without asking for any assurances, in the firm belief that after the war settlement would be made on the principles of justice, on the principles of the self-determination of nationalities, and in accordance with the promises of the Allies.

As in the past, so at the present, and in the future, Serbia desired to live in amicable relations with her neighbours, the Roumanians. Roumania and Serbia had existed side by side for ten centuries and no serious difficulties had arisen. As regards the Banat the Serbs [Page 823]based their claims solely on the principles recognised and proclaimed by all the Allies, and confirmed by the last nation to enter the war, the great democracy of America.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was not aware that the Treaty of 1916 had been secret.

M. VESNITCH replied that not only had the treaty never been published, but that as a representative of a power fighting with the Allies, he had several times asked here in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to know terms of the Treaty. He had been told that the contents of the Treaty could not be divulged.

M. BRATIANO stated that the discussion of the claims of Roumania had been begun in London in 1916, and had then been transferred to Petrograd, as a place where the examination of Eastern questions could be more conveniently carried on, especially in regard to Serbia.

M. PICHON then read the last paragraph of the Treaty, which required the maintenance of its secrecy to the end of the war.

M. VESNITCH continuing, said that Serbia had no pretensions to the whole of the Banat. Serbia merely claimed that part to which she had a right on ethnological grounds, where their race had a majority over the Germans and Hungarians, and an absolute majority over the Roumanians. He did not mean to offend his Roumanian friends when he said that Germany and Hungary had always shown greater favour to the Roumanians than to the Serbians, and the Roumanians had been allied to the Central Powers for nearly thirty years.

Under the Hapsburgs this very part of Hungary had occupied a peculiar position. The boundaries of military districts had been arranged according to nationalities. The regiments raised in those districts had been recruited by nationalities, but no exact statistics were available. Moreover, while both Serbians and Roumanians belonged to the Orthodox Church, the Hapsburgs had insisted on their religious administration being carried out by nationality, and though this

classification had been made by strangers the results showed the justice of the Serbian contention.

Furthermore, for forty years there had been Parliamentary elections in the Banat. These elections had always led to political contests between the Serbs and the Magyars; but there had never been any contests between the Roumanians and the Magyars.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether any Serbian members had ever been returned to Parliament, and for what districts?

M. VESNITCH replied in the affirmative to the first question and mentioned Werschetz, Temesvar, Pancsova, Weisskirchen, Kikinda, Banat Komlos, as electoral districts represented by Serbs at Buda-Pest at [Page 824]the outbreak of the war. He added that in latter years the artificial means used by the Magyars to manipulate the elections had brought about a diminution in the Serbian representation.

MR. LANSING asked whether the Roumanians had returned any delegates.

M. BRATIANO replied that violent political struggles had always occurred during the elections in the Banat in which the Roumanians had been involved, but he lacked any definite records as to the numbers of Roumanian deputies returned. He thought, however, three million Roumanians were represented at Buda-Pest by five Deputies, while the Servians had only three. The violence of the Roumanian political struggles could not be reassured [*measured?*] by the number of Deputies sent to Buda-Pest, but by the number of Roumanian candidates in the prisons.

M. VESNITCH continuing, said that as regards the violence of the political struggles they were in complete agreement. M. Bratiano's remarks applied equally to the Serbs and the Roumanians.

Since the Middle Ages the portion of the Banat claimed by Serbia had always been closely connected with the Serbian people. The manners, customs, aspirations, and traditions of the Serbs of the Banat and of the Serbs of Serbia were the same. At critical periods they had helped one another. When, in 1848, the Serbs had endeavoured to free themselves by siding with the Hapsburgs against the Magyars, the Hapsburgs had rewarded the Serbs by declaring the autonomy of a part of the Banat. A Voivoidia had been created with its own elected Voivod. As usual, the promises of the Hapsburgs had not been kept, but the territorial limits of the Voivoidia had been fixed, and the territory then demarcated was exactly the same as that which the Serbs now claimed. Historically, as the Isle of France was to France, and Tuscany to Italy, so was the Banat to Serbia. Serbian Renaissance had taken root in the Banat in the 17th Century; there Serb literature, art, theatre, etc., had reappeared; there the great Serbian ideal had been conceived. He, himself, entered political life there. In 1881 the young Serbians met there to discuss their new aspirations. The Banat had given birth to many Serbian leaders who had rendered service to the Allies, and carried their cause to a happy conclusion. He would merely mention such well known names as Pirdrik, Pashek, the greatest authority

on financial questions, Nicholvitch, Porpish [*Pupin?*] of Columbia University, and the present Rector of the University of Belgrade. As a further proof of the close attachment between the Serbians of Serbia and the Banat, he called attention to the fact that the Royal Family, when exiled, had found an asylum there.

[Page 825]

He submitted in addition two supplementary arguments. In his country, lying on the border land between Christendom and Islam, the monasteries played a prominent part as a civilising agency, all of which were Serbian. Further, all real estates were still to this day in the hands of the Serbians, in spite of the efforts made by the Germans and Hungarians to dispossess them.

So far, he had presented merely the Serbian point of view, and he had not referred to the question of the frontiers. In dealing with this question both the interests of Serbia and the general interest must be considered. He was glad to say that from the Serbian point of view the two questions were identic. During the war the Serbian General Staff had realised that a successful offensive could only be made along the valley of the Morawa. As long as the Austrians had failed to attack along this line, the Serbians were able to resist successfully. But finally when the German General Staff assumed the leadership, and attacked down the Valley of the Morawa, further defence became impossible.

In conclusion he thought that if guarantees for future peace were required the proper protection of this feeble strategic point must be assured. He felt sure the Conference would consider favourably the just claims and aspirations of the Serbs, and coordinate these aspirations with the general interests of the world, and of civilisation, with which he felt confident they would be found to agree.

MR. BALFOUR enquired whether the Serbian Representatives were in a position to give any figures. So far, only a general statement had been made but no statistics of populations by nationalities had been given.

M. VESNITCH replied that he was quite ready to supply the figures, but had not brought them with him.

M. PASHITCH asked permission to lay on the table an official map dated 1853, prepared at the time when the Banat Voivoidia had been created. This map clearly showed the parts then belonging to Serbia and to Roumania. It would be seen that in the eastern portion, the population was chiefly Roumanian, whereas in the western part the Serbians were predominant. Between the two, the population was very mixed, because it had always been the policy of Austria to prevent the expression of national feeling by the introduction of emigrants. Notwithstanding this, it was extremely easy to find, between these two territories, the just line of demarcation, based on grounds of nationality. In conclusion, he would add that a paper setting forth the Serbian case had been prepared and would be submitted in due course.

M. BRATIANO invited attention to the fact that though sentimental reasons, such as the statement that some great men had left one country [Page 826] to settle in

another, deserved some recognition, it would, as a rule, be extremely unwise for statesmen to be influenced by such facts. It was with some emotion that he had heard the statement that the Royal Karageorgevitch family had taken refuge in the Temesvar. He thought that that hardly constituted a claim to the acquisition of that territory by Serbia, otherwise the whole of Roumania might as well be claimed by Serbia, since many of the members of the Royal families of Obrenovitch and Karageorgevitch had taken refuge in Roumania, and even M. Pashitch himself, when the situation in Serbia was somewhat dangerous, had made his home in Roumania. Furthermore, the convent question could establish no right, since the fact that many of the convents in the Banat were inhabited by Serbs was due to the religious leanings of the Slavs as a race. Thus, even in Roumania itself, many of the convents would be found to be occupied by more Serbs than Roumanians. Further, he wished to point out that the provisional partition of the Banat in 1848 by the granting of autonomy to the Voivoidia lasted theoretically for a period of ten years only. Moreover, Roumania had also taken part in the struggles for independence, but the tendency of the Hapsburg Government had always been to favour the Yugo-Slavs because they had stood by them in their wars against the Magyars.

Stress had been laid upon the secret character of the treaty of 1916. Though the treaty may have been secret, its consequences were not secret, since that treaty had permitted the maintenance at Salonika of an army of occupation, which had led to the results known by all.

M. TRUMBITCH asked permission to add a few words to M. Vesnitch's statement. As regards the secret treaty he wished to declare most emphatically in the name of Serbia, as well as in the name of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State, that the treaty had been negotiated without Serbia's knowledge, and consequently Serbia refused to recognise it. Therefore, the problem must be discussed on another basis. In the first place, it was essential to define the objects of the discussion. Obviously there existed a territory which was in dispute between the Roumanians and the Serbo-Croat-Slovenes, namely, the Banat. M. Bratiano had talked about the whole of the Banat which included three comitats:—Torontal, Temesvar, and Krasnow (?) [*Krassó-Szörény*], Now, the Serbians did not claim all three comitats: they merely claimed Torontal in the West of the Banat, Temesvar in the centre, and a small part of the Krasnow [*Krassó-Szörény*] comitat. They were prepared to admit that all the Eastern part of the Banat was Roumanian. Therefore, he had nothing to say about that territory. The Serbs recognised Roumania's claims to that territory, which was inhabited by Roumanians, so that [Page 827]the principle of nationality could be applied. Consequently the question only dealt with two comitats, the claims of which were based on population and territory. As regards the population, everyone would agree that in those two comitats the inhabitants did not all belong to one nationality. There were Magyars, Germans, Serbs and Roumanians. The Magyars and Germans were enemies. The Germans were colonists living far from their own

country and consequently they could possess no sovereign claims. Consequently it could positively be stated that the Germans must remain under the Sovereignty of the country that would own that territory. The Magyars who inhabited the Banat were separated from Magyaria, and the Serbs and the Roumanians possessed the same rights and claims to ownership. In addition, he fully admitted that the wishes of all the people should be considered, not only those of the Serbs and Roumanians, but those of others also; because the question of future peace was involved and it was essential to ensure contentment to all the peoples. The Serbs thought that they were justified in claiming the two comitats not only on account of nationality, but also because the population itself would be pleased to form part of their State. The reason for this would also be made apparent by a study of the topographical situation. The Germans and the Magyars would obviously prefer to belong to a State which was situated along the Danube, whose Capital was on the Danube, and towards which river the people gravitated. Their economic and social interests were such that the Germans and the Magyars who were very numerous, would prefer to belong to Serbia, consequently the Serbs rested their claims not only on nationality, but also on the will of the people. Should the Great Powers decide to have a referendum on this question, Serbia would certainly agree.

The two comitats were bounded on the North by the River Maros, on the West by the River Theiss, on the South by the Danube and on the West [*East*] by a line east of Temesvar and Werschetz. Hungarian statistics, which were never favourable to the Serbs, gave the following figures of population in the two comitats:—

Roumanians	266,000
Germans	328,560
Magyars	251,000
Serbs	272,000

These were official statistics and they showed that the four nationalities were equally represented. The Serbs, however, were in the majority in the South and West, that is to say, in the territories of the Theiss, Danube and Maros. The above figures showed no great preponderance in favour of any nationality. Consequently the problem must be solved on other grounds than those of the principle [Page 828] of nationality. For this purpose he thought in the first place the will and wishes of the people themselves should be considered, because the people were always fully alive to their own interests and were prepared to give them their full value.

The whole of the valley from the Maros to the Danube constituted the natural continuation of Serbia. That would explain why, in history, Serbs, when unhappy in Serbia, especially during the period of Turkish misrule, emigrated to the Banat and there created a new Serb centre of civilisation. When the Serbs began their

struggle for independence it was the Serbs of the Banat who first fought for the cause of the first Karageorge; and in 1849, when the Magyars attempted to crush the Serbs in the Banat, the Serbs of Serbia rushed to their rescue and they fought side by side, just as they had done in the last war. Though the Danube divided the territories into two, it did not divide the nationality, the civilisation, or the traditions of the Serbs on either side, and they could not now when victory had been achieved, after a struggle lasting so many centuries, abandon their brothers on the other side of the Danube.

The Serbs were anxious to establish good relations with the Roumanians. With the exception of the Banat problem, for which a solution must be found, the two countries had no differences. If the Roumanians wanted the Danube and the Theiss as their frontiers no agreement could possibly be reached. During this war of liberation Roumania had suffered bitterly, but it must not be forgotten that Serbia in particular and Yugo-Slavia in general, had also suffered heavy losses. And for this reason the Serbs insisted on the recognition of their claims to the two comitats. These claims meant no injustice to Roumania, for the Banat was a continuation of Serbia and Yugo-Slavia, whilst between Roumania and the Banat claimed by Serbia, stretched a chain of mountains the importance of which in the settlement of this question could not be overlooked.

M. BRATIANO apologised for having to address the meeting a third time. He was compelled to do so as the Roumanians had only two representatives to pit against the three representatives of Serbia. M. Trumbitch had explained the situation of the population in the Banat, and he had proposed to divide the territory into two parts, giving the mountainous portion with its mines and forests to Roumania, whilst allotting to the Serbs the industrial areas of Temesvar and the agricultural districts of Torontal. As regards the figures relating to the two comitats, given by M. Trumbitch, it would be remembered that the Germans and Magyars were twice as numerous as either the Serbs or Roumanians. The only possibility of applying the ethnical test was to consider the Banat as a whole, because on ethnical grounds it would be impossible to justify the placing of [Page 829]580,000 Germans and Magyars under the control of 272,000 Serbs. Therefore, the Banat could not be divided into two for ethnical reasons. Similarly it would be easy to say that economically it would be unsound to separate the mines and forests from the commercial, industrial and agricultural regions. In the course of history the frontiers of the Banat had never been changed except on the Roumanian side because on that side no real frontier existed between the Banat and Wallachia. On the other frontiers no changes had ever occurred except during the ten years which covered the period of the existence in theory of the Voivoidia. Consequently, politically the Banat formed part of Roumania. Furthermore, the idea of separating the two fertile districts of the Banat from the mountainous one, where the population would

be left without food resources, would be impossible, since the population of the latter would thereby be compelled to emigrate.

To sum up, for the populations inhabiting those regions, the work which the Conference was now called upon to carry out could be compared with that of an Inter-Allied Commission (had such a Commission then been possible) appointed in the time of Charlemagne to adjudicate on the question of the Rhine. Had the Commission at that time decided that the Rhine should form the boundary between Germany and France, what untold benefits might have been conferred on the world, what influence such a decision might have had on the events leading up to the present war. That Conference was now in the same way settling the future of Eastern Europe. The use of the Danube was essential for the development of civilisation. The Danube could alone form the only real boundary of everlasting friendship. That being his conviction he would, in conclusion, invite the attention of the Great Powers to the dangerous situation now existing in the Banat which called for immediate action. The Serbian troops occupying the Banat were in open strife with the Roumanian population, and if the real wishes of the peoples must be known, the first step must be the removal of the Serbian troops and their replacement by Allied troops who could hold the scales evenly between the various peoples. This course was urgent, as serious developments might otherwise take place.

M. CLEMENCEAU enquired from **M. Bratiano** whether he would agree to the general principle of the referendum.

M. BRATIANO replied that he considered the question already settled. He had insisted on the Banat being dealt with as a whole, and he could not agree to any partition of the area. If a referendum were insisted on, he would require time for consideration, although at the moment he would not oppose the proposal.

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M. VESNITCH expressed his regret that **M. Bratiano** had thought it necessary to raise the question of the actual occupation of the Banat by Serbian troops. If the French Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in the East had ordered the Serbian troops to occupy that territory, the welcome that Army had received was sufficient proof that the decision taken had been a good one. At any rate, Serbia was not to blame if Roumania had not entered the Banat either now or in 1916.

(The Roumanian and Serbian Delegates then withdrew.)

The meeting adjourned until Saturday, 1st February, at 3–0 p.m.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 1 February, 1919.

Annexure to IC–129 [BC–19]

[*Statement by M. J. Bratiano, of the Roumanian Delegation*]

THE QUESTION OF THE BANAT

The task of setting forth Roumania's rights to the Banat is greatly facilitated by the fact that this question was considered by our three great European Allies

during the weighty discussions which took place before the Treaty of Alliance of 17th August, 1916, and that this Treaty, which was signed by them, recognises the validity of our claim.

We have complete confidence in the support which the said signatory Powers will grant in demonstrating our just claim to the two great non-European Powers who took no part in the examination of this question in 1916 and who may, therefore, be ignorant of the principles thereof.

These claims are based on the principle of ethnology, and are put forward in virtue of our right to national unity.

This principle should, however, be in accordance with other requirements of national life, which it is impossible to dissociate from the territorial conditions amongst which a nation has evolved.

Those desirous of assuring the future of Eastern Europe must face the problem of uniting these two principles. Our claims with regard to the Banat are based on the solution of this problem.

THE QUESTION OF THE BANAT OF TEMESVAR

Nobody can think of denying Roumania the right to claim political union with a territory which has been inhabited for many centuries by Roumanians and where they number 600,000, as against less than 400,000 Germans, who settled in the district in the 18th century, and [Page 831]rather more than 300,000 Serbs, who immigrated in the 15th and especially in the 18th centuries, to mention only the ethnical units of most importance.

But it has been imagined that a distinction might be drawn in the Banat between the districts where the Roumanian population is absolutely in the majority and those in which it constitutes only a relative majority or an important minority; it has been thought that it might be possible to trace a State frontier line across the plain of the Banat between the Roumanians on the East, who would be re-united to the Kingdom of Roumania, and the non-Roumanians on the West, who would become subjects of the Serbian State; the Roumanian Government considers this a dangerous error.

The Banat is not a geographical term, it is a reality, a real geographical region and also a real political province forming at the present day, as it has done throughout the ages, a complete and indivisible whole. It is, in fact, difficult to conceive that any State can claim or accept one portion only of the country, and still more difficult to expect that, once in possession of that portion, it would be able to withstand the necessity of soon claiming the whole country.

The waterways which surround the Banat on three sides (the Maros, Theiss and Danube) form a natural frontier which bounds a region of plains on the West and a mountainous district to the East, which are closely interconnected. It is the plain of the Banat which yields the necessary food supplies for the inhabitants of the moun-

tains; whilst the people of the hill country send the plain dwellers their wealth of timber and minerals. The rich plains, which are comparatively sparsely populated, draw their indispensable supplies of labour and settlers from the mountains; the plain and the mountains cannot exist apart from one another.

All the systems of communication, whether by road, rail, or water, are organised in the Banat for the whole province, and if a State frontier were drawn which would cut them asunder, all efforts made in this region since the 18th century to establish the means of communication indispensable to economic welfare, would be rendered ineffective.

The navigable rivers and canals traversing the plain carry the heavy produce of the mountains on the East to the Theiss and the Danube; a division of the Banat would leave the Roumanians the upper courses of the rivers and give the Serbs the lower reaches and the canals, which would result in ruining the very advantages of the natural situation of the Banat between its three waterways, by cutting off one entire part of the country from free access to the Danube and the Theiss.

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Transylvania itself, where the Maros is the one great waterway intersecting the country and penetrating into the heart of its mountains, would be deprived of one of its most necessary outlets. The produce of its forests and mines normally descends the Maros and Theiss to the Danube and thence to the sea, but a Serbo-Roumanian frontier would stop its course below the Lower Maros.

No useful purpose would be served by solemnly affirming, or even guaranteeing *de facto*, freedom of navigation on all the waterways, streams, rivers and canals. Navigation requires something more than this—i. e. technical organisation, depôts and warehouses, mechanical, commercial, and industrial installations—in order to preserve, manufacture, distribute, work up or convert the produce at the most suitable points and under the most favourable conditions.

The river trade of Transylvania and the Banat would naturally find all those advantages on the Roumanian banks of the Theiss and Danube; it would be useless to expect them from a foreign State for the products of another State.

But if, notwithstanding everything, the Banat were to be cut in two by a frontier on imaginary ethnographical lines, this would be impossible except by disturbing the necessary balance in every direction.

Even in the region where the Serbs are numerous, large groups of Roumanians are interspersed among them, as well as German colonies which cannot be reunited politically to any other State of the same nationality, but which there is no reason to join to Serbia and which could not, in any event, be annexed to that State because of their distribution throughout the centre of the Banat. These Germans (Serbians), so soon as they are at liberty to give public expression to wishes which are already known, will moreover refuse to allow their national numbers to be diminished by a division between Serbia and Roumania, and they will rally round the latter State.

The intermixture of these various nationalities in the West of the Banat is such that, in order to detach from Roumania the 200,000 Serbians inhabiting such region, it would be necessary, at the same time, to annex to Serbia double the number of non-Serbs, Germans, Magyars and Roumanians. And thus new hotbeds of Irredentism would be created.

In order that at least the south-western portion of the Banat might be wrested from Roumania, it is probable that the necessity for giving Belgrade a protective zone may be brought forward. The lessons of the last year of the war have resulted in an extraordinary diminution in the belief in the utility of such protection, and consequently of the importance of its corresponding argument.

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Furthermore, Roumania replied to this contention in 1916, by inserting in her agreement with the Allied Powers a clause undertaking to leave a zone opposite the present capital of Serbia without military works or garrison.

This is a sufficient guarantee from the defensive point of view. But the creation, on the left bank of the Danube, of a protective zone in the nature of a Serbian political and military possession, would be a veritable bridgehead, or a military organisation less defensive than offensive.

Ever since the Serbian and the Roumanian States have adjoined each other on the Danube, history has furnished proofs of their active intercourse from the point of view of trade and civilisation, but has never had to record disagreements between them. The pacific feeling of both peoples has been greatly assisted by the fact that the Danube formed a well-defined and certain boundary between them, both as regards geography and interests.

The Roumanian Government has always been so persuaded of the Danube's importance as a peace-maintaining frontier, that it has never cast its eyes beyond this river, nor considered the possibility of uniting to that part of Roumania watered by the Northern Danube the many Roumanians settled in Serbia between the Timok and the Morava valleys.

It is persuaded that once the Danube is crossed, once a bridgehead is established on the further bank, yet wider territorial extensions in this direction will become of ever-increasing political and economic urgency. There would then be no end to the unappeasable disputes connected with more or less conventional frontiers. And these disputes, which Roumania has steadfastly refused to tolerate on the right bank of the Danube, could not fail to arise on its left bank with regard to a frontier line drawn across the plain of the Banat, for no nice adjustment could make it anything but ill-defined and inequitable.

Thus, the only results of allowing Serbia to cross the Danube in order to ensure that State a supposed ethnographical boundary, in the hope of finding in such concessions a guarantee for the organisation of international peace, would be economic disorganisation, arrested development of a whole region, and the certainty of future disputes.

It is hardly necessary to add that Roumania will ensure to all Serbs who may remain within her territory all the rights and guarantees ensured to Roumanian subjects by the Serbian State, in conformity with the principles which may be laid down by the League of Nations in the case of minorities.

Such were the general outlines of the arguments put forward by Roumania before the war, in order to justify the validity of her [Page 834]claims to the Banat. The part played by Roumania in the war cannot fail to confirm such rights.

In order to appreciate what Roumania has done, without even calling to mind the conditions under which she was obliged to begin and continue her military action, one has only to remember the fact that the losses of the Roumanian army alone, not including even greater losses among the civilian population amount to a total of 335,000 men, and to trace on the map appended hereto the proofs of the influence of Roumania's military action on the general conduct of the war.

13. DOCUMENT

Roumanian Territorial Claims. Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, 1 February, 1919, at 3 p.m. Paris, February 1, 1919, 3 p.m. PPC Volume III. Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/27

Source: Roumanian Territorial Claims. Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, 1 February, 1919, at 3 p.m. Paris, February 1, 1919, 3 p.m. PPC Volume III. Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/27

PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE, 1919, VOLUME III

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/27

BC-20

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, 1 February, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, February 1, 1919, 3 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

President Wilson

Mr. R. Lansing

Mr. A. H. Frazier

Col. U. S. Grant

Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE

Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George

Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour

Gen. the Rt. Hon. Louis Botha

Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey

Major A. M. Caccia

Mr. E. Phipps

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau

M. Pichon

M. Dutasta

M. Berthelot

M. de Bearn

M. Guerin

Capt. Portier

ITALY

M. Orlando

Baron Sonnino

Count Aldrovandi

Major Jones.

JAPAN

Baron Makino

H. E. M. Matsui

M. Saburi

PRESENT DURING DISCUSSION OF ROUMANIAN QUESTION**AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF**

Major Stephen Bonsai

BRITISH EMPIRE

Mr. H. Nicolson

ROUMANIA

M. Bratiano

M. Nicolas Misu

M. Al. Laperdatu

M. Constantin Bratiano

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.**1.**

Meeting of Russian Representative at Prinkipo **PRESIDENT WILSON** asked permission to communicate to the Conference the gist of a telegram, which he had received from M. Tchicherin, the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs of the Bolshevik Government. In this telegram M. Tchicherin said that he had seen in the Press some reference to the summoning of a Conference of Russian Delegates at Prinkipo, and he asked for an official invitation. He, (President Wilson), wished to know what action should be taken. To send an official communication would be tantamount to a recognition of the Bolshevik Government.

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MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed the view that M. Tchicherin had received his notice like everybody else.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that a notification had been made to the Press and not in a direct manner. He was quite willing to ignore M. Tchicherin's request, but the Great Powers were anxious to get these delegates together, and perhaps an answer should be sent to take away the excuse that they had received no invitation to attend the meeting. Apparently M. Tchicherin wanted a personal invitation.

(It was decided to adjourn the question for further consideration).

2.

Agreement Between Czecho-Slovaks and Poles Regarding Teschen **M. CLEMENCEAU** handed in the following document representing the final agreement

reached between the Czechs and the Poles regarding the occupation of the Principality of Teschen:

“The Representatives of the Great Powers, having been informed of the conflict which has arisen between the Czechs and Poles in the Principality of Teschen, in consequence of which the mining district of Ostrawa-Karwin and the railway from Oderberg to Teschen and Jablunkau has been occupied by the Czechs, have declared as follows:

In the first instance they think it necessary to remind the nationalities who have engaged to submit the territorial questions which concern them to the Peace Conference, that they are, pending its decision, to refrain from taking as a pawn or from occupying the territories to which they lay claim.

The representatives take note of the engagement by which the Czech Delegates have declared that they were definitely stopping their troops on the line of the railway which runs from Oderberg to Teschen–Jablunkau.

Pending the decisions of the Peace Conference Congress as to the definitive assignment of the territories that part of the railway line to the North of Teschen and the mining regions will remain in the occupation of Czech troops while the southern section of the line starting from and including the town of Teschen down to Jablunkau will be entrusted to the military supervision of the Poles.

The undersigned consider it indispensable that a Commission of Control should be immediately sent to the spot to avoid any conflict between the Czechs and Poles in the region of Teschen. This Commission, apart from the measures that it will have to prescribe, will proceed to an enquiry on the basis of which the Peace Conference may form its decision in fixing definitely the respective frontiers of the Czechs and Poles in the contested zone. The seat of this Commission will be situated in the town of Teschen.

In order to seal the Entente between two friendly nations which should follow a policy in full accord with that of the Allied and Associated Powers, the representatives of the Great Powers register the promise of the Czech representatives that their country will put at the disposition of the Poles all its available resources in war material and will grant to them every facility for the transit of arms and ammunition.

The exploitation of the mines of the Karwin-Ostrawa district will be carried out in such a way as to avoid all infraction of private property [Page 837]while reserving any police measures which the situation may require. The Commission of Control will be empowered to supervise this and if necessary to secure to the Poles that part of the output which may be equitably claimed by them to meet their wants.

It is understood that the local administration will continue to function in accordance with the conditions of the pact of the 5th November, 1918, and that the rights of minorities will be strictly respected.

Pending the decision of the Peace Congress, political elections and military conscription will be suspended in the Principality of Teschen.

No measure implying annexation of all or of a part of the said Principality either to the territory of Poland or of Czecho-Slovakia taken by interested parties shall have binding force.

The Delegates of the Czech Nation engage to release immediately with their arms and baggage the Polish prisoners taken during the recent conflict.”

On the proposal of Mr. Lloyd George and General Botha—

It was agreed that the document should first be signed by the representatives of the Great Powers and subsequently by the Czech and Pole delegates and by the members of the Commission for Poland.

3.

Allied Troops of Occupation in Turkish Territory and Trans-Caucasia **M. CLEMENCEAU** read the following reply received from the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council, Versailles, with reference to the Resolution passed by the Delegates of the Five Great Powers at the Conversation held at the Quai d’Orsay on the 30th January, 1919, (see I. C. 128) on the subject of the proper distribution of the Allied Military forces required for the maintenance of order in the Turkish Empire and in Trans-Caucasia:—

The Military Representatives consider it necessary for them to be further advised on the three following subjects:

1.

