


New Approaches to the Habsburg–Ottoman Diplomatic Relations

Edited by
Sándor Papp and Gellért Ernő Marton



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New Approaches to the
Habsburg–Ottoman Diplomatic Relations

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Sándor Papp

New Approaches to the Habsburg–Ottoman Diplomatic Relations

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Sándor PAPP and Gellért Ernő MARTON

SZTE BTK
Department of Medieval and Early Modern Hungarian History
Szeged
2021

This publication was supported by the MTA–SZTE Research Group of the Ottoman Age, ELKH (TKP2020 Thematic Excellence Programme 2020 NKFIH-1279-2/2020).

ELKH | Eötvös Loránd
Kutatási Hálózat



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ISSN 2786-2755
ISBN 978-963-306-822-9

Published by the
SZTE BTK
Department of Medieval and Early Modern Hungarian History
Responsible editor: Sándor Papp
Cover design: Gábor Annus
Prepress preparation: Péter Ákos Ferwagner

Cover image by
Giovanni Giacomo de Rossi: Vienna assediata dalle Armi Ottomane gli 12 Luglio 1683 [...] (post 1683, detail)
<https://polona.pl/item/bitwa-pod-wiedniem-inc-vienna-assediata-dalle-ar-m-i-ottomane-gli-12-luglio-1683,NTkxMjg5Mg/0/#info:metadata>

Printed by
Innovariant Ltd., Algyő
Responsible leader: György Drágán
www.innovariant.hu

Table of Contents

SÁNDOR PAPP	
Preface	7
SÁNDOR PAPP	
Temporary Appointments by the Sultan – A New Method for Ensuring Succession in Transylvania before the Death of the Ruling Prince	11
ZOLTÁN PÉTER BAGI	
The Story of Johann von Pernstein’s regiment	45
GERGELY BRANDL – JÁNOS SZABADOS	
The Burden of Authority – The Preparations for the Ambassadorial Mission to Constantinople of Baron Johann Ludwig von Kuefstein in 1628	63
KRISZTINA JUHÁSZ	
On the Margins of the Second Treaty of Szőny. Data for the History of the Signing of the Treaty of Szőny in 1642	87
SZABOLCS HADNAGY	
A Campaign Against Two Enemies Simultaneously? – The 1658 Military Venture of the Ottomans	107
ZSUZSANNA CZIRÁKI	
Ambassador or Rogue? The Labyrinth of Habsburg Diplomacy in the Light of a Murder in Constantinople	125
KUTSE ALTIN	
Letters from Tayyib Gökbilgin’s Personal Archives: László Rásonyi	151
SÁNDOR PAPP – GELLÉRT ERNŐ MARTON	
A Bibliography: Works made within the framework of the ongoing project of MTA–SZTE Research Group of the Ottoman Age (ELKH) between 2017 and 2021	177
Summaries of the Articles	185
Authors of the volume	189

SÁNDOR PAPP

Preface

This volume contains articles of the members of the MTA–SZTE Research Group of the Ottoman Age (Eötvös Loránd Research Network) and some dear colleagues, who work with us in a close contact. The articles are presenting the results of their own research.

The Research Group of the Ottoman Age was founded almost in 2017, and focuses on medieval and early modern Ottoman–Hungarian and Habsburg diplomatic history based on international examples. It has been greatly inspired by the influential research and publications of Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, who has written about Ottoman, Crimean Tatar, and Polish relations; and Hans Peter Alexander Theunissen, who presented the almost complete Venetian–Ottoman diplomatic contact based on the political and commercial treaties in his dissertation. The composer of these lines has worked on a special area of Hungarian–Ottoman relations, published the sultan’s appointment documents and princely confirmation diplomas used for the confirmation of the Transylvanian voivodes and princes in the period of 1528–1606. He continued this research until 1739, and the result of it a yet unpublished volume about the same topic, which contains the transcriptions and translations of the basic documents (‘ahdnāmes, berāts, nāmes, fermāns) into Hungarian and German languages.

These works can be seen as precursors to the current project. In it, the texts of the peace treaties between the Ottoman Empire and the medieval Hungarian state, or later the Vienna-based Habsburg Monarchy that replaced it in eastern diplomacy, are processed from the first examples in the 15th century up to 1739.

A few years ago, when I collected documents for the Ottoman–Transylvanian diplomatic relationship found almost untouched material about the inauguration system of the princes of Transylvania. In addition to this, I discovered a new diplomatic process in the case of Transylvania. According to the new system, the young princes were appointed in the life of their predecessors, actually their fathers by the sultan’s temporary confirmation. This new type of confirmation was not enough to rule the dominion, on the contrary, only bestowed upon the recipient an assurance of his right to inherit the throne prior to the death of their fathers.

The second study, “The Story of Johann von Pernstein’s regiment” is a contribution of the military historian and chief archivist Zoltán Péter Bagi. His main research field is the “Türkische Kriege” in Hungary, especially the Long Turkish War (1591/93–1606). He examines in this volume an infantry regiment hired and led by Johann von Pernstein. The mercenaries served and fought on the theatres of war of the Kingdom of Hungary in 1597 for just a few months, because their Obrist Pernstein was killed on 30 September.

The third contribution is a common article of two young scholars, Gergely Brandl's and János Szabados's. The main goal of the essay is to present a case study about the ambassadorial mission of the Habsburgs led by Baron Johann Ludwig von Kuefstein, which was sent to ratify the documents in Constantinople. It discusses the early period of the mission from the request of the emperor (18 November 1627) until the arrival of the delegation (18 November 1628) in the Ottoman capital. After briefly touching upon general surveys, the study describes the various problems that the baron had to face during the appointment of the personnel for the mission.

The fourth study was written by Krisztina Juhász, who is interested in the diplomatic negotiations taking place along the Ottoman–Hungarian frontier during the first half of the 17th century. In this article she focused on the so-called Second Peace Treaty of Szőny in 1642. She highlighted one node of the communication network during the aforementioned negotiation. She presented the communication channel through the letters of two members of the Esterházy family (Dániel Esterházy, who was a member of the delegation, and his elder brother, Miklós Esterházy, a remarkable Palatinus of the Hungarian Kingdom). Whilst Krisztina Juhász concentrates on the correspondence of the Esterházys, she provides valuable information to the negotiations itself.

As a fifth study, Szabolcs Hadnagy focused on the campaign of the Grand Vizier Köprülü Mehmed Pasha against Transylvania in 1658. As the consequence of the Ottoman Military action, Transylvania lost one third of its territory and the right to elect a new prince without Ottoman influence. The aim of the campaign was to remove Prince György II Rákóczi. The recently discovered sources in the Ottoman language concerning the army's food supplies put the whole issue into a different perspective. According to these sources, the campaign was planned against the Dalmatian regions of the Republic of Venice, then slowly turned against Transylvania due to Rákóczi desperately trying to hold onto power, and culminated in the capture of the castle of Jenő and the appointment of the new Prince Ákos Barcsai because of the Celālī rebellion that broke out in the Ottoman Empire.

Zsuzsanna Cziráki's study focused on a crime in Istanbul in the autumn of 1646, committed by the resident ambassador, Alexander Greiffenklau. The victim of a murder was a certain Don Juan de Menesses, an adventurer, who had been involved in conspiring against the Habsburg dynasty within the Sultan's entourage. The paper describes what led to Menesses's murder and what kind of consequences can be drawn on the basis of the crime as to the diplomatic cooperation between the Spanish and the Austrian lines of the Habsburg dynasty in the last years of the Thirty Years' War.

The last article changes the focus from the historical events to the characters writing history. Kutse Altın's contribution leads us to the academic activity of Prof. Dr. Tayyib Gökbilgin, who was the first student of Hungarology at Faculty of Language, History, and Geography in Ankara in the 1930's. The article was based on Gökbilgin's personal collection, in which the individual perspectives of

Preface

scholars on the socio-political environment can also be traced. The aim of this article is to present the letters of László Rásonyi, the first head of the Department of Hungarology to his first student and later colleague Tayyib Gökbilgin in the context of the personal archive and first-person documents.

Last but not least, this volume contains a bibliography which shows the data of the (published as well as in press) works of our research group from 2017 until the closing of this volume. This paper aims to help the readers to find our works concerning the Ottoman – Habsburg diplomacy of the early modern period.

To conclude this introduction, I would like to thank our colleagues inside and outside of the Research Group for their contributions in this volume. It is a great accomplishment that every author managed to complete their manuscripts within the deadline. I would like to thank Gellért Ernő Marton, who performed the meticulous and laborious technical work of editing with his usual consistency and precision.

Szeged, 17 October 2021

Sándor Papp

SÁNDOR PAPP

Temporary Appointments by the Sultan

*A New Method for Ensuring Succession in Transylvania
before the Death of the Ruling Prince**

INTRODUCTION

The power structure of the Ottoman Empire was quite diverse, and the flexibility of their rule is shown by the fact that their system of autonomy in religion, communities and states survived up to the modernisation of the 19th century. In order to examine the individual areas not in isolation, but instead from the perspective of the empire, it is necessary to make a comparative analysis of similar structures.¹

Researchers studying the state structure of the Ottoman Empire sharply differentiate between those vilayets and sanjaks where it was possible to observe an arrangement that is considered classical, and those that retained in some form the internal structures from prior to their conquest, in some cases even their ruling dynasties. The phrase “vassal state” has been used in relation to the history of the Ottoman Empire by European literature, but this currently seems to be in the process of being replaced by the term “tributary state”, which can be traced back to the Ottoman terminology of *haracgüzâr* (‘tributary’). This term was generally in widespread use for vassal states, even when certain Muslim and Christian states never paid tribute. In Ottoman terminology, it is primarily the terms *teba’a* and *tebâ’iyet* that appear for vassal states. In every case, the Ottoman Empire considered the vassal states to be a part of their own imperial territories, the *memâlik-i mahrûse* (‘well-protected empire’).² In addition to the possible payment of tribute,

* This article has been written within the framework of the work of the MTA–SZTE Research Group of the Ottoman Age (Eötvös Loránd Research Network). The research and the writing of this paper have been supported by the Ministry of Human Capacities (Emberi Erőforrások Minisztériuma) through a grant (code nr. 20391-3/2018/FEKÜSTRAT; TUDFO/47138-1/2019-ITM) The research has also been supported by the National Research, Development and Innovation Office (NRDI) (Nemzeti Kutatási, Fejlesztési és Innovációs Hivatal) through a grant (Thematic Excellence Programme (Tématerületi Kiválósági Program) 2020, NKFIH-1279-2/2020) of the Interdisciplinary Centre of Excellence (University of Szeged), the Department of Medieval and Early Modern Hungarian History (Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Szeged), MTA–SZTE Research Group of the Ottoman Age (Eötvös Loránd Research Network). I would hereby like to thank András Oross, the Hungarian archival delegate responsible for the materials in the Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, and Hofkammer Archiv. A shorter version of this article was published without the appendices in the studies in honor of my former professor, Mária Ivanics: Papp, “The Prince and the Sultan”. Thus, this This paper is an enlarged version of the earlier published study in Hungarian.

¹ Papp, “Die Inaugurationen der Krimkhane”; Papp, “The System of Autonomous Muslim and Christian Communities”; Papp, “Gesetzliche Garantien”.

² Panaite, *Pace, război și comerț în Islam*; Idem, *The Ottoman Law of War and Peace: The Ottoman Empire and Tribute Payers*; Idem, *The Ottoman Law of War and Peace: The Ottoman Empire and Its Tribute-Payers from North of Danube*.

the subservience was underlined by the naming of services and stressing the sultan's *right of investiture* over the vassal rulers. This is the point in which the circumstances of Transylvania are of prominent significance to international Ottoman research, namely that only this Ottoman vassal state has essentially complete surviving source materials related to a century and a half of the sultan's practice of installing rulers. The sources on the sultan's appointment of princes related to the 16th century are even available to researchers in published form.³

In the following, I will discuss the sultan's confirmation of two consecutive princes of Transylvania. The first instance was a temporary confirmation that only bestowed upon the recipient an assurance of his right to inherit the throne prior to the death of his father, who was his predecessor. This type of legal act seems to be unknown in the case of other vassal states. The second procedure presents the structural system for the handover of power that had developed by the middle of the 17th century.

THE PRINCE'S RIGHT OF INHERITANCE ACCORDING TO THE SO-CALLED
“‘*AHDNĀME OF SÜLEYMĀN*”

My research up to this point has led to the idea that the first Hungarian king to accept Ottoman authority, János (or John) Szapolyai, received a letter of confirmation from the sultan in 1529, that represented the legal background and model for the power of the later voivodes and princes of Transylvania. However, this document was not addressed to a prince of Transylvania, but instead a Hungarian king, and it provided for rule over the entire Kingdom of Hungary in exchange for recognising the payment of tribute. Although this document has been lost, we know from Ferenc Forgács that it included the amount of tribute, which at this time was 50,000 gold ducats.⁴

In the case of János Zsigmond (or John Sigismund), the contemporary Hungarian translation of the *ahdname* issued in October 1540, is known, which confirms the right to inherit the throne alongside the fact of the tribute. In this, we find the first indication that Kanuni Sultan Süleyman endorsed succession by male heirs following János Zsigmond.⁵

The next text of an actual imperial pledge (in Ottoman-Turkish '*ahdnāme-i hümāyūn*, 'imperial treaty') of the sultan that remains is only from 1571/72,⁶ which granted the powers of the voivode of Transylvania, namely to István Báthory. This document is the link between the "*Süleymān era*" and the *ahdnames* from later periods. It prefigured the later imperial pledges of the sultan to later princes in its structure, content and phrasing. At the same time, the document cites

³ Papp, *Die Verleihungs-, Bekräftigungs- und Vertragsurkunden*.

