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A Campaign Against Two Enemies Simultaneously?*

The 1658 Military Venture of the Ottomans

INTRODUCTION

The 1658 Ottoman campaign led against Transylvania has been represented in history textbooks as a military operation in which the Ottoman Empire regulated one of its vassals. However, as has been pointed out by a number of studies,¹ contemporary events involved a Venetian aspect. The military operation was organised at the beginning of the above-mentioned year against the republic, and its direction was modified only later, in light of the Transylvanian events and the escalating Celālī rebellions in the eastern half of the empire. The documents pertaining to the food supplies of the Ottoman army testify that the plan of an offensive against Venice was not dismissed; in other words, there may have been a double campaign too. In the following I examine this question from the perspective of Ottoman military leadership with the help of the documents relating to the events of 1658 and the organisation of food supplies of the campaign.

As for the Venetian issue, this war between the republic and the Ottomans between 1645 and 1669 for the possession of Crete is related to overland events of the Dalmatian theatre of war. Venice dominated the region until 1653–1654, and then it transferred its main military operation to the sea, and aimed to gain control over the Dardanelles. They came closest to achieve it in the summer of 1656, when under the leadership of the commander of the Venetian fleet, Barbaro Badoer, they occupied the islands of Tenedos and Limnos, after they had defeated and destroyed the Ottoman fleet in a sea battle near the Dardanelles, and had practically blockaded the strait. As a consequence of these events, in the mid-September of

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¹ B. Szabó – Sudár, “„Independens fejedelem az Portán kívül””, pp. 987–988; B. Szabó, “II. Rákóczi György”, pp. 232–233; Papp, “II. Rákóczi György”, pp. 148–149.

1656, Köprülü Mehmed Pasha gained the position of grand vizier (1656–1661), who started to consolidate the affairs of the empire with a firm hand. First, he managed to avert the immediate danger, namely the rebuilt Ottoman fleet retook the two above mentioned islands in the following year.²

Besides these troop movements, the Ottomans prepared for landed military operations in Dalmatia and taking castles in 1657 with the intention of luring the Venetians away from the sea. However, their enterprise proved an utter failure due to the disorder and rivalry of provincial forces in the region. The Beylerbey of Bosnia, Seydi Ahmed endeavoured to take Split in June 1657, without success. The military action led against Kotor, which was launched at the end of July under the command of Hisim (Varlac) Mehmed, the Sanjak-bey of Shkodra, did not yield any success either because of the “machinations” of ‘Alī Çengizāde, the Sanjak-bey of Herzegovina, who was bribed by the Venetians and, moreover, was personally motivated and interested in the fall of Varlac.³

Meanwhile in 1657 the Ottomans encountered problems in Transylvania as well. The prince, György II Rákóczi (1648–1660) invaded Poland as an ally of the Swedish in order to claim the Polish crown. However, Rákóczi did not ask for permission from Istanbul to proceed with this military operation, so the prospective punishment was carried out by the Porte. Crimean Tatars captured a sizeable part of the Transylvanian army, and Rákóczi was forced to relinquish his power. In November, a new prince, Ferenc Rhédey was the supreme leader of Transylvania (1657–1658), so it seemed that the problem was solved. This also gave way to preparing for the landed operation against the Venetians in the following year.

AGAINST VENICE

At the beginning of 1658, irrespective of the Transylvanian events, the Ottomans were preparing against the Venetians this time with their main military forces, drawing the conclusions of previous year’s failure. Once again, they planned an offensive on land, but, besides the military routes used so far, they wanted a surprise attack on the republic from the direction of Friuli. It meant that they intended to trespass the territory of the Habsburg Monarchy, so, for instance, they would have marched through the estates of Miklós Zrínyi, the Ban of Croatia (1646–1664), while the Tatars would have stepped on the territory of the monarchy from the outskirts of Kanizsa. This solution was raised when planning the Dalmatian military enterprise in the previous year, but the Habsburgs turned down the inquiry to use their territory.⁴

² Setton, *Venice, Austria, and the Turks*, p. 184, 186 and 189; Eickhoff, *Venedig, Wien und die Osmanen*, pp. 138–139.

³ Madunić, *Frontier Elites*, pp. 63–69; Sudár, Balázs: “A hódoltságú pasák”, p. 894.

⁴ The report of the Habsburg resident ambassador in Constantinople, Simon Reniger, Edirne, 6 January 1658, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 129, Konv. 1, fol. 7r–19r. Conf.: Papp, “II. Rákóczi György”, pp. 148–149 and 164; Szilágyi, *Erdélyi országgyűlési emlékek*, vol. 11 (in the following: Szilágyi, *EOE*, vol. 11), pp. 348–350; B. Szabó–Sudár: “„Independens fejedelem””, p. 981.