The territories to be occupied in view of the fact that certain parts of the Ottoman Empire are not at the present time occupied.

2.

The total number of troops required to maintain order in these territories as estimated by the local military commanders.

3.

Whether a joint occupation of these territories is intended, or whether definite zones are to be attributed to the interested Powers, who would be designated by the Great Powers.

M. Clemenceau said that the Conference had put certain definite questions to the Military Representatives, who had merely asked the same questions in reply.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed the view that it was the duty of the Military Representatives to reply to the questions set to them. The first question put by the Military Representatives was perhaps only partly a military question, but the second was wholly a military one. It was one of the very questions the Military Representatives themselves had been asked, and, in his opinion, they should certainly [Page 838] give an answer. The third question was one which the Conference could perhaps, and, indeed, ought to answer.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the answer to the last question would be that definite zones would be allotted to particular Powers, and there would be no joint occupation.

After some further discussion, it was agreed to transmit the following reply to the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles through the Secretaries:

1.

The Conference does not contemplate a joint occupation of any territories.

2.

The Conference did not contemplate the military occupation of any territories other than those already occupied, unless the Military Representatives think that the occupation of additional territory is desirable.

3.

The Military Representatives should themselves obtain and submit estimates regarding the number of troops required for the maintenance of order in the occupied territories.

4.

The Minutes of the Meeting of the 30th January, 1919, relating to the question under reference, shall be supplied to the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles.

5.

Instructions To Be Issued to the Commission for Poland **M. CLEMENCEAU** said that he would next ask the Conference to give their formal approval to the Instructions for the Delegates of the Allied Governments to Poland.

On proposal of President Wilson it was agreed, after some discussion, that the following clause should be added to the Instructions for the Delegates of the Allied Governments to Poland:

“Marshal Foch is requested to inform the German military authorities that the Associated Powers are sending to Poland a commission which is fully empowered to compose all disturbances there so far as possible, and instructed, for that purpose, to insist that the Polish authorities refrain from all use of force against the German forces, and the Marshal is requested to convey to the German authorities in German Poland the demand of the Associated Powers that they altogether refrain from the further use of force in that province and from interference with the life of the people there pending the conclusion of the Peace Conference.”

GENERAL BOTHA then proposed the addition of the following final clause to the Instructions:

“Where matters within the scope of these instructions require the making of special arrangements for their immediate disposition, the delegates are authorised and empowered to make such necessary and provisional arrangements, which shall

be binding upon all parties concerned unless and until disapproved by the four Powers concerned.”

(This was agreed to.)

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GENERAL BOTHA pointed out that the Delegates would have to deal with the neighbours of Poland. One of these neighbours would be the Bolsheviks. He enquired whether the Delegates were authorised to enter into negotiations with the Bolshevik representatives.

PRESIDENT WILSON expressed the view that it was almost an inevitable part of their duties as Commissioners to endeavour to bring about an armistice between the Poles and the Bolsheviks.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that there would be no objection to the Delegates seeing the leaders of the Bolshevik Armies. But it would obviously not be necessary for them to meet either M. Trotski or M. Lenin.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought the sense of the meeting would be that the Delegates could meet whoever they liked, provided they did not ask for definite permission to meet particular individuals to be named.

(The following text of Final Instructions for the Delegates of the Allied Governments in Poland was then formally accepted:

“It will be the business of the Delegates of the Allied Governments to convey as early as possible information to their Governments on the present situation in Poland. The Military question and the Food question are the most urgent, but reports on the political and social conditions of the country should be sent without unnecessary delay.

The Polish Government should be warned against adopting a policy of an aggressive character. Any appearance of attempting to prejudge the decisions of the Conference will have the worst possible effect. The Delegates should invite the most earnest consideration of the Polish Government to the declaration recently made on this subject by the representatives of the Powers at Paris.

Every effort should be made to bring to an end the hostilities which are now taking place between the Poles and neighbouring peoples. Armistices should be arranged wherever possible and the Delegates should use their good offices to bring them about.

In this connection it should be noted that the invasion by the Poles of German territory tends to restore the German military spirit and to delay the breakup of the German Army; and it has the further disadvantage of complicating the arrangements for German disarmament which the Allies desire to carry out with the least possible delay.

The Delegates should enquire how far the Polish Government possess the means to maintain order within their existing territory and of preserving it from external aggression whether carried out by Bolsheviks or any other forces and

they should study and report on the measures necessary to supply any deficiencies which may be found to exist.

The food question will require their earnest attention and they should co-operate with the Mission about to be despatched to Poland by the Supreme Council of Supply and Relief. In order to secure this cooperation the principal Delegates of the Supreme Council of [Page 840]Supply and Relief should be attached to the Delegation whenever questions of food supply have to be dealt with.

Marshal Foch is requested to inform the German military authorities that the Associated Powers are sending to Poland a Commission which is fully empowered to compose all disturbances there so far as possible, and instructed, for that purpose, to insist that the Polish authorities refrain from all use of force against the German forces, and the Marshal is requested to convey to the German authorities in German Poland the demand of the Associated Powers that they altogether refrain from the further use of force in that province and from interference with the life of the people there pending the conclusion of the Peace Conference.

Where matters within the scope of these instructions require the making of special arrangements for their immediate disposition, the Delegates are authorised and empowered to make such necessary and provisional arrangements, which shall be binding upon all parties concerned unless and until disapproved by the four Powers concerned.”)

5.

Procedure **M. ORLANDO** invited attention to the fact that the period granted for the submission of documents relating to territorial claims would expire on that date. He wished to enquire whether this period was to be rigidly applied. He had been informed by M. Dutasta that, up to yesterday, no documents had been received by the Secretariat General, except a part of the Greek case and a report by the Czecho-Slovak Delegates.

MR. BALFOUR expressed the view that a time limit having been granted, the Conference could now proceed with their business. Should any of the Delegations object, the obvious reply would be that the Delegations themselves were to blame for not having submitted their reports in due time. On the other hand, the Conference should not refuse to accept any documents which might be sent in hereafter.

6.

Nomination of Members of Commission for Teschen **M. CLEMENCEAU** said that the members of the Commission for Teschen would have to be nominated. France would appoint M. Veltel, one of the Members for the Commission for Poland.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the members of the Teschen Commission should be military or civil.

(It was agreed that the Members of the Commission for Teschen might be either military or civil, and that their names should be handed in Monday morning, 3rd February, 1919.)

7.

Roumanian Territorial Claims At this stage M. Bratiano and M. Misu, members of the Roumanian Delegation to the Peace Conference, accompanied by their experts, MM. A. Laperdatu and Constantin Bratiano, were admitted to the Conference.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked M. Bratiano to put forward the Roumanian case.

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M. BRATIANO then read the following report on the situation in Roumania:

(a) Roumania's Attitude During the War M. Bratiano said that the Balkan War, into which Roumania entered at the appeal of the Serbs and Greeks, who had been attacked the Bulgars, bore witness to the strength and moral ascendancy of her people in that region of Europe. Far-reaching democratic reforms of a social and political nature were being carried out. The last sixty years of Peace made it possible to profit fully by the productivity of her soil, which had been constantly ravaged for centuries. It was in this phase of productive labour and of great political and economic prosperity, that the world-war broke upon Roumania. But, from the very outbreak of hostilities, Roumania, although bound to the Central Powers by a defensive alliance, refused to follow the aggressors in their action, which was contrary to her feelings and opposed to her interests.

During the course of the war she never ceased to emphasise the benevolent nature of her neutrality with respect to the Entente. Thus, contrary to her own most important economic interests, she restricted such of her exports as might benefit the Central Powers, and only let them have an indispensable minimum as compensation for the supply of necessary arms and equipment to the Roumanian army, which she was, at that time, unable to obtain elsewhere.

Roumania facilitated the passage of arms for Serbia and prevented the transit of any war material for Turkey—just at the time when the question of Constantinople appeared to be of paramount interest. The importance of the services thus rendered to the Entente, which drew down upon Roumania the unfriendly feeling and threats of Germany, was expressly recognised by the Entente Governments and gave rise to a formal undertaking on the part of Russia defining the territories in Austria-Hungary claimed by Roumania, which had, moreover, been recognised in principle by the Russian Government at the outset of war in consideration of the benevolent neutrality of Roumania. (Agreement of 1st October, 1914).

At the request of the Entente Governments, Roumania declared herself ready to give effective support by her army to a cause which she already considered her own. She accordingly notified London of the conditions on which she could take effective military action and which would assure victory, at the same time appealing to the great [Page 842]principles of justice, and stating the conditions necessary for the national development of the Roumanian people.

The Roumanian point of view, summarised in the reply made by the Roumanian Government to the Entente in the Spring of 1916 was determined by the necessity:

1.

Of denning the position of Italy, whose intentions certain of the Allies at that time appeared to doubt, although the Roumanian Government knew them to be quite favourable;

2.

Of defining on the map the claims which had already been admitted in the former undertaking by Russia, in order to obviate any discussion at a later date, which is always to be deprecated;

3.

Of ensuring the supply of arms and munitions for the Roumanian army;

4.

Of ensuring the position of Roumania against Bulgarian aggression by political and military conditions, and to guarantee her against a war on two fronts which her geographical position would not allow her to wage successfully.

After various delays, the causes of which it is unnecessary to explain, but which did not emanate from the Roumanian Government, whose attitude never varied, the Entente Powers finally recognised the justice of the Roumanian demands and undertook, by a Treaty of Alliance and a Military Convention, to give effect thereto. These two documents were intended, on the one hand, to ensure the ability of Roumania to assist the common cause by effective military action, and at the same time to guarantee, after victory, the claims which had been recognised as legitimate and necessary for the development of the Roumanian nation.

Roumania was conscious that, without allowing herself to be discouraged by the worst disappointments, which did not always come from the side of the enemy, she loyally fulfilled her duty to the great cause which she had espoused, to the extreme limits of possibility and in the supreme hope that, no matter what her sacrifices might cost, they might be in proportion to the services she rendered.

Neither the Bulgarian attack, nor the possibility accorded to Germany by quiet on the other fronts of concentrating her efforts against Roumania, nor the inactivity of the neighbouring Allies, who did not meet in Transylvania as arranged, nor the delay in the Russian assistance which might have covered Bucharest and Wallachia, nor that which from the material and moral points of view represented the loss of two-thirds of the country, including the capital, [Page 843]shook the loyalty and devotion of the Roumanians to the cause they had made their own.

Aided by the French Mission, the Roumanians, who had lost more than half their army, continued the fight, and at Marasesti inflicted a defeat upon Marshal Mackensen's best troops and made the invasion of Russia from the south impossible.

Unfortunately, Russia collapsed at this time, and the Roumanian army found itself surrounded by the enemy, with whom its Russian Ally was openly treating. Neither this situation nor the Bolshevik example and propoganda succeeded in demoralising the Roumanian army and nation. Although enveloped and penetrated on all sides by these elements of disorder, not a single Roumanian company, not a single platoon deserted.

The armistice concluded on the Roumanian front was the result, not of Roumanian discouragement, but of the condition demanded by the Ukrainian command, which at that time was the last hope of the Allies in Russia, who saw in this measure the sole possibility of re-forming a Russian front capable of carrying on the struggle. This possibility was far from being realised. Bolshevism continued to complete its work of dissolution on the Russian front in Moldavia and began open hostilities with the Ukrainian command which the representatives of the Allies attempted to constitute on the Roumanian front.

At the demand of the representatives of the Entente, who declared in writing that this operation was the last military co-operation that they were entitled to expect from Roumania, the Roumanian army commenced open hostilities with the Bolshevik troops which then occupied the whole territory of Moldavia and Besarabia. It was thought that this supreme effort would at least ensure the existence of an Ukraine friendly to the Allies.

In spite of all the risk involved in an operation of this nature, when Roumania had the enemy army before her and no possibility of obtaining supplies, she did not hesitate to provoke the hostility of the million Russians who were in occupation of her territory, thus giving her Allies a last proof of her spirit of sacrifice in their cause and affording them, since they thought it possible, an opportunity in which she herself did not believe.

Whilst desultory warfare was being waged on Roumanian territory with her Allies of yesterday, the peace of Brest-Litovsk was concluded. The Ukraine threw off its mask, openly negotiating and signing the peace with the Germans, who occupied its territory and descended the Dniester, threatening the rear and cutting off the retreat of the Roumanian Army.

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As the representatives of the Allies admitted, military action on the part of Roumania was no longer possible at that period of the war.

The only thing that remained for the King of Roumania and his Government to do, was to attempt to maintain the Roumanian Army at sufficient strength to enable it to resume active operations so soon as more favourable conditions should render this possible. This resolve—which was immediately communicated to the Allied Governments—gave its right interpretation to the so-called “Treaty of Bucharest”—i. e. that of a lull in a conflict which was to be resumed.

The peace negotiations were only entered into in order to gain time and not to separate the King from his Army. The peace was merely a means of awaiting events.

Neither legally, practically, nor morally, were the Roumanians ever really at peace with the enemy.

The Treaty of Bucharest, passed by a Parliament elected under the German occupation, when the Moldavian refugees were not allowed to return to their homes and all electoral manifestos were subject to German censorship, was never sanctioned or ratified by the King.

The character of the military occupation continued the same; 8 German divisions, having to maintain Germanic order in Roumania, were prevented from returning to other fronts; 40,000 Roumanian prisoners were still in Germany. The burden of requisitions increased even after the signature of the general armistice. The restrictions imposed on persons and property continued arbitrary and violent; Roumanian institutions such as the Appeal Court and the large government offices refused, with the consent of the King, to continue their functions at Bucharest, in fact both individuals and property were subjected to the same reign of iniquity and violence which inaugurated the occupation by the enemy.

In their hearts, neither King, Army, nor people, had ever ceased longing for the day when they could once more take action. The military and civil representatives of the Allies at Jassy continued to co-operate in expectation of that moment.

Therefore it was without a day's delay that Roumania responded to the call of the Allies when they thought it once more possible for Roumania to resume operations, and on the same day that General Berthelot's army crossed the Danube, the Roumanian troops crossed the line of trenches which had never ceased, during the Peace of Bucharest, to form a fortified line between two enemy nations.

It is thus that the position and action of Roumania developed during the war. Having espoused a great and noble cause, she had [Page 845] served it with loyal devotion, and had achieved even more in the common interests than was imposed by her treaty conditions.

The occupation of two-thirds of her territory, the pillage and exhaustion of the whole country, the decimation of her population by epidemic disease, casualties in her army amounting to over 335,000 men, such in broad outline were the sacrifices borne by Roumania. She did not grudge them for a single instant, being convinced that they were entailed by the service she was rendering to the Allies and that they were at the same time assuring the realisation of her national ideals, as guaranteed by the Treaty signed with the Allies and by the sense of justice of those whose cause she had joined. Roumania had an unshakeable trust in that sense of justice, which she found faithfully expressed in the noble words of President Wilson, who in his speech on the 27th September, 1918, stated "That solutions* have arisen from the very nature and circumstances of the war; the most that statesmen or assemblies can do is to carry them out or be false to them".

In very truth, the question of Roumania arose from its "very nature" on the day when the principles of justice, independence and liberty for the peoples were proclaimed; it also arose from "the circumstances of the war" when, by the treaty of 16th [17th] August, 1916, the Allies undertook to ensure the national unity of Roumania.

The claims of Roumania, as recognised by her treaty of alliance had never been of an imperialistic character. Her claims had only represented the manifestation of the national aspirations of the people and the desire of the Roumanians to be once more united on the ethnical territory assigned to them by history.

(b) Roumania's claims to Transylvania A reference to the map would show in this corner of the world a mountainous district forming the central portion of Transylvania. This elevated region on the one side gradually sloped down to the rich plains of the Danube and the Dniester, whilst on the North it was bordered by the Carpathians and Galicia, and so constituted a well defined geographical area from every point of view. It was in this territory that the Roumanian nation had been constituted and formed; and all its aspirations for centuries had tended towards the political union of that territory.

At the outbreak of War, Hungary, with the Banat, constituted what might be called Transylvania, because from the political point of view Transylvania occupied the exact centre of the whole of that region. [Page 846]But in order to avoid mentioning different parts of that territory at every turn, in the term "Transylvania" would be included not only the Banat but all the countries extending as far as the Galician Carpathians and as far as the Theiss; the whole of that region having formed part of the late kingdom of Hungary.

According to Hungarian statistics, (the nature of which were such that they could not be taken as basis for an accurate estimate), the Roumanians represented 55% and the Magyars 23% of the population.

M. ORLANDO enquired how many Hungarians there were in this district.

M. BRATIANO replied that, according to these same statistics, there were 1,000,000 Hungarians and 2,500,000 Roumanians in Transylvania, not including the Banat. It was, moreover, certain that these statistics were inaccurate. As a matter of fact, if one considers the increase in the Roumanian population according to these statistics, one finds fanciful figures, varying according to the political situation and the degree of acuteness of political struggles. Whilst the Roumanian population on the other side of the Carpathians had tripled and quadrupled, the Roumanian population of Transylvania remained stationary, according to the Hungarian statistics. If an exact census could be taken, 2,900,000 Roumanians and 687,000 Magyars or 72% and 15% respectively of the population would be found to be the exact figures. Whilst the Roumanian population represented 23% of the population of the towns and 72% of that of the villages, the Magyars only represented 40% of the urban population and 13% of that of the villages. The Magyars

were chiefly officials and soldiers, but from the ethnical point of view they were far from representing the ethnical proportion that they claimed for themselves. The Magyar population formed a dominating class which had lived in the midst of the Roumanian population.

Transylvania also included, near the Moldavian frontier, a race related to the Hungarians and a Saxon population: the former numbering 450,000 and the latter 260,000.

On the whole, the great ethnical majority of the population was therefore Roumanian. There was one region that Roumania did not claim, although it included some Roumanian villages, namely the district of Debreczyn; but, in order to maintain the ethnical character of their claims, the Roumanians did not claim such an active Hungarian centre as this town constituted for the adjacent district.

At the beginning of the armistice, the German colonies on the Wallachian and Moldavian frontiers joined Roumania, and the union of Roumania was accomplished with the greatest ease. The Saxon colonies even concluded a formal deed of union with the Kingdom [Page 847]of Roumania. The Roumanians of Transylvania immediately held a great meeting and constituted themselves into an Assembly, 150,000 men meeting for this purpose from all parts of the region; Roumania had already admitted into its Government three Ministers representing Transylvania and the Roumanian countries in Hungary.

(c) Roumanian Claims to Bukovina As regards the Roumanian claims in the Bukovina, this was a Moldavian province, annexed 140 years ago by Austria. The policy of Austria with regard to this province was quite different to that of Hungary. Hungary tried to suppress the ethnical character of the populations by means of violence. The programme of Austria, on the contrary, was peaceful penetration. Thus, for example, she encouraged Ruthenian immigration. In the Bukovina there are about 200,000 inhabitants of various races who had rallied to the Roumanian rule. The Bukovina had constituted an autonomous government since Austria collapsed, thus annulling the annexation by Austria in 1775.

In 1916, Roumania had claimed the whole of the Bukovina, but Russia had not wished the Roumanians to cross the river.

The Bukovina, by its reunion with Bessarabia and Moldavia on the Dniester, had become once more what it originally was, and it would be inconsistent, both politically and geographically, not to leave to Roumania the Bukovina in its present form. 500,000 inhabitants out of 800,000 were represented at the proclamation of the union of the Bukovina with Roumania.

(d) Roumania's Claim to Bessarabia As regards Bessarabia, there were at the present moment 500,000 Roumanians on the other side of the Dniester, more than 100,000 in Bulgaria, more than 300,000 in Serbia, and several hundred thousand in Macedonia, but they did not form groups sufficiently compact for Roumania to be able to claim them at present. It was otherwise in Bessarabia, which was severed

from Moldavia in 1812. Part of the province was restored to Roumania after the Crimean War, but after the war of 1878, Russia took back this province, although admitting the integrity of Roumania by a formal treaty.

The Roumanian claims had always extended to Bessarabia, but they would probably not have been allowed if a great political event had not occurred; Tsarist Russia collapsed and Bessarabia constituted itself an autonomous Republic, recognised by the Russian Government under the presidency of M. Kerensky. The Bolshevik disturbances created a serious situation in Bessarabia, and the Government then applied to Roumania for help in maintaining order. Roumania had refused until she had received similar requests from the Ukrainian Government and the representatives of the Allies at [Page 848]Jassy. The military occupation of Bessarabia by Roumanian troops only took place, therefore, with the consent of the local Government and at the request of the Ukraine and the representatives of the Entente. Subsequently, Bessarabia separated itself completely from Russia and, later, the Bessarabian Government declared its desire to unite with Roumania, and united itself once more to Moldavia, from which it had been severed in 1812.

Such was the history of the reunion of Bessarabia and Roumania. A great injustice had thus been righted. More than 72% of the inhabitants are Roumanians, the remainder are Slavs, Bulgars, or Germans, and they did not represent even 15% of the populations; therefore from every point of view Bessarabia was a Roumanian country.

The incorporation of Bessarabia with Russia was an anachronism which could no longer be allowed to exist. Whatever may be the fate of Russia, she could and must no longer exercise supremacy in the Balkans. This dream was perhaps cherished by the Russian Government at the beginning of the 19th century, and the occupation of Bessarabia was doubtless a first step towards the occupation of Moldavia, Bulgaria and Constantinople, but it was a false political move. Bessarabia was, moreover, of no importance to Russia, for there was scarcely a Russian in the country. But after having once seized the country, it was difficult for Russia to restore it. As soon as circumstances allowed, it returned to Roumania who was able to prevent the work of destruction which the Bolsheviks had begun. It was far more advantageous to have a friendly country as neighbour than a country foreign in her ideas and ways of life. Now Bessarabia would possess community of ideas with Roumanian national consciousness.

For all these reasons, Roumania believed that the Peace Conference would not question the justification of the union of Bessarabia with Roumania.

(e) Present Constitutional Arrangements in Transylvania and Bukovina Bessarabia **MR. LLOYD GEORGE** enquired whether the national assemblies formed in these three countries, Transylvania, the Bukovina had demanded their return to Roumania and whether they had laid down any conditions?

MR. BRATIANO said that the three countries had made different constitutional arrangements. In Transylvania, the Roumanian representatives formed themselves into a National Assembly, which the representatives of the Saxon population joined: But the Hungarian population had refused to do so.

For the Bukovina all nationalities, except the Ruthenians, elected a government, which had proclaimed the union of the Bukovina with Roumania.

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In Bessarabia, elections had taken place under the Russian Republican Government, and the Assembly thus elected had proclaimed the union with Roumania, subject to certain reservations which the Assembly had since withdrawn, on condition that it should be granted a special Agrarian Law.

Transylvania had proclaimed complete union, but with provisional autonomy, in order to settle the legal conditions under which effect would finally be given to such union. Transylvania had, as a matter of fact, different laws from those in force in Roumania and her representatives wished to study these specially important questions and to refer the decision reached to the people before signing the final act of union.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether Roumania was asking the representatives of the Powers purely and simply to proclaim the annexation of these different territories, or was she asking the Conference to declare that in these various regions regularly constituted assemblies shall have power definitely to declare for union and to settle the conditions? When the union of Scotland with England had taken place, that union was only effected after certain conditions imposed by Scotland had been carried out.

MR. BRATIANO said that Roumania asked for the recognition of the union of these provinces with Roumania, for that union had already been proclaimed and the latter had already sent three Ministers to the Roumanian Cabinet. A Statute had even been arranged. The same remarks applied to the Bukovina.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had reason to believe that certain minorities had not taken part in the elections. It was important that the decision should be made by assemblies representing the whole population.

MR. BRATIANO said he could not quite follow the question put by the Prime Minister of England. Roumania had fought in order to impose her national will on the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. It was certain, therefore, that if the Hungarians were asked to vote in favour of union with Roumania, they could hardly be expected to do so. He did not think a fresh election should be held at the present time. As regards the situation created in Transylvania by the armistice, he considered that the question of principle had been decided by the war, and that these territories must be restored to Roumania. In their future political life, the rights of the minorities would assuredly be respected and they would be granted the greatest possible freedom. But the vanquished could not now be

expected willingly to unite themselves to a country, which for a thousand years they had sought to dominate.

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MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed that the majority must be the final arbiters: but it was essential that the wrongs which had been imposed under Hungarian domination should not be perpetuated. It must not be possible for the minorities to be treated in future as were the Roumanians in the Hungarian State, who were deprived of their language, their traditions and their own life.

(f) Roumania Asks Authorization to Occupy Immediately All Territories Claimed by Her **M. BRATIANO** expressed complete agreement on that point. In the Deed of Union with Transylvania it had been stipulated that the religious and political liberty of all the nationalities Transylvania would be recognised, and that was the reason why the Saxon population had associated itself with the Union. The principle involved was one of general application, to be extended to all annexed countries without exception. But it would be an act fraught with serious consequences if the union with Transylvania were not to be declared now, at a time when her late masters were convinced that their cause was lost. There had been too much delay already; occupation of the territories must take place under the most favourable conditions, in the very interests of the nations who were to live together. For instance, the conditions were most satisfactory in the districts bordering on the Roumanian frontier which had been occupied before the signing of the armistice, even though Roumanians there actually formed the minority of the population, on the other hand, in the territories not occupied by Roumania, although Roumanians were in the majority, conditions were very serious owing to the enemy having organised a violent agitation on Bolshevik lines. The division of wealth and the abolition of rank had been promised: Wilson's policy had been proclaimed to be nothing but a capitalist policy; people had been told to kill officers and to do away with the governing classes. This propaganda had caused 100,000 workpeople to strike and the news received from Transylvania was very disquieting. This state of affairs was largely due to the uncertainty of the future. Therefore, he would beg the Commission to come to an immediate decision on the practical questions arising out of the war, and to authorise Roumania to occupy these territories immediately. The Roumanian Government might still be able, without bloodshed, to make relations between the various nations possible and even fraternal. But if the present situation were allowed to drag on, a new animosity would be created and blood would flow once more. Roumania was in a condition of great exhaustion due to the trials she had undergone and to the Bolshevik propaganda which had spread from the Ukraine through Bessarabia. Roumania was in need of the moral support of the Allies, if she was to remain what she had been hitherto—a rallying point for Europe against [Page 851]Bolshevism. He did not know what decisions would be reached by the Conference with regard to Bolshevism; but it was not a political

doctrine; it was a serious and contagious disease that must be fought. Roumania asked to be placed in a position to resist it. She asked this not only in her own interests, but in those of the whole of Europe and, without exaggeration, of the civilisation of the world.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked what troops were at present occupying Transylvania.

M. BRATIANO replied that the small tract bordering on the Roumanian frontier had been occupied by the Roumanians and that the remainder of the country, not being under any occupation, was a prey to anarchy. The Bukovina had been occupied by the Roumanians.

(f) Roumania Asks for Occupation of Banat & Dobruja by Allied Troops Yesterday, at the close of the meeting with the Serbian representatives, he had ventured to request that the Banat should be evacuated by Serbian troops, and that these should be replaced by the Allied troops at present in that neighborhood. In consideration of the nature and purpose of the meeting, he did not wish to enlarge upon the acts of violence which the Serbian Army were committing against the peoples of the Banat, and which might sow regrettable seeds of enmity. Whatever might be the decision of the Conference, it was most desirable that such occupation should be effected by Allied and not by Serbian troops. The question was an urgent one. The same applied to the Dobruja, where, by reason of the armistice conditions, the Roumanian State was not yet able to exercise its full authority. Whatever decision the Conference might reach, it surely could have no desire to wrest a portion of territory from an Allied State, without such State having consented to an alteration of the frontier line; and justice demanded that Roumania should remain mistress of the Dobruja. (g) Situation in Dobruja

MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed the view that the question of the Banat could not be discussed in the absence of the Serbs.