⁴ Forgács, *Emlékirat Magyarország állapotáról*, p. 571; Papp, *Die Verleihungs-, Bekräftigungs- und Vertragsurkunden*, p. 42.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 43 and pp. 159–162.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 214–219.

the ahdname issued to János Zsigmond during the time of Selim II, which presumably dates from around 1566 or a little bit later. István Báthory was issued another two ahdnames in 1575, and the pretender to the throne, Pál Márkházy was issued one in 1581,⁷ which besides the updates were so similar to one another that it can be hypothesised that the same was also the case with earlier examples. Thus, the ahdnames with unknown texts, such as that issued to John Sigismund in 1541, or the one issued upon his return from Poland in 1556, that was rewritten in the name of Selim II (circa 1566),⁸ may have also been very similar to one another and in the end may have shown a strong relationship with the formal elements and text of the known ahdname of István Báthory (1571/72).

If we accept the above train of thought, it is possible to make progress towards answering the question of whether ahdnames between 1571/72 and 1581, immediately after the “*Süleymān era*”, contained the passage stating that the title of king or voivode can be primarily inherited by the blood relatives of the reigning monarch. The answer seems to be yes, since it can be clearly read from the ahdname of István Báthory that if the office of the ruler of Transylvania falls vacant, then power is given at the Sublime Porte first to the person who the estates consider worthy from amongst the sons, brothers and relatives of the previous voivode. The above passage can also be found in István Báthory’s two other confirmations from 1575. At the same time, it was left out of the imperial treaty of the sultan to Pál Márkházy, who was in opposition to Zsigmond Báthory (1581–1599 and 1601–1602). This is understandable, since it was uncertain whether he would be able to unseat the child voivode, let alone have the right of succession to the throne. However, the right of succession from father to son returns during the Long Turkish War (1591/93–1606), albeit in a narrower form because other relatives were left out. In the case of András Báthory (1599), the imperial pledge states that the Transylvanian estates could only elect a “son of the house” if the line of the prince was broken. This is repeated in the imperial pledge of the sultan issued to Zsigmond Báthory in 1601 as well. It is also possible to read about succession from father to son in the original Turkish text of the draft ahdname for Bocskai, as well as in the final version amended in Hungary.⁹

The next imperial pledge of the sultan, which also spoke of succession, is from 1608, and confirmed the position of Gábor Báthory (1608–1613). This document was now from many aspects the precursor of the classical ahdnames of the sultan for great Transylvanian princes. The wording on the issue of succession precisely follows the historical background for Gábor Báthory’s rise to power, namely that he did not inherit the throne peacefully, but took it by force and the Sublime Porte

⁷ Papp, *Die Verleihungs-, Bekräftigungs- und Vertragsurkunden*, pp. 220–228 and 243–247.

⁸ Sándor Szilágyi describes an ahdname that was dated 1566, but that was a 17th-century forgery. Szilágyi, *Erdélyország története*, pp. 385–388; Papp, *Die Verleihungs-, Bekräftigungs- und Vertragsurkunden*, pp. 47–52.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 265–287; The full text of the imperial pledge of the sultan to András Báthory was published in Kármán, “Báthori András ahdnáméja”; Kármán, “The ’Ahdname of Sultan Mehmed III”.

gave its blessing to this. Thus, the ahdname declares that if someone must be installed as prince, then he should be one who is worthy of the position chosen from the sons and brothers of the Transylvanian beys (that is, nobles). It does not talk about succession according to blood within the prince's family. If we examine the structure of the text thoroughly, it comes to light that the above ideas do not reflect Ottoman opinions, but instead the points of the Transylvanian petition were employed as a model for the Ottoman imperial treaty of the sultan and in the explanation for the document they included.

“[Gábor Báthory] sent a letter through his envoy, the pride of the dignitaries of the Christian community, Gábor Bethlen, who is amongst the noteworthy and outstanding lords, the content of which is as follows: When, beginning from old times, a voivode or prince was installed in the aforementioned country, they graciously bestowed the honorable position of prince in the manner set down and recorded in the imperial pledge to a person who was amongst the sons or brothers of the Transylvanian nobles and was worthy of the position of prince, who the lords and noblemen of the country accepted and who had declared their fidelity, loyalty and submission to my great empire.”¹⁰

The issue of succession comes up one more time in the document, but citing previously issued imperial treaty of the sultan it indicates that the Sublime Porte can only appoint a Transylvanian lord to be prince whose confirmation the estates of the country have requested, and those who do not have this mandate should be rejected.

“If the position of Transylvanian leader is vacant, they should only accept and appoint one who is effective, upstanding and honest to the lords and nobles of the country, to the country and state and to my lofty empire. After this individual is announced to my blessed Sublime Porte, the [power] is granted and bestowed on the part of my majesty, but in no case will it be given to one who seeks power at my blessed Sublime Porte without the petition and desire of the country.”¹¹

It is only in the imperial treaty of the sultan for Catherine of Brandenburg and then transplanted into those of György I and II Rákóczi that the train of thought can be found that defined the continuity of 17th century succession. This aspect is that the new ruler can be selected from the sons, brothers and relatives of the prince.

¹⁰ “mektübla mü teber u güzide ümerâsından qıdvetü â yâni l-milleti mesîhîye Betlen Gâbör nâm elçisini irsâl edüb mazmûnunda vilâyet-i mezbûreye mâ-teqaddümden berü voyvoda ve hâkim naşb olunmaq lâzım geldükde yine vilâyet-i Erdel begleri evlâdından ve qarındaşlarından hükûmete layıq olanı vilâyet begleri ve â yâni qabül edüb devlet-i aliyemüze şadâqat u ihlâş ve ubûdiyet u ihtişâş üzre olduğın i lâm êtdüklerinde vilâyet-i mezbûre hükûmeti aña inâyet olunmaq ahd-nâmelerde mestür u muqayyed olmağın [...]”, ÖNB, Handschriftensammlung, Mixt 1598. lines 10–12.

¹¹ „muqaddemâ verilen ahdnâme-i hümayûn-i mazmûni mer t qılınub Erdel hükûmeti maħlûle olduqda vilâyetüñ ümerâ vu â yâni memleket u vilâyete ve devlet-i aliyemüze nâfi ve foğru ve müstaqim kimesneyi hükûmete qabül u ta yin edüb âsitâne-i se âdetimizde arz êtdüklerinde maqbül-i hümayûnimuz olub ke-mâ kân inâyet u ihsân olunub anuñ gibi â yân-i vilâyetüñ taleb u ittifaqı yoğ-iken âsitâne-i se âdetimizde hükûmet-i mezbûreye talib olduqlarında verilmeye...” ÖNB Handschriftensammlung Mixt 1598. lines 16–17.

“Since the strict law is if it again becomes necessary by leave of my highest majesty to appoint someone to the position of prince of Transylvania in the case of death or for some other reason, then my sovereign’s letter of appointment and my favourable imperial pledge shall be placed in the hands of one who the other lords and nobles of the three estates and the subjects have nominated, and who is from the sons, brothers or relatives of the Transylvanian ruling dynasty and who is at the same time worthy of the position.”¹²

Thus, as can be seen, a kind of continuity was ensured from Süleyman I both on the issue of ahdnames and on the question of succession contained within these. Despite this, it cannot be stated that this tradition can be traced unbroken either from the time of King John Szapolyai or that of his son, John Sigismund. Independent of this, there was an effort by the Sublime Porte to issue ahdnames with identical structure and content not just for Transylvania, but for other allied countries as well. It can be hypothesised, although it cannot be proven through documents, that the Ottomans themselves were not able to produce an original version or copy of the “*ahdnâme of Süleymân*” in the 17th century, or more precisely at least from the time of the Long Turkish War. The continuity was still ensured through the spirit and phrasing of the later documents, including long sections that are repeated, even if the Hungarian–Ottoman relationship had to be re-interpreted from a diplomatic perspective amongst new political circumstances, particularly during the time of István Bocskai’s uprising (1604–1606). It is only from the 17th century that a kind of stability again develops in the structure of the ahdnames, similar to the period of the Long Turkish War. The ordered and lasting circumstances of rule provided another opportunity to develop or attempt to establish a princely dynasty, as it is found in the formula cited above in the case of Catherine of Brandenburg and the two György Rákóczi to reinstitute succession according to blood.

There were times when a certain voivode or prince was not only confirmed once, but several times. The reason for this was that in the 16th century, following

¹² „*anuñ gibi hulül-i ecliyle fevt olduqda veyâhüd âhar tarîqle Erdel hâkimi tecdîd olunmaq lâzım geldükde Erdel hâkimleriniñ silsilesine münteşib olan oğullarından ve qarındaşlarından vesâ’ir aqrabalarından hükümete esâs ‘ubüdiyeti üstivâr olan kimesneyi rızâ-yi hümâyûnumla vilâyet-i Erdeliñ sâyir begleri ve üç millet â’yâm ve re’âyâsı hükümetlerine ihtiyâr edüb dañi südde-i se’âdetümden üzerlerine hâkim naşb u ta’yîn olunub ellerine berât-i hümâyûn ve ‘ahd-nâme-i se’âdet-maqrûnum vèrilmek muqarrer olmağla ...*”; Catherine of Brandenburg’s ahd-name: GSPK I. (Berlin) Hauptabteilung, Geheimer Rat, Repositorium 11, Auswärtige Beziehungen, 255a Siebenbürgen nr. 3. vol. 3. Bl. 339–344, and fol. 345–347; (Ottoman-Turkish and German language versions of Catherine of Brandenburg’s ahdname), Incomplete publication of Gábor Bethlen’s ahdname: Ferîdün, *Mecmû’a-i münşe’âtü s-selâfîn*, pp. 450–453. (I would like to express my gratitude towards Gábor Kármán and Éva Deák for providing me with a photocopy of the Turkish text and German translation of the imperial pledge given to Catherine of Brandenburg that is held in Berlin.); György I Rákóczi’s ahdname: MNL OL, Mikrofilmtár, box 21050 (miscellaneous document copies from Ljubljana); Handžić, “Diploma sultana Murada IV”, pp. 175–191 and table 5; György II Rákóczi’s ahdname: Babinger, “Zwei türkische Schutzbriefe”, pp. 124–149; the contemporary Hungarian translations of the ahdnames of Báthory, Bethlen and György I Rákóczi can be found in: Mikó, “Athnámék”, pp. 328–349.

the death of the sultan, the previous imperial appointments had to be reconfirmed in the name of the new sultan. This took place in the case of István Báthory in 1575, when Selim II (1566–1574) died and Murad III (1574–1595) came to the throne. As a result of the change in sultans, he received three ahdnames. The first version received from Selim II was reissued in the spring of 1575, following the accession to the throne of Murad III, and then again at the very end of 1575. The reason for it being issued twice is that the voivode did not want to accept the increase in annual tribute of 5,000 ducats in such a way that the annual amount would be raised another 5,000 ducats after every new transition of ruler. The second ahdname sent out by Sultan Murad III, codified that the increase in tribute was a single event and would not be raised again.¹³ When the document arrived in Transylvania in February of 1576, the older brother of István Báthory (1571–1576), Kristóf Báthory (1576–1581), had already temporarily taken over the position of voivode. The reason behind this was that the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth had invited István Báthory to be king, and he then left Transylvania.¹⁴

The confirmation of Kristóf Báthory in 1576, did not even come in the form of an ahdname, but instead an order of the sultan (*hüküm, fermān*).¹⁵ This type of procedure had originally been a part of the confirmation process in the case of Transylvanian voivodes. Following the election, the sultan sent two sets of orders about the transfer of power, one to the voivode and one to the estates. This was followed by another set of orders that was accompanied by the symbol of rule, the sultan's banner (*sancaq*). When it was certain that István Báthory was not going to return to the voivodship from Poland, they then sent the imperial pledge for the prince to Kristóf Báthory but this document has not yet been discovered at this point. It is known for certain that it did exist at some time due to later documents that cited this ahdname as a precedent. These include the Ottoman documents sent after the death of Kristóf Báthory (in 1581) to both his son, Zsigmond Báthory (1581–1599, 1601–1602), and the pretender to the throne opposed to him, Pál Márkházy (1581).¹⁶ It is interesting that in the middle of July of 1576, when he obtained the title of voivode, he not only did not receive an ahdname, but even had to return the silver flagpole finial (*ser-‘alem*) that had been amongst the insignia of his younger brother István Báthory as voivode. Later he did also receive this kind of insignia of power by his own right.¹⁷

The second method for transferring power in the principality, which can be considered unusual, can be linked to the confirmation of the princess Catherine of Brandenburg. Her husband, Gábor Bethlen, the Prince of Transylvania (1613–1629), did everything in his power to ensure that after his death – with no living male heirs – he should be succeeded by his wife, Catherine of Brandenburg, the sister of the Elector of Brandenburg, George William (1619–1640). In accordance

¹³ Papp, *Die Verleihungs-, Bekräftigungs- und Vertragsurkunden*, pp. 84–91.

¹⁴ Beydilli, *Die polnischen Königswahlen*, passim.

¹⁵ Papp, *Die Verleihungs-, Bekräftigungs- und Vertragsurkunden*, pp. 89–91 and 229–232.