The Venetians endeavoured to make peace with the Ottomans, who in turn demanded Candia, further islands near Anatolia, the castle of Klis, and war reparations. These quite serious demands that were hardly acceptable for the opponent indicate that at any rate the Turkish were preparing for war. They summoned the military forces of Rumelia and Anatolia to Edirne on 21 March, the spring equinox, and moreover, rumours had it that the Sultan, Mehmed IV (1648–1687) wanted to accompany the army as far as Bosnia. This rumour might have originated from the order issued on 22 January 1658, stipulating that the *kazās* situated in the outskirts of Edirne should bring food contributions in kind (*sürsāt*) to the sultan (and his army) to the field of Edirne.⁵

The Venetians replied to the Turkish demands at the end of February, but the standpoints could not be reconciled, since both parties held on to Crete. Venice did not intend to renounce Candia, though the republic showed willingness to pay 50,000 thalers as annual tax, and an additional sum of 200,000 thalers to the sultan, and two years later they also promised to pay an annual sum of 100,000 thalers. Instead of the fortresses of Chania and Rethymno, the Venetians would have handed over the islands of Tinos and Paros, and they offered another city instead of Klis.⁶

Meanwhile, in February–March 1658, the Turkish had already started to construct bridges over the Rivers Sava and Drava, and they had also begun to prepare the food supplies in Belgrade. Due to the sapping of the territories north of Belgrade, the region witnessed a rise in costs, but even so because of the mild winter it seemed that it was unnecessary to transport so much wood, flour, and forage for the animals to the region. At this time, it could be assumed that the primary aim of the army led by the sultan is to attack some Venetian territory, mostly Kotor or another Dalmatian fortresses (Zadar, Sibenik, Klis, or Split).⁷

However, the Turkish did not call off their foray from the direction of Friuli, and upon this matter they constantly vexed the Habsburg resident in Constantinople, Simon Reniger.⁸ Moreover, insisting on a higher level of official inquiry, they even sent an envoy to Vienna. The Habsburgs regarded the planned Ottoman operation as violating the peace, which could have created wartime circumstance for them in the Italian region. They did not want any “turmoil”, as they needed peaceful times because of the prolonged election of the emperor due to the machinations of French diplomacy that was very solicitous to prevent the Habsburg House from

⁵ The report of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 6 January 1658, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 129, Konv. 1, fol. 7r–19r; BOA MAD 2998, pp. 43–47; BOA D.MKF 27493, pp. 6–10.

⁶ The report of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 28 February 1658, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 129, Konv. 1, fol. 143r–v and 147r–149v.

⁷ The report of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 13 February 1658, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 129, Konv. 1, fol. 66r–79v; The Privy Council to the Emperor, Vienna, 17 March 1658, *Ibid.*, fol. 229r–238r.

⁸ For more information on Simon Reniger, see Zsuzsanna Cziráki’s article in this volume. Furthermore, see: Cziráki, “Habsburg–Oszmán diplomácia a 17. század közepén”. Reniger’s systematic reports within the framework of the project “Everyday Life and Imperial Politics during the Time of the Köprülü Restoration” (OTKA (NKFI) project nr. 109070; principal investigator: Sándor Papp); Papp, “Egy Habsburg-követ”.

remaining on the Holy Roman throne. Finally, by April 1658, the plan to attack the republic from the direction of Friuli was dismissed, and the envoy had to return with a neutral answer with regard to the existing peace.⁹

The grand vizier, Köprülü Mehmed Pasha, hoisted his flag on 25 March, and thus the Ottomans officially declared war. On 29 March, the Kapudan Pasha set sail with thirty galleys and ten further ships were planned to be sent after him or in the direction of Tenedos; moreover, the Ottomans even considered continuing the siege of Candia. All this, however, rather served to distract the Venetians, and it followed from this situation that their real target would be Kotor or Dalmatia.¹⁰

AGAINST VENICE AND/OR TRANSYLVANIA

The direction of the offensive became clear on 9 April 1658, when Yusuf Müteferrika from Belgrade was ordered to prepare the quarters (*menzil*) along the Belgrade–Zadar route. The order also revealed that the Ottomans had been preparing against the Venetians earlier too, and the offensive against Zadar was now in the actual phase of preparation.¹¹

The plans were altered by the events in Transylvania nonetheless. Although the affairs in Transylvania seemed to be settled since the end of 1657, yet everybody was aware at the Porte that the Transylvanians only tried to elevate the situation by electing Rhédey as prince, but in fact they still supported Rákóczi who regarded himself as prince due to his wealth and power. Therefore, the Turkish put pressure on the orders, and started to demand the handover of Jenő (Borosjenő, present day Ineu, in Romania) and some other nearby palisades referring to the alleged assurance of Prince Gábor Bethlen (1613–1629). Moreover, the doubling of their annual tax was also mentioned, and ‘naturally’ the expulsion of Rákóczi and his sons from the principality, and in case it would not happen, the revocation of their right to freely elect their prince.¹² What the Ottomans could achieve was that they gave endorsement to Rákóczi’s claim on once again assuming control over the country, since the Transylvanians did not consider the objection against the person of Rákóczi yet, but they rather envisioned the violation of the borders of Transylvania, the abrogation of their franchise, in other words the transgression of the alleged (but practically non-existent) the so-called “*Ahdnāme of*

⁹ The reports of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 6 January (fol. 7r–19r), and 13 February 1658 (fol. 66r–79v), ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 129, Konv. 1; The Privy Council to the Emperor, Vienna, 17 March 1658, *Ibid.*, fol. 229r–238r.

¹⁰ The reports of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 10 March 1658 (fol. 219r–220r), Constantinople, 12 March 1658 (97v–98v), Constantinople, 1 April 1658 (fol. 98v–100r), ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 129, Konv. 1; Edirne, 3 April 1658 (pp. 380–382), Edirne, 8 April 1658 (pp. 383–384), *EOE*, vol. 11.

¹¹ BOA MAD 2998, p. 103; BOA D.MKF 27491, p. 9 and 11.

¹² The reports of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 6 January (fol. 7r–19r), and 19 March 1658 (fol. 241r–244v), ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 129, Konv. 1.