M. CLEMENCEAU thanked M. Bratiano for his statement with regard to Roumania's claims.

(The Roumanian delegates then withdrew.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, speaking for himself and for many of those whom he had been able to consult, it was extremely difficult to decide questions of boundaries on statements, however lucid, made in the course of a Conversation. He wished, therefore, to propose that in the first place experts of the five Great Powers should examine such questions, and, if possible, make a unanimous recommendation. It is quite possible that on many of the questions to be considered, the experts would agree. Naturally, these experts [Page 852] could not decide the problem, but they could clear the ground, and, in cases of disagreement, the representatives of the Great Powers would be compelled to argue out the case there in that Council Chamber. But there were many questions regarding which the Great Powers were perfectly impartial. For instance, they were quite impartial regarding

the Roumanian claims on Hungary, to an expose of which they had listened that day. He thought, therefore, that if a preliminary investigation was carried out by experts, it would greatly assist. He fully admitted that this procedure could not be introduced as a permanent arrangement, or be accepted as a precedent for universal application; but in the particular case of the Roumanian claims, in order to arrive at a decision, he hoped the experts would be allowed to examine the ground in the first instance, and the representatives of the Great Powers would eventually decide the question. He wished, therefore, to move the following Resolution:—

“It is agreed that the questions raised in M. Bratiano’s statement on the Roumanian territorial interests in the Peace Settlement shall be referred for examination in the first instance by an expert Committee composed of two representatives each of the United States of America, the British Empire, France and Italy.

It shall be the duty of the Committee to reduce the questions for decision within the narrowest possible limits, and to make recommendations for a just settlement.

The Committee is authorised to consult the representatives of the peoples concerned.”

PRESIDENT WILSON expressed the view, which he felt sure was shared by the mover of the Resolution, that only those aspects of the question, which did not touch the purely political side of the problem, should be examined by the experts. All other questions requiring the exercise of tact and compromise must necessarily be reserved to the representatives of the Great Powers, including the protection of minorities, etc. The experts, therefore, should merely consider the territorial and racial aspects of the case.

MR. BALFOUR thought that strategical questions might also be considered by the experts.

M. ORLANDO said he had a statement to make in reference to a matter of individual conscience, which he did not wish to force on his colleagues. But he felt himself bound to Roumania by a Treaty. In his opinion, the laws relating to public and civil rights only became valid after their promulgation. He did not wish to defend secret treaties which, indeed, were now out of fashion; but a treaty having been signed by Italy, France and Great Britain, he could make no distinction between a secret treaty and a public treaty.

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M. CLEMENCEAU drew the attention of M. Orlando to the fact that the Roumanian Treaty had, by the common assent of the representatives of the Great Powers there in that room, been cancelled. It had been agreed that Roumania should, for reasons given, have proper representation at the Peace Conference; but, it was distinctly understood that the grant of representation would not renew every clause of the Treaty, which she had broken by going out of the war. (I. C. 104.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE also pointed out that Roumania was now claiming more than she had been granted by the secret treaty.

M. ORLANDO said he had no recollection of the incident quoted. But, in any case, the treaty of 1916 between Roumania and the Allies having been signed, did that fact tend to invalidate the Peace Treaty subsequently signed by Roumania with the Central Powers at Bucarest? If so, the previous treaty with the Allies was *ipso facto* annulled. In his opinion, Roumania was forced to sign the Peace Treaty with the Central Powers, and she had not been a free agent. Consequently, he did not consider the latter treaty to be valid, no more than he would consider himself bound by an agreement signed whilst a pistol was being held at his head.

M. CLEMENCEAU remarked that he did not think such an argument really helped the case of the Roumanians.

M. ORLANDO said that, at any rate, he had given expression to a matter which had lain on his conscience. He turned now to Mr. Lloyd George's proposal and was glad to find that it was not to form a precedent. Therefore, some of his objections would fall to the ground. But, as regards the application of the proposal to the case under consideration, the decisive question to be settled was wholly and solely a political one. Being exclusively political, the whole responsibility for the settlement must rest with the representatives of the Great Powers.

Mr. Lloyd George's resolution said that specialists would be appointed. What kind of specialists? If it was intended to appoint specialists on the Roumanian question, he himself had none; and they would be difficult to find. But even then, he would ask: What branch of the Roumanian question should those specialists represent? Should they be geographical, historical, strategical or ethnographical specialists? The question was a very complex and mixed one, and its various aspects could not be separately examined. Consequently, the specialists who might be appointed though knowing their particular subject could not give good assistance in the final solution of the problem. Further, the resolution said that the Committee would [Page 854]consult the representatives of the people concerned. The experts would thus, in fact, become examining magistrates. Mr. Lloyd George's proposal thus became a very serious one, since the experts would constitute the Court of First Instance and the delegates of the Great Powers, the Final Court of Appeal. He failed to see how such a procedure would expedite matters. In his opinion, it necessarily meant delay, especially if the experts decided that the enquiry must take place *in situ*. His proposals might not be acceptable to his colleagues: but he had felt obliged to put forward his views though he did not wish to press them. In his opinion, the procedure proposed by Mr. Lloyd George in this case had great inconveniences, and, if accepted, he noted with pleasure that it would not form a precedent.

M. SONNINO expressed the view that the experts might find themselves compelled to go to the spot to consult the representatives of the people concerned.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE explained that the experts would carry out their work in exactly the same manner as their Committee on Teschen had done.

M. SONNINO replied that unfortunately in the case of the Roumanian claims, the representatives of the minorities, (Hungarians, Ukrainians, Bolsheviks), would have to be consulted, and they had no representatives here in Paris. He did not see why the representatives of the Great Powers themselves should not first discuss the question with their own experts, and afterwards consult the delegates of the countries concerned, who could give the most expert information available.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed that perhaps it might be wise to omit the clause of the resolution which authorised the experts to consult the representatives of the people concerned. Ever since the United States of America had entered the war, he had had a body of scholars continuously studying such questions of fact as racial aspects, historical antecedents, and economic and commercial elements: the two latter being of very great importance in many of the questions under dispute, as had been realised in the case of the Banat. Furthermore, it must be remembered that however complete their confidence might be in the delegates of Roumania, Serbia, and other countries, who would present claims; these delegates were merely advocates, and they made opposite claims as to the right inferences to be drawn from facts. They did not represent their facts in the same way, and there would always be something that was not quite clear. As the United States of America were not bound by any of the treaties in question, they were quite ready to approve a settlement on a basis of facts. But the claimants did not always restrict themselves even to the [Page 855]limits set by Treaties and their claims frequently exceeded what was justified by the Treaties.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, in this connection, drew attention to the Roumanian claims on the Banat. The Roumanians now claimed the whole of the Banat, whereas the Treaty only gave them a part.

PRESIDENT WILSON, continuing, said that he was seeking enlightenment, and this would no doubt be afforded by a convincing presentation by the experts. If the resolution proposed by Mr. Lloyd George did not receive acceptance, he would find himself compelled to fight the question merely on the views expressed by the American experts; but he would prefer that these conclusions should be corrected by the views of the French, British and Italian experts.

M. CLEMENCEAU enquired from M. Orlando whether he still objected to the resolution.

M. ORLANDO said that he had already expressed his willingness to accept the resolution, provided it was not to create a precedent.

(It was agreed that the questions raised in M. Bratiano's statement on the Roumanian territorial interests in the Peace settlement should be referred for examination in the first instance by an expert committee, composed of two representatives each of the United States of America, the British Empire, France and Italy.

It shall be the duty of this Committee to reduce the questions for decision within the narrowest possible limits, and to make recommendations for a just settlement.

The Committee is authorised to consult the representatives of the peoples concerned.)

8.

Naval Peace Terms Committee It was decided that the Naval Peace Terms Committee should forthwith meet to draft the Naval clauses to be introduced in the Peace Treaty with Germany.

(The Meeting adjourned to 11 o'clock on Monday, the 3rd February, 1919).

14. DOCUMENT

Discussion of Czecho-Slovak Question. Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, 5 February, 1919, at 3 p.m. Paris, February 5, 1919, 3 p.m. PPC Volume III. Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/30.

Source: Discussion of Czecho-Slovak Question. Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, 5 February, 1919, at 3 p.m. Paris, February 5, 1919, 3 p.m. PPC Volume III. Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/30.

PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE, 1919, VOLUME III

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/30

BC-23

Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, 5 February, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, February 5, 1919, 3 p.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

President Wilson

Mr. R. Lansing

Mr. A. H. Frazier

Mr. L. Harrison

Lieut. Burden

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, M. P.

Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey

Captain E. Abraham

Mr. E. Phipps

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau

M. Pichon

M. Dutasta

M. Berthelot

M. de Bearn

Capt. Portier

ITALY

M. Orlando

Baron Sonnino

Count Aldrovandi

Major Jones

JAPAN

Baron Makino

H. E. M. Matsui

M. Saburi

PRESENT DURING DISCUSSION OF CZECHO-SLOVAK QUESTION**AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF**

Major Bonsal

Mr. Dulles

Mr. Seymour

BRITISH EMPIRE

Mr. H. Nicolson

Mr. A. Leeper

CZECHO-SLOVAKIA

M. Benes

M. Kramartz

ITALY

Count Vannutelli

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. Nominees for Greek Committee **M. CLEMENCEAU**, in opening the meeting, asked for the names of the delegates appointed by the various Powers to serve on the Greek Committee.

The following names were given:—

United States of America	Mr Westermann.
	Mr. Day.
British Empire	Sir Robert Borden.
	Sir Eyre Crowe.
France	M. Jules Cambon.
	M. Gout.
Italy	M. de Martino.
	Colonel Castoldi.

(At this stage Dr. Kramartz and M. Benes and the technical advisers entered the room).

2. Czecho-Slovak Territorial Claims **M. BENES** said that, before beginning to expound the Czechoslovak problem, he would like to declare what were the principles guiding Czecho-Slovak policy. The movement culminating in the formation of an independent Czechoslovak State had begun 3½ years ago. The agitation had been carried on by scattered exiles in the various Allied countries. There was, at that time, no Government and no organised political body. In 3 years these exiles had succeeded, with the help of the population remaining at home, in putting up a Central Government and a political organisation which was vital, and, with the help of the Allies, three armies in the field.

Before dealing with the question of the future frontiers of this new State, he would like to recall that the Czecho-Slovak people had shown a practical sense of politics which had won for them the recognition of the Allies. He would also like to recall that, in all these years, the Nation had been entirely united. It had never hesitated to side with the Allies in the interests of democracy. It had not fought for territory, but for the same principles as the Allied Nations. It had risen against a mediaeval Dynasty backed by bureaucracy, militarism, the Roman Catholic Church, and, to some extent, by high finance. The Nation had plunged into this struggle without asking for any guarantees or weighing the probabilities of success. All the Nation wanted was to control its own destinies. The Nation felt itself to be a European Nation and a member of the Society of the Western States.

In seeking now to shape the Czecho-Slovak State, the very same principles would be their guide. They would adopt the European and human point of view, and base their claims on the very principles the Conference was assembled to establish.

The Nation, after 300 years of servitude and vicissitudes which had almost led to its extermination, felt that it must be prudent, reasonable and just to its neighbours; and that it must avoid provoking jealousy and renewed struggles which might again plunge it into similar danger. It was in this spirit that he wished to explain the territorial problem.

(i) The Four Provinces of Czechoslovakia **M. Benes**, continuing, said that the first territorial question was that of the four provinces, Bohemia, Moravia, Austrian Silesia and Slovakia. These territories were claimed for ethno-graphical reasons. They contained 10 millions of the Nation.

[Page 878]

(ii) Historical Considerations The first three had been one State from the sixth Century. The Czech Dynasty had lasted until 1747, when a unitary form of government had prevailed against federalist and national tendencies. In 1526, the Hapsburgs had been elected Kings of Bohemia, and, though, up to the present time they had *de jure* recognized Czech Institutions, they had begun from that date to cen-

tralize power. Czech independence might be said to have lasted until 1747. Since then, though the Juridical existence of the State continued to be acknowledged, it had no practical significance. Hence the Czech Insurrection in 1848 and that which had coincided with the beginning of this war.

Historical considerations, though not the predominant factor at the present time, must be accorded some weight, in as much as they; very deeply affected public opinion. It was these old historical causes that armed the Czech people against the Germanic masses around them. Three times the Czech people had rebelled, not merely against Germanism but against a system of aristocratic and Roman Catholic privilege; three times the nation had been overwhelmed by the superior numbers of the German peoples. At the end of the 17th Century, after the great battle of the White Mountain, the Czech people had practically ceased to exist. It was reanimated only at the end of the 18th Century by the French Revolution. Since then the Nation had worked so hard that, at the beginning of the 20th century, it was industrially, intellectually and politically, the most developed community in Central Europe. Throughout the 19th Century whenever the Czech people had attempted to free themselves it was always the appeal to history that had inspired them.

(iii) Exposed Situation of Czecho-Slovakia M. Benes said that he must draw attention to the exposed situation of the Czecho-Slovak nation. It was the advanced guard of the Slav world in the West, and therefore constantly situation of threatened by German expansion. The Germanic mass, now numbering some 80 millions, could not push westwards as its road was blocked on that side by highly developed nations. It was, therefore, always seeking outlets to the south and to the east. In this movement it found the Poles and the Czechs in its path. Hence the special importance of the Czecho-Slovak frontiers in Central Europe. It might be hoped that the Germans would not again attempt forcible invasions, but they had done so in the past so often that the Czechs had always felt they had a special mission to resist the Teutonic flood. Hence the fanatical devotion of the Czechs which had been noticed by all in this war. It was due to the constant feeling of the Czechs that they were the protectors of democracy against Germanism, and that it was their duty at all times to fight the Germans.

[Page 879]

(iv) German Element in Bohemia The first territorial claim of the Czechs was to Bohemia, Moravia and Austrian Silesia, which formed a geographical and ethnographical whole. However, there were some 2,400,000 Germans in Bohemia according to Austrian official statistics. The presence of these Germans was the result of centuries of infiltration and colonisation. The statistics, however, were official statistics drawn up with a deliberate political purpose. It was easy to prove their mendacity. The Czech figures showed that the Austrian census exaggerated the number of Germans in Bohemia by 800,000 or a million. The Czech statistics

had been very carefully made. When the Austrian census in 1910 was under preparation, State and Municipal authorities sent to each village in the mixed districts warnings that the census would be established on the lines of spoken language not of mother tongue. If, therefore, a workman conversed in German with his employer, he was set down as a German, under pain of losing his employment and of being evicted from his home. The same method had been employed in the territories of other mixed populations in the Austro-Hungarian Kingdom. According to Czech calculations there were about 1,500,000 Germans in Bohemia.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked when the previous census had taken place.

M. BENES replied that it had been in 1900, and that the same methods had been employed and the same results obtained.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked how many Czechs there were in Bohemia.

M. BENES replied that in Bohemia itself there were 4,500,000.

He wished to add that in the Bohemian territory represented as German there was also an autochthonous Czech population representing about one-third of the whole. To this must be added the fluctuations of the industrial population. He explained by the help of a map the progress of the German encroachments on Bohemia. Four distinct spheres could be distinguished, and it was noticeable that the greatest German advance had always taken place after the defeat of the Czech nation. The most notable encroachment had occurred at the end of the 17th and during the 18th Centuries. The progress had been checked in the 19th Century and in the 20th a beginning of the reversal of the process had been noticeable. It was on these considerations that the Czechs founded their claim to the restoration of the land taken from them.

(v) Economic Arguments The best argument, however, on which to establish the rights of the Czechs was of an economic order. The Czecho-German parts of Bohemia contained nearly the whole of the industries Arguments of the country. Bohemia as a whole was the strongest industrial portion of Austria-Hungary. It possessed 93% of the [Page 880]sugar industry (it was the fourth sugar producing country in the world). The whole of the glass works of Austria-Hungary were on Czecho-Slovak territory. It possessed 70% of the textile industry, 70% of the metal industry, 55% of the brewing, and 60% of the alcohol production. Nearly all these industries were on the confines of Bohemia in the mixed territory. Without the peripheral areas Bohemia could not live. The centre of the country was agricultural, and the two parts were so interdependent that neither could exist without the other. If the Germans were to be given the outer rim of Bohemia they would also possess the hinterland. Most of the workmen on which these industries depended were of Czech nationality. In particular, the mining regions attracted large numbers of Czechs. The whole country was really homogeneous, and must remain united.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired what the reasons might be which led to the concentration of industries on the edges of the country.

M. BENES replied, that the presence of water-power, coal and minerals explained it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the population engaged in these industries was German or Czech.

M. BENES replied that the majority was Czech, but that the employers were chiefly German. However, since the educational movement in Bohemia, the professional and middle classes among the Czechs were rising in importance and had begun to compete with the Germans as employers of labour.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired at what date the educational movement among the Czechs had begun.

M. BENES replied that it began in 1880.

MR. BALFOUR enquired whether the majority of the employers was still German.

M. BENES replied that this was so, but that the majority was diminishing. It was the economic aspect of the Czech national movement which had most alarmed the Germans and Magyars. They saw that this movement would be irresistible, and this consideration had precipitated the war.

He would add one more point. The Bohemian Germans fully understood their position. Whether they were bourgeois, workmen or peasants, they all realised that they must remain in Bohemia. They said freely in their Chambers of Commerce that they would be ruined if they were enclosed in Germany. The competition of the great German industries was such that they could not possibly survive. They were prevented from making open declaration of this feeling because they were terrorised by a small number of Pan-German agitators from Vienna. It was not the Germans of Germany proper [Page 881] that exercised any pressure on them, but only the Germans of Austria, for it had always been a deliberate policy of the Austrians to set German and Czech against one another.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether the area in question had been represented in the Reichsrat by German deputies.

M. BENES replied in the affirmative, and explained that the voting areas were so contrived as to give the Germans a majority. Nevertheless, in two such districts, the Czechs had put up candidates of their own who obtained substantial minorities in their favour.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the inhabitants of these districts, if offered the choice, would vote for exclusion from the Czechoslovak State or for inclusion.

M. BENES replied that they would vote for exclusion, chiefly through the influence of the Social Democratic Party, which thought that the Germans would henceforth have a Social Democratic regime. The Czech Government was a coalition Government, and was regarded by them as bourgeois. It would be for reasons of this kind and for nationalist reasons, rather than for economic reasons, that the

German Bohemians would be likely to adhere to their fellow-countrymen outside Bohemia.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the German manufacturers in Bohemia were protected by tariffs against the competition of German manufacturers in Germany.

DR. KRAMARTZ replied that this was so, and that without such protection they could not have resisted the competition at all. He added that the Germans would be very pleased to have this territory added to theirs, as it would afford them an outlet for their products, which in many parts of the world would for a long time be denied them.

M. BENES said that to close the question of the German Bohemians, he wished to lay down that the Czecho-Slovak Government had no intention to oppress them. It was intended to grant them full minority rights, and it was fully realised that it would be political folly not to do so. All necessary guarantees would be accorded to this minority.

(vi) Teschen **M. BENES** said that on the subject of Teschen he would be brief, as the problem had been previously dealt with. He had then stated the problem from its economic side. He would like the problem to add that the Czech argument was strong on ethnographical grounds, also. Austrian official statistics were false, and for political reasons favoured both Poles and Germans at the expense of Czechs. The reason for this was that since 1848, and especially since 1867, the whole Czecho-Slovak population had always been in opposition to the Government. The Germans and the Poles, who [Page 882]in Austria had been far better treated than in Germany or Russia, had been supporters of the Government. In consequence, the census exaggerated the numbers of Poles to the detriment of the Czechs. 50 years ago official life in Teschen had been Czech. When the industrial exploitation of the country began, cheap labour, mostly Polish, had been introduced. Of the 230,000 Poles set down in the Census as living in the country, at least 50,000 were really domiciled in Galicia. If these were deducted, the Poles were a minority as opposed to 115,000 Czechs and 80,000 Germans. The territory was not Polish. Teschen itself was a German town, and the industrial and mining parts of the country were really occupied by a Czech population. The inhabitants of the mountains in the South spoke a half Czech and half Polish patois. North of them the people were German. Still further North they declared themselves to be Silesians. The people as a whole, if given the choice, would elect to join the Czecho-Slovaks rather than the Polish state, as being the richer of the two, and the one which offered the greater likelihood of order and freedom. This certainly applied to all the Germans and Jews in the country.

MR. LANSING asked whether this was the locality concerning which President Masaryk had said that the population was not ready for a plebiscite.

M. BENES said that he had no information about any such statement. He thought it unlikely, as in his opinion a plebiscite would certainly result in favour of the Czechs.

He also wished to point out that the coal in Teschen was absolutely essential to the development of Czecho-Slovak industry. Bohemia before the war had bought 470 million Kroners worth of coal from German Silesia. Teschen supplied the coal most suitable for Czech industries. By losing this region the Czecho-Slovak State would lose one of the essential things on which its life depended. The whole Teschen area was one geological whole. The coal-field had not been entirely explored. It extended across the Vistula, and the Czecho-Slovak State claimed the whole basin. Nothing less could ensure its industrial revival, and this claim could not be given up.

Moreover, the only important railway linking up Bohemia, Moravia and Northern Slovakia passed through Teschen. Slovakia was economically backward, and could only be developed by means of this railway. This territory also contained the only pass through the mountains affording connection between Silesia, Moravia and Slovakia.

(vii) Rectification of Present Frontiers of Bohemia, Moravia & Silesia **M. BENES** said that certain alterations in the existing frontiers [Page 883] were required, mostly for economic reasons, but also with the object of including outlying Czech towns within the State, and in particular he wished to mention the Moravia & district of Ratibor, in Prussian Silesia. Ethnographically the Czechs spread beyond the frontier of Austria into Prussian Silesia. The people called themselves Moravians, but it was for economic reasons that this district was claimed. It was a continuation of the Teschen coal-fields. The town of Ratibor was populated in the proportion of 60 per cent by Germans, and the regulation of their status would be a subject for the Committee. Ratibor Districts

Country of Glatz The next subject was that of the County of Glatz, which intruded into the corner of the Czecho-Slovak territory. Some wished to annex the whole of this territory, and some only a part of it. Historically, it was Czech, and had been yielded by Austria to Germany in 1867. He did not wish to be uncompromising about this area, but for national and economic reasons some portion of it should be included in the Czecho-Slovak State.

(viii) Slovakia **M. Benes** said that Slovakia had at one time formed part of the Czecho-Slovak State. It had been over-run by the Magyars at the beginning of the 10th Century. The conquerors had attempted without success to magyarise the country. The population still felt Czech, and wished to belong to the new state. There was never any suggestion of separatism in Slovakia. The same language, the same ideas and the same religion prevailed. Slovak national enthusiasm had been bred by antagonism to the Magyars.

The Northern frontier of the Slovaks was formed by the Carpathians; their Southern frontier by the Danube. From the southward bend of the Danube to the River Theiss the frontier was partly natural and partly artificial. It was bound to include many Magyars, and this constituted a problem which must be solved by the Conference.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed the opinion that no doubt existed about the claim to Slovakia proper. If this were so, he would suggest that Dr. Benes should confine his remarks to the doubtful points.

(It was generally agreed that the claim to Slovakia presented no difficulties, and that the only points requiring elucidation referred to the frontiers with Hungary.)

(ix) Danube Frontier **M. BENES**, resuming, said that the Danube frontier was claimed as a matter of principle. Slovakia was a Danubian country. At the time of the Magyar invasion the Slovaks had Frontier occupied the whole of Pannonia. The Magyars had [Page 884] thrust the Slovak populations into the mountains, and after clearing them from the right bank of the Danube had come into contact with the Germans. On the left bank the Slav population had not been exterminated. They had remained on the land, though they had become more or less magyarised. The deepest strata of the population in the villages on the Northern side were Slovak. Only the upper strata artificially superposed were Hungarian.

There was also a very cogent economic reason for the Danube frontier. The Czecho-Slovak State would have no direct access to the sea. It was surrounded on three sides by Germans and on the fourth by Magyars. It was an industrial country, and absolutely required some access to the sea. The Danube internationalised would afford them this access. It would become the base of the economic life of the State. This was a geographical necessity, and the new State could not survive without it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked what percentage of Slovaks inhabited the Danubian regions.

M. BENES replied that in taking over this region the Czechoslovak State would be including some 350,000 Magyars. He again pointed out that the country had been forcibly magyarised. These figures applied to the area between Pressburg and Vaitzen. He would add that on the other side of the river there were many scattered communities of Slovaks. For instance in the region of Budapest there were as many as 150,000. These would be abandoned in compensation for the Hungarians absorbed.

M. SONNINO asked what proportion the Slovaks represented as opposed to the Hungarians.

M. BENES replied that this varied according to the district. The districts on which statistics were based had been traced from North to South and thus made to comprise strong Magyar majorities. He estimated that in the districts to which he referred the Slovak population represented 60 per cent but it was difficult to make a trustworthy estimate, as these areas had never been used as districts for census purposes.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked whether communal statistics could be obtained and whether it was a fact that the Slovak population only touched the Danube at Pressburg.

M. BENES replied that it reached the Danube also North of Budapest, but he admitted that the greater part of the riverain population was Magyar.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether the rivers passing through Slovakia were navigable.

M. BENES replied that only the Vah was navigable, but only half way up its course.
[Page 885]

M. KRAMARTZ said that an attempt was being made to render the Morava navigable and a great development of canal communication was in project, which would connect the North Sea through the Elbe with the Black Sea through the Danube. These communications would pass through Czecho-Slovak territory.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether, if the territories claimed declared themselves Magyar, free access to the internationalised route of the Danube through the rivers of Slovakia would satisfy M. Benes.

M. BENES replied that these rivers were not at present navigable, with the exception of the Vah. The whole of Slovakia would be cut off from the Danube.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether, if Czecho-Slovakia obtained access by railway to fixed points on the Danube, this would satisfy them.

M. BENES replied that the valley and the uplands were so interdependent that great disorganisation would ensue on their separation. These territories lived by the exchange of industrial and agricultural necessaries. The uplands of Slovakia were industrial and the valley was agricultural.

(x) Frontier Between Danube and Ung **M. BENES** said that the claim for this frontier was dictated by railway communications. The mountains ran from North to South and there was little communication from East to West.

It was therefore necessary to include the only railway offering lateral communication. He admitted that a considerable Hungarian population would thus be brought in to the Czechoslovak State, but he would point out that the Hungarian census was even worse than the Austrian. As a whole, 250,000 Magyars would be included, while 350,000 Slovaks would be left out. In all, 650,000 Hungarians would become subjects of the new State, while 450,000 Czecho-Slovaks would remain within Hungary. Racial confusion in Hungary owing to the savage persecutions of the past, was very great.

The Slovaks had been particularly oppressed, and even Kossuth had said that the Slovaks could not be granted the franchise. Magyars freely said that the Slovaks were not men. Out of 2,300 officials in Slovakia only 17 had been Slovaks. Out of 1,700 judges only one had been Slovak, and out of 2,500 Collectors of Taxes only 10 had been Slovaks. In consequence nearly one third of the Slovak population had emigrated to the United States of America. Others had left their homes and settled in places in Hungary where it was easier to make a living, which accounted for the 90,000 Slovaks found near Budapest, and the 80,000 round Debreczin.

[Page 886]

(xi) Ruthenes in Hungary M. Benes said that it remained for him to draw attention of the conference to certain suggestions which were not to be considered claims made on behalf of Czecho-Slovakia.

The first of these suggestions related to the Ruthenes in Hungary. Next to the Slovaks and to the East of them, was a territory inhabited by Ruthenes.

These Ruthenes were the same stock as the Ruthenes of Eastern Galicia, from whom they were divided by the Carpathians. They were close neighbours to the Slovaks, socially and economically similar to them, and there were even transitional dialects between their language and that of Slovakia. They did not wish to remain under Hungarian control and proposed to form an autonomous state in close federation with Czecho-Slovakia. They numbered about 450,000. It would be unjust to leave them to the tender mercies of the Magyars, and though Czecho-Slovakia made no claim on their behalf, he had undertaken to put their case before the Conference. If Eastern Galicia became Russian it would be dangerous to bring Russia South of the Carpathians. If Eastern Galicia became Polish, the Poles themselves would not wish to include this population. It followed therefore that this people must either be Hungarian or autonomous. If the latter, they wished to be federated to the Czecho-Slovak State. This would impose a burden on Czecho-Slovakia, but would afford them the advantage of a common frontier with the Roumanians.

(xii) Serbs of Lusatia A similar problem was that of the Serbs of Lusatia numbering from 150,000 to 160,000. These people were the remnant of the Slav population which at one time extended as far as Lübeck. With the exception of this group, that population had been germanised. These Serbs lived independently in the Spreewald. They were nearest to the Czechs, and had begged him to present their problem to the Conference. These Serbs desired to be autonomous under Czech protection, but the Czechs made no claim on this subject, and even thought it might be dangerous for them to undertake this mission. He thought, however, that the Conference should examine the problem. It was a moral rather than a political matter. The country had once belonged to Bohemia, and had become German territory in 1867. It was situated only 6 kilometres from the Bohemian frontier.