¹⁶ Papp, *Die Verleihungs-, Bekräftigungs- und Vertragsurkunden*, pp. 233, 235–237 and 241–252.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 82–83.

with this, an *ahdname* was issued at the Sublime Porte dated to the period of ten days between 7 and 16 February 1627. The document was identical word-for-word with the *ahdname* issued for her husband that was created in July of 1614. Despite this, there was a fundamental difference between the two legal acts, namely that while Bethlen came to the throne on a permanent basis, his wife received the title during her husband's life, and the legal basis for the actual wielding of power was only after the death of Bethlen. However, the content of the *ahdname* confirming the appointment by the sultan did not restrict the powers of the princess as heir to the throne. After Bethlen's death, even though the final decision of the sultan was in the hands of the princess, it still seemed necessary for an order of the sultan to be sent to Transylvania, which called upon Catherine of Brandenburg to take power on the basis of an election by the Transylvanians. The sultan ordered the estates to serve loyally. Unfortunately, it cannot be clearly determined whether the insignia of the prince were sent again, as no additional data related to this have been found.¹⁸

In addition to the *ahdnames* that have been mentioned repeatedly so far, there was another kind of confirmation document from the sultan that existed, which was called a *berāt* or *menşūr* in the Turkish language. This type of document had already appeared several times during the appointment of a prince of Transylvania, and on the basis of an Ottoman source in the Persian language it is my impression that the imperial treaty issued to Szapolyai in 1529, was also an *ahdname* drafted in the form of a *berat*.¹⁹ However, I do not intend on discussing the structural elements of this kind of document now. It must be noted, though, that the vassal voivodes of Moldavia and Wallachia, the Cossack hetmans, the Tatar khans, *kalgas* and *nureddins* and the Tunisian beys and *beylerbeys* were also appointed using documents of the *berat* or *menşur* type, and several examples are known from Transylvanian history.²⁰ In relation to the 16th century, I have come to the conclusion that a *berat* is a part of an appointment procedure with four levels. I have surmised this despite the fact that the *berats* sent to the Transylvanian voivodes have not survived from the 16th century. On the other hand, I have found data that prior to obtaining the final element for appointment, the *ahdname*, a *berat* was issued following the payment of a fee.²¹ Although the data led to this conclusion, later I began to feel doubt, since up to 1604 – as I mentioned above – not a single example had survived until the *berat* of István Bocskai (1604–1606). Thus, the possibility cannot be completely discounted that already in the 16th century *ahdnames* were referred to as *berats*, since their introductory formulas were similar. The first surviving *berat* was made in Buda in 1604, through which the Grand Vizier Lala Mehmed named István Bocskai Prince of Transylvania and King of

¹⁸ Ötvös, “Brandenburgi Katalin fejedelemsége”, pp. 153–244; Szilágyi, “Brandenburgi Katalin trónraléptére”, pp. 470–476.

¹⁹ Papp, “Hungary and the Ottoman Empire”, p. 77.

²⁰ Papp, “Muszlim és keresztény közösségek”, pp. 25–72; Papp, “The System of Autonomous Muslim and Christian Communities”, pp. 375–419.

²¹ Papp, *Die Verleihungs-, Bekräftigungs- und Vertragsurkunden*, p. 136.

the Hungarian nation.²² Bálint Drugeth of Homonna received the next one, in which the Grand Vizier Kuyucu Murad confirmed him as Bocskai's successor as prince in the name of the sultan in 1607. This document was altered through forgery to the name of Zsigmond Rákóczi (1607–1608).²³ The granting of a *berat* did not represent the final transfer of power in the aforementioned cases, which is shown by the fact that Bocskai received his imperial pledge from the sultan following negotiations at the Sublime Porte as well as by data that an *ahdname* was expected from the sultan for Drugeth's appointment, which allegedly arrived in Hungary in the autumn of 1607.²⁴ Although it does not come to light from the 17th century Hungarian translations, it is clear from the Turkish texts that the imperial pledges of the sultan sent to Gábor Bethlen (1613–1629), Catherine of Brandenburg (1629–1630) and György I (1630–1648) and György II Rákóczi (1648–1660) could be categorised as two types of documents at the same time, despite the fact that in their structure and language they were similar to the Ottoman imperial treaties sent to European Christian states such as the Habsburg Empire, Venice, Poland and France. In the texts of the aforementioned documents, there are references that appear alongside one another to them being called both *berats* and *ahdnames*. The first type of document shows the transfer of the title of prince, while the second presents the contractual relationship set in historical traditions that existed with the Sublime Porte. As I have indicated, this hybrid type of document first appeared in 1614, with the appointment of Gábor Bethlen. As more time passed after the 16th century, when Hungary had in a legal sense changed from an equal power to a subject state, it became harder and harder for the Ottoman government to understand why Transylvania, which fundamentally was a vassal just like the Romanian voivodeships, Moldavia and Wallachia alongside it, should receive an *ahdname* in contrast to the general custom. Perhaps the solution to this contradiction, which is difficult to understand legally, was created by the form of a letter of appointment similar in structure and linguistic elements to the *ahdnames* of the western countries, but that also took on the name of a *berat* to confirm the prince, closer to the standard procedure of the Ottoman Empire. Comparing the Transylvanian imperial pledges with the Moldavian and Wallachian *beräts* (which contain no reference to the title *ahdname*), the latter are reminiscent of the western *ahdnames* in structure, and the articles included in the text were based traditionally on a petition of the estates. In the case of the Moldavian and Wallachian *berats*, the most important factor was the one-sided tribute, and the structure of the documents is clearly related to documents appointing Ottoman officials.²⁵

However, a very important factor should not be forgotten. Although the documents also refer to themselves as *berats* as well as *ahdnames*, even the Ottomans saw the Transylvanian imperial treaties issued between 1614 and 1649 as

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 261–263.

²³ Papp, “Eine „verfälschte“ sultanische Bestallungsurkunde”, pp. 125–130.

²⁴ Papp, “Homonai Drugeth Bálint fellépése”, pp. 133–152.

²⁵ Papp, “Christian Vassals on the Northwest Border”, pp. 719–730.

ahdnames, just as had been the case previously. At the same time, it should be pointed out that in 1642, when György II Rákóczi received his confirmation while his father was still alive, the Sublime Porte wanted to issue a document very similar to the *berats* that were the final confirmation letters for Moldavian and Wallachian voivodes. A *berat* like this provided *temporary* confirmation, which the other vassal principalities always received as a final document. All of this was intended to represent the political weight and power of Transylvania at the time.

THE PROTOTYPE: THE FIRST TEMPORARY CONFIRMATION AND APPOINTMENT OF GYÖRGY II RÁKÓCZI BY THE SULTAN DURING HIS FATHER'S LIFETIME (1642)

The Transylvanian envoys arrived in Constantinople on 3 May 1642, to begin the negotiations for the sultan to confirm the son of the prince, György II Rákóczi. In accordance with tradition, they were ceremonially received before the city gates, and the Sublime Porte's Hungarian *interpreter* Zülfikar Agha²⁶ was present with his son and 28 *chiauses*. The number of *chiauses* always indicated the opinion about the prince. The next day the vizier, Kemankeş Kara Mustafa Pasha (1638–1644) sent the Hungarian *interpreter* to inquire if they had the gifts sent for the sultan and for him. They opened the chests and the agha appraised the value of the silver items, which the envoys said were greater in weight than they actually were. The agha recalculated their value and found the total value of 6,000 thalers to be much too small. The envoys claimed that the country does not customarily pay for the issuance of the insignia of appointment and the *ahdname* – at least according to the reasoning of the prince – and wanted to avoid the financial demands. They even denied that they had cash.

The haggling went on in the manner customary in the bazaars of the oriental world for the issuance of the imperial treaty of the sultan. They promised Zülfikar, as the intermediary, an additional payment of 500 thalers, while obtaining the concession that it would not be necessary to pay the sultan cash. However, in the case of the grand vizier the agha only agreed to the reduction of the amount to 8,000 thalers.²⁷

Zülfikar continued to uphold the promise that if the prince were to devote a small expense to him, then he would be able to achieve other goals, such as regaining Ottoman support for the seven counties in Upper Hungary (mostly within present-day Slovakia) that were under the rule of the Habsburg Hungarian king, but which Gábor Bethlen had held. Through skillful political negotiation, they could have had the pretender to the throne Mózes II Székely, the posthumous son of the Prince of Transylvania Mózes I Székely (1602–1603) who had been living in Yedikule Fortress in Constantinople since 1636, sent to Rhodes or Cyprus where he would not have been able to plot against the prince as much. Mózes Székely's situation was genuinely uncertain, which is shown by the fact that he

²⁶ Kármán, "Grand Dragoman Zülfikar Ağa".

²⁷ Mihály Maurer's report to György I Rákóczi, Constantinople, 8 May 1642, Szilády–Szilágyi, *Török-magyarkori államokmánytár*, vol. 3, pp. 102–103.

had not been given an allowance by the Sublime Porte for months.²⁸ Later, the prince was quite annoyed at the envoys that they had passed up this excellent opportunity.

However, they could not have done anything about this, since they had to concentrate on a much more serious issue than the possibility of being rid of Mózes Székely, something that put their efforts up to that point in doubt. The grand vizier ordered the members of the delegation to his office on 11 May 1642. Several of those in attendance wrote reports on what was said during this meeting. The tension was caused by the grand vizier proposing that instead of the insignia of the prince expected by the Transylvanians, that is, the banner, sabre, sceptre and horse as well as the imperial pledge of the sultan, he would only provide a lower-level confirmation. He did not want to grant the horse and the *ahdname* of the sultan. The grand vizier cited that in reference to the imperial pledge of Sultan Süleyman, the *ahdnames* of István Bocskai, Gábor Báthori, Gábor Bethlen and Catherine of Brandenburg stated the successor would only be confirmed following the death of the prince and only after this would the insignia of the prince be issued from the Sublime Porte. The grand vizier interpreted the law in such a way that since the prince had not died, an *ahdname* could not be granted to his successor, only a letter under the seal (in case of course *tuğra*) of the sultan. The ambassador István Serédy touched upon the following in his response:

“When István Báthory was to assume the kingdom of Poland, the election of Kristóf Báthory took place and was confirmed by the Sublime Porte, and this was the case for Zsigmond Báthori and Princess Catharina. The final conclusion of this matter would be that the letter that your Highness and the noble country wrote to our magnificent emperor was brought to him and he immediately understood the purpose of the mission.”

At the same time, for the first time it came up that the reduction of the tribute granted to Gábor Bethlen, as a result of which the tribute that had been 15,000 ducats was lowered to 10,000 ducats with the ceding of Lippa (present day Lipova, in Romania), was canceled by the Sublime Porte, and they began to demand the increase in tribute as a condition for inauguration by the Sublime Porte.²⁹

Following a meal, they brought the special gifts to the grand vizier, with the gold coins placed in a pile in addition to guns as well. The grand vizier bestowed 20 ducats to István Rácz, 18 to Mihály Maurer and around 40 to Zülfikar. The grand vizier received the envoys without ceremony in a simple tunic, and then following the talks visited the sultan at the Field of Davud Pasha. Returning later, he sent for Serdély for a personal discussion. Again, he asked him why the prince

²⁸ Mihály Maurer's report to György I Rákóczi, Constantinople, 08 May 1642, Szilády–Szilágyi, *Török-magyarkori államokmánytár*, vol. 3, pp. 102–103.

²⁹ István Rácz's report to György I Rákóczi, Constantinople, 15 May 1642, Szilády–Szilágyi, *Török-magyarkori államokmánytár*, vol. 3, pp. 105–107. We also found data on the alteration of the Transylvanian tribute in the manuscript no. Mixt 174 held in the Nationalbibliothek in Vienna. This also shows that the compiler of the manuscript delved deeply into the relationships in the Sublime Porte at the time of György I Rákóczi, fol. 54v–55v. “*Ber-müceb-i defter-i hazîne-i ‘amire ‘an tahvîl voyvoda-i Erdel’*”

wanted to have his son confirmed, and whether he perhaps wanted a kingdom for himself somewhere.

The ambassador stood pat in his denials, but Mihály Maurer promised another 5,000 thalers to Zülfikar if he could resolve the matters of avoiding the increase in tribute and obtaining the ahdname. The ambassador met another time that day with the grand vizier, who appeared more compliant prior to his visit with the sultan. Following his departure, Zülfikar considered the matter to be closed and demanded the so-called “*celebratory cake*”³⁰ fee ahead of time. At this time, the issue of the gift and money to be given to the grand vizier was brought up again. The negotiations came to 13,000 thalers and a washbasin with a pitcher, but the other dignitaries that had participated in the matter also demanded sums of varying sizes. However, it is conspicuous that everyone was merely concerned with their own benefit, and they appeared to be far more liberal on the matter of the money and gifts for the sultan.³¹ In addition to the special gift, the regular annual gift had to be given to both the sultan and the grand vizier. This took place on 17 May, and it seemed that they were satisfied with the carriage for the sultan and the gifts handed over to his mother and the grand vizier.³²

However, hopes were finally dashed on 2 of June. The permanent envoy István Rácz informed the prince that they had cited both the ahdname of sultan Süleyman and the letters of the prince and the estates in vain, as they did not receive what they wanted. The grand vizier held back the ahdname and the horse, but would send the banner, sceptre, sabre, cap and two kaftans for the prince, two for his son and ten for the counsellors. However, a promise was made that the successor would receive the ahdname and the horse following the death of the older prince. It was declared for the first time on this day what type of document the Ottomans wanted to employ for a temporary confirmation. “*Nevertheless, they will hand over a letter that they call a berat, so that after the death of your highness, they will recognise his majesty, his highness as the prince.*” At the same time, they again began to demand the increase of the tribute of 5,000 ducats.³³

Based on the above data, Sándor Szilágyi established in the Records of the Transylvanian National Assembly that an ahdname did not arrive, but György II Rákóczi was confirmed with a berat.³⁴ At the same time, in the pages of *Levelek és okiratok I. Rákóczi György keleti összeköttetései történetéhez*³⁵ they cited the documents published in volume 3 of the *Török–magyarkori államokmánytár*³⁶ as an explanation, which were translated by Áron Szilády from the work entitled *Correspondence of the Sultans* by Ferīdūn bey. The document in question was

³⁰ The phrase “öröm-kalács”, meaning ‘celebratory cake’ was a euphemism for a kind of bribe given to Ottoman officials. (SP)

³¹ Mihály Maurer’s report to György I Rákóczi, Constantinople, 15 May 1642, Szilády–Szilágyi, *Török–magyarkori államokmánytár*, vol. 3, pp. 109–110.