Süleymān”.¹³ On 22 January, at the Diet of Szászmedgyes (present day Mediaș, in Romania) they took an oath of allegiance to Rákóczi, which was also taken by Rhédey on 29 January.¹⁴

Meanwhile, the Köprülü Mehmed Pasha set out to reinforce Turkish positions in opposition to Rákóczi that mostly affected the eastern borders of the principality. The Romanian voivodes were summoned to Edirne at the end of 1657, and according to some opinions, on account of their participation in the campaign against the Venetians, but in fact the Ottomans wanted to levy further food taxes on them (partly in relation to the campaign as well), and the voivodes had to face being accounted for having supported Rákóczi. Fearful of repercussions, the voivode of Wallachia, Constantin Șerban (1654–1658) did not want to be admitted to the presence of the sultan, as a consequence of which a new voivode, Mihail Radu (Mihnea III, 1658–1659) took the oath of allegiance on 26 January 1658, who was inaugurated to his office, as if he were a beylerbey. Șerban fled to Transylvania, and thus Rákóczi lost one of his allies.¹⁵

A similar fate awaited the other voivode, Gheorghe Ștefan, who was the Voivode of Moldavia (1653–1658). Instead of him, the sultan appointed Gheorghe Ghica (1658–1659) on 18 March, who was already in his sixties and quite reluctant to assume this position. After his dismissal, Ștefan fled toward the direction of Transylvania. In addition to this, the Turkish ordered the Tatars of Crimea now on more than one occasion to be prepared at the borders of Transylvania, and simultaneously, they sent a message to the Transylvanians: if they remove Rákóczi from power, then their country is not demoted to the status of Romanian voivodship.¹⁶

The Transylvanians utterly refused to comply with the *fermān* (royal mandate) that had been sent three times, and they could not convince Rákóczi, who abided by his power, to abdicate. As a consequence, according to history writers, on 13 April, the Ottomans decided to intervene in Transylvanian affairs, though no official document has been uncovered so far that substantiates this claim. It seems

¹³ The alleged “*Ahdnāme of Süleymān*” was a forged document compiled on the basis of a 1528 peace treaty between the Polish and the Ottomans. Papp, “Hungary and the Ottoman Empire”, pp. 70–76; Cf.: Sándor Papp’s article in this volume.

¹⁴ The acts passed at the Diet of Szászmedgyes, 24 January 1658, *EOE*, vol. 11, pp. 350–354; Ferenc Rhédey’s oath of allegiance to György II Rákóczi, Szászmedgyes, 29 January 1658, *Ibid*, p. 357; György II Rákóczi to the Country, s.d., s.l., MNL OL, E190, 30/7447.

¹⁵ The reports of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 12 January (fol. 40r–v), and 13 February 1658 (fol. 66r–79v), ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 129, Konv. 1; B. Szabó – Sudár, “„Independens fejedelem az Portán kívül””, p. 987.

¹⁶ The reports of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 12 January 1658 (40r–v), Edirne, 13 February 1658 (fol. 66r–79v), and Edirne, 19 March 1658 (fol. 241r–244v), ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 129, Konv. 1; The report of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 3 April 1658, *EOE*, vol. 11, pp. 380–382. The Ottomans did not entirely trust the recently elected Romanian voivodes either. This mistrust was mostly expressed in the case of Radu who frequented the governmental circles of Constantinople and after his appointment made contact with not only the Habsburgs but the Venetians as well in order to create an anti-Turkish coalition. Moreover, after a while Rákóczi could gain information from the Porte thanks to Radu. Păun, “Belső ellenségek”, p. 70; B. Szabó – Sudár, “„Independens fejedelem az Portán kívül””, p. 992; Andreescu, “The Relations”, pp. 166–168.

that the Turkish hesitated regarding the campaign, and the following day they informed Reniger that the peace with the Habsburgs should be maintained and war ought to be started against Venice and Transylvania.¹⁷

Irrespective of these developments, the people of Transylvania was offered the possibility of appeasement, if they send Rákóczi and the two dismissed voivodes, who fled to Transylvania, to the Porte. The Ottomans regarded Transylvania as a supplementary theatre of war, and in case of intervention, they reckoned that the Ottoman army could be divided at Belgrade: one part could march against the Venetian interests, while the other part could carry out manoeuvres in Transylvania, supported by the Turks from Buda, Eger, Temesvár (present day Timișoara, in Romania), and Silistra, by the Tatar Khan and perhaps by the Cossacks. This part of the Ottoman army, even without the Tatars, could have numbered 25–30,000 soldiers, so even without the main army, it seemed sufficient to reckon with Rákóczi.¹⁸

As the next step of preparing for the campaign, the grand vizier solemnly entered into his encampment on 29 April 1658. According to Reniger's reports, the agha of the janissaries arrived on that day with 17,000 janissaries, who were stationed in the region of the Dardanelles.¹⁹ This number shows how well-informed the Habsburg resident was, as 18,786 soldiers are mentioned in an acquittance roll²⁰ that is sufficient to embark on a military enterprise of great magnitude, but seems to be too numerous to regulate a vassal state. However, far less janissaries participated in the campaign, approximately 6–7,000 soldiers²¹ that did not count immoderate for an intervention in Transylvania. (In comparison: approximately 10,000 janissaries were present in the 1663–1664 campaign.)²²

Generally, people expected the army to begin its march toward the end of May, but more cautious estimates did not rule out the end of June and that the grand vizier may spend the winter in Belgrade. Nevertheless, it seemed certain that the sultan would not accompany the army.²³

The delay might have been caused by the tardy assembling of the Anatolian part of the army. The reason for this tardiness was that the Celālīs rebelled against

¹⁷ The report of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 22 April 1658, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 130, Konv. 1, fol. 98r–108r; B. Szabó – Sudár, „„Independens fejedelem az Portán kívül””, p. 988; Hammer, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, vol. 6, p. 34; Behcetî, *Târîh-i Sülâle-i Köprülü*, 35a.