(xiii) Communication With the Adriatic M. Benes said that in order to free itself from the grip of the Germans and Magyars the Czecho-Slovak State wished to establish close relations with the Yugo-Slavs and with Italy. The nearest sea to the Czecho-Slovak territory was the Adriatic. He thought that by means of a small territory either under the Czech or Yugo-Slav Government, or under the [Page 887] League of Nations, means of communication would be best established. A railway line alone, with territory on either side of it would, he thought, be insufficient. He would suggest that this territory should be marked out on the confines of the Germans and the Magyars. It would thus furnish a corridor between Czecho-Slovakia and Yugoslavia.

This was merely a suggestion put forward for consideration with reference to the general principle adopted by the Conference.

The Czecho-Slovak Government had no wish to hamper the purposes of the Conference. They wished to do all in their power to assist a just and durable peace.

(The following resolution was then adopted:—

That the questions raised in the statement by M. Benes on the Czechoslovak territorial interests in the Peace Settlement shall be referred for examination in the first instance to an expert Committee composed of two representatives each of the United States of America, the British Empire, France and Italy.

It shall be the duty of this Committee to reduce the questions for decision within the narrowest possible limits and make recommendations for a just settlement.

The Committee is authorised to consult representatives of the peoples concerned.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS , 6 February, 1919.

15. DOCUMENT

Memorandum by Professor A. C. Coolidge. March 10 [1919]. The New Frontiers in Former Austria-Hungary. PPC Volume XII. Paris Peace Conf. Paris Peace Conf.185.212/5.

The complete organizational structure of the Paris Conference can be found in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States (1942-1947). III. Washington. Organisation of the Conference, October 1, 1919. Pages 117-123 of this document list the general territorial committees and subcommittees. The leading American figure of the General Territorial Committee is Archibald Cary Coolidge, whose memorandum on the borders of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire is reproduced here. The organizational structure of the General Territorial Commission and the Czech and Romanian South Slavic Territorial Sub commissions is shown below:

III. Territorial Questions

CENTRAL TERRITORIAL COMMITTEE

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of February 27, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

President: M. André Tardieu (France)

Mr. Archibald Cary Coolidge;

Assisted by:

Mr. Johnson (for Bulgarian boundaries)

Sir Eyre Crowe;

British Empire:

Assisted by:

The Hon. H. Nicolson (for Bulgarian boundaries)

M. André Tardieu;

France:

Succeeded by:

M. L. Aubert.

M. G. de Martino;

Assisted by:

Italy:

Colonel Pariani (for the boundary between Italy and Austria)

and: Colonel Castoldi.

Japan:

M. M. Adatci.

SECRETARIAT

Secretaries:

France:	M. de Montille (Chargé of the Secretariat General)
United States of America:	Mr. Parker Thomas Moon.
British Empire:	Mr. M. Palairet.
Italy:	Marquis G. Paterno.

Subcommission on Territorial Questions**(Appointed by the Central Territorial Committee)**

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

President: General Le Rond (France)

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United States of America:	Mr. D. W. Johnson.
British Empire:	The Hon. H. Nicolson; <i>Assisted by:</i> Major Temperley.
France:	General Le Rond; <i>Assisted by:</i> Commandant de Montal.
Italy:	Colonel Castoldi.
Japan:	M. Kato.

SECRETARIAT*Secretary:* M. de Montille (France)**1. CZECHO-SLOVAK AFFAIRS**

(Session of the Supreme Council of the Allies of February 5, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

President: M. Jules Cambon (France)

United States of America:	Mr. Archibald Cary Coolidge; Mr. Allen W. Dulles.
British Empire:	The Rt. Hon. Sir Joseph Cook; The Hon. Harold Nicolson.
France:	M. Jules Cambon; M. Laroche.
Italy:	M. G. Marconi; M. A. Stranieri.

SECRETARIAT

Secretaries:

United States of America:	Captain Lester W. Perrin.
British Empire:	Mr. M. Palairet.
France:	M. R. de Saint-Quentin.
Italy:	M. G. Barone Russo.

Subcommission on Czecho-Slovak Affairs

(Session of the Commission on Czecho-Slovak Affairs of February 28, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

President: General Le Rond (France)

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United States of America:	Mr. Allen W. Dulles; <i>Assisted by:</i> Major D. W. Johnson. The Hon. Harold Nicolson;
British Empire:	<i>Assisted by:</i> Lieut. Colonel J. H. M. Cornwall.
France:	General Le Rond. M. A. Stranieri; <i>Assisted by:</i>
Italy:	Commandant M. Pergolani; Captain E. Romagnoli.

SECRETARIAT

Secretary: M. Lavondès (France)

4. ROUMANIAN AND YUGO-SLAV AFFAIRS

(With the exception of frontier questions common to the Yugo-Slav State and Italy)

(Sessions of the Supreme Council of the Allies of February 1 and 18, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

President: M. André Tardieu (France)

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Vice President: M. G. de Martino (Italy)

United States of America:	Professor Archibald Cary Coolidge; Mr. D. W. Johnson.
British Empire:	Sir Eyre Crowe; Mr. A. Leeper.
France:	M. André Tardieu; M. Laroche. M. G. de Martino;
Italy:	Count Vannutelli-Rey; <i>Assisted by:</i> Commandant Rugiu.

SECRETARIAT

Secretaries:

France:	Mr. R. de Saint-Quentin (Chargé of the Secretariat General)
United States of America:	Lieutenant Reuben Horschow.
British Empire:	Mr. M. Palairet.
Italy:	Count L. O. Vinci.

Subcommission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs

(Decision of the Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs of March 2, 1919)

Place of Meeting: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

President: General Le Rond (France)

United States of America:	Dr. Charles Seymour; <i>Assisted and succeeded by:</i> Major D. W. Johnson. Mr. A. Leeper;
British Empire:	<i>Assisted by:</i> Lieut. Colonel T. G. Heywood; Lieut. Colonel J. H. M. Cornwall.

France: General Le Rond;
Assisted by:
 M. de Martonne;
 M. Haumant.
 Count Vannutelli-Rey;
Assisted by:

Italy: Colonel Castoldi;
 Commandant G. Rugiu;
 Commandant G. Mazzolini.

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SECRETARIAT

Secretary: M. R. de Saint-Quentin (France)

Source: Memorandum by Professor A. C. Coolidge. March 10 [1919]. The New Frontiers in Former Austria-Hungary. PPC Volume XII. Paris Peace Conf. Paris Peace Conf.185.212/5.

PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE, 1919, VOLUME XII

Paris Peace Conf.185.212/5

Memorandum by Professor A. C. Coolidge

MARCH 10 [1919].

THE NEW FRONTIERS IN FORMER AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

In the difficult and complicated series of questions involved in the problem of determining the frontiers of the new countries formed out [Page 272]of what was once Austria-Hungary, I believe that the guiding principle to be observed is that of self determination or the wish of the people immediately concerned. Usually though not always, this depends upon the nationality to which they belong. The principle, it is true, is not everywhere applicable. There are communities too small and too unfavorably situated to claim its advantages except by such laws as may be made for the protection of minorities. Its application also may involve disproportionate injury to others and concessions must be made to geographical, economic, and historical considerations, even if so-called strategic ones do not deserve much

regard. I admit too that recent events must be taken into account. For instance, the Germans and the Magyars have not at the present moment the same claims as the Czechs to the benevolence of the Allies and of the United States. Likewise it seems hardly fair to overlook a long record of ill-treatment on one side and of suffering on the other. Nevertheless the nearer we can come to forgetting the past and to applying equal treatment to all, the better it will be and the firmer the foundation for the future.

Even the idea of compensation need not always be rejected. The fact that Bohemia and Jugoslavia will include unwilling Germans, and Rumania unwilling Hungarians is not in itself a reason for handing over unwilling Czechs and Slovenes to Austrian and Rumanians to Magyar domination. Nevertheless the fact that such regions as Brünn and Iglau will come under the Czechs, Gottochee and Cilli under the Slovenes, and the Székler region under the Rumanians makes it less unfair if in the fixing of certain disputed boundaries a number of Slavs and Rumanians are left under Austrian and Hungarian rule.

It is well known that the official statistics of population at our disposition are partisan and not to be trusted implicitly, nor are the estimates made by the rival nationalities worthy of confidence any more than are their readings of history. It must be remembered too that certain elements in a region, such as day laborers, may be only transient. Others under changed circumstances will disappear quickly. The German and Magyar colonies of officials, teachers, etc., and their families scattered throughout Slav and Rumanian districts have no longer any reason for existence. All these things have to be taken into account, but they are seldom important enough to modify materially the main decisions.

The opinions which I shall now venture to submit represent in many cases ideas of long standing confirmed or modified by unusual opportunities of observation in the last few months. I shall merely state my conclusions with but a few words of explanation, as it would take far too long to attempt anything like adequate treatment of the various questions.

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I. CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The clearest cases of conflict between the rights of nationality and those of history and geography come up in connection with the boundaries demanded by the Czechoslovaks who in inconsistent but human fashion base their claims to the two halves of their territory on opposite principles. In Bohemia they demand their "historic frontiers" regardless of the protests of the large number of Germans who do not wish to be taken over in this way. In Slovakia they insist on the rights of nationality and pay no heed to the ancient and well marked "historic frontiers" of Hungary. I believe that here the national claim is the stronger, though we cannot

push it to an extreme, that is to say, I think that a large part of German Bohemia should not be incorporated into the Czechoslovak state even if the historical and geographical unity of Bohemia (including Moravia and Austrian Silesia) will suffer from the amputation, while Slovakia should be taken away from Hungary even though Hungary will thereby suffer still more. As a wrong must be done in both instances to legitimate claims, the decision in details should tend to favor the side being injured, that is the Czechs in Bohemia and the Magyars in Hungary.

To grant to the Czechoslovaks all the territory they demand would be not only an injustice to millions of people unwilling to come under Czech rule, but it would also be dangerous and perhaps fatal to the future of the new state. In Bohemia the relations between the Czechs and the Germans have been growing steadily worse during the last three months. The hostility between them is now intense and there is no reason to expect that it will soon disappear. The blood shed on March 3d when Czech soldiers in several towns fired on German crowds, though but a drop compared with the human sacrifices the world has been witnessing, was shed in a manner that is not easily forgiven. Whatever German sentiment there may have been last November favorable to the maintenance of political union with the Czechs for economic reasons is reaching the vanishing point.

For the Bohemia of the future to contain within its limits great numbers of deeply discontented inhabitants who will have behind them across the border tens of millions of sympathizers of their own race will be a perilous experiment and one which can hardly promise success in the long run. If the minority continues, as it is likely to, both large and profoundly disloyal, one cannot imagine that a League of Nations will force it to remain indefinitely under a hated alien rule. Such a league is not intended to perpetuate the existence of Alsace-Lorraines. Many Germans will have to be citizens of the new Bohemia in any event, but the number should be cut down wherever this can be done without subtracting a considerable number of Czechs from the population. Some weight may be attached to economic considerations, [Page 274] but the argument one hears so often these days that a state "cannot exist without" this that or the other bit of territory that it covets should be acceptable only after the closest scrutiny. Even if the "historic frontiers of Bohemia" have been promised to the Czechs by the Allies, modifications can and should be made in the details.

Taking up the frontiers of Bohemia and Moravia one after another, I believe that

a)

in the south, Lower and Upper Austria should be extended as nearly as possible to the existing ethnic line, as studied out by our experts in Paris. There are no serious geographic objections to this.

b)

The Eger District which is not part of the original Bohemia should be allowed to go to Bavaria if it wants to.

c)

The question is much more difficult in the case of the large rich territory of Northern Bohemia. It is separated from Saxony by natural obstacles, it is of great economic value and its loss would be a very serious blow to the Czechoslovaks. At the same time if it demands, as to all appearances it does, by an overwhelming majority to be separated from Bohemia, it will be hard to deny the justice of its claims. If they are admitted, the Czechs should be given the preference in doubtful districts. If they are not admitted, the territory of Eger should be extended and wherever it is feasible, other modifications should be made.

d)

The so-called Sudetenland can be easily cut off from Bohemia and Moravia. Unfortunately it has no connection with either Austria or the rest of German Bohemia. It might exist as a small state in the new German republic or be united to Prussian Silesia.

e)

Austrian Silesia has recently been the subject of special investigation on the spot by an international commission. Its attribution or division may be safely left to their judgment, corrected, if need be, by the knowledge of our own people who have studied the question. The only suggestion I have to make is that the Czechs and the Poles are not the only people to be considered, but that the Germans have some rights, and that much of this territory forms a natural portion of the Sudetenland mentioned above.

In the small districts in the Carpathians of Spiz (Zips) and Orava, the population is largely German. The Slavs are mountaineers who are more or less half way between Poles and Czechs. If there were any way of consulting their preferences, these might be decisive. If not, I should favor the Poles, who have historical claims to Spiz.

Slovakia, in accordance with the principle of nationalities but doing great violence to those of history and geography, should be given to the Czechs and taken away from the Magyars. Such a decision will, I think, be in accordance with the desires of the majority of the population, although the Hungarians vehemently deny this and I should be surer of the fact if President Masaryk had not for lame reasons refused to hold a plebiscite there. The Czechs, indeed, [Page 275] do not seem sure of their ground, as is shown by such measures as putting the region under martial law. The boundary between Slovakia and Hungary should be made to correspond with the best ascertainable ethnic line, but as the loss to Hungary will in any case be as great as the loss of Northern Bohemia would be to the Czechs, doubtful points should as a rule be decided in her favor. The loss of Pressburg, a city famous throughout Hungarian history, the place of coronation of the Hungarian kings, will be deeply felt by the Magyars, even if they are but a small element in the population, which is chiefly German. But though there are few Slovaks

in the place itself, there are many in the vicinity, and the possession of the town giving the Czechoslovaks access to the Danube will be of much commercial value to them. On the other hand, I see no reason or justice in allowing them to extend their dominion as they do at present for a considerable distance along the northern edge of the Danube in predominantly Hungarian country. As I have said above, the smaller the number of discontented people that they have in their new state, the easier it will be to govern and the greater the chances of its permanence. Hungary will suffer terribly in any case and should be left as many as possible of her former sources of wealth.

The Ruthenian districts of Northern Hungary should not be taken away from her. The geographical reasons are particularly strong against it, for the region is almost entirely mountainous and in the valleys the lines of life and of communication run not east and west but north and south to the Hungarian plains below. The Czechs maintain that the Ruthenians desire to be united to them by at least a confederation. I doubt whether the desire on their part is either spontaneous, widespread or deep-seated. The autonomy granted them by a recent Hungarian law respects their individuality and will be much more profitable economically. The wish of the Czechs to extend their own frontier until they are in touch with Rumania and the Ukraine and to cut off direct communication between Poland and Hungary, although not unnatural, is a bit of imperialism of no particular moral value. It is not, however, as immoral as the suggested corridor through German and Magyar lands to connect Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia.

II. GALICIA

I have made no close study of this question. In general I should favor as a boundary between Poland and Ukrainia something like the line of the Bug and the Stryi or the temporary demarcation fixed by the international commission recently in Lemberg and rejected by the Ukrainians.

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III. BUKOWINA

The greater part, including Czernowitz, should be given to Rumania, cutting off the western portion for the benefit of the Ukrainians who should also receive the northern tip of Bessarabia.

IV. TRANSYLVANIA

Transylvania should be allotted to Rumania, but unusual care should be taken to guarantee the rights of the Székler population, indeed it would be desirable if in any way possible geographically that their union with Hungary should be maintained. I have not studied this question sufficiently to have a fixed opinion about it, but looking at it superficially the plan hardly appears feasible. In any event

the western frontier of Rumania should be drawn to the eastward of the territory occupied by the Rumanian forces. Some sort of a dividing line should be sought that shall be tolerable economically and that shall correspond as well as may be with the ethnic situation. Here again in view of the great loss to the Magyars and great gains to the Rumanians, doubtful cases should usually be decided in favor of Hungary.

V. THE BANAT

The Banat should be divided. The arguments in favor of its unity are weak. The Rumanians should be given the eastern portion, the Serbs a block in the south, and the rest be left to the Hungarians. A boundary established on these principles will satisfy nobody, but will represent an approximation to justice. In such a settlement, the scattered German population can hardly be taken into account, except insofar as its preferences are thrown in on one side or the other. These preferences are difficult to ascertain. Meetings of the so-called representatives of such populations at the present time usually represent little more than political moves of some outside agency. My belief is that in spite of the natural tendency to side with the winning parties, the Germans in this part of the world would prefer to belong to a Magyar rather than to a Slav or a Rumanian state, although there are doubtless exceptions among them, particularly among the Saxons of Southern Transylvania. The Backa Region should go to Jugoslavia.

VI. WEST HUNGARY SOUTH OF THE DANUBE

This territory seems to belong with Austria rather than with Hungary, though it would be a particularly good case to have the matter settled by a popular vote, if it were possible to have a fair one, which I greatly doubt. Neither the Austrians nor the Hungarians, although both have expressed their willingness to abide by the results of such [Page 277]a test, could be trusted to carry it out fairly, if they were in control and a mixed regime would probably lead to endless friction and ill feeling with charges and countercharges difficult to prove or to disprove. I should favor annexation to Austria with the boundaries as fixed by Major Lawrence Martin in his report to me, accompanying my dispatch No. 122, March 3, 1919.

VII. JUGOSLAVIA

The boundary between Austria and Jugoslavia should be drawn along the mountains according to the lines laid down by Lieutenant-Colonel Sherman Miles, Lieutenant LeRoy King and Major Lawrence Martin in their report to me accompanying my dispatch No. 80, February 14, 1919. We have here the advantage of possessing competent and impartial studies by our own men.

VIII. SOUTH TYROL

The German speaking South Tyrol should be given to Austria, not to Italy. All the arguments except perhaps those arising from the political necessities of the present international situation demand that these Tyrolese should remain united with their brethren in the north and not be put under a hated alien rule. History, economic interest and the feelings of the inhabitants are on the same side in this instance. I have been surprised by how widespread and deep is the feeling throughout Austria and I believe throughout Germany in regard to this small section of land with a scanty population and of no great economic value. The feeling is chiefly sentimental, but it is strong, and the loss of this beautiful and poetic territory would never be forgiven. The Ladin portion of the Tyrol, although I think that for commercial reasons it would prefer its present affiliation, might be handed over to Italy with less injustice.

IX. VORARLBERG

This little district resembles one of the Swiss mountain cantons. Economically it is more closely united with Switzerland than with Austria. If it be true, as I have recently heard from an Austrian source, that in a private vote of the population, 65% expressed themselves in favor of union with the Swiss republic, we may feel sure that a considerably larger number would have done so if the vote could have been public and the voters had had no fear of unpleasant consequences. If Switzerland is willing to accept the union, which is doubtful, it should be made. In this case Liechtenstein would probably go with Vorarlberg.

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In conclusion let me add that I am aware that political and other considerations at the present time may make it impossible for our commission to support all of the solutions I have advocated. Nevertheless, I am presenting them as those which seem to me best in themselves.

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

16. DOCUMENT

Council of Ten - British Delegation Envoy Extraordinary Clerk's reports. Percy Loraine's opinion on territorial questions

4 November 1919.

**George R. Clerk to Crowe. TNA FO 608/5/17. 524–613. 20976;
TNA FO 608/5/17. 199–204**

The members of the British peace delegation who had participated in the work of the Czechoslovak Committee and the Committee on Romanian and Yugoslav Affairs had taken the border proposal of 8 February 1919 as their starting point, and in the course of the discussions they tried to enforce it against the French, US and Italian delegates. They were not entirely successful in this endeavour, and in many cases they backed down in the debates. As a result, the Czechoslovak Committee and the Committee on Romanian and Yugoslav Affairs agreed on borders less favourable to Hungary than the British border proposals! Let us look at two examples: on the one hand, on 8 February the British wanted to leave the Chaldean part of Hungary, but the Commission annexed it to Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, the British wanted to leave the Baranyai Triangle to the Hungarian state, but it ended up with the South Slav state. These and similar cases can be explained by the fact that during the negotiations and debates in the Commission, the British delegates backed down under strong French pressure, which put the interests of the successor states first.

It should be noted here that the Clerk's mission in the autumn of 1919 sent a report to the Foreign Office - the report was given to Leeper and Crowe - on the Hungarian politicians' views on territorial questions. The author of the report was Percy Loraine - a member of the Clerk mission who had conducted a number of discussions with Hungarian politicians in Budapest. Based on these, he sent 10 memoranda to the Foreign Office. Among these, his report of 12 November 1919, in which he argued that Hungarian politicians would not accept the annexation of Banat, Bačka, Baranya, Muraköz, Slovakia, Carpathia, a strip of Western Hungary and Transylvania, is worthy of note. If you look at this list, you will see that the only part of the former territories of the Kingdom of Hungary that is not included is Croatia. In effect, Percy Loraine informed the Foreign Office that the Hungarians did not want to accept any of the borders drawn by the Paris Peace Conference. This report, however, had no effect, since, as we have seen, by the summer of 1919 the Peace Conference had drawn the borders of the Hungarian state.

Source: TNA FO 608/5/17. 524–613. 20976; TNA FO 608/5/17. 199–204

2nd December, 1919.

Privat

My dear Crowe,

I enclose an official letter to the Supreme Council, I do not think I need covering the accounts of my Mission. add any detailed explanations or say more than I have said in the official letter. As you will readily understand, it was essential for the Mission to be lodged and live in a manner commensurate with its importance, but as the accounts have to be discharged in the first place by H.M.G., either Gascoyne or I will of course be prepared to give any detailed explanations that are called for.

I should like to say here how perfectly splendidly Gascoyne worked throughout. I borrowed him from the Cypher Department to do my telegram, and he found himself engaged in running a large house in a place where the simplest necessities of life such as bread, meat and fuel were at times almost impossible to procure. No trouble was too great for him and he worked day and night with equal seal and efficiency. B very great debt of gratitude to him. I am under. a very great debt of gratitude to him.

There is one point on which I venture to consult you. A certain number of Hungarians and one or two Roumanians were attached to me and their services were quite invaluable. They were the sort of people whom one would normally recommend for an M.E.E. or something of the sort, but that is not possible in this case, in the first place because of the international character of the Mission, and secondly because we can scarcely give decorations to our enemies. But they all worked with the greatest Loyalty, and took endless trouble to help me in every possible way,, even when it meant, as it occasionally did, difficulties with Their own people. Do you think the Supreme Council would allow me to send them a modest cigarette case or something of that sort? bars would be about eight or nine of them at the outside, so far as I can judge. If you agree, shall I write a formal letter to the Supreme Council, or will you get them to pass a resolution authorising me to incur this expense?

Yours ever,
(Sgd.)

GEORGE R. CLERK.

17. DOCUMENT

Percy Loraine to Leeper. TNA FO 608/5/17. 524–613. 20976; TNA FO 608/5/17. 199–204.

Source: Percy Loraine to Leeper. TNA FO 608/5/17. 524–613. 20976; TNA FO 608/5/17. 199–204.

BUDAPEST

12th November, 1919.

My dear Leeper,

To judge from various recent official telegrams and reports in the Press any discussion of territorial questions affecting Hungary in of an almost purely academic character now, but I think nevertheless that you ought to be placed in possession of various arguments, statistics and views which have been laid before this Mission with a very earnest request for their due consideration. I enclose a list of the papers handed in to us in this connection, which accompany this letter, and George Clerk would be glad if you would have them reproduced and distributed to the competent Commissions etc., through the Secretariat General.

The interviews with persons desirous of discussing territorial questions have, without exception I think, fallen to my lot, and it may be useful therefore if I endeavour to summarise the impressions which I have received, as throwing light on the documents which you will have to examine.

As far as I can gather, there is no serious objection in Hungary to the amputation of Croatia and Slovenin, or at any rate of such parts of them an have a distinctly Slav majority. The sensible people realise that the formation of a greater Southern Slav state was inevitable and is just. I do not therefore foresee any irredentist movement for the recovery of the Slav provinces.

From all the evidence I have had however, there will be no such acquiescence as regards any of the other portions of Hungarians territory which are to pass under another sovereignty.

These are:

- (1) The Banat, Bascka and Baranya.
- (2) The Mur Island.
- (3) Slovakia.
- (4) Ruthenia.
- (5) West Hungarian Districts.
- (6) Transylvania.

I will take these seriatim:

(1) The various deputations are unanimous in deprecating separation from Hungary. The general plea is that the Germans and Magyars, who live in brotherly affection, represent a far higher stage of culture and literary, which must inevitably be destroyed by less gifted and educate "Balkanic" races. The Roumanians, in this connection, admitted to be on a higher plane than the Yugo-Slavs, b their policy of general expropriation and expulsion in favour of Roumanian elements is said to engender as much mistrust as the resurrection of bastinado by the Yugo-Slavs created bitterness. The population is said to be i such a state of mental torment and despair that forcible revolt must inevitably ensue if the Conference leaves them under the detested yoke.

One proposal which you will find in an enclosed document is that the Banat, if it cannot remain in Hungary, should be constituted into an independent, neutralised Republic, in which, the petitioners allege, German, French, Magyar, Serb and Roumanian, each of which form roughly quarter of the total population, will continue to live in perfect harmony.

Another petition you will see is from the Bunyevacs and Sokacs, who likewise deprecate separation from Hungary.

(2) Much the same arguments apply most especially as regards the sub-ordination of a high to a low level of culture.

(3) The theory is here that the Conference has been completely duped by the Czechs; that no desire ever existed in the Slovak heart or head for union with "the Prussian of the Slave", that no free expression of Slovak will was ever heard on the subject in Paris: that a remorseless process of Czechisation is being carried out, to which the comparatively tolerant rule of Magyar was infinitely preferable. Lastly, that a Slovak revolt against the Czechs in favour of re-union with Hungary is imminent and inevitable but that the Slovaks are unable to make their will heard in Paris.

I have endeavoured so far as possible to check this statement by information given me by Mlle. Louise Weiss, correspondent of the "Petit Parisien", who has quite recently travelled all through Slovakia. She says that the mis difficulty is the violent struggle going on between Trage and Rome, so that the whole of Roman Catholic influence is wielded against the Czechs: while there is also a very natural antagonism between the democratizing and inexperienced Czech, and the primitive and mostly Illiterate Slovak, who is entirely under the thumb of the parish priest and schoolmaster, whose patronage the Magyar seems to have captured with considerable skill.

(4) Ruthenia. You will find enclosed a long printed memorandum, and also a type-written one. My interlocutors were very vehement in their denunciation of any conceivable. connection with the Czecho-Slovak State.

(5) West Hungary. The deputation vigorously asserts that of the population, as a strict minimum, would view the assignment to Austria of even the regions with a recognised German-origin population with and resentments and that it would be contrary to all their wishes, interests and aspirations. The Germans admit no kinship except that of language with the Austrian Germans, who always despised and scorned them as an inferior caste, whereas the same story is told of the most perfect harmony and amity with their tolerant and easy-going Magyar brethren.

There is one observation which I especially wish to make on this question. It is not at all unlikely that at the moment when the correspondence on this subject was being exchanged with the Austrian Delegation in Paris there may have been a current of opinion in the German district of West Hungary in favour of incorporation with Austria, but due more to terror of the Bolshevist regime, which then held Hungary in its grip, than to any inherent desire for Austrian citizenship. Now, however, the boot is on the other leg: Hungary has shaken off the Bolshevik microbe, whereas Vienna shows many symptoms of sickening into a perfectly receptive state for the red disease. In these circumstances it is easily possible that the current which I postulate, if it ever actually existed, has now set in the other direction. The deputation pointed out moreover, and not without force, that at the time when Paris acquiesced in assignment to Austria, these districts, being as they were under Bolshevik terror, were reduced to complete silence as regards any expression of their views on the territorial issue.

In the case of all the five points I have hitherto discussed, all petitioners are unanimous in requesting a plebiscite, with proper guarantees for free and impartial Voting, and in expressing their complete willingness to Abide by its result, of which they profess to entertain no shadow of doubt.