³² Constantinople, 19 May 1642, Szilágyi, *Levelek és okiratok*, p. 671.

³³ István Rácz to György I Rákóczi, Constantinople, 2 June 1642, Szilágyi, *Levelek és okiratok*, p. 674.

³⁴ Szilágyi, *EOE*, vol. 10, p. 62.

³⁵ Szilágyi, *Levelek és okiratok*, p.

³⁶ Szilády–Szilágyi, *Török–magyarkori államokmánytár*, vol. 3, pp. 116–117.

described in both the original Turkish publication of sources and in the translation that it was the text of the ahdname issued to György II Rákóczi *while his father was still alive*.³⁷ János Kósa in his book on György II Rákóczi resolved the seeming contradiction by hypothesizing that with further gifts it was possible to obtain the issuance of an imperial pledge of the sultan.³⁸ This may be indicated by the invitation to the ceremony for the granting of the prince's insignia, "*the Turkish emperor and the sublime porte have accepted and affirmed the election of our beloved son, György Rákóczi to the position of prince; and as a true indication and proof according to the old custom of the sublime porte and the country the kapuji-bashi has been sent to us with the imperial banner, sceptre, 'athname' and other appropriate imperial gifts, and solemnly sent to the new prince,*" who since he was proceeding in national matters, wanted to receive him with great ceremony. The invitees had to go to Gyulafehérvár (present day Alba Iulia, in Romania) on 2 July.³⁹

If we continue to read the correspondence between the prince and his men working at the Sublime Porte, it is clear that Rákóczi was very dissatisfied. There is no evidence that they might have succeeded in having an imperial pledge of the sultan, or ahdname, issued, but instead just the opposite. All of their efforts were frustrated by the grand vizier's stubbornness. Before continuing to follow the events, I will summarise the four factors that made up the turning points in the negotiations at the Sublime Porte, and which I will examine in detail below. The factors are the following: 1) already on 11 May, so at the beginning of the talks, the Sublime Porte made it clear that it did not want to issue an imperial pledge of the sultan; 2) the grand vizier cited the "*imperial pledge of Süleymān*", in which the automatic confirmation would only come following the death of the father, and with no strings attached; 3) the envoys knew of two events from Transylvanian history, the appointments of Kristóf Báthory in 1576 and of Catherine of Brandenburg in 1627, that could serve as models in the matter being negotiated; and 4) of the princely insignia, György II Rákóczi only received the ahdname and the horse following his father's death, and until then had to be satisfied with a *berāt*.

During the negotiations taking place to confirm the young prince, Transylvanian diplomacy was not prepared for the issuance of the imperial pledge of the sultan to be denied at the Sublime Porte. The reign of Sultan Suleyman, which both parties cited as a model, in the 17th century had become a symbol of a lost golden age in all aspects. In the eyes of the Transylvanians, the ahdname he had issued meant even more than this. In the feudal public consciousness, the internal constitutional relationships of the country and the clearly definable leeway to act in external political matters were linked to this document, so it provided a kind of legitimacy for the rights of the ruler. However, this document did not in fact exist,

³⁷ Szilády–Szilágyi, *Török–magyarkori államokmánytár*, vol. 3, pp. 116–120; Ferīdūn "Mecmū' a-i münşe'ātü s-selātin 2", pp. 470–471.

³⁸ Kósa, *II. Rákóczi György*, p. 18.

³⁹ György I Rákóczi to Péter Sófálvai Gávai, Gyulafehérvár, 16 June 1642, Szilády–Szilágyi, *Török–magyarkori államokmánytár*, vol. 3, pp. 124–125.

despite the fact that it had become a part of a historical tradition that was not just based on fairy tales, as we have seen above.

The envoy of György I Rákóczi, István Rác, reported in detail about the negotiations that preceded his son, György II Rákóczi, receiving the confirmation as prince from the sultan while his father was still alive. He also informed the prince that the envoys would be departing for home on 3 June and would be bringing with them the kapuji-bashi (kapıcı başı), who would arrive in the seat of the principality, Gyulaféhevár, for the investiture. György I Rákóczi was able to receive information about all of this in person from Mihály Maurer, who had been sent ahead.⁴⁰ The response from Gyulaféhevár was already on its way to Constantinople on 13 June. György I Rákóczi was very angry that the envoys had left the Ottoman capital without his permission. He deemed that they had not proceeded in the spirit of their orders. If they had waited for his letters, then the matter would not have taken an unfavourable turn from him. He stated his position as follows:

*"[...] and in the future, if our son follows our advice, after our death he and the country will not incur any expense or even solicit either an ahdname or a horse, I could write several reasons for this to your grace, but we see that the vizier acted (from someone's advice) to gain benefit for himself both during our life and after our death, but they will be in error and they will realise this before long. If we had not relied upon the vizier's promise and reassurance, then we would have been able to take care of the matter better, we could send the vizier's and the mufti's letters both in Hungarian. If your grace Zülfikar had not made your persistent comments, then it would have been easy for the country and us to tell the porte about the election of our son, and to petition for his confirmation after our death, and keep the fine gift. Thus, we believe that the princes after us will learn from this and avoid this situation."*⁴¹

It can be seen that the prince considered the behaviour of the Sublime Porte to be deceitful, because in spite of the promises of the grand vizier and the *seyhülislam* and the great expenditures of the Transylvanians, it had not issued an ahdname, but instead a berat. He gave orders that the troublemaker Mózes Székely, who was waiting to gain the throne of prince of Transylvania in Yedikule Fortress as the posthumous son of his father, the prince Mózes I Székely (1602–1603),⁴² should be removed from the Ottoman capital to Rhodes or Cyprus, so that he would no longer be able to meddle in Transylvanian affairs. The matter of the unsuccessful diplomatic maneuvering crops up from time to time for a few weeks in the correspondence of the prince and the envoy to the Sublime Porte, but then attention was drawn away from this by a much more pressing matter. This was the possibility of intervening in the Thirty Years' War, possible Ottoman support in joining the European anti-Habsburg alliance and most specifically, the taking back

⁴⁰ István Rác to György I Rákóczi, Constantinople, 2 June 1642, Szilágyi, *Levelek és okiratok*, p. 674.

⁴¹ György I Rákóczi to István Rác, Gyulaféhevár, 13 June 1642, Szilágyi, *Levelek és okiratok*, pp. 676–677.

⁴² Papp, "Egy Habsburg követ", pp. 40–52; Idem, "Osmanische Funktionäre", pp. 24–41.

of the seven counties of Upper Hungary that were in Habsburg hands.⁴³ Since the commissioners of the two great empires had renegotiated the continuance of the Treaty of Zsitvatorok in Szőny in the spring of 1642,⁴⁴ it was uncertain whether the Sublime Porte would give permission for military action.

Instead of 2 July, date that was indicated on the invitation, the ceremonial handover of the insignia of the prince took place on Tuesday, 8 July, and this is reported on in an anonymous journal. Since there are not a great deal of these types of descriptions available, I consider it worthwhile to present the reception in detail. One of the confidants of the prince, Ákos Barcsai, joined the envoys arriving from the Sublime Porte in Transylvania, and they escorted the kapuji-bashi, Mustafa Agha, to Mühlbach (in Hungarian Szászsebes, present day Sebeș, in Romania) on 7 July. The next day the procession set off from there to the seat of the prince in Gyulafehérvár. Preparations were also underway in the capital. Following the early morning church service, which the young prince attended with the counsellors and the people of the court, György II Rákóczi returned to the prince's audience chamber. From there, his father gave him his blessing and sent him back to his accommodations. During this time, the estates of the country prepared to march out on horseback. When the drum of the country was struck, the young prince joined them as well. The peers also joined the procession, led by the field armies and then the nobility that lived in the vicinity of Gyulafehérvár. This was followed by the thirty-two person escort of the young prince, and then ten lead horses that were richly decorated and equipped, expressing the majesty of the prince. Following the horses, György II Rákóczi marched with his closest escort, Zsigmond Rákóczi, Boldizsár Wesselényi, Ferenc Kornis, Zsigmond Barcsai, István Szalánczi, Simon Péchi, Ferenc Rédey, István Haller and Zsigmond Kornis, who all rode alongside one another in threes. The young prince himself followed them, and behind him, a group of leading men marched, including Pál Bornemissza, the captain-general of the court cavalry, János Kemény and Ferenc Bethlen, the head steward. The ceremonial procession was closed by the people of the princely court and the court guard organised into four battalions. The military escort consisted of 700 Hungarian and 550 German infantrymen.

The escort of the kapuji-bashi was made up of 39 people, and his son was also in attendance with him. They approached one another ceremonially. The Hungarian and German infantry of the court encircled an area where the first ceremony took place. The nearby mounted lancer units also appeared. First, the kapuji-bashi dismounted from his horse and approached the prince on foot. The young prince reciprocated this honor and dismounted from his horse along with his younger brother, counsellors and ten leaders, as well as Pál Bornemissza, János Kemény and István Haller. Following the mutual words of greeting, the kapuji-bashi personally buckled the sabre that was one of the insignia around the waist of the

⁴³ Szilády–Szilágyi, *Török–magyarkori államokmánytár*, vol. 3, pp. 125–126 and 131–132.

⁴⁴ For the so-called second Peace Treaty of Szőny in 1642, see the article by Krisztina Juhász in the present volume. Cf.: Juhász, “A második szőnyi béke margójára”; Idem, “Esterházy Dániel és Esterházy Miklós”; Idem, “...gyümölcsé pedig semmi nem volt”.

young prince. At the same time, he unbuckled his own sabre from his belt and held it out to Mihály Monaki. The most important of the prince's insignia, the banner was handed over second, which the prince passed along to Mátyás Huszár. Third to be handed over was the ornamental mace that was referred to as a sceptre, which Péter Haller received. Words of greeting again followed the bestowal of the sultan's insignia.

After the ceremony, everyone mounted their horses while the cannons sounded from the bastion. Mustafa Agha was to the left, the young prince to the right, and they returned to Gyulafehérvár in the same order in which they marched out. The sultan's insignia of rule were brought ahead of the prince by the aristocrats that had received them from the young György Rákóczi when they were handed over. The procession accompanied the Ottoman delegation to their accommodations in the Gálfi House, where they bid them farewell but left a large escort alongside the Ottoman dignitary. Meanwhile, the Hungarian and German infantrymen marched into the market square and took their positions. The Ottoman pipers and drummers escorted the prince up to the castle palace, on his way to his father.⁴⁵ The "old" prince greeted the counsellors and his son and gave them advice. While the young prince was in the palace with his father, the Hungarian and German infantry fired two salutes. The German soldiers then marched to their quarters but stopped on the way before the accommodations of the kapuji-bashi, where they also fired off a salvo. At 10 o'clock, the prince sent his carriage accompanied by numerous aristocrats and courtiers for Mustafa Agha, who they escorted to the audience chamber. At the gate to the palace, the prince's steward, Ferenc Bethlen, greeted the Ottoman dignitary and escorted him in to see his lord. György I Rákóczi rose from the table in deference to him. To his right stood the young prince, behind him Zsigmond Rákóczi and to his left the counsellors. Mustafa kissed the hand and robe of the "old" prince, and then handed over the letters of the sultan and the grand vizier to him, György II Rákóczi and the estates, comprising six letters in all. At the same time, he presented two ceremonial robes, or kaftans, each to the young and the old prince. At this time, the kapuji-bashi placed upon the head of György II Rákóczi the "scofium embroidered cap", which was the headwear of a janissary officer and was adorned with a decorative plume (*üsküf, börk*). Ten counsellors also each received a kaftan. During the period before lunch, the old prince and his sons accompanied by the Turkish scribe had a talk with Mustafa Agha and his entourage. Meanwhile, everyone else left the reception hall. After the meal together, during which the younger György Rákóczi sat at the prince's right hand and Mustafa Agha at his left, the participants in the ceremony went back to the audience chamber for a brief time, where the Ottoman envoy bid farewell and returned to his accommodations.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Although the source talks about the castle outside the city, it is clear on the basis of András Kovács's book that there was no freestanding castle, just the fortified city, and within this, the prince's palace. Kovács, *Késő reneszánsz építészet Erdélyben*, pp. 75–83.