¹⁸ The report of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 3 April 1658, *EOE*, vol. 11, pp. 380–382; The report of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 8 April 1658, *ibid*, pp. 383–384; The report of Giovanni Battista Balarino, Pera, 11 April 1658, and a report from Edirne, 22 April 1658, Óváry, *A Magyar Tud. Akadémia*, p. 145; The report of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 22 April 1658, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 130, Konv. 1, fol. 98r–108r; B. Szabó, “II. Rákóczi György”, p. 234.

¹⁹ The report of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 19 May 1658, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 130, Konv. 1, fol. 137r–150v.

²⁰ BOA KK 1949, p. 51.

²¹ Hadnagy, “Az oszmán hadsereg”, p. 198.

²² Kolçak, “Yeniçeriler”, pp. 221–223; *idem*, “XVII. Yüzyıl Askerî Gelişimi”, p. 159.

²³ Johann Rudolf Schmid von Schwarzenhorn to Ken‘ân Pasha, Vienna, 27 May 1658 (fol. 161r–162v), and The report of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 28 May 1658 (fol. 164r–166r), ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 130, Konv. 1.

the person of the grand vizier who consolidated the empire with an iron fist and because of this; he did not enjoy great popularity. Notwithstanding this, the disgruntled Celālīs turned to the Pasha of Aleppo, Ābāza Hasan, who came from one of the most influential families of the age. Moreover, Ābāza Hasan sought the opportunity to quit scores with political circles of the Porte on account of the execution of his benefactor, Grand Vizier Ibşir Mustafa Pasha (1654–1655). Most of the governors of Anatolia joined him and Anatolian forces refused to march to Edirne unless the ruler removes the grand vizier from his position.²⁴

At the same time, the military route of Belgrade–Banja Luka–Knin–Zadar was designated, along which the supply lines were intended to be financed from *sürsāt* taxes of the vilayets of not only Belgrade and Kanizsa, but also of Buda and Temesvár. Nearly two-third of the food procured had to be accumulated in Belgrade, while one-third in the castles of Temesvár and its vicinity, and this latter part of the food had to be prepared for an immediate transport to Belgrade. In addition to this, it had to be reckoned with that, like the plans of 1657, the Turkish would attack more than one fortress in Dalmatia simultaneously, Zadar, Sibenik, Klis, or perhaps Split too.²⁵ It seems that the question of Transylvania could still be regarded as a supplementary military operation.

In the meantime, the solution of the Transylvanian problem started on a local level too. Setting out from his headquarters, the Pasha of Buda, Gürcī Ken‘ān (1655–1656, 1656–1658, 1658–1659, 1663) arrived in Szolnok with his army at the end of April 1658. From there, he travelled to Gyula. For the time being, however, he only reached and lodged in Mezőmegyer (near the castle of Gyula), but, as part of putting pressure on the locals, he ordered to harass Lippa (present day Lipova, in Romania) and the vicinity of the River Maros in the borderland.²⁶

The plan of Transylvanian intervention had caused friction between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans. Vienna considered the Ottoman’s demand on Jenő as an endeavour to change the borders of the principality and to violate the existing peace treaty. Because of this, in order to defend the Kingdom of Hungary, the Habsburgs planned to send a task force under the command of Prince Annibale Gonzaga, privy counsellor, to the western borders of the principality (though the available resources would have allowed for the recruitment of an army consisting of only several thousand soldiers), and they made arrangements to reinforce Kassa (present day Košice, in Slovakia). At the same time, the Ottomans feared a Habsburg intervention to help Rákóczi. Although the parties assured each other after March, many times that they would adhere to the conditions of the treaties, the

²⁴ The report of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 28 April 1658 (fol. 79r–v and 82r), and Edirne, 19 May 1658 (fol. 137r–150v), ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 130, Konv. 1; B. Szabó – Sudár, “„Independens fejedelem az Portán kívül””, p. 989.

²⁵ BOA MAD 2998, p. 140, 147 and pp. 159/1–2.

²⁶ Ferenc Gyulai to György II Rákóczi, Várad, 27 May 1658, MNL OL, E190, 30/7462, and *EOE*, vol. 11, pp. 393–395; Mihály Thúry to Mihály Teleki, Borosjenő, 4 May 1658 (pp. 178–179), and Borosjenő, 17 May 1658 (pp. 190–191), Gergely, *Teleki Mihály*.

frictions originating from mutual mistrust ceased with the onset of summer, since none of the parties were interested in transgressing the existing peace.²⁷