As regards (6) I think we have said enough in previous communications. We the recommendation stand most strongly by already made that the Conference should send a Commission of Enquiry with the utmost despatch.

may add that whenever confronted with a deputation with territorial matters to ventilate, I have endeavoured to make it as clear as possible that this Mission is not concerned with such matters, which can be dealt with by Paris alone, but that we are willing to ensure the transmission to the competent persons in Paris of their memorandum etc.

I have also on a good many occasions endeavoured to explain how all the arrangements are founded on the basic expound principle of nationality and to expend the cross-bearing on the territorial adjustments made in the application of that principle of the guarantees contained in (1) the Minorities Treaties and (2) the Ports, Waterways and Railways clauses.

Yours ever, Percy Loraine

18. DOCUMENT

Memorandum about the deliverance of the Muraköz from the South star occupation and the leaving of the same under the supremacy of Hungary. In the name of the population of Muraköz, (Signed). Signatures illegible. Budapest. 30. October, 1919. TNA FO 608/5/17. 206–213.

Source: Memorandum about the deliverance of the Muraköz from the South star occupation and the leaving of the same under the supremacy of Hungary. In the name of the population of Muraköz, (Signed). Signatures illegible. Budapest. 30. October, 1919. TNA FO 608/5/17. 206–213.

Memorandum

about the deliverance of the Muraköz from the South star occupation and the leaving of the same under the supremacy of Hungary.

That part of the territory lying between 28 Draws and Mura in the county of Zala, 750 square kilometres in area and it general known by the name of “Muraköz” was occupied by Yugoslav troops who were recruited in Zagreb on the 24th of December 1918, by way of newspaper advertisements, in direct contradiction to the term of the armistice of the 10th of November 1918, by which we determined that the Drawn demarcation-line from the bridge over the Drave at Barcs to the frontier of the kingdom.

The occupation troops, taking into their hands the administration, expropriated all the offices court of justice, schools together with their equipments, dismissed all officials. Judges and teachers, putting their own en in their place. they private property, because for example they expropriated the whole domain Count Eugene Festetics at Csáktornya in area 36,000 yokes, together with all instalments.

They also closed all the roads leading from this territory into the parts to not yet occupied, thereby taking away all possibility of communication with the Muraköz.

The population of the Muraköz amounting to about 100,000 souls, almost exclusively employed in agriculture, are greatly embittered by these actions, carried out by the abovementioned private company, under the motto of the so-called “liberation”, and protests against these acts from historical, national, economic and sentimental standpoints.

It protests first from historical reasons, because this territory never belonged to Croatia, but always to the county of Zala and was therefore an integral part of Hungary. Once only, from 1849 to 1860, es a punishment of the absolute ruler of

Austria, it was joined to the county of Varasdin, because in the revolution of 1848-49 the people of the Muraköz fought on the side of the Hungarians.

As soon however as the constitutional life was intended to be reestablished in some measure by the emperor, in his diplom of October 1860, the counties were re-established in their ancient territory and the Muraköz was automatically re joined to Zala. The people through a plebiscite taken in the presence of the Croatian occupation troops decided by great majority (80%) to rejoin themselves to Hungary.

As it is, the fact, that Muraköz never belonged to Croatia, ia affirmed even by Croatian historians.

Thus Tkalcio in the Monumenta episcopatus Zagradiensis, Zagreb 1874, "II. vol 59 p.", publishes a decision, dated from 1334 of the Zagrabian chapter, Which mentione expressively, that Muraköz does not fall under the authority of the Banus.

The likewise Croatian historian Smiciklas Writes: /Codex Diplomatious Croatiae Dalmatiae et Slavoniae IX. 25 / conform to a royal order of the year 1325. to the Jurisdiction of the Banus are only those submitted who live beyond the Drava.

According to the 43rd article of the laws of the diet in 1842, the two mostly important villages of Muraköz: Csáktornya and Stridó are mentioned as fortresses situated in the county Zala, but besides, a whole series of later and earlier documents verify that Muraköz belongs to the Comitatus Zala.

Still less will nationality motives legitimate the occupation executed by Jugoslavs.

Namely, the language of the people of Muraköz is not identical with the Croatian-Servian one, but it is a Slav idiom having an independent character and only as far kindred to Croatian and Servian language, as Polish language to the Czechian-one or an Slovakian language to the Ruthenian one.

Grammatical deviations between Croatian language and that of Muraköz, are conspicuous chiefly in the declension of substantives, adjectives, pronouns, numerals and in the conjugation of verbs.

The language of Muraköz does not discern the "dualis", a speciality of the Croatian-Servian language; it has no vocativus as the Croatian has, etc. etc. In the idiom of Muraköz there are many substantives expressing the same idea in a different form, word and often gender from Croatian-Servian language. Relative to the attributes of substantives and actings of them, the people of the Muraköz mostly use words differing from Croatian-Servian idiom. Even, many words of congruant form with Croatian-Servian ones have a quite different sense in the language of Muraköz as in that of Croatian-Servian one.

Hence people of Muraköz do not understand those who speak the Croatian-Servian idiom is strange to them.

Moreover, several renowned philologists, state that the language of Muraköz is not a Croatian-one even, that it does not originate from the Croatian-one.

For the sake of comparison let us insert here some sentences taken from everyday conversation:

1. Yesterday it was raining all day long:
2. I have just got home:
3. We shall draw water from the well:

In Croatian language: "Jucer je citav dan kisa padala" In Muraköz language: "Vcera je cell den dezdy isel!!"

In Croatian language: "Upravo seda sam dosao kuci". In Muraköz language: "Ran ve sem dosel dimo".

In Croatian language: "Vodu cemo iz bunare vaditi". In Muraköz language: "Vodu budemo iz zdenca grabiti".

Without exaggeration we may say, that there are scarcely sentences which people of Muraköz would not express differently to that as Croatian or Serbian people would do and therefore it is natural, that the proceeding of Yugoslavians, namely: introducing Croatian-Serbian language in administration, in jurisdiction, in schools and in churches, excited the utmost discontentment among the people of the Muraköz and this was still enhanced by introducing Slovenian language wholly unintelligible to them in to the railway- service. This discontentment is the greater, because under Hungarian administration they could use their own language at liberty.

Furthermore Croatians demonstrate a mocking disparagement of the language of Muraköz, make fun of it by reproducing articles, and expressions in this idiom under a permanent heading of their comic-papers.

But in return, the people of Muraköz do not spare the manner of speaking and expressions of their transdravean neighbours either and on occasion of wedding feasts and other meetings, Croatian manner of speaking is mockingly cited amidst a general exhilaration, which shows the great difference between the two languages and the antipathy against Croatian-Serbian language.

Generally the people of Muraköz which stands on a higher level as well economically as culturally, than Transdravean Croatian and Slovenian people directly disdains them both, calls the Croatian "Zagorac", the Slovenian "Kraujec" which last word in its idiom means both "Slovenian" and "wandering beggar".

But the people of Muraköz differs from the Croatians in their songs, dances, in their manner of dressing in their way of thinking and feeling. People of Muraköz don't dance the Croatian-Serbian "kolo", but the Magyarien "csárdás" and were extremely shocked, when on the occasion of the Servion king officers and officials according to Balkan customs danced "Kolo" in front of their churches, Their songs have magyarian motives, their dressed are Magyarian-like: "Magyar" trousers and dolmans and high boots instead of Croatian Servian sandals: the "opanka",

In spite of its connection with Croatia, Vend and Sloven neighbours, this people conserved its special character of Muraköz and as a such one it always con-

sidered itself and do so still today belonging to Hungary, but furthermore all its economical interests draw it thither.

Thus, not even by economical motives the Yugoslavians occupation can be justified. Muraköz is bound to Hungary by its whole economical situation. The one sole circumstance, that the large and multibranshed Drave river is a far greater hindrance to traffic, than the small and single-bedded Mure, illustrates this sufficiently; across the Drava at its whole length in Muraköz there exists only one bridge and in two places there are tracks, whilst over the Murs there are even three bridges and a whole series of tracks (6-7).

The consequence of this is, that the people of Muraköz trade much more intensively with the territories beyond the Mura, even, so to say, they gravitate exclusively towards this direction.

People of Muraköz have lands amounting to 6000 yokes on the northern bank of the Mura, while on the southern bank of the Drava they have hardly any and even then only by continance and not out of economical necessity. They always sold their raw-products beyond the Mura and it was there, where they purchased their requirements from. Croatia could not supply them, because its prime necessities, that is its dresses, its harnesses etc. being Magyarian-like, could only be supplied by Magyar manufacturers, which accounts for the sole use of the railway line Pragerhof-Budapest for the purpose, a line now blacked and degraded to a mere branch line of Pragerhof-Kotor, through the occupation.

Finally, Jugoslavian occupation is not justified even by sentimental motives, because the people of Muraköz although of Slavian language always sympathised with the Magyars, enthusiastically assisted the Hungarian actions of deliverance inheriting the Magyar race-love from its late Lord, Count Nicholas Zrinyi and it never had the least controversy with its Magyarian brothers.

Not even the riots of last November, and the disturbance connected with it, which was never meant against the Magyars but rather against the mostly foreign traders and accomplices who took advantage of the war and turned it to their selfish aims are exceptions to this.

But here we have to mention, that the bolshevist military-council (sovjet) of that time has sent a terror-troop to the Muraköz in order to quell the disturbances there and that the cruelties occurred in that time were committed by this troop. But the Hungarian state, awaking from the narcosis of bolshevism, imprisoned the fellows of this terror-troop and will call them to account, whilst the very person, who - as member of the military-council- gave the order and led the troop, since the fall of communism lives in impunity under the protection of the Jugoslav authorities.

When the people of Muraköz see such thing and they who terror- see moreover, that the members of directories - who terrorized the neighbouring Magyar countries during the communism spotted from the place of their misdeeds received shelter not protection at the Jugoslav authorities they see their fear justified, that

from these authorities no fostering of their welfare on a Christian and national basis can be expected, but appealing by the historical past, to their being separate race of Muraköz, to their economical interests and to the almost millenary brotherly connections to the Magyars they expressively wish, that the Yugoslav troops should immediately be withdrawn beyond the demarcation-line fixed on the 13th November 1910, and that the presently occupied Territory should without delay be restored to the administration of the mother country and should remain under Hungary's authority after the conclusion of peace too.

If on the part of the enemy a doubt should arise about this desire being a general one, the people of the Muraköz give respectful expression to their request that a Muraköz should be held on wale territory, the military forces and authorities of the occupation being withdrawn on that occasion.

Budapest. 30. October, 1919.

In the name of the population of Muraköz, (Signed)

Signatures illegible.

19. DOCUMENT

Italy's territorial requirements. Strategical Importance for Italy of the Brenner Pass. Memorandum on Recent events in Tyrol, Vorarlberg and Liechtenstein, and their international implications. TNA 608/15/10

Source: TNA 608/15/10

STRATEGICAL IMPORTANCE FOR ITALY OF THE BRENNER PASS

The conformation of the pre-war frontier in the Tyrol gave Austria-Hungary stranglehold on Italy. Any offensive efforts made by latter on the Isonza were liable to be paralyzed by she threat on her flank which she could not afford to neglect.

It is of the first importance from the Italian point of that this handicap should be removed for the future and to the position satisfactory Italy should be in possession of main watershed of the Alpe. She must also possess possibilities for concentration and deployment on the frontier least equal to those of her potential enemy in the valley of the Inn. That is to say, the lateral railway from Toblach through and Meran to Male must be in her possession and sufficiently in rear of the frontier to ensure its being available for the movement of troops.

To satisfy these conditions the frontier should follow the awn in red on the attached map, and the Brenner Pass mast inclusive to Italy. This is the line promised to Italy by the Entente in what is known as the Pact of London as one of the conditions of her entering the war and, from the point of view of strategical security, she is amply justified in pressing her claim to it.

Unfortunately the ideal strategical frontier does not coincide with the ethnological boundary, which is shewn in green on the map, and if the Italian claim is granted it will mean handing over a Teutonic population of some 200,000 to an alien power. It in for consideration whether in each cases as this, where the principle of nationality in at variance with the requirements of military security, some arrangement cannot be mate whereby a large measure of autonomy, coupled possibly with the demilitarisation of the debatable area would reconcile these conflicting demands.

January 15th 1919

**MEMORANDUM
ON RECENT EVENTS IN TYROL, VORARLBERG AND LIECHTEN-
STEIN, AND THEIR INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS.**

THE following memorandum chronicles developments of the recent movements away from Vienna in Tyrol, Vorarlberg, and Liechtenstein and attempts to estimate their international significance:

The various movements away from Vienna and in the direction of independence, which have been manifesting themselves recently (November and December, 1918) in the Tyrol and Vorarlberg districts, and in the principality of Liechtenstein, may become international significance. If carried to their logical conclusion they might even have an important place in the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe.

I.

With the signing of the Austrian armistice on 3rd November, or even before, owing Vorarlberg in the Austro-Hungarian Army, the greater part of Tyrol and was thrown into the greatest confusion and distress. It should be borne in that Tyrol, though an agricultural district, has suffered intensely in the last stages of the war, owing to the exhaustion of its man-power, and from the effect of its being base for the Austro-Hungarian armies. When these armies began to dissolve, and deserters, accompanied after the armistice by civilian fugitives, began to flow back, then the situation of the country became extremely desperate. Added to all this, immediately following the signing of the armistice, was the invasion by Bavarian troops, in order to protect the Bavarian frontier. Dr. Karl Renner, in an interview to the "Neue Freie Presse" of 9th November, admitted that internal administration in Tyrol was completely destroyed. By about the 14th things had become so bad that deputies were sent both from Tyrol and Vorarlberg to Switzerland with the object of getting food from the Entente, and even Swiss troops to keep order. At about the same time Botzen was occupied by the Italians at the request of the population, who were suffering severely from the depredations of the returning Hungarian soldiers. Successful efforts were, however, shortly made to set going again the machinery of Government. Provisional "Landesversammlungen" were set up, the re-organisation of the public service undertaken, and a "Volkswehr" formed to preserve order. Popular feeling in both Tyrol and Vorarlberg seems to have been against Vienna from the beginning. "The Neue Freie Presse," in its issue of 10th November, goes so far as to assert that the telegram from the Vienna Staatsrat to Prince Max of Baden, expressing the hope that German Austria would be able to adhere to Germany, was prompted by the circumstance that Tyrol, as well as certain other German provinces, had separately declared themselves in favour of joining Germany.

This telegram, however, as well as the decisions of the Vienna Nationalversammlung which followed, was by no means in accordance with the wishes of the Tyrolese und Vorarlbergers. The following under-currents of opinion, all of them away from Vienna, were early to be noted. There was, first of all, the tendency, stronger in Vorarlberg than in Tyrol, towards incorporation in the Swiss Confederation. In the communes of Gaissau, Höchst, and Fussach, where ninety per cent. of the population were considered to be in favour of union with Switzerland, the movement was very widespread; indeed, but, even though it is considered to be growing in the other communes, it is doubtful whether a referendum for adhesion to Switzerland would result in any considerable majority.

The second tendency was towards adhesion to Germany, Vienna, it was considered, had never given Vorarlberg the economic support it required and as a speaker at a public meeting at Bregenz declared Vorarlberg was decided against Austria but had an open mind towards Bavaria and Switzerland. In Tyrol the motives there were more political than economic.

The Tyrolese Catholics could not bring themselves to approve setting up a government in Vienna largely under Socialist control. They were also evidently offended at being presented with *fait accompli* by the Central Government. For them, they declared, the Vienna Government merely "Liquidationsregierung". On 25th November, however, the Tyrolese National Assembly declared for provisional adhesion to the German-Austrian Republic, wording its resolution very reservedly, but in such a way to leave the impression that if only the Vienna Government would use little tact and flattery and hold themselves aloof from anti-clerical measures they might secure the permanent support of the Tyrolese.

A third tendency, monarchical, has also shown itself, though not very strong support of the Tyrolese "Die Zeit," of 22d November, considers the Tyrolese point of view to be that as the common ruler of Austria has disappeared, so have all Tyrolese obligations to Vienna.

In the St. Gall "Ostschweiz" it may be noted that Bishop of Feldkirch, Dr. Waitz is quoted as having declared that the monarchical "Staatsform" must be preserved.

A week or two later, however, all opinion of this kind seems to have been relegated to obscurity, and the monarchical tendency is at the present date hardly one which concerns practical politics.

Finally, there is the movement in favour of the formation of a completely independent Republic consisting of Tyrol, Vorarlberg, Salzburg, and certain German speaking parts of Carinthia and Styria. This solution, the "Innsbrucker Nachrichten" is quoted as saying, would be far preferable to joining the German-Austrian Republic it is probable that much more will be heard of this last suggestion than of any of others.

The principality of Liechtenstein is of small importance, but it about the middle of November it had succeeded in establishing a provision by which proceeded to exclude the non-Liechtensteiners who had previously office. The latest news is that the Prince of Liechtenstein has prevented together of the new Landtag, which when it meets is to decide on the future the district. The decision is likely to be in favour of continued independence under a member of the House of Liechtenstein, with greater opportunities for Liechtensteiners to fill the offices of the principality. There is no desire to join with Switzerland, though the Vorarlberg district with which it is united in its customs arrangement carry Liechtenstein with it in any decision which it may make.

Ecclesiastically it might be pointed out, the principality is in the jurisdiction of the Bishopric of Coire.

II

From the above narrative of events it is clear that there is in Tyrol and Vorarlberg at least an extremely reserved attitude towards the new Vienna Government. The motives are many. In the first place there is the old inclination against Vienna and towards Germany which manifested itself in 1870. There is the natural feeling of soreness at not having been consulted by the Central Government in its decision to set up a Republic. Among this almost entirely Catholic population there is naturally suspicion of an administration largely Socialist in its composition, and there lurks also a faint hope that the Emperor Karl's departure is not irrevocable. Probably the most immediate motive of all is the feeling that if Tyrol and Vorarlberg remain independent of German-Austria, the goodwill of the Entente might be so far gained as to facilitate the retention of the German districts of South Tyrol.

The "Arbeiter-Zeitung" for the 22nd November asserts that this hope is a vain one, and the "Neue Freie Presse" of the 26th November, quotes the "Tiroler" of Botzen, to the effect that the Italians in occupation in Botzen, Toblach, and other German towns in South Tyrol are exhibiting placards to the effect that theirs is not to be a temporary stay but a permanent.

III.

The Italian frontier must inevitably be carried forward Prospect of the emergence of a Grossdeutschland from the present confusion. If a League of Nation be not formed and the Italians justly asserts predominantly of strategic considerations over all others, there can be no alternative to making the present armistice line the new German Italian boundary, since only in potential strength.

At the same time it may be pointed out that this involves a violation of President Wilson's 9th Points; it may also be recalled that Baron Sonnino in April

1915 demanded an extension of the frontier such as would take in only 74,000 Germans. The extension of Italian rule over the whole of the Middle Tyrol, however (Botzen, Meran, Schlanders, Brixen, and Bruneck), would take in population consisting, according to the 1910 Austrian census, of 213,373 Germans, 9,463 Ladinians, and 7,047 Italians. In the establishment of a League of Nations, the first foundation of which must be the settlement on national lines of mutually recognised frontiers between national States. From this vital consideration arises the question as to whether the setting up of a perpetually neutral state consisting of North and Central Tyrol and perhaps Lichtenstein, and the Western German-speaking districts of Styria and Carinthia might not provide a way out.

IV

The matter is one of general European interest. By the carrying forward of the Italian frontier to the summit of the Brenner, not only would the irredenta danger become more pronounced, but the position of Switzerland would be prejudiced to the great disadvantage of falling into the arms of Germany, but by the French conquest of Alsace and Lorraine, and by other factors, this has been averted. The same events have, however, increased the risk of Switzerland's being driven into the arms of France, a contingency which it is equally to British interests to avoid. By the setting up of what would, in effect, be a new Switzerland holding the Brenner Railway, just as Switzerland holds the St. Gotthard, the aims the Allies achieved in 1815 by the consolidation of Swiss neutrality would be extended further east, to the general advantage of European equilibrium. A perpetually neutral Tyrolean State provided sufficient national self-consciousness could be discovered to guarantee permanent neutrality and independence, the most important point to consider from the Italian point of view, would have the advantage of subtracting from Germany 500,000 to 600,000 Germans, and of entrusting them with a great line of international traffic. The ideal is not altogether impracticable. Already, as has been seen, the tendency towards independence has shown itself very clearly, and one may surmise that in a few years Tyrolean national self-consciousness might advance to as great a degree as that of the German-speaking Swiss. This means that there will be no *Germania irredenta* in Tyrol, any more than there is *Germania irredenta* among the German-Swiss. There would be, one hopes, and one is perhaps entitled to think, in Tyrol, no overwhelming longing to join an eventual "Grossdeutschland" unless such changes in the constitution of Germany and German-Austria were to take place as to make such adherence innocuous. It would, therefore, seem to be of advantage to consider carefully all possible means of encouraging Tyrolean aspirations, and of using the opportunities with which the present "Los-von-Wien" movement presents us.

APPENDIX.

Vienna, November 21st. 1918.

Sir,

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY no longer exists, constituted, amongst them German Austria. They look to the Peace Congress for a just settlement of their racial and territorial claims, which will allow them to develop their national life. Unless this condition is fulfilled, the principal den of the League of Nations with of a permanent peace, cannot be attained.

On behalf of the United Committees of the Austrian Peace Associations I have the honour to transmit to you two memoranda referring to the claims of German Austria to the German sections of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, and to the mid-land districts of Tirol endangered by the rival aspirations of the Czecho-Slovaks and Italians respectively.

I take the liberty to call your kind attention to the historical, statistical and political aspects of the question and the express the earnest hope that the Allied Powers will give it their serious consideration.

Believe me, Sir.

Yours sincerely, C. DUMBA. Former Austria-Hungarian Ambassadors,

The armistice concluded with Austria on the 2nd November 1918, entitles the Allied Powers to occupy those part of Southern Tyrol, which Italy covets Permanent acquisition, and which were specified in the Treaty of London of April 1915. The newly constituted States of Austria and especially Tyrol protest emphatically against this attempt to bring settlements of an essentially German population under on alien domination.

In his message age of the 8th January (item 9) President Wilson stated: "A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognisable lines of nationality". No objection is therefore raised against the severance from Tyrol "Trentino" i.e. the districts of Trient and Rovereto with their predominantly Italian population. The incorporation of the Midland of Tirol into the Kingdom of Italy would, however, constitute a flagrant violation of the principle of self-determination of the nations. Ever since the great migration, German tribes settled permanently in those regions They belonged to the old German Empire, and the Habsburgs succeeded the Counts of Tirol in 1363.

The latest census, of 1910, throws a vivid light on the Italian aspirations. We have to deal with the five districts of Bozen, Meran, Schlanders, Brixen, and Bruneck comprising seventeen judicial districts. Besides the German and the Italian, a third nation dwells here, the Ladins, probably descendents of the aborigines of Rhaetic race Their language is a mixture of Germanic and Romanic elements. In

the Dolomite valleys they maintained intact for 1,500 years their language and their individuality.

According to the census of 1910 the population was distributed as follows:

-	Germaines	Italians	Ladins
I. Political District Botzen			
Town of Botzen	21,200	1,300	...
Rural of Botzen	22,000	1,000	...
District of Kaltern	16,500	850	...
Kastelruth	4,700	...	4,200
Clausen	9,800	38	(Valley of Groden)
Neumarkt	8,000	1,300	...
Sarnthal	3,842	21	...
	86,042	4,509	4,200

II. Political District Meran			
District of Meran Town	32,000	1,400	...
Rural of Meran	11,000	162	...
District of Passeyrl	5,100	78	...
	48,100	1640	...

III. Political District Schlanders			
District of Schlanders	12,293	40	...
Rural of Glurns	9,607	4	...
	21,900	44	...

IV. Political District Brixen			
District of Brixen	17,242	397	...
Rural of Sterzing	11,500	16	...
	28,742	418	...

VI. Political District Bruneck						
District of Bruneck	11,180	277	...
Rural of Enneberg	126	...	5,251
District of Taufers	8,716	7	(Valley of Enneberg)
District of Welsberg	9,460	59	...
				29,482	343	5,251

The midland of Tirol was therefore in 1910 inhabited by 215,266 Germans, 9,450 Ladins, and only 6,945 Italians, i.e., hardly 3 per cent. of the total population. Besides, this country is not only German by language; its customs, traditions, and whole mentality open a moral abyss between Germans and Italians. The old flourishing of Bosen, Meran and Brixen, the ancient townlets Klausen, Sterzing and Bruneck, with their characteristic German features cannot be made Italian by a stroke of the pen. The German and Italian peasants are moreover essentially uncongenial. The former live in isolated homesteads, the latter in villages. Their common law equally differs, in as far as the German peasants have adopted the right of primogeniture, whereas the children of the Italian peasants are, according to the Code Napoleon, entitled to share in the estate of their father. The inevitable consequence of a forcible annexation of this region would be the creation of a "German Irredenta." Italy tries to substantiate her claims by alleging the necessity of "natural frontiers." The land of Tirol belongs to the system of the river Adige that flows through Italian territory in its middle and lower course. But the hydrography of a region cannot reasonably be invoked for determining its nationality; such a principle applied to the Rhine, or the Danube, would lead to the most absurd consequences. The contention that the Central Alps form the natural frontier between Germans and Ladins likewise contrary to facts, whereas the group of the Dolomites, the Mendel and the Ultener mountains, that distinctly separate the German and Italian settlements, on truly natural frontier, Military and strategical considerations can furthermore be of any weight when free nations combine in a league and agree to disarmament arbitration,

There is no reasonable ground to justify the mutilation of German Tirol which then disappear from the map, as the remaining strip of land North of the Brenner, to live an independent life, would be compelled to join Bavaria.

In her deep sorrow Austria can only appeal to the high sense of equity of President Wilson. She sincerely hopes that the Allied Powers will principle of equal justice for the small and great Powers, principle for which they have od their victorious war. This hope is confirmed by the declaration of President Wilson, who, in his address of the 12th of February, 1918, laid down uphold the following rules eminently applicable to case of Tirol:

Point 2.

“The Peoples and Provinces are not to be bartered about sovereignty to sovereignty as if they pawns in a game.”

Point 3. That every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the population concerned, and not a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims of rival States.”

A unique power is vested in the Allied Council, but to the magnitude of power corresponds the greatness of responsibility. Suffering mankind is longing for the just peace which they promised of the word. They cannot allow the Tirolese to become victims of Italian Imperialism, after having brought to a victorious issue their struggle with German Imperialism.

The Midland of Tirol, incorporated in the kingdom Italy, would form The dangerous centre of unrest, ever magnetically attracted neighbouring State Austria, to whom it belongs by racial ties, language, traditions, and customs. The Conference, which is to lay the foundation of a lasting peace cannot create a state of things so unnatural without endangering its own work. It is confidently hoped that the right of the Midland of Tirol to self-determination will be respected by the Allied Powers.

NOTE ON THE NORTHERN FRONTIER OF ITALY,

1. NO question which will come up for decision at the Peace Conference presents such difficulties as the future of the Upper Valley of the Adige, for, in regard to this, just as in regard to the Italian Yugo-Slav frontier, the British Government is pledged to two completely inconsistent policies. On the one hand, we have the Treaty of Italy of 1915, by which we engaged to secure to Italy the Tyrol as far as the main range of the Alps and the Brenner Pass; on the other hand, we are equally committed to the general principle that the apportionment of the territory should be in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants. In one respect only is the situation here less immediately difficult than in Dalmatia and Istria, in that the Italian claims, if granted, will be not at the expense of our friends, but of our enemies. So far as the immediate diplomatic situation goes, it is of course easy to insist on the cession of territory by Austria, but it would be a mistake to attach too much importance to this; it might easily happen that false policy with regard to this district would create greater unrest in the future than would one with regard to the Eastern frontier of Italy.

2. The problem can be very simply stated. Tyrol may be divided into three districts: -

(1.) That north of the Brenner. This is purely German in population, and no one seriously suggests that it should be given to Italy.

(2.) The Trentino, which is roughly the lower valley of the Adige. This is entirely Italian, and it is universally agreed that it should go to Italy. It was in fact offered to Italy by the Austrians themselves in the spring of 1915.