⁴⁶ Szilágyi, *II. Rákóczi György fejedelemmé választása*, pp. 237–244.

It may be apparent that the handover of the insignia did not occur at once but took place in well-structured stages. There was some kind of customary order that stretched back to the 16th century for these events at the prince's court. István Báthory's insignia of confirmation were brought to Transylvania by the master falconer Mehmed Agha. The delegation was much larger and more impressive, being comprised of two hundred people according to the chronicler. The voivode rode a mile out of Gyulafehérvár to greet the Ottoman dignitary and received the sultan's banner there in the open, mounted on his horse, slightly different from described above. The Ottoman envoy and István Báthory also rode into the city alongside one another. The audience was held on the third day after this, and this was when there was the handover of the kaftans, the horse, the sceptre (*sceptrum=topuz*) and diadem, which here should not be understood as a crown, but instead a cap with a plume. During the investiture ceremony, twenty-five counsellors received kaftans.⁴⁷

György I Rákóczi could not help himself, and at the final reception on 12 July 1642, he threw it in the face of the kapuji-bashi that the Sublime Porte had made such a mess of it. The Ottoman dignitary promised that the horse would also be bestowed, and perhaps they would send it after him. However, the prince did not lighten up, and stated that it should have been there already. Although the above matter affected György I Rákóczi very deeply, he also paid attention to other affairs in Constantinople. For weeks, he had corresponded on the matter of the purchase of several items with his agent (*kapitiha*) at the Sublime Porte, who wrote that he could offer 850 thalers for the four rugs in question, and if they sold them, then fine, if not, then they would keep the money.⁴⁸ He showed similar "implacability" in the matter of the rugs as he did in connection with his son's appointment.

THE FINAL CONFIRMATION BY THE SULTAN OF GYÖRGY II RÁKÓCZI AFTER HIS FATHER'S DEATH (1649)

They wanted to hold the funeral of the "old" György Rákóczi on 10 January 1649. First, a national assembly was called, where it was decided to give back five of the seven counties that they had been able to reconquer temporarily (1644–1649) during the Thirty Years' War. After this, there were still areas under the control of the Transylvanian government such as Szabolcs and Szatmár counties as well as Nagyálló, Nagybánya (present day Baia Mare, in Romania), Tokaj, Regéc and Lednice (in present day Lednica, in Slovakia). The delegation reporting on the death of the prince had to beg to have the increase in tribute dismissed. Before they had officially reported the death, the Sublime Porte had been informed through Ferenc Gyárfás. At the news of the death, the men of Mózes Székely, who

⁴⁷ Papp, *Die Verleihungs-, Bekräftigungs- und Vertragsurkunden*, pp. 81–82; Forgách, *Emlékirat Magyarország állapotáról*, pp. 995–996; Majer, "Ghymeszi Forgách Ferencz", p. 475.

⁴⁸ György I Rákóczi to István Rácz, Gyulafehérvár, 12 July 1642, Szilágyi, *Levelek és okiratok*, pp. 678–679; István Rácz to György I Rákóczi, Constantinople, 11 June 1642, Szilágyi–Szilágyi, *Török-magyarkori államokmánytár*, vol. 3, p. 120.

was in captivity (or rather held hostage) at Yedikule Fortress, took measures to obtain the title of prince.

György II Rákóczi sent some gifts to the Sublime Porte through the envoy Miklós Sebessi, the amount of which the permanent envoy, Ferenc Gyárfás, thought was rather too small, pointing out that “*both our magnificent emperor is a new emperor [Mehmed IV (1648–1687)], the grand vizier is a new vizier [Sofu Mehmed (1648–1649)], and by the grace of God, your gracious highness also just gained the title of prince in reality, [...]*” so it would not have hurt to be more generous.⁴⁹ The estates tried to achieve their aim through a collective letter of petition (*mahzar* or *mazar letter* in contemporary Hungarian parlance). The document only touches upon a single issue, the elimination of the increase in tribute, and names István Serédy and his fellow envoys, who were begging for the good graces of the sultan on behalf of the prince and the estates. The type of document is also interesting. In national matters, the Hungarian estates, the same as the boyars of Moldavia and Wallachia, submitted a collective petition to the Sublime Porte signed and sealed by the counsellors.⁵⁰

The ambassador, István Serédy arrived in the Ottoman capital on 29 March 1649, where he was honorably received, but did not come before the grand vizier. He was also only briefly able to speak with Zülfikar Agha,⁵¹ since the ambassador of the Habsburg emperor, Johann Rudolf Schmid von Schwarzenhorn, took part in an audience with the sultan on this same day. Habsburg diplomacy was faced with a great task at this time, since at stake was the signing of the new Habsburg–Ottoman peace treaty. Johann Rudolf Schmid had been trying to make an agreement on this for a while with the Grand Vizeir Sofu Mehmed, whose dismissal further complicated the negotiations. At the same time, the talks had also proceeded slowly due to the demands of the Sublime Porte. The situation did not become any easier with the arrival of the new grand vizier, Kara Murat (1649–1650),⁵² who citing the Treaty of Zsitvatorok demanded a renewed payment of 200,000 thalers, just as his predecessor had.⁵³

Serédy also soon reported that the gift sent by Miklós Sebessi truly was too small and begged the prince to bring another 10,000 ducats to the Sublime Porte. At the same time, he asked that a draft ahdname also be submitted.⁵⁴ In Serédy’s letter dated 2 May, he reported that the Sublime Porte was not willing to back down on the reduction of the tribute, and were demanding another 15,000 ducats

⁴⁹ Ferenc Gyárfás to György II Rákóczi, Constantinople, 20 December 1648, Szilády–Szilágyi, *Török–magyarkori államokmánytár*, vol. 3, pp. 414–417.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 417–420.

⁵¹ Reports from István Serédy to György II Rákóczi, Constantinople, 30 March and 12 April 1649, Szilágyi, *Erdély és az északkeleti háború*, pp. 73–75.

⁵² Danişmend, “Osmanlı Devlet Erkânı”, p. 38.

⁵³ Johann Rudolf Schmid to Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 15 April 1649, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 121., Konv. 1, fol. 54–57; Meienberger, *Johann Rudolf Schmid zum Schwarzenhorn*; Durregger, *Diplomatische Kommunikation*; Cziráki, “Making Decisions at the Imperial Court”.

⁵⁴ Reports from István Serédy to György II Rákóczi, Constantinople, 30 March and 12 April 1649, Szilágyi *Erdély és az északkeleti háború*, pp. 73–75.

in addition. If the young prince did not want to concede, then they also threatened the envoy that they would overwhelm the country with Tatar soldiers. If the tribute were to arrive, then the obstacles to issuing the ahdname and the other insignia would be removed, and they would be brought to Transylvania by a kapuji-bashi. At the same time, they also demanded the “sum” from the Hungarian counties.⁵⁵ It was probably fortunate for the Transylvanians that the previous grand vizier, Sofu Mehmed, who was old and greedy for gifts, was dismissed on 21 May, and the janissary agha, Kara Murat was appointed to replace him. He received István Serédy on the third day after taking office, and everything that seemed so beyond hope before was settled at once. The grand vizier even noted that he was very happy that Mózes Székely – who had pleaded for the principality with the promise of a great amount of money – would not take the throne as prince, but instead the young Rákóczi. This is when the ambassador handed over the draft for the ahdname as well. Soon, on 1 June, he had an audience before the sultan. The grand vizier found out why they had allowed Kassa (present day Košice, in Slovakia) and the seven counties to return to Habsburg control. Although the ambassador alluded that the gates of Kassa had been opened to the armies in secret, at night, the grand vizier asked whether it was true that according to the agreement they were only in the hands of the prince until his death. Serédy admitted that was so, since the Sublime Porte had not provided real support and had ordered the prince at that time to return from the campaign. The grand vizier took the matter off the agenda, but noted that in the treaty signed with the Habsburg emperor the seven counties had been placed permanently under Transylvanian rule.⁵⁶ As I mentioned above, the representatives of the Habsburg and Ottoman empires had set down the basis of the new peace treaty at this time.⁵⁷ The manuscript volume containing the agreements signed with the Habsburg Empire and the submissions of the permanent ambassador that was kept at the Sublime Porte contains the notation that the temporary peace treaty (*temessük*) was issued under the name of the Grand Vizier Kara Murat. The seven counties were discussed at the very end of this, which however reflects the situation following their handover, according to which, “five

⁵⁵ Ambassador István Serédy to György II Rákóczi, Constantinople, 2 May 1649, Szilágyi, *Okmánytár II. Rákóczy György diplomáciai összeköttetéseihez*, pp.17–19.

⁵⁶ Report from István Serédy to György II Rákóczi, Constantinople, 15 June 1649, Szilágyi, *Erdély és az északkeleti háború*, p. 77.

⁵⁷ Papp, “Az Oszmán Birodalom”; Treaty text with the stamp of the Grand Vizier Kara Murat Pasha; The treaty text in Latin with the signature of the internuncius Johann Rudolf Schmid. (Jo. Schmidt); Three other copies of the Italian translation: ÖStA HHStA, TU, Kt. 8, 12 July 1649 (2 Recep 1059); GNN, 4 o Cod. MS. Turcica 29; The Latin translation of the Turkish text, along with the imperial ratification, Constantinople, 01 July 1649, ÖStA HHStA, HS, W 518; BOA, Düvel-i Ecnebiyye defterleri, Nr. 57/1. Nemeçe Ahd defteri, pp. 15–17; *Mu’ahedât mecmû’ası*. 3, pp. 84–88; *Treaties between Turkey and the Foreign Powers*, pp. 35–38. (01 July 1649) and alongside this, the imperial ratification with no date.

of the seven counties in Middle Hungary along with the castle of Kassa will remain in their current condition, and the voivode of Transylvania should not interfere in their affairs in any way.”⁵⁸

Franz Babinger in 1920, in Uppsala in the Oriental studies journal, *Le Monde Oriental* published the ceremonial acknowledgement of the sultan issued for György II Rákóczi's first tribute payment as well as the imperial pledge of the sultan itself transcribed in Arabic script, in German translation and with an attached photograph.⁵⁹ Following the appearance of the essay and the publication of sources, Imre Lukinich published a review of it in *Századok*, in which he stated along with a few other minor errors that the text of the document was already known to Hungarian historians in Hungarian translation.⁶⁰ This remark was fundamentally erroneous. Lukinich had not read the German translation of the documents carefully, but had only skimmed them, otherwise he could not have written that on pages 118–120 of volume 3 of the *Török–magyarkori államokmánytár* the text had already been published in Hungarian translation. It was not even the Hungarian translation of the berat for appointment mentioned above that was published there (it was on pages 116–117), but the firman of the sultan sent to György I Rákóczi as an accompanying letter to it. The field of history could have had a passing familiarity with the content of the imperial pledge through the work of Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall, who had quoted the text of the ahdname from a collection of letters (*Inscha des Reis Efendi Mohamed* Nr. 34.), the date of which he provided as follows: “*Haziran 1059* [July 1649]”.⁶¹

The original copy of the ahdname along with the letter from the sultan confirming the payment of tribute was held in the State and Court Library in Karlsruhe until the end of the Second World War, when a significant portion of the abundant materials related to Ottoman studies were destroyed.⁶²

⁵⁸ BOA, Düvel-i Ecnebiyye defterleri, Nemçe Ahd defteri, 17; *Mu‘āhedāt mecmū‘ası*. İstanbul, 3. no date. (1297.) 88.

⁵⁹ Babinger, “Zwei türkische Schutzbriefe”, pp. 115–151.

⁶⁰ Lukinich, “Franz Babinger: Zwei türkische Schutzbriefe” pp. 252–253.

⁶¹ Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, vol. 5, pp. 491–492 and p. 491, footnote c; Lukinich, as well as Sándor Silágyi previously had used the abridged second German publication. Szilády–Szilágyi, *Török–magyarkori államokmánytár*, vol. 3, p. 348; Lukinich, „Franz Babinger: Zwei türkische Schutzbriefe”, pp. 252–253.

⁶² I first heard from the renowned expert on Turkish studies from Munich, Hans Georg Majer, that the rich material on Ottoman studies there had burned due to the bombing during the Second World War. This personal information is confirmed by the most recent publication of the Holder catalogue, in which they indicated the surviving documents and sections with a cross. The collection that was located in the reference code Rastatt 216-326a was completely destroyed, with only the document, number 325, a brief record of a military muster of 1683, escaping (Holder, *Die Durlaucher und Rastatter Handschriften*, p. 217.). It is fortunate that in 1931 Franz Babinger published the photographs of the other lost documents with an introduction and notes, so that now on the basis of his publication the collection can at least be examined in photographs, which is unique from the standpoint that it contained the personal archives of a certain Bosnian Osman Pasha. It included the various documents from the offices of the bostanji-bashi and of the grand vizier's kaymakams that were created during official work, all the way to the offices of the Syrian, Anatolian and Egyptian beylerbeys. According to my knowledge, no similar collection

The outstanding Hungarian expert on Turkish studies, Lajos Fekete, spoke appreciatively about Babinger's publication of sources on the sultan's letters sent to György II Rákóczi, highlighting the careful transcription and translation, and the fine facsimile. Both Lukinich and also Fekete pointed out that the *ahdname* of György II Rákóczi showed extraordinary similarities to the *ahdnames* surviving in 17th-century Hungarian translations published by Imre Mikó in the *Erdélyi Történeti Adatokban*, particularly the imperial pledge of the sultan given to György I Rákóczi in 1630.⁶³

The above statement is completely correct.⁶⁴ If we consider that ambassador Serédy submitted a draft *ahdname* at the Sublime Porte, which was the basis for the imperial pledge for György II Rákóczi, then an explanation for the great similarity is found instantly. At the same time, I mentioned above that the Ottoman chancellery – just like similar European bureaus of the time – was based on stock phrases, it used the formal and structural elements from documents of the same type that had been created earlier, in the current case the texts of the imperial pledges for Bethlen, Catherine of Brandenburg and in particular, György I Rákóczi.