After the Transylvanians had not fulfilled the agreed conditions, the sultan gave an order to the Pasha of Buda on 10 June 1658, that if he ran out of the means to solve the problem, then he had to invade Transylvania. The military plan was given: Ken'ān Pasha would have attacked with the other border-zone Turkish troops from the direction of Temesvár, the Voivode of Wallachia along with the Pasha of Silistra from Wallachia, while the Voivode of Moldavia with the Khan of the Tatars would have done so from the direction of Moldavia.²⁸ The Pasha of Buda arrived in Gyula in early July, from where he departed in the second half of the month in accordance with the above-mentioned mandate. On 21 June, soldiers from Jenő raided his scouts, the unit of the Sanjak-bey of Gyula, as a consequence of which Ken'ān Pasha crossed the Maros and moved to Lippa. It seemed that he intended to besiege the castle of Jenő.²⁹ However, the arrival of one of the key actors of this plan, Mehmed IV Girāy, khan of the Crimean Khanate (1641–1644, 1654–1666) proved to be problematic. The major part of the Tatar army, which was supposed to have departed already in May, had to return because of the internal conflict of the Cossacks³⁰ and hence the security of the Crimean Khanate. After pouring oil on troubled waters, the Tatars rose and set off again only in the second half of June or in the first half of July, so their main army could not be expected to arrive until the beginning or the middle of August.³¹

The Ottoman army left Edirne on 24 June 1658 eventually, without the majority of the Anatolian army, because Ābāza Hasan Pasha completely refused to appear in Edirne. The exact objective of the campaign was unknown or at least not made public yet, but there were still rumours that grand vizier would spend the

²⁷ The Privy Council to the Emperor, Vienna, 27 March 1658, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 129, Konv. 1, fol. 261r–v and 269r–279r; Johann Rudolf Schmid von Schwarzenhorn to Gürcü Ken'ān Pasha, Vienna, 27 May 1658 (fol. 161r–162v), and the report of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 28 May 1658, (fol. 164r–166r), ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 130, Konv. 1.

²⁸ The report of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 24 June 1658, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 130, Konv. 1, fol. 182r–186v; Simon Szaplóczay to the citizens of Beszterce, Majszin, 3 June 1658, Hurmuzaki, *Documente privitoare*, vol. 15/2, pp. 1280–1281.

²⁹ Mihály Thúry to Mihály Teleki, Borosjenő, 22 June 1658, Gergely, *Teleki Mihály*, p. 214; György II Rákóczi to Zsuzsanna Lórántffy, Jánosd, 24 June 1658, MNL OL, E190, 30/7342.

³⁰ The disagreement between Ivan Vyhovsky, the successor of Bohdan Khmelnytsky (who deceased in August 1657) hetman (1648–1657), and his pro-Russian opposition (Martyn Pushkar, the polkovnik (colonel) of Poltava regiment and Yakiv Barabash, Otaman of the Zaporozhian Sich after B. Khmelnytsky's death) led to a military conflict. The Tatars helped Vyhovsky for sake of the security of the Crimea, and participated in the Battle of Poltava fought between the two parties that brought a Pyrrhic victory to the hetman on 11 June 1658. Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, p. 234; Plokyh, *Ukraine and Russia*, p. 276; Cf.: the entries of *Internet Encyclopedia of Ukraine*.

³¹ Constantin Postelnik to György II Rákóczi, Bucharest, 16 June 1658, MNL OL, E190, 37/9215; György Rákóczi to Zsuzsanna Lórántffy, Gyulafehérvár, 11 June 1658, MNL OL, E190, 30/7339; The report of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 28 May 1658, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 130, Konv. 1, fol. 164r–166r; The report of Giovanni Battista Ballarino, Edirne, 31 July 1658, Óváry: *A Magyar Tud. Akadémia*, p.148.

winter in Belgrade that could be interpreted as a sign of a longer military enterprise.³²

The intention to lead an offensive against Dalmatia was not dismissed either which is substantiated by the experience of the Habsburg envoy, Johann Friedrich Metzger, who was sent from Vienna to the Pasha of Buda. Metzger travelled from Buda to Lippa on 18–27 June 1658, and then he travelled from Buda to Baja by ship, crossed the River Tisza at Becse (present day Бечеј (Bečej), in Serbia), and finally met Ken‘ān Pasha at Lippa. While on his journey, Metzger heard that the Turkish built a pontoon-bridge over the Sava and the Danube, they dug wells at Valkóvár (present day Vukovar, in Croatia) and Tárnok (Felsőtárnok, present day Tovarnik, in Croatia), and they prepared locations suitable for encampment near Eszék (present day Osijek, in Croatia) and other places. On the basis of these pieces of information, Metzger drew the conclusion that the primary objective of the grand vizier is Dalmatia that was known among the Turkish soldiers too, but they were forbidden to speak about it to anybody on pain of death.³³ A similar conclusion was drawn by Julius Heinrich Wogin, the Habsburg envoy sent to the grand vizier one month later, who arrived in Belgrade on 12 August. During his journey, he gained pieces of information not only about the well-boring of the Turkish, but he personally witnessed wells and meticulously cleaned wells.³⁴

The Turkish army advanced at the “usual speed”, and it reached the first major rest area in Filibe (present day Пловдив (Plovdiv) in Bulgaria) already on 1 July. Meanwhile, according to the information the Habsburgs gathered, the grand vizier decided to march to Belgrade unconventionally without additional, major resting intervals, as Köprülü Mehmed Pasha gained unfavourable news, namely that Ádám I Batthyány, captain-general of the border zone across Kanizsa (1633/1637–1659) and Miklós Zrinyi, the Ban of Croatia vanquished the Pasha of Bosnia, and Rákóczi was besieging Temesvár. Although the latter news items proved to be unfounded hearsay, the Ottoman army’s forced march is also substantiated by a note in a rüznâmçe-defter (register of daily income and expenditure). This designated the 15-menzil distance between Sofia and Belgrade in 15 days, on the basis of which it can be assumed that the grand vizier may have received some bad news already in the vicinity of Sofia.³⁵

This was probably the report on the defeats of the Pasha of Buda at the hands of Rákóczi’s forces on 5 July. Rákóczi stayed in the castle of Jenő and in order to

³² The report of Giovanni Battista Ballarino, Pera, 21 June 1658, Óváry: *A Magyar Tud. Akadé-mia*, p. 148; The report of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 24 June 1658, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 130, Konv. 1, fol. 168r–170r.