(3.) Between these two districts lies what may be called the Mid-Tyrol, stretching from the Brenner to a line south of Botzen. This is the district the fate of which is at issue. The population is practically entirely German and is between 220,000 and 230,000 in number. Not only is it German in speech, but it is, according to all accounts, thoroughly German in feeling. In particular, it must be noted that the clerical element is very strong, and this is bitterly opposed to the prevailing tendencies in the modern kingdom of Italy. This district is in fact an essential part of history Tyrol, and plays a great rôle in the traditions and historical reminiscences which have a real bearing on present political controversies. As Professor Oman points out, if this were transferred to Italy, it would not only bring 230,000 Germans under Italian rule, "but would actually make Italian the village of Passeyr, the home of Andreas Hofer, and the centre of all Tyrolese legend and patriotism." The whole district is closely connected with the name of Walther von der Vogelweide, the most popular and widely-read of the Minnesänger,

3. The German case against the Italian claim is strongly put in the memorandum from Dr. Dumba, ed with P.C. /14, formerly Austro-Hungarian printed Ambassador at Washington, who is apparently the chairman of certain semi-official associations in Vienna,

4. On the other hand, the Italians are determined to get this district; according to our information they are already in occupation of it; they are putting out proclamations to state that their possession will be permanent, and are in fact, acting on this assumption. If, however, this district is transferred to Italy, there will almost undoubtedly be a permanent German irridenta, which will remain as a source of irritation and danger.

5. It may be useful to look at the matter from the point not of local feeling, but of the general establishment of national frontiers. If the whole of German Austria eventually were incorporated in a great German National State, then, in addition to the promises which the Italians have already received, they would be able to urge that it was essential that they should have a strong strategic frontier, and that the permanent division between the two great national States should, as far as possible, be identical with the main chain of the Alps, which seem to form the natural division between Central Europe and the Mediterranean States.

6. There is, however, another alternative, to which attention is drawn by the memorandum on Tyrol (P.C./014). There is apparently the possibility of a movement for the establishment of Tyrol as an independent republic, which would then, presumably, be neutralised and made a second Switzerland. This, however, would clearly imply the incorporation in this republic of the district of Mid-Tyrol in question. Supposing this solution could be brought about, then it would to a large extent

do away with the strategic considerations, and there would be less objection to the Italians allowing districts which it might be claimed were geographically Italian to remain in a State of this kind than in a great National German State. Of course, however, a small republic like this would be very insecure unless it was placed under the full guarantee of all the Powers which took part in the settlement.

Foreign Office,
December 30, 1918

20. DOCUMENT

The Italian Claims. Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House, in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Wednesday, April 23, 1919, at 11 a.m. PPC 1919, Volume V. Paris Peace Conf. 180.03401/115.

On 23 April 1919, the Italian territorial claims were discussed. On that day, the three addressed a large letter to Italy. Wilson rejected the Italian claims to Rijeka, arguing that there were more Italians in New York than in the Adriatic port. Almost five years after the signing of the London Peace Treaty, the Big Three rejected Italy's further territorial claims to Rijeka, pointing out that 'this port must not be separated from the territories to which it naturally belongs economically, geographically and ethnically. In addition to rejecting the Italian claims, the US President also provoked controversy by addressing the Italian people directly, in contrast to their political representatives.

Moreover, the Italians have gained far less in Dalmatia than the London Treaty promised. On the mainland, Zara became a small enclave under Italian rule, and on the Dalmatian coast Italy took Lagos and Pelagosa (Rome gave up Lissa as a last-minute concession).

Orlando's statement of 24 April 1919. Yesterday, while the Italian delegation was assembled to discuss the alternative proposal sent by the British Prime Minister to reconcile the opposing tendencies in regard to Italian territorial aspirations, the Paris newspapers carried a message from the President of the United States, Mr. Wilson, in which he expressed his own views on some of the most important problems which had been submitted to the world bodies for decision.

Balfour's statement of 24 April 1919. For these reasons, if for no other, we implore our Italian colleagues to reconsider their policy. That they were inspired by a sense of patriotism we have no doubt. But neither can we believe that it is in Italy's interests, nor that it is worthy of the great role that Italy is being given, which Italy must play in the Council of Nations.

Having failed to promote Italian interests as expected, he was forced to resign on 19 June 1919. The new Prime Minister was Francesco Saverio Nitti. On 2 December Orlando was elected President of the Chamber of Deputies.

Source: The Italian Claims. Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House, in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Wednesday, April 23, 1919, at 11 a.m. PPC 1919, Volume V. Paris Peace Conf. 180.03401/115.

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume V

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03401/115

IC-175F

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House, in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Wednesday, April 23, 1919, at 11 a.m.

Paris, April 23, 1919, 11 a.m.

Present

United States of America

President Wilson

British Empire

Mr. Lloyd George

France

M. Clemenceau

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B., Secretary

Professor P. Mantoux, Interpreter.

(1) The Italian Claims Mr. Lloyd George produced a communication he had received from M. Orlando giving the latest Italian proposal (Appendix I).

He felt this offered no basis for negotiation. He suggested it might be desirable to ask the Italian delegates whether they intended to meet the Germans when they came to Versailles.

M. Clemenceau thought it was a good idea.

President Wilson suggested that when we came to deal with Austria, if the Italians were standing out of the Conference the boundaries should be settled as fairly as though Italy were in. Italy should be treated on absolutely fair lines and shown that their interests were taken care of.

Mr. Lloyd George suggested that if Italy was not present in the negotiations with Germany it would be difficult for the Allied and Associated Powers to put forward claims on their behalf for reparation, for example.

President Wilson referred to a report which he had received from a M. Pupin, a scientist of Yugo-Slav nationality, who was working in Columbia University. The memorandum was by no means of a menacing character, but it did convey the impression that the result of a peace unsatisfactory to the Jugo-Slavs would be to drive them into the hands of the Bolsheviks. They would unite with the rest of the Slav peoples. One interesting point in M. Pupin's memorandum was a reference to an Italian Socialist meeting which had been held at Rome at which Italian claims, as recognised by the Socialists, had been outlined. No mention was made of Dalmatia, Fiume, Gorizia, or of Carinthia.

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After some further discussion on this subject, which was taken up after other subjects had been discussed, President Wilson said that it was his intention to publish his memorandum on the Italian question this evening.

Mr. Lloyd George read a memorandum which Mr. Balfour had prepared at his request and which presented the point of view of France and Great Britain. In the course of the reading of Mr. Balfour's memorandum the following corrections were suggested:—

(1)

An alteration in certain phrases which conveyed the impression that Fiume was not mentioned in the Treaty of London. It was pointed out that Fiume was mentioned in a note to Article 5.

(2)

Fiume, it was pointed out, was not on the Dalmatian but on the Croatian coast.

(3)

The addition, after a sentence in which it was mentioned that Fiume was one town and not two, of the following words "and that is Slav."

(4)

That it would be better to omit a passage on the last page referring to the forthcoming withdrawal of Italy from the Conference. It was pointed out that although Italy had withdrawn from these conversations they had not formally withdrawn from the Preliminary Peace Conference. It was suggested it would be better to prepare the memorandum to deter Italy from doing so rather than to suggest that it was a probable contingency.

Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau agreed on the following:

(1)

That the letter should be revised on the above lines.

(2)

That copy should be sent to M. Clemenceau for him to have translated and examined.

No decision was taken as to when the letter should be forwarded to the Italian representatives.

There was some discussion as to the difficult position which would arise if Italy persisted in her present attitude. It was pointed out that if Italy should insist on holding on to Fiume, this would be itself a breach of the Treaty which definitely allotted Fiume to Croatia. If, on the other hand, Italy should abandon her position in Fiume, the situation would be very difficult, because then France and Great Britain would be bound by their Treaty to sign a Treaty with Austria which President Wilson did not feel himself in a position to sign, since Italy could insist on the portion of Dalmatia comprised in the Treaty being transferred to her sovereignty. It was generally agreed that anything which caused a difference between Great Britain and France on the one hand, and the United States of America on the other, would

be most deplorable, since the future peace of the world depended so much on these three nations standing [Page 151] together. The danger of uniting the whole of the Slavs in a possible Bolshevist regime was also commented on.

Attention was also drawn to the fact that Italy had, on the 26th April 1915, adhered to the Pact of London of the 5th September 1914, thereby engaging herself mutually with Great Britain, France, and Russia, not to conclude a separate peace in the course of the War, and that when there was a question of discussing the terms of peace none of the Allied Powers should propose conditions of peace without previous agreement with each of the other Allies.

2. Attitude of German Delegates Mr. Lloyd George said that he had just seen Captain Gibson, an officer who had returned from Berlin and who had given us consistently very valuable information. Captain Gibson said that the best of the German Delegates was named Melchior, who desired peace. Melchior was very much in with the industrialists, who desired peace. Rantzau, whom he did not think very much of, was, he believed, opposed to peace.

M. Clemenceau doubted if the present German Government could make peace.

3. Credit Scheme for Re-starting Industry Raising of Blockade Mr. Lloyd George said that Captain Gibson had explained that the most important factor inducing the Germans to sign peace was their desire to re-start their national life. This brought him to the question of a scheme for re-starting Europe. No trade was at present moving anywhere in Europe. In Belgium there were many unemployed, and the same was true of other countries and particularly of Germany. Mr. Keynes had prepared a scheme, the broad outline of which was that the first thousand million pounds which Germany had to pay should be taken and guaranteed by all the Powers. Cash should be raised on it in order to enable all countries, including Germany, to get raw material and re-start their industries. Unless something of the kind was done, Melchior would not be able to make peace.

President Wilson said he had given Captain Gibson's paper to Mr. Hoover, who had some 40 agents travelling about in Europe in connection with relief work. Mr. Hoover had said that the paper was extraordinarily correct, but he thought nothing could be done unless the people could get food and start their industrial life. At present, they were in a hopeless position. The ordinary life could not grow on the present soil and Bolshevism was the only system it could. Hence, he thought that the blockade ought to be raised.

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Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that there was the same paralysis in countries that had no blockade.

M. Clemenceau thought it would be a great mistake to raise it.

President Wilson pointed out that it could be reimposed.

M. Clemenceau said that the moment was bad for raising the blockade. The Germans were about to arrive for the purpose of signing peace and we must not appear to be weakening.

4. Admission of Enemy Journalists to the Peace Conference M. Clemenceau read information which showed that the German Delegation contemplated bringing journalists to Versailles. He asked whether the French ought to allow them to come to Versailles. His own view was strongly opposed, and he would like authority not to admit them. His information was more and more in the direction that Rantzau was coming to cause a breakdown in the negotiations.

Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that Melchior was not coming with this object.

5. Economic Terms President Wilson considered that, in view of Melchior's presence, the attitude of the Germans would depend largely upon the economic terms. If the Germans found that chains were to be imposed on them, they would not sign, but if a fair basis were offered, they would. He had talked to the United States experts on the subject and the attitude they took was that the Allied and Associated Powers should only require that there should be no discrimination by Germany against any particular belligerent. That is to say, all should have the most favoured nation terms.

6. The Transport of General Haller's Army to Poland: German Interference M. Clemenceau read a telegram from the Chief of the Military Mission at Warsaw to Marshal Foch, reporting that by midnight of the 20th, 12 trains had passed through Warsaw conveying a portion of General Haller's Army. He reported a number of incidents where the Germans had molested the trains and broken open wagons and taken foodstuffs, such as biscuits, preserved meat and sacks of oats and clothing. These incidents had mainly taken place at Glogau.

Mr. Lloyd George said he was surprised that the troops had got through with so little trouble. He thought the attention of Marshal Foch ought to be called to the matter and that he should be directed to make representations.

President Wilson agreed.

(It was agreed that M. Clemenceau should instruct Marshal Foch to call the attention of the Germans to the molestation of trains conveying General Haller's Army to Poland and should insist on their carrying out their engagements.)

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7. Persia President Wilson said he had received an appeal from Persia, who had sent a Delegation to the Peace Conference, and complained that [not] only had she not been admitted or heard at the Peace Conference but that no reply had even been made to communications addressed to the Bureau of the Conference.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he was informed by Sir Maurice Hankey that Mr. Balfour was opposed to the admission of Persia to the Conference, though he did not know the reasons. He asked that the matter might be postponed until he had consulted Mr. Balfour.

8. Plenary Conference President Wilson said the time had come for holding a Plenary Conference. Lord Robert Cecil had written to him about the desirability of discussing the League of Nations Covenant there. He proposed that the Covenant

should be laid before the Plenary Conference without any further speech making, although he would make a statement to the effect that the last revision which had been made to consider such criticisms as had been offered only clarified certain points. After this, anyone who wanted to discuss the question could do so. There would probably be only a few speeches. There were also several other reports which had been called for by the Plenary Conference which should be laid before them.

Mr. Lloyd George agreed that there must be a meeting.

M. Clemenceau also agreed.

(After some further discussion, it was decided:—

(1)

That a plenary meeting of the Preliminary Peace Conference should be held on Monday, April 28th, when the following reports should be considered:—

The League of Nations Covenant

The Labour Clauses

Responsibility and Breaches of the laws of War.

(2)

That the clauses being drafted by the Drafting Committee to give effect to the conclusion of the Supreme Council on the subject of the Responsibility and Breaches of the laws of war should be circulated for the meeting.

(3)

That a second plenary meeting of the Conference should be held on the day preceding the night on which the Germans were due to arrive at Versailles. The object of this meeting would be to communicate the contents of the Peace Treaty.)

9. The question of publicity was discussed several times during this meeting.

Publicity of the Peace Treaty M. Clemenceau strongly urged that the Treaty should be published when it was communicated to the Germans. It would not be fair to our own people to let the Germans see the Treaty and to conceal it from them. His [Page 154] own position would be an impossible one if the Treaty were not published. It was absolutely certain that the Germans would publish it, particularly if they wished to make mischief for us and it would make a very bad impression in the countries of the Allied and Associated Powers if the public first learnt of the terms of the Treaty of Peace from the German wireless.

Mr. Lloyd George suggested that the Germans might not want to publish the Treaty and that negotiations would be easier for all concerned without publicity.

Both Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson laid the utmost stress on the preparation of a good summary for publication.

Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that the reception of the Peace Treaty would depend largely on the first impression made.

M. Clemenceau said he was preparing a summary for communicating to the Preliminary Meeting and he thought this might also serve for the Press. He undertook to communicate it to and to discuss it with his colleagues.

Mr. Lloyd George suggested that a notice ought to be issued to the Press of the Allied and Associated Powers to the effect that the moment for publication would be after the communication of the Treaty to the Germans and that premature publicity might have very serious effects. (M. Clemenceau undertook to draft a preface notice on the subject.)

Appendix I

Italian Proposals

I

The line of the Alps (Brenner) to the sea, East of Volosca.

II

Fiume under the sovereignty of Italy.

Italy will establish in the port of Fiume free zones in accordance with the terms of articles 8, 9 and 10 of the Peace clauses drawn up by the Commission of Ports, Waterways, and Railways and will extend to Fiume those facilitations which may be arranged for later on in a general convention with reference to free ports.

III

Italy will have all the islands mentioned in the Pact of London except Pago.

IV

Zara and Sebenico will be placed under the League of Nations with Italy as Mandatory Power.

21. DOCUMENT

Italian memorandum of Claims. February 7, 1919. Italy at the Paris Peace Conference by René Albrecht-Carré. History and Documents. Columbia University Press New York, 1938. 369-387.

This memorandum drafted by Salvatore Barzilai was the first official statement of the Italian position and is worth analysing in detail. It was dated 7 February, and its summary was published on 12 March by the Stefani Agency. The original document is a long and verbose treatise. The purpose of the memorandum was “to provide a statement of Italy’s claims to the former Austro-Hungarian territories”. The document “set out in full the various grounds on which the treaties governing Italy’s entry into the war were based”. It is possible that Orlando, sensing that under the changed circumstances Italy was unlikely to get Dalmatia, thought that Rijeka might be a suitable place to present to the public as the fruit of successful negotiations. He conceded to Colonel House, Wilson’s aide, that if the territorial issues had been resolved in November 1918, Rijeka might never have been discussed. But in the end, the Italian memorandum, drafted by Trieste-born lawyer Salvatore Barzilai and presented on 7 February, almost put Rijeka at its centre.

Source: Italy at the Paris Peace Conference by René Albrecht-Carré. History and Documents. Columbia University Press New York, 1938. 369-387.

ITALIAN MEMORANDUM OF CLAIMS

FEBRUARY 7, 1919

THE ITALIAN CLAIMS ON THE ALPS AND IN THE ADRIATIC

The following pages contain a statement of Italy’s claims on the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. They set forth in their whole the various reasons upon which the Conventions regulating Italy’s entrance into the war were based. Quite apart from these conventions the Italian claims show such a spirit of justice, rightfulness, and moderation that they come entirely within the principles enunciated by President Wilson and should therefore be recognised and approved by everybody.

Our claims involve the inclusion in Italian territory of a certain number of people of foreign tongue and descent. But similar inclusions have taken place, and on a much larger scale, in the formation of already existing states, and are going to be recognised and legalised in the formation of new states about to be brought into

existence. This depends on the fact that the long disregard of natural boundaries by Governments which were the outcome of the policy of equilibrium established by the Treaties of Westphalia, Utrecht, Campoformio, and Vienna, and the interest these

Governments had in destroying all proofs of nationality in order to crush political aspirations, have favoured the infiltration and importation of foreign races within the boundaries assigned by nature to the various countries. But the wrong inflicted upon a people can never under any circumstances become a source of rightful claims on the part of those who are responsible before history for the wrong committed. Thus, according to their national aspirations, Poland, with the additions in Galicia, Danzig, Posen, and Eastern Prussia, would include over 40 per cent, of foreign population; Bohemia, with the addition of Slovakia and Austrian Silesia, about 30 per cent.; Rumania, with the addition of Transylvania, Bessarabia, Bukovina, and part of the Banat, over 17 per cent.; Yugoslavia over 11 per cent., claiming as they do, outside the Italian frontiers, territories in which the percentage of the Slav populations is insignificant; France over 4 per cent.; Italy only 3 per cent.

There need be no fear that Italy will create new forms of irredentism, which is always the result of injustice and persecution, since Italy's history gives assurance in this respect. The French-speaking citizens of the Valle d'Aosta, the Slavs of the Natisone, the Germans of the Sette Comuni, have never felt they were living under a foreign government, because Italy has always respected their individuality. Europe, which has never heard any complaints or protests on the part of these long-standing citizens of the Italian State, will likewise never hear in the future of any injustice inflicted upon Germans and Slavs whom the course of events will now bring within the new Italian boundaries.

Such a conception of the common citizenship of peoples of different tongues does not in our opinion clash with the actual bearing of Mr. Wilson's proposals, in that part in which they ask for a just settlement of long-standing territorial, racial, and national questions, and for the equality of nations on which to lay the foundations of peace.

Italy's Claims

In entering the war in order to face the aggression of the Central Empires, the special aims of Italy were to free her sons still lingering under foreign oppression and to attain an assurance of safety both on land and sea.

The victory to which she contributed by an effort which compares favourably with the efforts of any of her Allies, entitles Italy to formulate her claims on the basis of the principles underlying her resolution to partake in the great struggle by the side of the Entente and against her former allies.

By conciliating as far as possible national rights with fundamental conditions of safety, her aims might be attained as to the land by claiming the boundary of

the Alps, comprising the Upper Adige, the Trentino, and Venezia Giulia; and, as to the sea, by so improving the situation on the Adriatic that, without prejudice to the legitimate aspirations of the new states which will border on it, Italy may no longer, as heretofore, be in a position of absolute inferiority and may be relieved of the dangers to which she was exposed up to now.

Italy's claims, in so far as they rest essentially on the principle of nationality, do not call for special explanation. But also those demands, which, while they depart in some measure from the rigorous application of the ethnical principle, aim at securing Italy's future safety, independently of the present or future attitude of the bordering states, are not in reality less consonant with the principles which guide the Allied and Associated Powers in their actions. It is clear that the foundations of the longed-for League of Nations will be solid and enduring in proportion to the security which the single nations which form it are guaranteed against danger and interference from outside, and definitely—we might almost say physically—against foreign menace. Italy's claims in this regard constitute no threat to others, they merely protect her against menace from others. Only by their realisation can Italy, without anxiety, put into actual practice the reduction of armaments which should be the greatest benefit mankind will reap as the result of the new world organisation.

The Northern Alpine Boundary

The new Alpine boundary which Italy requires corresponds practically with the line agreed upon in the Armistice signed on November 4th, 1918, between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria-Hungary. It starts from Pizzo Umbrail to the north of the Stelvio, follows the ridge of the Rhaetic Alps to the sources of the Adige and Isarco, passes through the Reschen, the Brenner, the Oetz, and the Ziller, whence it turns southward and reaches the Dobbiaco (Toblach) mountains and the Julian Alps.

This is the geographical boundary along the Alpine watershed. It is the only boundary which, being formed by an actual mountainous obstacle—the formidable wall which has always been considered Italy's frontier—has any intrinsic value as a necessary and real safeguard. It closes the passes which are crossed by two great highways; it leaves to the populations living in the upper valleys their natural intercourse with the plain; and it follows its course from one landmark to another, all clearly and incontestably defined. The natural development of this boundary should of course include the High Tauern system: but Italy, who has no desire beyond what is essential for her defence, willingly renounces her right to carry it any farther than the Pizzo dei Tre Signori (Ziller Group), diverting thence to the south towards the Hoch-Gall, thence to the summits of the Kreuz Spitz and Hoch-horn Spitz and reaching, after including the whole Sexten Valley with Innichen, the

Carnic Alps and the present political boundary of the Kingdom at Cima Vanscuro. The strategic value of the Upper Adige has always been recognised: in the upper valley of the Adige lies the centre of all the highways for a German invasion of Italy. With it, even if Italy had Trent, the Germans would still hold the gates of Italy in their hands. It is indispensable that Italy should reach beyond Bolzano in order that by owning the side line joining the two great railways of the Brenner and Toblach, the Germans should not continue to have the actual control also of the Italian side. An Austrian, General Kuhn, wrote: "The Italians must conquer southern Tyrol as far as the Brenner, if they want to defend Venice." Any other boundary more to the south would merely be an artificial amputation entailing the upkeep of expensive armaments contrary to the principles by which Peace should be inspired. The boundary chosen by Italy ensures equal security also to the peoples living on the northern side of it, because the difficult and impervious nature of the ground makes it practically impossible to carry out military operations of any importance either from the north or from the south. The boundary, which we will call the "Brenner Frontier," is therefore indicated by the very conditions of nature, by the necessities of the people's life, and by reasons of peaceful security. It places the two neighbouring countries on a footing of a perfect equality in every possible way. By reverting to actual natural conditions and by identifying itself with reality, it acquires all the elements of stability.

Compared to the supreme necessity and practical advantage of such a frontier, the fact that it includes about 200,000 inhabitants of German nationality becomes a matter of no significance. Apart from the former historic relations between this region and Italy, commemorated by so many monuments and indelible memories which received eloquent military and political sanction by Napoleon the First's annexation of the Upper Adige to the Italian Kingdom; apart from the fact that the present national conformation of the Upper Adige is the result of violent intrusion and foreign invasions in a basin which geographically, historically, and economically belongs to Italy (even at the opening of the nineteenth century the region was predominantly Italian not only south of the Napoleonic frontier, but in the entire Venosta Valley, and partially in the districts of Bressanone and Sterzen, while the valley of Badia is still Italian at the present day, a total of not less than 45,000 Italians residing at present in the real and proper Upper Adige), it should be noted that the territory lying between the pre-war political frontier and the frontier now claimed, that is, the region of the Trentino and the Upper Adige which form one geographical whole, has a total population of 600,000 inhabitants, of which number even the Austrian statistics admit 380,000 to be Italian, while the correct figures reach 420,000. Even if the reasons of national safety and defence did not militate in favour of the inclusion of the Trentino and Upper Adige in the Italian Kingdom, the mere numerical prevalence of the Italian population (about 70 per cent.), in a region which for evident reasons is indivisible, would necessitate its

return to its natural, economic, and national unity. Then the frontier assigned to Italy departs from the present political frontier near Mount Lodin, so as to include the valley of Tarvis, a cardinal point in the defence of the Tagliamento, a main junction of railway lines of great importance, and the centre of converging roads at the junction of the three ranges, the Julian, Carnic, and Karavank Alps; an open thoroughfare in three directions (wherefrom in all probability its name Treviso is derived) of which Napoleon experienced the defensive importance for the Friuli and for Italy when he united it with the Alto Fella and Weissenfels to his Italian Kingdom. Against these reasons of military security combined with economic considerations—for only in this manner is direct communication between the Alto Fella and the High Isontine Valley rendered possible by a connecting line 17 kilometres instead of 150 kilometres long—no serious national objections exist, as this widening of the frontier would involve the inclusion of barely 5,800 inhabitants of mainly Germanic race.

The Eastern Territorial Frontier

In order to remedy iniquity and error which in 1866 assigned to Italy as her eastern frontier with Austria what in reality was the artificial boundary established by the Government of Vienna between two administrative regions (Lombardy-Venetia and the Austrian Littoral) belonging to the same state, it is necessary, in Julian Venetia also, to follow the indications of nature and the warnings of history and to carry the new frontier of Italy to the watershed of the Julian Alps, from the Pass of Camporosso to the Quarnero.

Here also we must be guided by the same conception of geographical separation, natural defence, historic tradition, and national redemption. Geographers of all countries and all times have placed the Italian frontier at the Julian Alps. The whole of Julian Venetia has developed historically along lines similar to the rest of the Peninsula, with this difference only, that the movement for the complete national reunion of Italy in a single political organism has hitherto failed to achieve the redemption of this extreme corner of the motherland, just as, previous to 1866, Venetia had remained unredeemed, and as, up till 1859, Lombardy had remained under the foreign yoke. At every step from the sea to the mountains, the tokens of Rome and of St. Mark still fit in with the life of the population, the spirit and habits of which are predominantly Italian, even in those parts where infiltration has in the course of centuries interwoven new elements in their ethnical composition.

Documents of the highest eloquence, tenacious sacrifice which did not flinch even from martyrdom, the daily life of the people, which is truly, as Renan puts it, “a daily renewed plebiscite,” testify to the spontaneous and harmonious participation of Julian Venetia in the secular movement of ideals and heroic action for the liberation and unification of Italy, and to the aspiration of this people to unite

itself, when the longed-for hour should arrive, with their brothers who had already been liberated. Austria was compelled, on the very day when a state of war with Italy was proclaimed, to dissolve all Italian representations in the Communes of Julian Venetia, because she was well aware that in every Italian she possessed an irreconcilable enemy, dangerous to her existence as an oppressing state.

When the course of disintegration of their State organism forced the Governments of Vienna and Budapest to promise the right of self-determination to the people, this was the signal throughout Gorizia and Trieste, and the whole of Istria and Fiume, no less than in the Trentino, for the populations, uncowed by persecution, privations, penalties, and the internments, to which even old men, women, and children were subjected during the war, to rise and drive out in tumult the representatives of the Austro-Hungarian regime and to proclaim, as with one voice, their annexation to the Italian Kingdom. This occurred in defiance of the armed forces which still held the field, before Italian or Allied troops could ensure protection to the rebels. Thus, Julian Venetia, as President Poincaré said of Alsace, by instinctive impulse, “flung herself weeping with joy into the arms of her recovered mother.”

The Italian irredentist movement came into existence on the very day on which the peace of 1866 redressed only in partial measure the great political violence which was committed at Campoformio and reconfirmed by the Congress of Vienna.

In order to give peace to Central Europe and equilibrium to the Adriatic it is imperative to complete the work interrupted in 1866 and to tear up the last fragment of the Treaty of Vienna, which up to the present day has deprived Italy of some of her children, and undermined the security of her Adriatic frontier by sea and land.

To attain this end it is necessary in the first place to carry the Italian frontier to the watershed of the Julian Alps, which from the Moistrovka (east of Mt. Mangart), the Tricorno, Idria, Nauporto, descending by a series of massive ridges as outlined on the annexed map, and following the natural boundary marked by the watershed between Quarnero and the Canal of Maltempo (Croatian coast), plunges into the sea opposite the island of Veglia at the rock which bears the fateful name of St. Mark. The description of the frontier does not call for elucidation, even with regard to some slight modifications which do no more than define and interpret the summary outline as drawn also in the Treaty of London. Only this frontier will close “Italy’s Eastern Gate.” The territory of Julian Venetia has hitherto been assigned to six provinces of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The basin of the Isonzo constituted the “Principality of Gorizia and Gradisca.” Trieste and its territory formed a province by itself “directly dependent from the Empire, “the Istrian Peninsula (with the Quarnero Islands) constituted the “Istrian Margraviate”; the greater part of the Inner Carso was joined to the Carniola; the town of Fiume with the surrounding district was assigned to the Hungarian Crown as a “separate entity”;

lastly, the triangle formed by Fiume, the Polizza Pass, and the Rock of St. Mark formed part of Croatia. Nature, on the contrary, created Julian Venetia a single and clearly defined geographic whole. The iniquity of events, especially during the last century, has broken up this whole, and divided its ownership, without any regard to the will and interest of the population, thus spreading the seeds of domestic and foreign strife. Here also it is necessary to give Nature its due, to reconstitute the political unity of the region, and decree its ownership to the Italian State, which claims it by right of nature, history, and for economical reasons.