Following the Babinger publication of texts from 1920, the outstanding Czech expert in Oriental studies, Jan Rypka, also presented an essay. He published the document from the aforementioned *defter* under number Turcica 29 held in Göttingen, which the grand vizier sent as an accompaniment to the imperial pledge of the sultan. At the same time, he pointed out that the sultan's confirmation of the payment of tribute that Babinger also thought (incorrectly) was a *berat*, as well as the *ahdname* itself can also be found in the manuscript from Göttingen.⁶⁵

Thus, it can be shown that the *kapuji-bashi* brought three documents when confirming the prince: a letter from the sultan countersigning on the payment of tribute, an imperial pledge of the sultan that at the same time included the confirmation of the appointment of the prince, so was called both a *berat* and an *ahdname*, and a diploma from the grand vizier that was the letter accompanying the *ahdname*.

that has survived in the originals has not yet been discovered (Babinger, *Das Archiv des Bosniaken Osman Pascha*). The first Italian description of the collection was prepared by the famous Oriental studies expert of Emperor Leopold I not long after they were found in the camp of the Ottoman army following the second siege of Vienna. Brambach, *Meninski über türkische Handschriften*, pp. 303–308; Babinger, *Das Archiv des Bosniaken Osman Pascha*, pp. 2–6. For the two Turkish documents sent to György II Rákóczi, see: Brambach, *Die Handschriften*, p. 52, Nr. 96, “*Rastatt 232. Kalligraphisches Prachtstück; die Toghrâ und Doxologie (2 Zeilen) zu Anfang mit Goldschrift, 4,20 X 0,70 m; 36 Zeilen, je 7 cm von einander entfernt, vokalisiert Dîwânî. Berât und 'Ahdnâme aus Konstantinopel von Anfang Ğumâdi-l-âkhir 1059 (began am 12. Juni 1649), im Text dem 2. Hazîrân 1649 gleichgesetzt, an den Fürsten von Siebenbürgen (Erdel) Georg Rákóczy, dessen Inhalt ausführlich angegeben ist bei v. Hammer V. 491.)*”, “*Rastatt 233*”: the letter of the sultan confirming the payment of tribute is also mentioned here under the shelf guide.

⁶³ Fekete, “Osmanisch parkan”.

⁶⁴ MNL OL, Microfilm Archive. box 21050 (miscellaneous document copies from Ljubljana); the publication of the document in Arabic script and in the Serbo-Croatian language: Handžić, “Diploma sultana Murada IV”. Date: 3–13 April 1631; Mikó, “Athnámék”, pp. 343–348.

⁶⁵ Rypka, “Die türkischen Schutzbriefe”; GNN, 4 o Cod. MS. Turcica 29, 69b. and 62b–64a.

The envoys departed for home along with the kapuji-bashi at the end of June. On 7 July, the prince called the counsellors to Gyulafehérvár on 21 July, for the ceremonial inauguration.⁶⁶ The delegation from the Sublime Porte arrived from Kronstadt (in Hungarian Brassó, present day Braşov, in Romania), where it was received by a thousand *Székely* soldiers, and later another 2,000 joined them. For a while, the magistrates of Kronstadt also accompanied them to Weidenbach (in Hungarian Vidombák, present day Ghimbav, in Romania).⁶⁷

ANOTHER BERAT: THE CONFIRMATION OF THE PRINCE FERENC I RÁKÓCZI DURING HIS FATHER'S LIFETIME (1652)

György II Rákóczi called a Diet on 18 February, in Gyulafehérvár. The pressing reason for this was that he was suffering from such a serious case of smallpox that it could have been fatal. He asked the estates to elect his son, Ferenc Rákóczi, to be his successor while he was still alive. As with every similar case when preparations were made to place a child alongside his father, the example of Zsigmond Báthory and its sorrowful results came to mind. During the period of the Fifteen Years' War or Long Turkish War the rule of the restless prince devastated Transylvania nearly completely.

The election took place along with the enactment of strict regulations on 9 March. János Kemény was appointed as the regent. However, by the time the national assembly had concluded, György II Rákóczi had recovered nicely. János Boros was sent to the Sublime Porte for the confirmation by the sultan.⁶⁸

Sándor Szilágyi wrote very briefly about the sultan's confirmation of Ferenc Rákóczi in the 11th volume of *Erdélyi Országgyűlési Emlékek*. His information was for the most part taken from the chronicle of Georg Kraus, the scribe from Mühlbach. According to this, the insignia for confirmation were brought in March by an agent by the name of Hasan. However, the prince was not satisfied with this, and so in September he announced another national assembly, which sent István Serédy, a diplomat who was already experienced in these matters, along with János Daniel, György Bánffy and the royal magistrate of Mühlbach, Stephanus Mann, to rectify the "imperial pledge".⁶⁹

The confirmation by the sultan of the young prince ran into similar difficulties as that of György II Rákóczi ten years earlier. At first it seemed like everything would proceed in order, and the special and permanent envoys easily received the consent of the grand vizier with the help of the kizlar aghasi (*kizlar agasi*).⁷⁰ Szil-

⁶⁶ Szilágyi, *EOE*, vol. 11, p. 10, pp. 63–64.

⁶⁷ Szilágyi, *EOE*, vol. 11, p. 10.

⁶⁸ Szilágyi, *EOE*, vol. 10, pp. 21–24.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 23–24; Kraus, *Erdélyi krónika*, p. 201.

⁷⁰ Kapittha Márton Boldai to György II Rákóczi, Constantinople, 28 May 1652, Szilágyi, *Okmánytár II. Rákóczy György diplomáciai összeköttetéseihez*, p. 97.

ágyi noted that the papers from this delegation were still lurking somewhere. Recently it has been possible to discover some of the Ottoman documents related to the appointment of Ferenc I Rákóczi in Istanbul and in Göttingen.

It must be stated that Georg Kraus and Sándor Szilágyi who followed him were going down the wrong path. Naturally, the most obvious error was committed by Kraus, according to which “*Hasan Pasha*” had already brought the insignia of appointment in March. The envoy of the Sublime Porte, who was identified as *Elczi Haszon* (Elçi Hasan) in the Transylvanian sources, did in fact go to Transylvania during the prince’s illness.⁷¹ The purpose of his journey was twofold, on the one hand, he had to provide information on whether the prince of Transylvania was alive and on the other hand, he was participating in a joint Ottoman–Habsburg border demarcation commission in Hungary.⁷² However, one thing is certain, at this time there was not yet any talk of electing Ferenc Rákóczi. Kraus thoroughly confused the events of this period, and it can be seen that for him the actual purpose of the envoy’s trip was not what was important, but for him to work his anti-Hungarian speech given in Mühlbach into his message. The group of insignia that were wanted could not have arrived before the Transylvanian delegation petitioned for Ferenc Rákóczi’s confirmation. The envoy Márton Boldai still mentions getting the grand vizier’s permission in May.⁷³ However, the documents to be presented now all place the petition and the confirmation itself in the autumn and winter of 1652. I propose that the first steps thought to be for appointment could not have been anything other than preliminary requests for permission. If in connection with this, an order was prepared in the name of the sultan, that would not have been considered a final confirmation. An example such as this is known from later, when Mihály II Apafi was recognised as the future prince while his father was still alive.⁷⁴ All of this is just supposition in terms of Ferenc Rákóczi, and there is no proof of it. The prince and the estates pleaded for the mercy of the sultan through a collective letter of petition, just as they had ten years earlier. This document is known in Turkish translation. Several Transylvanian aristocrats

⁷¹ János Kemény to György II Rákóczi, Gyulafehérvár, 8 January 1652, MNL OL MKA, Archivum Familiae Rákóczi, E 190. 27. cs. 6566; Publication: Szilágyi, *Okmánytár II. Rákóczy György diplomáciai összeköttetéseihez*, pp. 92–94; the pasha of Buda also reports on this: TSMA, E.6977.

⁷² Papp, “Egy Habsburg követ”, pp. 40–52; Papp, “Osmanische Funktionäre”; Szabados, *Die Berichte Hans Caspars*, Nr. 34, pp. 98–102 and Nr. 36, pp. 105–109. Nr. 36.

⁷³ Kapitihá Márton Boldai to György II Rákóczi, Constantinople, 28 May 1652, Szilágyi, *Okmánytár II. Rákóczy György diplomáciai összeköttetéseihez*, p. 97.

⁷⁴ Letter of the Sultan that Mihály II Apafi received to ensure him of the title of prince, while his father was still alive, ANR DG-București, Doc. turc. XXIX/2326, 03–12 August 1684 (“*evâhir Şabân 1095*”); Gemil, *Relațiile Țărilor Române cu Poarta Otomană*, p. 368. In this case, we also see that months passed between the first and final steps for the confirmation by the sultan. The final document of appointment of Mihály II Apafi, ÖStA HHStA, TU 1684. 11. 19–28. (Fragment of the original *berat*) (“Fragment, Nachfolge Apáfy’s in Siebenbürgen betrifft. Mitte Zilhidsche 1059 / Nov. 1684); SUB Göttingen, 4^o Cod. MS. Manuscript, Turcica 30, fol. 77r–77v; Its publication with a French translation: Veselá-Přenosiřová, “Contribution aux rapports de la Porte Sublime”, pp. 571–572.

signed the petition on behalf of the estates, and in the translation, it was also noted that the petition was authenticated by their seals above their names in the original. The document was issued in September (“*bu ‘ubūdīyet-nāmemiiz Erdel Belgrādında evvel-i güz ayıñ yigirmi sekizinci gününde sene 1641 velādet-i ĥazreti ‘İsā ‘m (= ‘aleyhi s-selām) yazılmışdur*”). The argument of the estates was so similar to the petition following the election ten years previously that it can be hypothesised that they were prepared using the model of earlier documents. In essence, they cited that if the prince were to die, it will be the duty of the estates to elect a new ruler, but all of this would take time. Since they were surrounded by large and strong countries, it would be better if they were to avoid the danger inherent in the interregnum and elect the son of the prince to be the future prince while his father was still alive. They had decided on all of this in the Diet that had been concluded, and requested that the sultan confirm their decision according to custom.⁷⁵ Two documents were created due to this petition, or at least this many are known up to now. One was addressed to György II Rákóczi and in this, he was informed of the sultan’s decision, according to which his son would be accepted as prince after his death, but until then he could not intervene in the matters of governance. In the manuscript at Göttingen it was considered necessary to mention that this document was not an *ahdname* of the sultan, just a *name*, or a letter (“*‘bi-l-fi ‘l Erdel ĥākimi olan Rāqōçī Gōrgī ve Erdel memleketine tābi ‘ üç millet ā ‘yāni ‘arż u maĥzarları ile ricā eyledükleri ‘ahdnāme vērilmeyüb işbu vērilen nāme-i hümmāyūnuñ şūretidür fi sene 1063* [In the request of the current prince of Transylvania, György Rákóczi and the nobles of the three estates and their collective letter of petition, they have requested an imperial treaty, which has not been issued. [This] is a copy of the sovereign’s letter in the year 1063]”) The document is in fact a response to the petition of the prince and the estates, which also repeats elements from the request. At the same time, it also differs in a few points from the previous *ahdnames*, and for example prohibits the voivodes of Moldavia and Wallachia being received if they rebel against Constantinople. It also blocks the immigration of rayahs, both from the voivodeships and from Ottoman territories. The insignia of the prince to come from the sultan were the following: two decorative kaftans, a banner of the sultan and a sceptre, which they bestowed upon both the adult and child princes. The insignia of rule were brought by an internal official of the court, the *haseki-bashi*, Ahmed.⁷⁶ Mention must also be made of the appointment letter itself. The confirmation document sent at this time has been unknown to the study of history to this point. Its copy can be found in the aforementioned manuscript from Göttingen under reference code Turcica 29, and it is a *berat*, not an *ahdname*.⁷⁷

⁷⁵ TSMA E. 6462.