³³ Johann Friedrich Metzger to Annibale Gonzaga, Szakálos, 16 July 1658, (fol. 27r–38r), and the report of Johann Friedrich Metzger on his visit to the Pasha of Buda, Vienna, 25 July 1658, (fol. 19r–26r), ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 130, Konv. 2.

³⁴ The report of Julius Heinrich Wogin, Kesekfalu, 5 September 1658, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 130, Konv. 2, fol. 126r–135r. For more information on Julius Heinrich Wogin, see: Szabados, “Egy tolmács diplomáciai küldetésben”.

³⁵ The report of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 1 July 1658, (fol. 1r–2r), and Edirne, 21 July 1658, (fol. 7r–9v), ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 130, Konv. 2; BOA KK 1949, p. 32.

draw the ‘attention’ of the Pasha of Buda away from the castle, he had the palisades at Arad set on fire. Ken‘ān Pasha saw this and left Lippa with his army, and clashed with Rákóczi’s forces at Pálülése (present day Păuliș (in Hungarian Ópálos), in Romania), but was defeated. Several dignitaries among the fleeing Turkish, including the Sanjak-bey of Esztergom and the Pasha of Temesvár drowned in the River Maros.³⁶ It seemed more and more probable that the Turkish forces along the border cannot solve the situation.

When designing the rest of the campaign, the grand vizier had to consider not only this defeat, but also the escalation of the Celālī uprising, because the resistance of Ābāza Hasan developed into open rebellion, and his army moved forward as far as Bursa. This may have been the cause why Köprülü Mehmed sent 2,400 janissaries from Sofia back to the capital in mid-July.³⁷

A mandate arrived on 14 July and issued that they had to come up with plans of moving into Transylvania in light of the actual situation, and to make further steps to lengthen and finalise the rest areas previously designated along the Belgrade–Lippa route towards Jenő as well as to supply them with food and to keep them prepared.³⁸ However, even at this point it did not seem evident in which direction the army would begin its march at Belgrade, and the soldiers only knew that they move to Zadar or Transylvania.³⁹

Many dignitaries supported the war against Dalmatia at the sultan’s court, namely that Köprülü Mehmed Pasha should settle the Venetian affair once and for all, and they regarded the case of Transylvania as marginal. However, purportedly, all of them agreed that, whatever happens, the grand vizier must return victorious, lest he should lose his head.⁴⁰

AGAINST TRANSYLVANIA

The Ottoman army arrived in Belgrade on 26 July, where it spent a bit more than two weeks. The turning point regarding the objective of the campaign came about on 6 August, when the grand vizier received a message from Edirne via a haseki or one of the confidants of the sultan that he ought to complete his mission within 40 days and return home. Köprülü Mehmed was ordered to return home because of the ever-spreading uprising of Ābāza Hasan, as the Pasha of Aleppo had extended his rule to the whole of Anatolia by this time; moreover, Topal Sarı

³⁶ György II Rákóczi to Zsuzsanna Lórántffy, Gyula, 11 July 1658, MNL OL, E190, 30/7348; Bethlen, *Erdély története*, pp. 35–36; Kraus, *Erdélyi krónika*, p. 311; Szakály, *Szalárdi János*, pp. 411–413; Doberdoi Bánlaky, *A magyar nemzet*, vol. 16, p. 118; Szabados, “Adalékok”, pp. 292–319.

³⁷ The report of Marin Görög, s.l., 21 July 1658, MNL OL, E143, 14. t, fol. 88 and *EOE*, vol. 11, pp. 405–406; The report of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 21 July 1658, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 130, Konv. 2, fol. 7r–9v.

³⁸ BOA MAD 2998, p. 157/1; BOA D.MKF, 62/67.

³⁹ The report of Marin Görög, s.l., 21 July 1658, MNL OL, E143, 14. t, fol. 88 and *EOE*, vol. 11, pp. 405–406.

⁴⁰ The report of Giovanni Battista Ballarino, Edirne, 8 August 1658, Óváry: *A Magyar Tud. Akadémia*, p. 148.

Ken‘ān Pasha, who had been sent to stop him in mid-July, also joined forces with him. The rebels demanded the heads of Köprülü Mehmed and the grand mufti who issued fatwa on them, and they threatened to set Scutari (Üsküdar) and Constantinople on fire unless their demand was fulfilled.⁴¹

The content of the message sent to the grand vizier is not known exactly, but if Transylvania was named as the matter to be taken care of, then it can be interpreted as an order. If no concrete direction was set, then the expanding uprising and the deadline make it evident what the real objective of the campaign was. The castle of Jenő, and in other words, Transylvania became the new target, as the problem was more acute here than elsewhere, but at the same time it seemed to be manageable in the given time frame; moreover, Köprülü, who had already gathered a lot of enemies, needed some kind of success in order to keep his position.