Quite apart from this past history, Gorizia, Trieste, Pola, and Fiume, the most important entres in Julian Venetia, are Italian by the overwhelming majority of their present population, as shown even by official Austrian and Hungarian statistics. The towns and minor boroughs are

Italian, and extensive rural districts, of which the economic and civil existence form an indivisible whole with these towns, are Italian also. Even the adversaries of the Italian cause do not also suggest that Julian Venetia should once again be broken up, and that certain of the inland portions should be assigned to a state other than that owning the large centres, which for the most part are situated on the coast. And as these large centres, whether along the coast or in the interior, are all incontestably Italian and lead the moral and material life of the whole region, Italy's claim to the possession of the whole region must be recognised, not only for the higher reasons of her eastern defence, and for those of history and civilisation, but also and more especially by reason of the economic laws of the country and the well-being of its population, without distinction of nationality. Even apart from indispensable reasons of military safety and geographical unity, a frontier of compromise, a frontier not based on clearly defined territorial principles, could neither completely settle the conflicts of nationality, which are apprehended as the result of the inclusion in our frontier of Slav minorities, nor present any economic stability. The natural outlets of the Slavified mountainous zones (which moreover are not densely populated) are the Venetian Friulian plain, and the Italian ports of Julian Venetia, from Trieste to Fiume. If these zones, which are now mainly inhabited by Slavs, were to belong to a state other than ours, they would become centres of anti-Italian agitation, they would inevitably press towards the sea and, supported also by the Slovene and Croatian hinterland, might exercise a vigorous and threatening pressure on our frontier territories, keeping them in a state of continuous agitation and the two bordering states in a condition of perpetual tension. The inclusion of the entire Cis-Alpine territory, also of that part which is partially or entirely inhabited by Slavs, far from creating the danger of Slav irredentism—which Italy knows how to avert by wise treatment of the minority—is the only way to prevent that movement for Slav irredentism which an irrational frontier would foster by the very pressure of that economic necessity which the Cis-Alpine Slavs would, on the contrary, be able to satisfy freely as heretofore in the urban centres and the Italian

ports under the common protection of Italian rule. Given the indivisibility of the region and the necessity that it should form, with its Alpine boundary, the eastern bulwark of Italy, the strength of Italian claims cannot be prejudiced by the number of inhabitants of other languages who are to be found either scattered as a minority among the Italian population in some parts, or even actually in the majority in certain outlying corners of the territory.

We have already explained the reasons and the general value of such phenomena—characteristic of the border lands of territories belonging also to others which, however, are not regarded on this account as politically reduced or split. In any case, in order to rectify current impressions, it is well to make it clear that Julian Venetia is only a part which has been severed by violence in recent times from the geographically compact region of Venetia which, taken as a whole, includes little over 40,000 Slavs on a total population of 3,600,000 inhabitants. If again one looks only to that part of Venetia which has hitherto been separated from the Kingdom of Italy (i. e. Julian Venetia) official statistics give a population of 482,000 Italians (Italian subjects included), against 411,000 Slavs (including Slovenes and Croats).

When it is considered that all the Italian residents (including the majority of Italian subjects) are natives and descendants of natives of the country, while, especially in the towns, the Slavs are mostly of recent immigration, deliberately organised for political aims; when it is considered that official censuses have misrepresented the truth to the disadvantage of Italy, as for instance (not to waste time on examples and details) can be demonstrated by the express statement made by the I. R. Central Statistical Commission, which admitted the artificialness of the methods followed for some one-side revisions of the last census, it must be recognised that the proportion of nationalities, which official Austrian statistics have acknowledged to show an Italian majority for the whole of Julian 1 The French text gives 400,000 which is the correct figure.

Venetia, may be presumed to be in reality even much more favourable to the Italians, and unquestionably the reality supports their claims, which are based on geography and on civil and economic predominance. Without enlarging on records of the political life of the country, it will suffice to mention that in the three administrative provinces of Trieste, Gorizia-Gradisca, and Istria, which according to official statistics count an Italian population of 44 per cent., with 32 per cent. Slovenes and 20 per cent. Croats, the local administrations, that is to say, the fundamental and traditional organs of public life, are in Italian hands in a number of Communes that include in aggregate 70 per cent, of the entire population of Julian Venetia, and this although the electoral system in use is on the widest possible basis. On the contrary, the Communes administered by the Slavs include only 30 per cent, of the total population of the three Julian provinces. Thus the Provincial Diets—even without counting Trieste where the Council Diet counts 68 Italians out of a total of 80 members—are mostly Italian throughout Istria and the Gorizian

districts, in spite of electoral regulations which under pressure of the Government have been arranged to favour the Slavs. These clear manifestations of the political life of Julian Venetia prove either that the Italians form, contrary to official statistics, the very great majority and the Slavs, notwithstanding hostile pressure and agitations, recognise Italian superiority and the necessity and utility of living in community with Italian elements; that they speak our language and accept our political programme, concerning which Italians have never made a mystery even in the administrative field. These data acquire special importance when we remember the policy of national persecution carried out by every means, especially during the last fifty years, by the Government of Vienna against the Italian elements, who, regardless of their constitutional rights, have always been deprived of elementary medium and higher schools, while the Slovenes and Croats, in consideration of their unflinching loyalty to the monarchy, solemnly reconfirmed by the motion passed in May 1917 by the Austrian Parliament, and by their military efforts which continued until October 1919, always enjoyed a privileged situation, even in the cities which were purely Italian.

The Defence of the Adriatic

The new boundary of the Julian Alps, which includes in the Kingdom of Italy, the Istrian Coast with Pola up to Fiume, reduces, without eliminating it, the state of inferiority in which, greatly to the danger of the nation and of the peace of Europe, Italy has been placed up to the present in the Adriatic. In order to remove this evil and to eliminate all danger and menace, it is imperative to return to Italy a share on the Dalmatian coast and islands.

Ever since the moment when, on the fall of Venice in 1797, Istria and Dalmatia were handed to Austria, and the natural unity of the Adriatic was shattered into military and political divisions, the problem presented itself, as it does to-day, clear and precise, grave and full of menace: torment to all young Italian democracies called into being by the genius of revolution—remorse to Napoleon who attempted to rectify at Presburg the mistake of Campoformio—nightmare of German and Viennese reaction which from the opposite shore knows that it can still rivet the chains of Italy—clear vision to the thinkers and statesmen, to the people and to the armies of our country, whom only misfortunes and mistakes—up to the battle of Lissa and the Congress of Berlin—prevented from ensuring Italy's welfare and the world's peace.

Times and conditions having changed, Italy can revise her case as regards the Adriatic: instead of demanding absolute rule on this sea her request may be limited to that of freedom, which will not exclude the Yugoslavs from a share in the possession of the Adriatic coast; Italy claiming for herself no more, but also no less, than will ensure her peaceful security and eliminate foreign menace.

Italy's claim is not antagonistic to the laws of geography and history nor to the principles of nationality and economy. The whole of Dalmatia was united to Italy in the centuries of Rome and Venice, for its own good fortune and the world's peace. Indeed, Austria herself considered it Italian territory together with Lombardy and Venetia up to the year 1866 and this even in the geography textbooks written for her military schools.

The Treaties stipulated prior to Italy's entry into the war aimed at ensuring to her that part of the islands and of the mainland of Dalmatia which was considered sufficient to eliminate danger and threat. It was a compromise, not including Spalato, the old town, with the most glorious tokens of latinity, and which therefore could and should be added.

Out of a total area of 12,385 square kilometres, she was to receive only 6,325 of Dalmatian territory, out of the Dalmatian population of 645,000 inhabitants, only 287,000, i. e. only 44 per cent.; of the whole coastline, exclusive of the islands, from Fiume to the mouth of the Boiana, Italy was to receive 117 miles against 647 given to the Slavs, that is to say, only one-sixth. The Yugoslavs would therefore have on the eastern shore a coastline six times the extent of that given to Italy, would possess more than half of the population, and half of the continental and insular area of Dalmatia. Considering that as late as 1909 a Serbian semi-official writer put forward as sufficient for the independence of Serbia a coast on the Adriatic only 5 kilometres long between Ragusa and Cattaro, one cannot but appreciate the moderation of the Italian claims and her liberality towards her new neighbours, especially when we remember that besides the ports of the Croatian coast (Buccari, Portori, Segna, etc.), the most important ports in Dalmatia could also be allotted to this state. As regards nationalities, the Dalmatian territory ensured to Italy by the Treaty includes about 280,000 inhabitants, among whom the official statistics enumerate only 12,000 Italians. This is the result of the most outrageous violence that the political history of Europe records during the last century. Austria did not recoil before any form of artifice or violence in Dalmatia in order to repress Italian feelings, after 1866 in order to check any movement towards annexation to Italy, and after 1878 and 1882 in order to carry out her Balkan schemes.

Even apart from the Illyric-Roman origin, with its Albanian affinity, altogether distinct from the Slav type, of the so-called Morlacchi who form almost one-third of the Dalmatian population, impartial observation supported indirectly by scholastic statistics, election results, and the various manifestations of social life, show the Dalmatian population who come within the boundaries assured to Italy to be of a very different national consistency from what would appear from Viennese statistics. There are no fewer than 50,000 Italians, Italian by name, by fact, and by conscience, of whom nearly four-fifths were artificially suppressed in the census; the so-called "Slavs for political opportunism" who can neither understand nor speak the Slav tongue and who at home speak exclusively Italian, number at least

15,000. There are then over 100,000 Slavs who know and speak Italian fluently, and to whom life in common with Italians, which is to-day a necessity, will be quite welcome to-morrow when they will be freed from external agitation.

Lastly, there remain in reality not more than 100,000 Slavs in the country districts, who do not speak Italian and remain unaffected by Italian influence, but, as a matter of fact, not even these latter under the pressure of the unbridled anti-Italian agitation which has been going on for so many years, show any genuine aversion to recognise the civil and economic superiority of the Italians of the towns and maritime boroughs.

So great even now, in spite of everything, is the vitality of the Italian element on the Dalmatian coast, that the Croats must themselves, in their own papers, openly complain that anybody visiting Dalmatia must receive an impression contrary to their aspirations, that is to say an Italian impression, and they reproach the Dalmatians for their "shameful habit" of speaking Italian. Nor could this be otherwise in a country in which the violence of Austrian rule may have robbed Italians of a parliamentary representation—which in 1869 consisted of 7 Italian against 2 Slav deputies—and of a majority in the Provincial Diet which in the first elections of 1861 had numbered 30 Italian deputies against 13 Slavs, but did not succeed either in impairing the Italian character of Zara which triumphantly asserts itself in Zara's all-Italian Town Council, nor in preventing, for instance, the Chambers of Commerce of the Zara and Sebenico districts from being Italian; nor the constituency of the wealthiest class of the same districts from sending unopposed to the Diet Italian deputies, thus affording clear proof that industrial and trade activity and real estate in the very territory reserved to Italy are still in Italian hands and supporting also in the economic field the Italian character of historic memories and feelings which, since the Italian occupation following on the Armistice, has revealed itself in such a touching and eloquent manner by the spontaneity and persistence of manifestations and aspirations.

But even if historic right did not support it and if racial reality were not actually so different from what the Austrian State has tried to make out in the Slav interest, Italy should still—for the sake of her future safety—not relinquish her claim to the possession of a minimum of the

Dalmatian coast and islands. It would carry us too far to go into a detailed examination of the strategic problems of the Adriatic. A single glance at map reveals, however, their essential features already thrown into tragic relief by the recent war.

On the eastern coast of the Adriatic a magnificent advance barrier of rocks and islands protects the mainland and with it the coastal lines of communication. On the western coast is a low-lying beach, undefended and exposed to aggression of all kinds. On the east side there is the possibility of sheltered navigation, no matter from what direction the wind may blow; on our side there is a complete lack of every kind of refuge, and risky sailing whenever the weather is bad. On the eastern

coast, wide recesses and the possibility of casting anchor anywhere; on the west, a lack of anchorages and difficulty of call and refuge.

On the Dalmatian coast high ground offers excellent observation posts which command the wide surrounding horizon; on the Italian coast, on the other hand, low-lying ground and (with the exception of the Gargano and the Conero) no possibility of observing the waters from a height.

It is clear that a Power having exclusive sway over the central tract of the Dalmatian coast from Zara to Spalato, with the military port of Sebenico and the islands, would be free to come out at any moment and give battle. The Italian fleet, speeding up partly from Venice and partly from Brindisi, would infallibly find itself exposed to fight with only half its forces against the entire enemy fleet, and to the possibility of being beaten separately before having a chance to join up its forces.

Dalmatia if all in the hands of one Power represents a danger to Italy; a portion of Dalmatia in possession of Italy, especially within the modest limits to which Italian aspirations are confined, represents a danger to no one.

The present war has proved this. Italy with all her fleet was unable to do anything substantial against the enemy's naval forces lurking in the ports and canals on the other shore, and even the co-operation of considerable French and British forces could achieve nothing. Italy was

compelled to suffer her naval energies to be worn away in an enervating effort of defence and unaccepted challenge, notwithstanding several acts of individual valour. Austria-Hungary, on the contrary, was able to attack and bombard undefended towns on the Italian coast and then take refuge behind her wonderful screen on the eastern coast, before the ever-vigilant Italian and Allied forces were able to overtake her.

In order to avoid remaining in a state of permanent and absolute inferiority, Italy is, therefore, entitled to ask that, in accordance with what has been set forth above, the coast and islands of the Adriatic which will be allotted to others shall be neutralised; that all fortifications, either on land or sea, should be forbidden and all existing ones dismantled.

As to the zone comprised between Zara and Sebenico, its configuration is such that no form of neutralisation could possibly prevent its being transformed in a few hours into a first-rate naval base by the sudden resort to the latest means of warfare such as mines, submarines, etc., which would make that coast absolutely impregnable. Only by having it in her possession could Italy guarantee her safety.

Italian Rights on Fiume

The Treaty with her Allies which preceded Italy's entrance into the war recognised those rights which, as shown above, are Italy's natural and historic rights

and essential to her economic and defensive unity in the mountains and on the sea. Fiume and her district have, however, been excepted, and Italy must now reclaim them not only as an essential part of Julian Venetia, as an indispensable fulfilment of her eastern defensive requirements, but, above all because Fiume is, after Trieste, Gorizia, and Pola, the most important Italian town on the eastern Adriatic. There are in Fiume 33,000 Italians with whom are intermixed only 10,927 Slavs and 1,300 Magyars. Both ancient and modern history show Fiume as thoroughly Italian: the very Croatian Ban Jelacic, who in 1848 forcibly occupied the town by order of Austria and as a punishment to Hungary which had rebelled against the Hapsburgs had publicly to guarantee to the citizens of Fiume "the use of their Italian tongue."

Jealously guarding her Italian culture and teaching, Fiume rebelled against the tendency towards introducing the teaching of other languages in her schools, "thus sowing in the tender hearts of the children prejudice against the Italian tongue, which has always been spoken since Fiume existed, which is the country's own language, and one of the principal elements to which can be attributed her culture and progress both commercial and industrial" (1861).

The mayors, all the members of the municipal council, the deputies, have always been and are Italian and only Italian. Up to quite recently, out of respect to the Italian character of Fiume, the Hungarian Kingdom published the laws in Italian.

Her Italian character and autonomy have been the fundamental elements of the life of Fiume; especially since the day which by her decree of April 23rd, 1779, Maria Theresa declared Fiume to be a separate body of the Hungarian Kingdom, and a town free from all union or connection with Croatia (*separatum sacrae regni Hungariae coronae adnexum corpus . . . neque cum alio Buccarano vcl ad regnum Croatiae pertinente ulla ratione commisceatur*). This privilege was confirmed by succeeding fundamental laws and by the "Statute of the *Free City* of Fiume." After the fall of the Hapsburg dynasty, Fiume claimed her right to self-determination and proclaimed, on October 29th, 1918, her adherence to Italy, to whom, according to the tradition of the Italian Risorgimento, she had already been assigned by the programme of the Carboneria (1822).

Italy, in asserting her right to accept and ask for recognition of the spontaneous self-dedication of Italian Fiume, knows too that she is thus meeting in the best way the necessity for a rational exploitation of Fiume's economic value in the interest particularly of the hinterland to which she serves as port. At the same time Italy would have in Fiume, according to the spirit of the Treaty with her Allies, one of the compensations to which she has earned a full right by the greater efforts and sacrifices by which she has contributed to the war, considering also the new conditions created by the disruption of Austria-Hungary.

When Italy joined the Allied Powers her undertaking, according to the military convention then agreed to, was limited by the obligation of Russia to employ

against Austria-Hungary a certain minimum force, “to prevent Austria-Hungary from concentrating all her efforts against Italy if Russia should desire to turn her attention in particular against Germany.”

The internal political events in Russia which led to a separate peace had the following double consequence: that Austria-Hungary, freed from any possibility of further pressure, was able to concentrate all her forces against Italy and that Germany, also freed from her eastern enemy, was in a position to lend Austria-Hungary that efficacious assistance which at one period had such serious repercussion to Italy’s detriment.

In fact, while the unexpected event of Russia’s disappearance from among the Entente belligerents was largely compensated to our Allies by the intervention of the American forces, no assistance of this sort came to the Italian Front to relieve the effort of the Italian Army, as President Wilson himself so sympathetically acknowledged and regretted.

The double consequence of Russia’s falling out, from which Italy was the principal sufferer, both as regards military effort and sacrifice on the part of the population, would justify Italy in requesting an all-round increase of the compensations which were agreed upon in anticipation of much smaller efforts and sacrifices.

Italy wishes to give proof—even in this case—of the greatest moderation, and limits herself to requesting, as has been stated above, the City and District of Fiume, which racially is in its great majority Italian, and which has of its own accord proclaimed its desire to be united to Italy. Moreover, in the defensive system of our land frontier, Fiume rounds off the extreme, and therefore the most critical point. The border would otherwise be reduced to an untenable line consisting of the administrative frontier between Istria and Fiume, up to now in the hands of one state only.

Fiume in Italian hands would complete, too, the anti-German programme of defence in the Adriatic. Only Italy, that is to say, only a great sea Power, can dispose of the necessary means for carrying into effect this programme which meets the requirements of the combined interests of all the Powers who have fought side by side in the war. Trieste and Fiume—a French writer warns us in 1915, referring to the terms of the future peace—either under Austrian or Hungarian disguise, are but German ports, southern terminals of a line of domination of which Hamburg and Bremen are the terminals on the North Sea. Having freed the one terminal, Trieste, from indirect German domination, we must prevent the other, Fiume, from carrying on her German functions under Yugoslav attire even against the desire and intention of the new Slav state, which would be powerless and unprepared to eliminate the old influences and to counteract the German efforts which will be concentrated, especially after the loss of Trieste, on the one possible point of penetration.

Not even an Anti-German Danube Confederation, even if it could be constituted, could replace Italy in this mission without serious delays of which the enemy, with the financial trickery of which he is master, would take full advantage.

The natural aptitude and technical means at the disposal of a sea Power such as Italy are necessary for this purpose. Italy would place this port, as she will place Trieste, entirely at the service of its natural hinterland. She would but reconcile, by means of the best technical and most advantageous economical methods, her own interests with those of her natural customers, avoiding the effects of any political influence or dependence, contrary to the common line of general interest.

To those states Italy could guarantee specific advantages such as bonded warehouses and bonded zones, reserved portions of the general storehouses, special landing places, preferential tariffs for harbour dues, special markets, agreements for cumulative railway and maritime tariffs, agreements for the emigration traffic, etc. She is thus sure of acting also in the interest of her own ports, whose prosperity is intimately connected with that of the hinterland states.

Since Trieste and Fiume must be outlets of German territories (Germany and German Austria), the Czechoslovak State, the Yugoslav countries (Slovenia and Croatia), and of Hungary, the difficulty—not to say the impossibility—is perfectly clear, of any Power other than Italy ensuring to their common outlets on the sea that impartial and objective technical management which is an indispensable requisite of the rapid and economical exploitation of these ports and of the railway and maritime lines by which they must be served. Only Italy could fulfil these functions, as she is obviously outside and superior to any competition either political or economic which may arise between the above mentioned states.

With regard particularly to Fiume, it must be denied that this port is essential to the economic needs of Croatia. The Croatian traffic amounts to only 7 per cent, of the total movement (import and export) of the port of Fiume; the remainder belongs to the other countries of the hinterland and especially to Hungary. Only 13 per cent, of the entire trade of Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina passed through Fiume, the rest going towards the ports of Lower Dalmatia. The maritime service of the port of Fiume, run so far by companies subsidised by the Hungarian Government, could certainly not be worked by a new state which would bring to Fiume such a small portion of her traffic, which would have many other more urgent demands, and which is in no way prepared for such work. Only a great sea Power, such as Italy, with the necessary traditions, means, connections, and experience could help Fiume to accomplish her mission, although at first some sacrifice would be required which could easily be borne by the Italian treasury in the summing up of the profit and loss which is possible through the cumulative management of so many ports.

Trieste and Fiume in Italian hands could have combined maritime services of wider range, and more economical and perfect in organisation, without giving rise

to any conflict of interests and to the mutual advantage of their respective hinterlands.

Maritime services run separately for Trieste and Fiume would be neither rational nor economical. Trieste supported by an important Power like Italy might have them while Fiume has not, to her own detriment as well as to the detriment of her hinterland, which would necessarily pay higher rates for such lines than they would require to pay if Fiume were

Italian and could make use of the cumulative services which Italy would maintain for both her ports in the northern Adriatic.

In other words, and not only in this respect, Italy would, to the advantage of both ports and of the producing and consuming districts of the hinterland, exercise a regulating and subsidising function. The other states of the hinterland, and especially Croatia and Yugoslavia, would lack for this purpose the requisite means, technical preparation and impartiality.

The problem of Fiume, so closely allied to that of Trieste, besides being one that intimately concerns Italy—involving, as it does, the interests of a city which is so markedly Italian, and which is, moreover, connected with the other problem of the eastern Italian frontier—is also a European problem in the anti-German sense of the word. Only as an Italian city would the development of Fiume as an emporium be ensured, thus protecting the port itself and the hinterland (especially the Magyar district) from the dangers of the following dilemma: either economic ruin or German help and therefore German hegemony, even if only of an economic character. “Fiume as a Croatian city,” as has been written by a French journalist, “means a Hungarian, Austro-Hungarian, or German Fiume, which all amounts to the same thing.”

In conclusion, if it is true that the Treaty of London united Fiume to the Kingdom of Croatia in view of its territorial continuity with that region, it is none the less true that the same Treaty did not foresee the fall of the Hapsburg Monarchy, of which the said Kingdom was an integral part. In that case it appeared reasonable that the political possession of an autonomous port on the Adriatic should not be denied to Transleithania and more especially to a total population of 50 million inhabitants, who were quite able to attend to its maintenance and support; whereas, with the fall of the Empire at Vittorio Veneto after the last determining factor of the Italian Army’s powerful blow, the need for and the claim to political rule over this commercial outlet ceased to exist. The history of over a century, from the proclamation of Maria Theresa which declares Fiume to be a “separate body” of the Hungarian state without any “connection whatsoever with Croatia” up to the last decisions of the National Council of Fiume, all goes to prove that only by deforming a material reality in perfect harmony with an inalterable spiritual reality, would it be possible to bind Fiume to the fortunes of a new Slav state.

No one can honestly contest Italy's right to obtain from Peace those fruits which for the most part were assured to her prior to her entry into the war as her due for efforts and for sacrifices infinitely inferior to those which they actually made in the common cause. Whoever disputes or discusses Italy's claims, does not do so from objective or intrinsic reasons, but only from too great a consideration for the pretensions of southern Slavs.

They are the very claims and objections of those Slavs who up to the last moment contributed in full measure to the war, specially devoting their energies against Italy. Only yesterday the most important Yugoslav paper admitted that they had fought *life lions against Italy*—that is to say against the Entente—for what they call *their land*. From the Austro-Hungarian Government, and almost as a reward for the loyalty and dynastic character preserved up to the last by their agitation for a Yugoslav state within the orbit of the Hapsburg Monarchy, they received at the last moment, in the handing over of the fleet, a mandate of confidence which cannot but cause some perplexity as to the attitude to be taken by the Allies towards the future of the new state. However, Italy foresaw, before allying herself to the enemies of the Central Empires, the possibility that rightful claims might be contested after the victory by companions in arms who might in some respects have political interests different from or opposite to hers.

For this reason she proposed and accepted an equitable compromise implying unquestionable renunciations to complete redemption of Italian land and peoples. Italy thus defined the minimum which, while giving some satisfaction to the legitimate desires of others, would also guarantee that on a favourable conclusion of the war, her hopes would not be rendered vain and illusory as a result of pressure exerted by those very men by whose side Italy had fought.

Having at that time, in order to avoid future misunderstanding, drawn the attention of her new Allies to the possibility of the contestations which have now arisen in a wholly unjustifiable form, Italy is now entitled to anticipate fully that her moderate requests, corresponding to her rights and necessities and having to such a great extent the full suffrage of the peoples involved, should be accepted in full.

22. DOCUMENT

The issue of the Baranya Triangle, the Banat, in British foreign policy documents. Boundaries of Baranya. Signed H.W. Temperley. TNA FO 608/5/15. 393;395–397.

The border proposal of the British peace delegation of 8 February 1919 did not support the annexation of the Baranian Triangle to the South Slav state. The memorandum stated that “The population of the Danube-Drava Triangle should not be part of the Yugoslav state, since neither its number nor its distribution justify this, and geographical and economic reasons strongly militate against it.”

Belgrade was probably informed informally of the decision of 12 May because it submitted a memorandum to the Peace Conference on 20 May. In it, referring to the South Slavic character of the territory, it requested that the border be changed to Hercegszántó-Lipó-Szentmárton-Miholyac. The Peace Conference did not want to deal with this memorandum, Major H.W. Temperley wrote in his report on the memorandum that the matter had already been settled.

Source: TNA FO 608/5/15. 393;395-397

BRITISH DELEGATION
PARIS
BOUNDARIES OF BARANYA

The enclosed two papers are petitions from various inhabitants of the Baranya for union with the Yugoslav Kingdom. All the places mentioned lie north of the proposed British line, and all but one (Baranya Kisfalud) lie north of the more advanced French boundary.

Since our discussion on the Commission some new points have arisen

(1) Boundary

I observe that the boundary east of the Danube hits the main strain on the east just about the point where the French line leaves it. From this point of view it would appear more convenient therefore to adopt the French line than the English.

(2) Ethnographic

It is not denied that the villages, north of the British line and included by the French, are ethnographically Yugoslav. Baranya Kisfalud has actually petitioned for inclusion.

(3) Political

It seems pretty clear that, even allowing for manufactured evidence, there is a real desire on the part of some inhabitants of the Baranya north of the British line to join the Yugoslavs. This tendency extends to some Magyars and Germans well as to Slavs. There are several reasons for this. The fear of Bolshevism is perhaps the most obvious but this is not permanent political tendency or, if it is, frontiers won't matter much. According, however, to evidence from the reputation, which is confirmed independently by Commander Williams-Freeman, there has been a considerable increase in agricultural production since the Serb arrival, due to their vigorous measures in confiscating great estates with absentee Archy-ducal landlords. Other landowners among whom was Count Festetic (a younger branch of the family) seem convinced that Gert rule is a stimulus to agricultural production, while it still offers the prospects of fair profits to those landowners who submit. It seems therefore that there may be a permanent economic motive as well. This would tend to suggest that actual Yugoslav villages, north of the British line and included in the French one, ought to be really enthusiastic, I don't personally think it advisable to include any of the Mohacs's area. This will lead to complications and encourage the Yugoslavs to claim Pécs and the coalmines and Baja. Both claims are undesirable.