⁷⁶ SUB, Göttingen, 4^o Cod. MS. Turcica 29. fol. 96v–97r. The date is 20–30 Muharrem 1063 / 2–11 December 1652.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

THE CONSTRUCTION, STRUCTURE AND DIPLOMATIC ANALYSIS OF THE
TEMPORARY LETTER OF APPOINTMENT (*BERÁT*)

This document bears special value when examining the diplomatic links between Transylvania and the Sublime Porte in the 17th century. Namely, on the basis of this berat it has also been possible to form a clear opinion on the documentary materials related to the confirmation of the prince ten years earlier mentioned above. Without the document from the sultan appointing Ferenc I Rákóczi, it would not have been possible to perform the textual critical analysis that provides the basis for me to state that the 1642 letter of confirmation for György II Rákóczi known from the collection of Ferīdūn bey and listed as an ahdname there, is instead a berat. From the comparison of the text of the two documents it becomes clear that the original berat of 1642 is essentially the same word-for-word as the document granted ten years later to Ferenc I Rákóczi. The question may arise about what was left out of the publication that could be supplemented by the manuscript in Göttingen. The elements that are missing are those that are indispensable for identifying the “type”, such as the long introductory section that states that the sultan, as the trustee of divine justice, fulfills the requests of those who turn to him as well as references to sections of the text of the Koran that are aimed at observing contracts and supporting beneficiaries. The Ferīdūn publication for the most part included the details that were interesting from a political perspective, which state that the prince and the representatives of the three nations had petitioned for the confirmation of the young György Rákóczi while his father was still alive with the condition that he not be able to interfere in the exercise of power. The tribute had to be sent in time and if the voivodes of Moldavia or Wallachia were to rise up against the Sublime Porte and seek refuge there or immigrating rayahs came looking for a better life, they must be handed over. Based on these conditions, the prince and the estates requested the issuance of a berat of the sultan, which – with the renewed mention of the terms – the sultan had fulfilled and appointed György II Rákóczi prince of Transylvania, but he would only be able to govern the country in actuality after the death of his father. The document repeatedly mentioned the surrender of the tribute on time, lawful rule and includes a recurrent formula, according to which the young György Rákóczi will be a friend to the sultan’s friends and an enemy to his enemies. The text in the Ferīdūn collection related to Ferenc I Rákóczi ends here, essentially in the middle of a sentence that states that a kapujibashi would bring the insignia of the prince. The missing section is also worthy of attention. This is where the berat talked about how György II Rákóczi must do everything to protect the state and his subjects, who in return must consider him the prince after his father’s death and must recognize his rule. The original text concluded with the customary formula, “*They have to know this, let them put their trust in the sublime monogram.*” A precise date was not included on the document, the currently unknown draftsman of the Ferīdūn collection only provided the year.

The above structural elements are thus repeated in the case of Ferenc I Rákóczi as well, and the text is identical aside from having the names changed and minor stylistic differences. This is a quite natural occurrence. An element of diplomacy

of this great importance, the installation of a vassal ruler into power, demands clear forms, grand, ceremonial phrasing, established ceremony and the reduction of improvisation to the extent possible by the sovereign power. Differences from the usual always suggest the development of a new structure of political power, which requires the alteration of the ceremonies as well as the symbols, insignia and documents used.

Therefore, there is no wonder that berats based on the same logic and using very similar expressive terminology and content were prepared for the vassal rulers of the period. However, very few examples of this are found in publications. As an example, there is a single known Moldavian berat from the 17th century, which was sent to the voivode Alexandru Iliaş around 1620/21, when Gaşpar Graţiani was removed.⁷⁸ Of those that have not been published, the berat of the Cossack hetman Petro Doroshenko stands out (1669).⁷⁹

Since the entire process is built upon a very rigid system, it is possible to identify those documents and insignia about which information was not found, or which due to the preliminary nature of the confirmation – since the father was still alive – were not sent. The prince's letter of petition sent to the Sublime Porte for his son's appointment has not survived, or has not yet been found. At the same time, the letter of the sultan issued to the estates is not known either, although I consider its existence to be certain, since there are continuous examples of them from the 16th century. It was also necessary for the grand vizier to write a document called a *mektûb* (letter). Despite the lack of these, we have made a large step forward, since there had been no materials available so far from Hungarian archives related to this appointment. From the berat, it is clear that only the decorative clothing, the sultan's banner and the sceptre were sent of the prince's insignia, so the sabre, the ornamental plume, the janissary officer's cap and the horse with its equipment were left out of the set. These should have been brought at the final confirmation, with the transfer of power, which – with the knowledge of Ferenc I Rákóczi's life story – never could have happened.

According to the Transylvanian Saxon historian Georg Kraus, a pasha by the name of Osman, the sultan's cup-bearer, was sent from the Sublime Porte to confirm the young prince.⁸⁰ Precise information was found in the correspondence of the Rákóczi family in terms of when and where the handover of the documents and insignia of appointment took place. The young Ferenc Rákóczi himself wrote to his grandmother, Zsuzsanna Lorántffy on 14 February 1653, that “*I went before the Turkish envoy and there were quite a lot shots, but I did not fear anything, and I entered with him on his horse from the Váradsja [present day Oarda, in Romania] Bridge.*”⁸¹ Although we do not have any more information about the ceremony besides the handover of the insignia of power, the cited correspondence indicates

⁷⁸ Ferīdūn, *Mecmū‘a-i münşe‘ātü s-selāfīn*, vol. 2, pp. 488–489, Papp, “Keresztény vazallusok”, pp. 67–96 and 92–93.

⁷⁹ BOA, İbnülemin, Hariciyye No. 52; Ostapchuk, “Cossack Ukraine”.

⁸⁰ Kraus, *Erdélyi krónika*, p. 201.

⁸¹ Szilágyi, *A két Rákóczi György*, p. 448.

that it proceeded in a similar manner to what took place ten years earlier, in the case of György II Rákóczi.

APPENDIX

1.

Document of temporary appointment issued to György II Rákóczi. The text of the document had been modified from its original form as a document of appointment (berāt) to an abridged version of an imperial pledge (‘ahdnāme).

Ferīdūn, Mecmū’-a-i münşe’ātü s-selāfīn, vol. 2, pp. 470–471.

Published copy

Type of document: berāt-i hümāyūn

Müşārūn ileyh Rāqōcī Gōrgī qrāluñ oğlına hükümetiñ tevfiži irādesiyle işdār buyurulan ‘ahd-nāme-i hümāyūn şüretidür

bi-l-fi’l Erdel hākimi olan Rāqōcī Gōrgī hutimet ‘avāqibuhu bi-l hayruñ oğlı gendüden-şoñra Erdel hükümetine mutaşarrıf olmaq fermānum olmağın tevqi’-i refi’-i hümāyūnum vāşıl olıcaq ma’lūm ola ki

müşārūn ileyh babañ Rāqōcī Gōrgīñ der-i devlet-medārımuza elçisi ile mektüb ve pişkeşi ve Erdel memleketine tābi’ üç millet ā’yānınuñ ādemleri ve mağzarları gelüb babañdan-şoñra hükümet saña ‘ināyet u ihsānum olunmaq bābında ‘avātıf-i ‘aliyemüzden ricā vu iltimās eylemeleriyle mādām-ki babañ hayātda ola Erdel hākimi olub vefātından-şoñra hükümet-i mezbūre⁸² sen mutaşarrıf ve şadāqat u istiğāmetle ‘ubūdīyet maqāmında şābit qadem olub ve dōstimuza dōst ve düşmenimūze düşmen olasın ve devlet-i ‘aliyeme hayr-i h’āhlıq ve toğrılıq üzere Erdel hārācını vaqtıyle irsāl u işālda ihtimām edesin Eflāq ve Boğdān voyvodalarından ve bōyār ve bellü başlıklarından biri ‘işyān edüb Erdel vilāyetine qaçub varduqlarında tütüb āsitāne-i devlet-medāruma gönderesin ve sāyir memālik-i mağrüsemez re’āyāsından dañı firār edenleri girtüye döndüresin şürüt-i mezkūreye ri’āyet eylemek üzere ve babañ hayātda olduqça sen hükūmete qarışmayub gendüden-şoñra Erdel vilāyetinüñ hākimi sen olmaq bābında haqqıñda mezīd-i ‘ināyet-i mülūkāne ve mezīyet-i ‘avārif-i husrevānem vücūde getürüb saña iki şevb hil’at-i mürişü l-behçet ile sancaq ve topuz ihsānımız olub dergāh-i mu’allāmuz qapucı başlıklarından iftiħārü l-emācidi ve-l-ekārim filān zīde mecduhu ile irsāl olunmuşdur vuşūlunda gerekdür ki eşnāf-i i’zāz ve ikrām ile hil’atları giyüb sancaq ve topuzı hıfz edüb işbu nāme-i encāmuñ mefhūmıyle ‘amel eylesesin sene 1052.

Translation:

Since my imperial command has been issued that the son of the current prince of Transylvania, György Rákóczi, may his life end in good, shall hold the government of Transylvania after him, as soon as the sublime imperial letter arrives, let it be known: A letter, an envoy, and a gift from your aforementioned father have arrived at the court of felicity as have the envoys and joint publications with the seals (*mağzarları*) of the nobles of the

⁸² In Original: “mezbūre hükūmete”.

Three Nations of Transylvania. They have indicated their request and hope that the government will be handed over to you after your father.

As long as your father is alive, he shall be the prince of Transylvania, but after his death, you shall hold the title of prince of Transylvania. You shall be constant in the sincerity and devotion of your loyalty, friend to our friends and enemy to our enemies, and remain benevolent in righteousness towards my exalted empire.

You shall pay the Transylvanian tribute on time. If any of the voivodes or nobles (bellü başlular) of Moldavia or Wallachia flees to Transylvania, you shall capture them and send them back to my court of felicity.

If anyone flees from the *re āyā* of my well-protected realm, you shall return them. In consideration of these conditions, as long as your father is alive, you shall not interfere in his reign. But in accordance with the fact that you shall become the prince of Transylvania after him, you have been granted an abundance of high, royal benevolence and magnanimous, distinguished grace, and from me are sent two robes of honour, which are the cause of joy, a banner, and a mace (*topuz*), which have been sent by my *kapudji bashi*, who is the pride of the illustrious and the grand dignitaries, [name missing], may his dignity increase, as soon as he arrives, you shall (consider) them the pinnacle of honour and favour, put on the robe of honour, keep the banner and the mace, and from now on act in accordance with the contents of my very kind letter. In 1052 (1642).

2.

Document of temporary appointment issued to Ferenc Rákóczi in relation to the fact that as long as the prince of Transylvania, György Rákóczi is still alive, he shall hold the said rulership, but after his death, (Ferenc Rákóczi) shall dispose of the principality.

Göttingen, Niedersächsische Nationalbibliothek, 4^o Cod. MS. Turcica 29. fol. 96r–96v.
Copy

Type of document: *berāt-i hümāyūn*

Erdel hākimi olan Rāqōçī Gōrgī mādām-ki hay^vātada ola hūkūmet-i mezbūreye muṭaṣṣaruf ola fevt olunduqdan soñra oğlı Rāqōçī Ferenc Erdel hākimi olmaq üzre verilən berātuñ şüretidür fi sene [10]63.

- 1 Nişān-i şerif oldur-ki çün cenāb-i mālīkū l-mülki celle celālehu ve te‘ālā ve ḥazret-i müfīzū n-nevālī ve-l-merātibi
- 2 ‘amma iḥsānuhu ve te‘ālā kemāl-i kerem ü cevdetden zāt-i se‘ādet-āyātumu innā ca ‘al-nāka ḥalīfeten fi-l-ārd⁸³
- 3 teşrīfine maḥşūş qılub ‘atebe-i ‘alīye-i ‘izzet-nişānumı melāz-i mülük-i eşrāf-i āfāq ve dūdmān-i devlet-bünyānımu
- 4 maqsim-i erzāq-i kāffe-i ennām eyledi fa-lā-cereme şükran ‘ale tilke n-ni‘ami zimmet-i himmet-i şāhāne ve şān-i se‘ādet-
- 5 nişān-i pādīşāhāneme vācib ü ehemmi ve müteḥattim ü elzem olmışdur-ki hemvāre elṭāf-i ‘ināyet ve iḥsānum küşāde
- 6 ve esbāb-i ‘atīfet-i fi imtinānum āmāde ola binā’en ‘alā zālīke bi-l-fi’l Erdel hākimi olan iftiḥārū

⁸³ In the original, instead of *ārz*, *ārş*. *Yā Dāvūdu innā ca ‘alnāka ḥalīfeten fi-l-ārd Qur’an*, Şād 38: 26, “O David, We appointed you a deputy on earth”. *Kur’ān-i Kerīm*, p. 453; *The Qur’an*, p. 370.