Pressed by time, the grand vizier also thought about reconciliation with Rákóczi (even if presumably only seemingly), and invited the prince to his camp so that Rákóczi could beg for mercy, who, however, refused to appear in front of the pasha, because he was informed by his Turkish supporters that the grand vizier was soon to be dismissed. The invitation might have been a ruse either, since Köprülü (due to his antipathy toward the person of the prince too) wanted to bring the prince to the sultan, and Rákóczi’s capture might have been a tangible result, if there had not been enough time to carry out a successful military campaign. It was after this that they decided that they would demand the food tax in kind (*sürsāt*) already in money from the other sanjaks of the Bosnia vilayet, and it was then that they ordered to beylerbey of Bosnia, Seydī Ahmed to accompany the army, who was originally commissioned, like the Pasha of Kanizsa, for military operations in Dalmatia.⁴²

In the following days the army “moved” to the area south from Pancsova (present day Панчево (Pančevo), in Serbia), and they waited for the news about the Tatars there. On 11 August, they started to transport the equipment of the janissaries to Temesvár, and on 15 August, the army also set off to that location, after the news about the incursion of the Wallachians reinforced with the Tatars had arrived.⁴³

Contrary to various rumours, Köprülü Mehmed Pasha arrived in Temesvár only on 20 August, whence he departed with his army towards Jenő on 24 August,

⁴¹ The report of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 5 August 1658, (fol. 64r–67v), and the report of Simon Reniger, Edirne, August 1658 (presumably after 11 August), (fol. 101r–102v and 105r) ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 130, Konv. 2; The report of Giovanni Battista Ballarino. Edirne, 1 November 1658. Óváry: *A Magyar Tud. Akadémia*, pp. 149–150; Hammer, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, vol. 6, p. 37.

⁴² The report of Julius Heinrich Wogin, Kesekfalu, 5 September 1658, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 130, Konv. 2, fol. 126r–135r; Szilágyi, *Rozsnyai Dávid*, pp. 170–173; B. Szabó – Sudár, “„Independens fejedelem az Portán kívül””, p. 992; Bethlen: *Erdély története*, pp. 176–180; Hadnagy, “Köprülü Mehmed”, pp. 109–110. Formerly as the Pasha of Eger, Köprülü had bad relations with Prince György Rákóczi I (1630–1648), and from that point on he held grudges against the Rákóczi family.

⁴³ The report of Julius Heinrich Wogin, Kesekfalu, 5 September 1658, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 130, Konv. 2, fol. 126r–135r; Silahdar, *Silahdar Tarihi*, vol. 1, p. 123; BOA MAD 2998, p. 157/2; BOA KK 1949, p. 41.

since he received news about the Tatars led by Mehmed IV Girāy. The Khan did not follow the original plans and invaded the territory of the principality not from Moldavia but from the direction of Wallachia through the Bodza Pass (present day Buzău Pass, in Romania) on 19 August. As part of a pincer movement, the Turkish party moved into the vicinity of Arad, arrived near Jenő on 27 August, and began the preparations for the siege of the castle.⁴⁴

The siege started on 30 August, the defenders, led by Captain László Újlaky, capitulated after a few days, and the Turkish occupied the dilapidated castle of Jenő without fight on 2 September. Then, in the name of the sultan, Köprülü Mehmed Pasha appointed Ákos Barcsai among the members of the delegation that had just arrived from the principality as the new prince on 14 September (disregarding the freedom of the Transylvanians and customary law). In addition to this, the annual tax of Transylvania was raised to 40,000 golden forints and the Transylvanians had to contribute to the war costs with an additional sum of 500,000 thalers as well as the castles of Lugos (present day Lugoj, in Romania) and Karánsebes (present day Caransebes, in Romania) had to be handed over to the Turkish. The principality was in a new situation; it was almost demoted to the status of Romanian voivodships that was represented by not only the form of the appointment, but also by the fact that Barcsai was appointed not by an *ahdnāme* but very probably only by a *berāt*.⁴⁵

Although Rákóczi could not be neutralised, but the 1658 campaign ended relatively successfully for the Turkish, since they could occupy a couple of far-from-formidable fortresses. The grand vizier depicted this result as a triumph of tremendous magnitude in order to keep his position, but in fact he was also lucky in achieving this, because allegedly, the Ottomans had not known the size of the enemy forces, and if the Transylvanians had properly prepared for the defense of Jenő, then under the pressure of time, the Turkish army may not have sufficient time to seize the castle. According to the Turkish prisoners of Rákóczi, the defenders of the castle should have persisted for six days and then an entirely new situation would have emerged.⁴⁶

CONCLUSIONS – DOUBLE CAMPAIGN?

On the basis of what have been said so far, the direction of the 1658 Ottoman campaign underwent several modifications due to the change of circumstances. While modifying the objectives of the campaign, there were many signs suggesting that quite unconventionally, a double campaign may be an option as well. The original plans of attacking Venice was overwritten by Rákóczi's return, and the prince's

⁴⁴ The report of Julius Heinrich Wogin, Kesekfalú, 5 September 1658, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 130, Konv. 2, fol. 126r–135r; The report of Giovanni Battista Ballarino, Edirne, 1 November 1658, Óváry: *A Magyar Tud. Akadémia*, pp. 149–150; B. Szabó, “II. Rákóczi György”, p. 251.

⁴⁵ Papp, “II. Rákóczi György”, pp. 168–169; Papp, “Amikor a nagyvezír választott”, pp. 128–129.