(4) Strategic

The Italian raised the objection to the French line because the English line runs along the crests of the hills north and west of Varosmarty, whereas the French given the Yugoslavs a work of barbican beyond it. If the English line is adopted these hills are useless for defence because, in effect, neutralised. If the French line is taken, troops can assemble under cover of the hills and concentrate for an attack. There is not much in this, though at first sight plausible, because the main concentration will always be on the east side near Danube Zombor, and the any case on Magyars would their main defence line on the hills just north of Mohács.

Conclusion

Adopt of French line. v. MAP.

Signed H.W. TEMPERLEY Maj. G. S. Military Section

23. DOCUMENT

Memorandum presented through a Deputation of Baranya. Paris, 12th of July 1919. TNA FO 608/5/15. 400. 15557. 12 June 1919.

Belgrade kept trying: in June 1919, an “official” delegation from Baranya appeared in Paris, headed by Vladislav Pandurovic, the Archbishop of Baranya. The delegation consisted of the following persons: the Serbs were represented by Dr. Todor Andrio, a lawyer from Mohács, Gavria Rasio, a landowner from Dunaszekcső, Damjan Stojsic, a landowner from Kasad, and Dr. Vojislav Gjurgjevic, a lawyer from Darda. Representing the Germans: Dr. Árpád Scheidl, landowner of Hercegmár. For the Hungarians: Count Imre Keglevic, landowner of Szigetvár, and Countess Imréné Festetics, landowner of Szigetvár. On 12 June, the delegation submitted a memorandum requesting that the Baranian territories be annexed to the South Slav state. At the committee meetings, which took place between 19 July and 26 July, the French position finally prevailed, with their line becoming the new Hungarian-Yugoslav border. Thus, was born the so-called Baranya Triangle, which was annexed to the Yugoslav state.

Source: TNA FO 608/5/15. 400 15557. 12 June 1919.

MEMORANDUM

PRESENTED THROUGH A DEPUTATION OF BARANYA

1° We, the undersigned delegates of the Country of Baragna, in the name of the Serb: Dr. Todor Andrio barrister at law of Mohac, formerley Member of Parliament of the circuit of Mohac elected (1910 1919), Gavris Rasio, landowner of Dunaszekeso, Damjan Stojsic landowner of Kasad, Dr. Vojislav Gjurgjevic, barrister at law of Darda.

In the name german: Dr. Arpad Scheidl landowner of Herzegnarol.

In the name of the Hungarian: Count Emerick Keglevic, landowner of Szigetvar Countess Emerick Festetic, landowner of Szigetvar.

Wladislaw Meszaroc, chief Clark of the Country of Baragna in Pec, declare before the Lord Lieutenant of the occupied country between the Danube and Drave Dr. Vladislav Pandurovich (citizen of Siklos country of Baragna) that, through of confidence and expressed wishes of the absolute majority of the country of Baragna and of the occupied parts of the County of Somogy, they are delegates of these parts and beg the Lord Lieutenant of the Government of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes that they should be introduced to the Peace Conference where they can give expression to the national and economical wishes of their county.

2°. On the enclosed map the blue lines mark the line of demarcation. On the east side of the occupied county the Slavonic and German population is in absolute majority, while on west side, the Hungarian population has the absolute, majority, and along the river of the Drave, there are only some Slavonic islands. The Servian Government has counted the population of Baragna in the year of 1919 again and this counting proved that there are 100.000 people of Slavonic nationality. A further and certain proof for this is, that the circuit of Mohac at the election of the members of parliament always elected members of Servian nationality.

The east aide wishes explicitly that, on the grounds of their nationality and of their economical condition, they should be united for ever with the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats et Slovenes.

They make this claim on the national grounds because the Serbs and the Slovaks declared every time at political meetings that they wish to belong to the Kingdom of S. C. and S: the Germans have expressed the same wish bough the different council of the villages.

The German population wishes to join the Kingdom of S. C. and S. principally on account of economical reasons, because the mountain in the Borth of the County, called the Mecsec separates them from Hungary and the economical highways an waterways all direct their economical life to the south. For national reasons also they prefer to belong to the Kingdom of S. C. and S. because they have received guarantees that their language will be protected in their schools, which was not the case during the Hungarian regime.

3° The majority of the Hungarians are living on the- west side of the County of Baragna. From national and sentimental reasons they do not wish to belong to Kingdom of S. C. and, but at the present moment, they do not wish to be delivered to the tender mercies of the Bolcheviki Government of Hungary, And it is the general desire that they remain for a longer time under the Serbian occupation and civilian administration. They leg that they should further have the right that after a certain Period of time they be allowed to decide by plebiscite which State they should belong to.

From an economical point of view, they see much better for themselves in the Kingdom of the S. C. and S. es prosperity specially on account of the river the Drave.

3° As to the question of the coal mines, we must notice that in the rayon of the Royal PreeCity of Pecuj, there is a coal mine which is called Banyatelep.


In the County of Baragna (Circuit Pecuj) there are three coal mines, in Szabolcs, Somogy and Vasas. In this case it would be just that Vasas and Somogy should belong to the Kingdom of the Serbs Croats and Slovenes and the other two mines would remain to the Royal Free City of Pecuj, in the case that this town

should decide in future to belong to Hungary again. The whole economical life of the county of Baragna depends upon the above-mentioned distribution of the coal supply.

If this disposition of Baragna is not made then the Peace Conference will not bring peace to this country on the contrary, it will start a new struggle again and most of the of all kind of nationalities could have to seek rein the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. This is the reason why everybody Baragne wishes the present time to belong to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.

Paris, 12th of July 1919

Original signature of the participants in the delegation.



24. DOCUMENT

Ethnographical Frontier between Serbians and the Rumanians in Banat. TNA FO 608/5/13 357-378.

One of the most sensitive issues in the process of creating the new borders of Central Europe was the fate of the Banat. The interests of two states, both allies of the Entente, clashed. As one of the 'peacemakers', Harold Nicolson, a member of the British delegation, put it: 'the representatives of the great powers cared little for Transylvania and Bukovina, which belonged to the enemy, but they were terribly concerned about the fate of Banat, which [...] was claimed by the Yugoslavs'.

The issue of Banat pitted the two allies of the Entente against each other, a so-called win-win situation. But in reality, this situation (Romanian and Serbian claims crossed) threatened the Entente with long-term political complications and even open armed conflict. The Entente's fears were particularly concerned with the long-term consequences. Even after the peace conference, the Entente counted on both states as allies. A Romanian-Serbian war would have made this impossible. In other words, the Banat problem had to be solved in such a way that the Entente powers could maintain the confidence of both Belgrade and Bucharest, while preventing further Serb-Roman discord.

After lengthy discussions, one of which even raised the possibility of a referendum on the Banat, the commission took its final decision on the partition of the Banat at its meeting on 18 March. The line dividing the Banat between Romanians and Serbs annexed 18.4 thousand km² of the territory of the Banat to Romania and 9.8 thousand km² to the southern Slav state. The resulting border left 76,000 Romanians within the borders of the South Slav state, while 65,000 Serbs were annexed to the Romanian state.

However, in a surprising development, the Banat was eventually divided between not two but three states. This happened because the American delegation declared that it saw the need to annex a small part of the Torontál county to Hungary in order to improve the economic life of the city of Szeged. This was envisioned by adding to the strip of Csongrád County allocated to Hungary at the meeting of 28 February - the tip of the Maros Angle between Szőreg and Szeged - the following nine Torontal municipalities. The committee accepted the proposal. Thus, a small part of the Banat county of Torontal - only 271 km² - located between Újszeged and Kiszombor, remained in Hungary.

Source: TNA FO 608/5/13 357-378

Ethnographical Frontier between Serbians and the Rumanians in Banat

ETHNOGRAPHICAL FRONTIER between the Serbians and the Romanians in the Banat,

The Banat is peopled by Serbians, Hungarians, Roumanians and Germans, The Serbians are indigenous; the other nationalities established themselves there later as colonists.

On the Enat the frontier has to be marked between the Serbians and the Roumanians, and on the North between the Serbians and the Hungarians,

Principal geographical and economical facts.

The Banat is not an ethnical, geographical and economical unity, On the contrary, it is composed of two parts, geographically and ethnographically independent one of the other with different economical relations and communications, which have represented during history special historical unities; besides, those two parts are of different ethnographical composition,

One of these parts is the Western Banat or the valley of the Banat which extends itself from the Tisza to Temesvar Vershats and Bela Terkva, whilst the other, which extends itself East of these towns, is the Eastern Banat which is mountainous, The Western Danat is characterised by the fact that its rivers - the Tisza, Moris Nera and Kara converge to the south, toward Belgrade, and make of this town the centre of the navigation and the emporium which commands all commercial currents of the Banat, Besides, from the morphological point of view, the Western Banat forms an unity with the valleys of the Morava and the Vardar. In the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries and nearly up to to-day (forty years ago) 1,6, before the Hungarian Government introduced prohibitive measures the commerce and the economical life of the Banat were intimately bound to Serbia. Temesvar was the centre of the commercial relations with the Balkans, When the Turkish invasion had destroyed the Serbian States of the Balkans, it was quite natural that the Serbian civilisation was continued on the territory of the Banat, on the North of the Valley of the Morava, From the XVIth to the XVIIIth century the Banat was simply called Serbia Rascia because there the national life and national conscience of the Serbians was the most intensified, The Western Banat has never had intimate relations with Roumania from which it 10 separated by the mountainous barrier of the Carpathians,

The Balkanic countries which belong to our State (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Dalmatia, Carniola and Istria), as well as a great part of Southern Serbia are mountainous countries, feeble producers of wheat, which shall greatly want the wheat from the Banat, Roumania, being one of the richest granaries of Europe, has no need to acquire a new agricultural province.

Being the continuation of the valley of the Morava, the Western Banat constitutes a territorial zone protecting the Northern frontier of Serbia which is quite open a sone covering the entrance of the valley of the Morava which, during the past as well as in the last war, has always represented an open door to the enemy; lastly, this region alone protects Belgrade, the capital of the Kingdom of the Serbians, Croatsians and Slovenes, which would otherwise remain completely exposed to the enemy the first day of the agressich, as was the case in the last war.

Whilst the Western Banat, alone, constitutes a geographical and ethnographical unity bound to Northern Serbia, whilst its Roumanian population has always remained without any numerical importance and has never played any part in the Roumanian civilisation, the Eastern Banat, the Comitatus of Kraso-Szoreny, on the contrary, has always formed an ethnographical, historical and economical unity with Transylvania. Far from claiming this part of the Banat notwithstanding it contains a certain number of Serbian elements, we consider that Roumania has perfectly the right to claim it,

SUMMARY HISTORIC REVIEW.

According to history the Banat was inhabited in ancient times by the Dacians. The Roman colonists having retired before the Goths of Dacia on the right side of the Danube, one must look for the cradle of the Roumanian nation on the right side of the Danube, Therefore, the Roumanians are not autochthonous in the Banat.

The first establishment of the Slavs in these regions is mentioned in the beginning of the VIth century, immediately after the dismemberment of the state of the Huns, In the VIth century, the Slavs who were inhabiting those regions fell under the domination of the Avarians, and, in the IXth, of the Franks, When the Hungarians came in these regions they found autochthonous Slavs inhabiting them who, according to the Hungarian historian Szentklary, were entertaining regular relations with the Slave of the Balkans, In the Xth and the XIth centuries, the Slave fell under the domination of the Hungarians; under the dynasty of the Arpads the Serbian population of these territories played an important part: they cooperated, as an autonomous army, in the conflict which took place between Hungary and Bohemia in the XIIIth century and had at Court their own nobility.

After the battle of Kossovo the Banat received an additional population of Serbians from the Balkans. In conformity with an arrangement concluded with the Kings of Hungary, all the Serbians living in South Hungary, Syrmia and a part of Slavonia came to the Banat under the conduct of their "Despots". In 1414 the King of Hungary granted to Stévan Lazarovitch, Serbian "Despot", the title of Governor of the "Joupania" of Torontal, George Brankovitch, Serbian "Despot", enlarged the domains of the Serbian "Despots" in the "Joupanias" of Tamis and Kraso where he exercised sovereign power. After the destruction of Serbia in 1459 the emigration increased

in such proportions that King Matthew could write to the Pope (the 12th of January 1483) that in the last four years about 200,000 Serbians had passed to Hungary, On the left side of the Danube a new Serbia was formed where the political life of the Serbians was concentrated. The grandson of the “Despot” Brankovitch, Zmal Vouk, is appointed Serbian “Despot” in 1471 by the King of Hungary, with particular autonomous rights: he only depends of the King of Hungary. In case of war the Serbian “Despot” was bound to furnish a “Banderium” of 1000 horsemen,

While the rest of the nobility, even the ban of Croatia, did not furnish more than 400. (“Despotus autem equites mille dare tenebitur” /Corpus juris Hungarici, p.493, 606/.) Generally speaking, up to the battle of Mohacs (1526) the Serbian “Despots” and the Serbian nobility played an important political part in Hungary, The Hungarians retiring more and more to the North before the Turkish advance, the population of the Western and Central Banat acquired a completely Serbian character, On the maps of the XVIth (Lazius) and of the XVIIth centuries (Tserming, Cluverius) the Central and Western Banat are called “Rascia”, which means Serbian country,

The historical and administrative unity of the Banat does not exist. One can find nowhere traces of Roumanians, The Roumanians pretend that the Banat always constituted an historical and administrative unity. This affirmation lacks exactness, Firstly, the Eastern part of the Banat, i.e. the Comitatus of Kraso Szöreny, has formed, with Small Valachia, up to the river Olt a military and administrative unity, a sort of “March” called the Banat of Severin, This division between the Eastern, Western and Central Banat continued to exist during the Turkish period, The Turks formed in 1552 the vilayet of Temisvar from the Central and Western Banat, while the actual Comitatus of Kraso-Szöreny was constituted in the “Banat of Karansebes and Lugos”, whose Ban governed the country in the name of the Prince of Transylvania, with the residence in Karansebes. During the Austrian period the North of the Banat received in 1751 a civil administration, while the Southern Banat became, between 1768 and 1773, the military frontier (Militärgrenze). In 1774 one constituted, with the actual Comitatus of Torontal, the autonomous Serbian district of Velika Kikinda. The actual division, in three Comitatus, dates only from 1873 and 1874 when the military frontier and the autonomous district of Kikinda were abolished. One can see by this that the unity of the Banat has never existed and that the Eastern part of the same has always been intimately bound to Transylvania.

The Serbian Church and the Serbian Privileges, The territories of the Banat, the Batchka and the Taranya comprise eight dioceses with 21 monasteries of which eleven great and six small ones are in the Banat; all these monasteries depended of the Patriarchate of Petch (Ipek) and all of them have been founded by Serbians “Despots” or noblemen¹.

1 The Roumanian Church depended of the Patriarchate of Constantinople and comprised Moldavia, Valachia and North- East Hungary.

When the Turks marched, in 1683, again toward Vienne, a Serbian noble, George Brankovitch, made his appearance with the aim of liberating and uniting all the regions of Southern Hungary and of the Balkans and of constituting a Great Serbia which would extend itself from Triblaf to the Rhodopes.

Leopold I, actuated by the necessity, accepted in appearance this idea and immediately appointed Brankovitch to be "Despot" of the Banat, Syrmia and Herzegovina. The insurrection was crowned with success, and the Turks were thrown back to the other side of the Banat; but Austria did not permit the realisation of Brankovitch's plans; she imprisoned him in 1689 and threw him in the dungeon of Heb (Eger) where he died in 1711.

Later, while she was at war with France, and in order to secure herself against the Turks, Austria invited the patriarch Arsenié III to foment an insurrection against the Turks, promising to the Serbians, in an appeal addressed to them the 6th of April 1690, the free election of the "Volvode" and the right to be governed freely according to their own will ("*Servata imprimis religionis suae eligendique voivode libertate*" Privilege of the 6th April 1690).

On August 21st, the Imperial Chancery proclaimed the privileges which formed the base of the religious and political autonomy of the Serbians in the Banat and the other regions. ("*Volumus ut sub directione et dispositione proprii magistratus eadem gens Rasciana perseverare at antiquas privilegias ajusque consuetudinibus imperturbate frui valeat*")

Privilege of the 20th August 1691. "*Ut gens Rasciana solummodo nostrae caesarae regiaeque Majestatis subiecta ab omni alia dependentia vero, tam comitatum quam dominorum terrestrium exempta maneat*". Privilege of the 31st May 1694), After the peace of Pojarevatz (Passarovitz) in 1748, after Austria had decided to extend her expansion on the Balkans, the Germanisation of the Banat began; nevertheless, the Banat conserved its Serbian character, (See the nomenclature of the localities on the topographical map edited in 1723/25 by order of Eugene of Savoy).

The Austro-Hungarian Government twice recognized the Serbian character of Southern Hungary. In 1790, the Serbian Diet (Sabor) of Temesvar, and in 1848 the Serbian Diet (Sabor) of Karlovtzi adopted a proposition for creating the Serbian Voivodina, including Syrmia, Batschka, the Banat and Barahya, and the Habsburgs adhered to the resolution of the Diet. The "Voivode" Shuplikatz was confirmed the 3rd December 1848 and, on the 6th November 1849, Kraso was joined to the Serbian "Voivodina". (See the enclosed map of the Serbian Voivodina of 1853). But at the end of 1860 the Voivodina was suppressed and, in 1867, she was incorporated to Hungary. Since that period the Hungarians began the Magyarization of the Banat and the other Serbian provinces.

The Roumanians are new-Comers

The history does absolutely not mention the Roumanians in this part of the Banat where the Serbians had developed such a great political and cultural activity. The Roumanians did not descend in the great plain of the Banat before the 18th century, in the same time as the German and Magyar colonists. The orthodox Roumanians of Transylvania and the Eastern Banat were placed under the jurisdiction of the Serbian Archbishops of Karlovitz since the beginning of the

XVIIIth century up to 1864 when an understanding was concluded between the Roumanians and the Court of Vienna according to which the Roumanian church was separated from the Serbian church (Understanding concluded without the Patriarch's knowledge and his concurrence). Of three new dioceses, the Roumanians obtained only one, in Kanansebes, in Eastern Banat, whilst the Serbians conserved their dioceses of Temesvar and Vershatz, which also proves that, though the Austro-Hungarian Government wanted to restrain the Serbians, they would not contest them the Low-Banat.

The Serbian and Roumanian populations.

According to the general census of 1910, there are in the Comitats of Torontal, with Pancevo, 199,750 Serbians,

and 86,937 Roumanians;

and in the Comitats of Tamis with Temesvar:

69,905 Serbians,

and 169,030 Roumanians;

besides, there are in these two Comitats, ie, in the Western and Central Banat, about 41,600 other Slavs (Croatsians, Slovaques, Ruthenes and others) whom the Hungarian statistics mention as others". Consequently, in these two Comitats:

311,255 Slavs,

255,967 Roumanians,

which gives

55,288 more Slavs than Roumanians.

The frontier we are demanding towards Roumania does not concord exactly with the frontier which separates the Comitats of Tamis and Kraso, as the latter leaves to Roumania a part of the Comitats of Tamis, comprising the districts of Busias and Lipova, the whole district of Rekas, with the exception of the village of Bukovac, then two villages (Gertenges and Soad) of the district of Det and gives to our State 13 localities of the district of Zam and 13 others from the district of Nova Modava, belonging to the Comitats of Kraso,

In our part of the Banat thus delimited (See the annexed map) there are, according to the Hungarian statistics:

316,386 Slavs, including those that the Hungarian statistics classify under the heading of “others”, and
 212,396 Roumanians,
 i.e. 103,890 Roumanians less than Slavs,

Notwithstanding all the efforts of the Austrian, and later of the Hungarian Government, who used all allowed and forbidden means for weakening the Serbian character of the Banat by colonizing the same with Germans, Magyars and Roumanians, the principally Serbian character of that part of the Banat which we indicate has been conserved and the number of its Serbian inhabitants is higher than the number of any other nationality, In this part of the Banat there are 194,876 Magyars and 309,889 Germans in a total population of 1,042,058.

We do not take into account the colonised Germans as they have no contact whatever with any point of the German territories and one cannot recognize any right to an independent existence or to the union with Germany to Germans who have been established in these regions against the will of the population of the same and with the only aim to put an obstacle to the national development, i.e. the union of the indigenous Serbians with those from the Kingdom of Serbia,

Moreover, the Serbian character of this part of the Banat can equally be judged by the fact that the Serbians of the Western and Central Banat possess eleven times more land than the Roumanians.

That part of the Banat has also to be considered as a Serbian region in consequence of the fact its intellectual movement is in the hands of the Serbians and that the Serbians, originary from there regions have founded and developed the Serbian literature and given to their nation a very great number of writers and celebrated scientists,

As we have already said it, the German are not taken into consideration in this question of delimitation of the different nationalities. They are too far from their territories, are not established in a continuous territory and have no contact whatever with Germany. As for the Serbians and Roumanians who touch their national territories, they must be delimited, The Serbians are in contact in the South and in the West with their fellow-Countrymen, and the Roumanians in the East.

In consequence the delimitation between Serbians and Roumanians will have to be done in the East, and between Serbians and Hungarians in the North,

The delimitation between Serbians and Hungarians can be easily and equitably obtained. In the Yougoslav part of the Banat there are 194,876 Magyars of whom a great number are State and other functionaries with their families. The Hungarian Government always intentionally appointed Magyars to all posts of functionaries, officials and office servants, with a view of propaganda and control on the rest of the population belonging to other nationalities. All the functionaries and officials of the railways, the roads, the canals and all the gendarmes are Magyars. Their number often reaches 20% of the total population. If one deducts this number

there only remain about 160,000 Magyars permanently established in our Banat, and there are nowhere in compact masses or in contact with the national Magyar territory.

Moreover, we must make the remark that the official Hungarian statistics are notoriously undertain, especially to the detriment of the Slavs. We possess a proof of this in the statistics of the orthodox Serbians published by the Serbian Patriarchate of Karlovtzi, according to which the number of the Serbians in the Comitats of Torontal and Tamis amounts to 323,378 against only 269.651 as indicated in the Hungarian statistics.

The Banat, the Batchka and Syrmia constituted the Serbian Voivodina of 1849, to 1863. The great majority of the population was Serbian, Afraid of this element which was in direct contact with Serbia, the Austrians and the Hungarians used to colonize these parts with foreign elements. Nevertheless the Serbians continued to remain much superior to the Roumanians in the Western and Central Banat, from the numerical and material point of view as well as the civilisation in general.

In view of the facts briefly exposed there nobody can have a stronger national right of the possession of this province than the Serbians. Moreover, the Western and Central Banat cannot be attributed to anybody else, as such an attribution would take away from the kingdom of the Serbians, Croates and Slovenes territories inhabited by a majority of Serbians and one would not guarantee the Capital, Belgrade, which would continue to remain of the frontier of a foreign State; in the same way the valley of the Morava would remain open and exposed to foreign invasions as all hostile incursions of the past have always used this valley for penetrating in Serbia. Lastly the Banat is the only granary of Serbia, and all its economical and commercial life gravitates towards Belgrade.

For all these reasons our State demands that the Western and Central Banat be recognized as a Serbian country. We think it necessary to remark and to have it taken into consideration that in the Roumanian part of the Eastern Banat and in the other territories of Hungary which are claimed by Roumania there remain (according to the statistics) about 70,000 Slavs.

FRONTIERS BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF THE SERBIANS, CROATIANS AND SLOVENES AND THE KINGDOM OF ROUMANIA.

The frontiers between the Kingdom of the Serbians, Croations and Slovenes and the Kingdom of Roumania will have to be such that they fulfil, from the strategic point of the view, at least the following three conditions:

1^o) That the security of the Lower Banat be completely guaranteed.

2^o) That Belgrade, the Capital of the Kingdom, be safe from all eventualities; and

3^o) That the valley of the Morava be assured against any surprise military operations.

An effective defense of the Banat can only be secured by the line of defense which we propose. On the West of this line there is no strategic position of any value for the defense of our country. Moreover, this line which we take as frontier is itself dominated by all positions which are on the East and it fulfils the real conditions of a good frontier only in a very limited measure.

Concerning the conditions which the new frontier must fulfil from the point of view of the security of the defense of Belgrade, it seems to us that they are quite clear and that they do not require any particular commentaries. The Capital of any State represents from all points of view the country's most precious good, and, for this reason, it must be guaranteed against all eventualities. One of the most important conditions of this security is that the Capital must be as far as possible from the frontier.

Lastly, a first-class importance must be attached to the demand concerning the protection of the valley of the Morava,

The valley of the Morava has always been the aim of the most important military operations, directed against Serbia, even to-day this valley presents the same strategic importance which it possessed since many centuries. It is without contestation a natural road of the greatest importance for the operations and communications and, consequently, its security must be guaranteed,

The defences of the valley of the Morava are situated on the positions of the left side of the river Poretch. This line prolonge itself to the North, on the other side of the Danube, and avails itself later of the mountain chains of Veterani-Svinika-Re-shidbanya-Lipova-o/Moris.


If we really wanted to fulfil those three strategic conditions the next frontier ought to be pushed much more to the East of the line which we propose. The frontier ought to pass, at least, along the line Kazan-Sterbetz-Svingika-Kumles - cote 1458 Rechidjbanya-Lipova o/Moris, because this is the natural strategic line of defence on which the defence of our State should be organised.

This line dominates all the positions on the West, and consequently, whoever is master of that line, is equally master, geographically and strategically, of all the other positions in the direction of the Tisza and the Danube; it would, therefore, be natural if the new frontier took this line,

However, we have drawn our frontier much more to the West, following a line less advantageous in consequence of purely political considerations and in order to avoid at any price everything which could trouble the secular friendship which unites us with our neighbours, the Roumanians. What we have exposed proves clearly that the line which we propose as frontier on that side is necessary and justified.

FRONTIER WITH ROUMANIA.**(1: 1,000,000)**

The frontier starts from the point where the three frontiers Serbo-Bulgaro-Roumanian meet, between the village of Aktchar and the mouth of the river Skomlia and mounts the Danube up to opposite the village of Brufica (on the left side of the Danube); from this point it goes to the North, following the crest to the cote 736, passes the river Nera to the West of the cote 596, then passing by the village of Illadia (which remains on the Roumanian side), it continues to the North passing by the village of Goruja (on the Serbian aide) and Izgar (on the Roumanian side); passes the river Berzava, East of the place called Nim Bagsan, From this point the frontier turns to the North West towards the village of Izgar (on the Serbian side) then to Basias, Jhittias, Temes-Bekas, Roman-Bencsek (which remain on the Serbian side) continues to the North, descending to the river Maros between the town of Arad and the village of Zadorlac.





Ferenc Tibor Szávai was born on 5 July 1960 in Enying, Fejér County. He graduated from the Teacher Training Faculty of JPTE in 1983 with a degree in Hungarian History, from the Faculties of Humanities of ELTE and PTE in 1991 with a degree in Political Science, then in 1998 as a German language teacher, and in 2003 as a German Nationality philologist.

Since 1991, she has been conducting research in archives and universities in Budapest, Stuttgart, Heidelberg, Vienna, Zurich, Geneva, Prague and London with the support of the Soros Foundation and the Europa Institut Budapest, Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst Bonn. In 1993 he obtained a PhD in Economic Modernisation.

DAAD scholarship holder at the University of Stuttgart-Hohenheim 1992-1993, 1997 and 2003. Swiss Confederation scholarship holder at the University of Zurich 1995, ÖAD scholarship holder in Vienna 1995. “Lise Meitner” scholarship at the University of Vienna 1998-1999, and research fellow 2000-2001. Awarded “János Bolyai” research fellowship 1999-2002 and “István Széchenyi” fellowship 2002-2005.

He has been active in the scientific community, serving as member and vice-chair of several MTA committees.

On 17 February 2006, he was awarded the title of Doctor of the Academy of Sciences. He was Rector of the University of Kaposvár from 2010 to 2019.

He was awarded the János Bolyai Memorial Medal of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, the FON University of Macedonia, the University of Eperjes and the Vasile Goldis University of Arad. In 2023 he will be awarded the Albert Szenczi Molnár Prize.

Currently, he is a Professor at the Institute of History of the Károli Gáspár University of the Reformed Church in Hungary.