⁴⁶ György II Rákóczi to Zsuzsanna Lórántffy, Várad, 5 September 1658, MNL OL, E190, 30/7369.

resistance made the Turkish consider a war against Transylvania parallel to the Venetian one. However, when designating the real target, different viewpoints emerged in the court of the sultan too, so practically they tried to solve the two problems simultaneously. They calculated that while the Turkish troops near the borders (those that were under the command of the Pashas of Buda, Temesvár, Eger, and Silistra), the armies of the two Romanian voivodeships and the Tatars with occasional Cossack or Polish assistance would be able to deal with the Transylvanian issue, the main Ottoman army could attack Venetian interest through Dalmatia.

They contributed great importance to the latter until the last moment. The deployment and supply line had already been made by the end of May, and they thought that the *sürsāt* of the vilayets of Temesvár and Buda would also contribute to supply the quarters along the route. Moreover, Belgrade was intended to serve as a hub for the storage of the majority of the food acquired. Similarly, to the 1657 plans, they would have attacked three or four castles (Zadar, Sibenik, Klis, and Split) simultaneously that may explain the initially high number of janissaries (18,786 soldiers) too.

At the beginning of July, due to the worsening of the Transylvanian situation, it seemed that the local forces were not able to solve the Rákóczi issue. It was then that they finalised the plan of the main army's invasion of Transylvania, which was seen necessary in light of the above said because the Tatars were considerably lagging behind schedule due to the internal conflicts of the Cossacks, and the newly appointed voivodes could not be trusted either. After his arrival in Belgrade, the grand vizier who was in a politically tight situation wanted to make a decision by pondering the evolved situation. His decision was finally enforced by the order recalling him because of the Celālī uprising. Regarding the acute situation, he had to solve the issue of Transylvania, and, as Giovanni Battista Ballarino, the Venetian Secretary at Constantinople, wrote in one of his reports in early October, the uprising overthrew the plans devised against Dalmatia.⁴⁷

It was also planned that the grand vizier should spend the winter in Belgrade, which was rumoured even before the beginning of the campaign, and which was later substantiated too.⁴⁸ The circumstances of levying and using the taxes (*nüzül*, *iştirā*) covering the costs of acquiring food may also indicate this or a presumably prolonged or winter campaign: both of these taxes were collected in kind in the sanjaks along the Danube, most of which was intended to be stored in Belgrade. Approximately two-third of it was not used, and around half of it was reshipped to the Danube ports, as was the case with almost the entire stockpile purchased from the Kanizsa vilayet.⁴⁹ These amounts might have covered the winter stay in Belgrade or the food supply of a winter campaign. If there were such ideas, they could not have been realised because of the Celālīs.

⁴⁷ The report of Giovanni Battista Ballarino, Edirne, 7 October 1658, Óváry: *A Magyar Tud. Akadémia*, p. 149.

⁴⁸ The report of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 25 September 1658, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 130, Konv. 2, fol. 171r–172v.

⁴⁹ BOA MAD 2998, p. 144 and 158.

In relation to what have been said thus far, the *rúznámçse* documents may bear relevance too. When documenting the incomes and expenses of the campaign, they indicated them with the expression of “*der sefer-i hümayün*” (“on the grand lord’s campaign”) as well, which was in some cases supplemented with naming the territory against which the campaign was launched. Until the beginning of August, only the words of “*Rümeli*” (“Rumelia”) or “*garb*” (“west”) appear in the documents related to the 1658 campaign (in 1657 the word “*garb*” can be read regarding the military enterprises against Dalmatia and Kotor), which may also indicate that the primary aim or main theatre of war of the campaign would have been Dalmatia. The expression “*Erdel*” (“Erdély”) had appeared in a note dated to 2 August for the first time, and then after 6 August until the end of the campaign only this word is mentioned.⁵⁰ In other words, the campaign against Transylvania (Erdély) was unambiguously named so from that day on when the messenger from Edirne brought the message for the grand vizier to solve the issues within 40 days. Consequently, the *rúznámçse* documents serve as points of reference if one intends to judge when the Transylvanian intervention was given priority ultimately.

Last but not least, let me quote from one of the great contemporary opponents of the Ottomans, the excellent general and scholar of the art of war, the above mentioned Miklós Zrínyi, whose opinion might also be used as an argument for the possibility of the double campaign: “I wonder, however, that the Turkish start two wars simultaneously. It has not been known in our history so far, their religion does not allow for it either, and sensibly no politics can endorse it. Maybe, they do not call the Transylvanian issue war, and hope and imagine that their ambition can be satisfied at their own pleasure and without peril.”⁵¹

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⁵⁰ BOA KK 1947, pp. 80–114; BOA KK 1949, pp. 6–50; BOA KK 1950, pp. 6–62; BOA D.BRZ 47/1–3 and 10–12; 48/1 and 13–14.

⁵¹ In Hungarian: “Csodálkozom azonban, hogy a török egyszerre két háborúba kezd. Ilyesmiről nem tud történelmük, és vallásuk sem engedi, meg a józan politika sem vallja. Lehet, hogy ezt az erdélyi ügyet nem nevezi háborúnak, s azt reméli és képzei, hogy nagyravágását kénye- kedve szerint és veszedelem nélkül kielégítheti.” Miklós Zrínyi to János Rucsecs, s.l., 1658, Kovács, *Zrínyi Miklós*, pp. 707–710.

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