- 7 l-ümerā' i 'izāmi l-ṭsevīye Rāqoçī Görgy hutimet 'avāqibuhu bi-l hayruñ oğlu olub
gendüden-şonra
- 8 Erdel hükümetine mutaşşarıf olmaq fermānum olan rāfi' -i tevqī' -i refi' ü ş-şān-i hāqānī
ve nāfiz-i yarlıg-i belīg-i meserret-
- 9 'unvān-i tācdārī qıdvetü ümerā' i l-milleti mesīhīye Rāqoçī Ferenc hutimet 'avāqibuhu
bi-l-hayr için müşārün ileyh
- 10 babası Rāqoçī Görginüñ der-i devlet-medārımuza mektüb ve elçisi ve pīşkeşi ve Erdel
memleketine tābi'
- 11 üç millet ā' yānımuñ ādemleri ve maḥzarları gelüb babası-i müşārün ileyhden şonra Er-
del hükümeti
- 12 oğlu-i mūmā ileyh Rāqoçī Ferenc hutimet 'avāqibuhuya 'ināyet u ihsānum olmaq
bābında 'avātıf-i 'alīyemüze
- 13 ricā vu iltimās eylemeleri ile mādām-ki babası hayv[ā]tda ola Erdel hākimi olub fevt
olunduğdan-şonra
- 14 hükümet-i Erdele oğlu-i mūmā ileyh mutaşşarıf olmaq üzre berāt-i hümāyūnum
vērilmek bābında istid' ā-yi
- 15 'ināyet ve istircā-i merḥamet eyledüğü ecilden imdi babası-i müşārün ileyh hayv[ā]tda
Erdel hākimi olub
- 16 fevt olduqdan şonra hükümet-i Erdele oğlu-i mūmā ileyh mutaşşarıf olub şadāqat u
istiḳāmet ile
- 17 'ubūdīyet maqāmında sābit qadem ve doğruluq ile devlet-i 'alīyemizüñ hayr-i h'āhi
olub Erdel ḥarācını
- 18 vaqit u zemānı ile irsāl ve Boğdān ve Eflāq voyvodalarından ve böyārlarından ve bellü
başlularından
- 19 'işyān edüb Erdel vilāyetine qaçub varduqlarında aḥz edüb āsitāne-i devlet-
medārımuza
- 20 gönderüb ve Boğdān ve Eflāq ve sāyir memālik-i maḥrüsemez re'āyālarından birisi
firār eyledükde cümlesi
- 21 girü memālik-i maḥsüsemeze redd edüb göndermek üzre ḥaṭṭ-i hümāyūn-i se'ādet-
maqrūnum şadır olmağın mücebince (96v.)
- 22 işbu berāt-i se'ādet-āyāt ve behcet-gāyātı vërdüm ve buyurdum-ki ba'dü l-yevm
müşārün ileyh Erdel
- 23 hākimi olan babası Rāqoçī Görgi hutimet 'avāqibuhu mādām-ki hayv'ātda ola Erdel
hākimi olub
- 24 fevt olduqdan şonra hükümet-i Erdele oğlu-i mūmā ileyh şurūt-i mezküre ile mutaşşarıf
ve āsitāne-i
- 25 se'ādet-āşyānımuza şadāqat u istiḳāmet ile 'ubūdīyet maqāmında sābit qadem ve
toğruluq ile devlet-i
- 26 'alīyemizüñ hayr-i h'āhi olub Erdel ḥarācı vaqit u zemānı ile āsitāne-i se'ādet-āşyānı-
muza
- 27 irsāl ve dōstuma dōst ve düşmenüme düşmen olub ve bu⁸⁴ minvāl-i meşrū' ve şurūt-i
mezküre ile
- 28 babası-i müşārün ileyh mutaşşarıf olduğı üzre oğlu-i mūmā ileyh daḥı mutaşşarıf olub
ve hıfz
- 29 u ḥirāset-i memleket ve zabṭ u şiyānet-i ḥazīne ve ra'īyet bābında bezl-i maqdūr ve
sa'y-i nā-maḥşūr eyleye ol bābda

⁸⁴ The ve (and) had been two times written or it should be bu (this), but it is from the manuscript not sure. I accepted according to context the second option.

30 imdād üze[r]inden [?] hıc āhad māni‘ ü dāfi‘ olunmaya şöyle bileler ‘alāmet-i şerīfe
i‘timād qılalar tahrīren fi evāhīri şehri muhārremü l-ḥaram sene selese ve-sittin ve-elf

Translation:

The noble monogram (*Niṣān*) is as follows: Since the majestic Lord of the Universe – great and sublime is his glory – and his Holy Majesty, the generous giver of grace – he shall give his manifold grace continually – from his perfect grace-giving excellence to honour my blissful personage [according to the Qur’anic verse], “we make you deputy (caliph) on earth”. He has made my grand, excellent court a refuge for the noble kings of our time and our eternal, blissful dynasty has made it the place where the daily bread of humanity is distributed.

No doubt, the expression of gratitude for these benefits has become a royal custom, necessary, obligatory, and inevitable for my sovereign, blessed Majesty. In the same way, my gracious and giving kindness should be open, and this gives me a reason to always give thanks.

Therefore, the current prince of Transylvania, the chosen one of the great Christian princes, György Rákóczi, may his life end in good, has my command as it is written for his son, namely, after him he shall hold the government of Transylvania, thus, the father of the one mentioned, György Rákóczi, has sent his letter, his envoy, and his gift to the blessed porte for the possessor of the exalted, grand monogram (*rāfi‘-i tevqī‘-i refī‘ü ṣ-ṣān-i ḥāqānī*), for the holder of the grand and mighty imperial document of appointment (*nāfiṣ-i yarlıg-i belīg-i meserret-‘unvān-i tācdārī*), for the model of the princes of the Christian community of faith, for Ferenc Rákóczi, may his life end in good. Both the messengers and the joint supplications with the seals (*maḥzarları*) of the nobles of the Three Nations of Transylvania have arrived.

They have directed their request and hope that after his aforementioned father, the government of Transylvania will pass to his aforementioned son, Ferenc Rákóczi, may his life end (in good).

As long as his father is alive, the latter shall be the prince of Transylvania, but after his death the son shall hold the government of Transylvania. In this matter, they have graciously and humbly requested that I issue my imperial document of appointment (*berāt-i hümāyūnum*).

Now we have issued our letter related to blessedness handwritten by ourselves (*ḥaṭṭ-i hümāyūn-i se ‘ādet-maqrūnum*), which provides that the father, as long as he survives, be prince of Transylvania. After his death, the government of Transylvania shall pass to the aforementioned son if he remains steadfast in sincerity and devotion in his loyalty and benevolent in righteousness towards my exalted realm and pays the Transylvanian tribute in a timely and punctual manner.

If any of the voivodes of Moldavia or Wallachia or their boyars or nobles (*bellü başlular*) flees to Transylvania, they shall be captured and sent back to my court of felicity.

If anyone flees from the *re ‘āyā* of Moldavia or Wallachia or from the other inhabitants of my lands, they shall be returned to my well-protected empire.

Therefore, my extraordinarily benevolent document of appointment (*berāt-i se ‘ādet-āyāt ve behcet-ğāyātı*), adorned with [Koranic] verses, is now issued, and I have ordered that as long as his father György Rákóczi, may his life end in good, the aforementioned prince of Transylvania is still alive, he shall also be prince of Transylvania. After his death, however, the government of Transylvania shall be held by his son, Ferenc Rákóczi, may his life end in good, under the aforementioned conditions.

He shall remain steadfast in sincerity and devotion in his loyalty towards my court, which is the refuge of felicity, benevolent in righteousness towards my exalted empire, and pay the Transylvanian tribute on time and punctually to my court, which is the refuge of felicity.

He shall be the friend of our friends and the enemy of our enemies.

The aforementioned son shall hold [the government of Transylvania] lawfully and under these aforementioned conditions, as his aforementioned father has held it.

He shall exert (all) possible effort for the preservation and support of the country and the protection and defence of the treasury and the subjects, and in this case there cannot be the slightest obstacle or any refusal to help. They have to know this, let them put their trust in the sublime monogram.

Written down in the first decade of the forbidden Muḥarrem in 1063 (22 December 1651 – 1 January 1652).

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ZOLTÁN PÉTER BAGI

The History of the Regiment of Johann von Pernstein*

INTRODUCTION

Today all of the world's military forces consist of precisely defined organisational units, where the bearers of each title and rank exactly know their tasks and purview. However, this transparency was not characteristic of the military organisations at the end of the 16th century and at the beginning of the 17th century. In these organisations, a person well-versed in warfare was bestowed with tasks and authority for a definite time period. In other words, the emperor hired an *Obrist* or *Obristhauptmann* or *Hauptmann* or *Rittmeister* or captain to recruit, organise, arm, move to the theatre of war and lead infantry or cavalry (consisting of a certain number of soldiers), a regiment, a battalion or battalions (*Fähnlein* or *Fahne*), or company or companies within the framework of a contract for a fixed time period (usually for three, or occasionally six month).¹ On the basis of available groups of various sources, one can get an insight into the everyday lives of mercenaries who were employed in the service of the Habsburg Empire at the turn of the 16th–17th century (like in the case of histories of regiments which were fashionable in 19th–20th century). This study examines the history of the infantry regiment hired and led by Johann von Pernstein during the Long Turkish War (1591/93–1606). However, before venturing into the discussion of the history of the regiment, it is worth briefly looking at the life of the *Obrist*.

THE CAREER OF JOHANN VON PERNSTEIN UNTIL HIS ASSIGNMENT AS OBRIST

Johann von Pernstein (*Jan z Pernštejna* in Czech) was born non 30 July 1561 from the marriage of Vratislav von Pernstein (*Vratislav z Pernštejna* in Czech) and Maria Manrique de Lara; in other word, he was the descendant of a Czech-Moravian and a Spanish aristocratic family. His father, true to this Catholic confession, counted as a very influential person in the Habsburg court, as he had close, as it

* This article was supported by the János Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. This article has been written within the framework of the János Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, as well as the project of the MTA–SZTE Research Group of the Ottoman Age (Eötvös Loránd Research Network). The research has been supported by the János Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, the National Research, Development and Innovation Office (NRDI) (Nemzeti Kutatási, Fejlesztési és Innovációs Hivatal) through a grant (Thematic Excellence Programme (Tématerületi Kiválósági Program) 2020, NKFIH-1279-2/2020) of the Interdisciplinary Centre of Excellence (University of Szeged), the Department of Medieval and Early Modern Hungarian History (Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Szeged), MTA–SZTE Research Group of the Ottoman Age (Eötvös Loránd Research Network).

¹ For the use and meaning of various offices, see: Bagi, *Pápa a Fuggerzeitungokban*, pp. 11–29.

were friendly, ties to Archduke Maximilian, who later became Holy Roman emperor as well as Czech and Hungarian king. He participated in the Schmalkaldic War (1546–1547), and then in the company of Archduke Maximilian, who was three years older than him, he attended the wedding ceremony of Philip II of Spain and Mary Tudor on 25 July 1554, in Winchester Cathedral in London. In his way back home, he was dubbed as a knight of the Distinguished Order of the Golden Fleece in Antwerp. He was the first among the Czech-Moravian nobles who was granted with this prestigious distinction. Archduke Maximilian held the fate of Pernstein's father at his heart, since Maximilian, who had been elected as emperor in 1564, appointed him as Czech Lord Chancellor (*Oberstkanzler von Böhmen*) in 1567, and then in 1572, the emperor sent him to the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth (*Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów*) with Wilhelm von Rosenberg (*Vilém z Rožmberka* in Czech) in order for them to support his second son, Archduke Ernest's claim to the Polish throne. The Czech Lord Chancellor and the Master of the Horse drowned in the Danube on 27 October 1582 in a ship accident.²

As a loyal subject of the Habsburg family, Johann carried out both military and political assignments that were far from being uncommon in the age. After he had married his own cousin, Anna Maria Manrique de Lara y Mendoza on 3 February 1587, in Vienna, he joined the army of one of the best generals of the age, Alessandro Farnese, the Prince of Parma, then governor of the Spanish Netherlands. It is also known that he commanded his own unit in 1591 there. After that, Rudolf II commissioned him along with Salentin von Isenburg and Simon Graf zu Lippe to mediate between the Spanish king and the orders of the Netherlands that revolted. However, this mission failed. After his diplomatic failure, he joined the army of Peter Ernst I von Mansfeld, the new governor of the Spanish Netherlands, in 1593. In the same year Johann participated in the campaign along the Oise against Henry IV Bourbon, during which he took the castle of Neuville with two German infantry regiments, two cavalry companies, and artillery of the same amount. In the next two years he continued warring in the Kingdom of France. He took part in the siege of Cambrai under the command of Pedro Henriquez de Acevedo, Count of Fuentes in 1595. Leading his troops, Pernstein stormed at the rift breached into the wall of the city on 2 October, after which the French defenders surrendered the citadel on 9 October.³

In the 19th century it was still believed that Pernstein had already participated in the siege of Esztergom in 1595.⁴ However, in fact he appeared in the Hungarian theatre of war only in the next year, in 1596. At that time, the emperor appointed Pernstein, who had gained military experience in the Spanish Netherlands, as one of the most important major officers of the Christian army led by Archduke Maximilian: he became *Obrist-Feldzeugmeister* who was in charge of acquiring and

² Schweigerd, *Oesterreichs Helden*, p. 470.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

supplying munitions and artillery.⁵ He participated in the campaign in this position; he fought at the siege of Hatvan (between 15 August and 3 September 1596) and in the battle of Mezőkeresztes (between 24 and 26 October 1596) too.⁶

In the next year, until the May of 1597, he took part in retaking Tata in this military position too. The fortress defending the only ford across the swamps of the Danube floodplain and the Által-rill was occupied by the advancing main Ottoman army in July 1594. By possessing this strategically vital location, on the one hand, the Turkish and Tatar troops stationed in Győr could be effectively severed from their supplies. On the other hand, the overland route between Komárom and Esztergom could be secured.⁷ Pernstein is supposed to having had the idea that one night they had to raid the enemy, and during the raid they could use the new weapon, the firecracker. The first prototype of this weapon was imported by Karl von Mansfeld in 1595, from the Netherlands, though; it seems that on the basis of his own experience, its effect was not entirely unknown to Pernstein either.⁸ Thus, the *Obrist-Feldzeugmeister* went to Érsekújvár (present day Nové Zámky, in Slovakia) on 20 May, and presented his plan to Miklós Pálffy, the *Obrist* of Mining Town and Esztergom, who accepted it. The available Christian corps, which had been stationed in Érsekújvár, Komárom, and Esztergom in the winter, marched under Tata in order of battle on the night of 22 May, after passing near Almás. Three cavalymen who had been sent ahead and spoke sophisticated Turkish made the gate guards believe that they were carrying food from Buda to Győr. As night approached and they were afraid of the enemy's attack, they asked for permission to spend the night under the walls. After they had acquired it, the twenty select Spanish and Walloon mercenaries pushed the cart carrying firecrackers meant to implode the gate onto the bridge over arching the moat. When it came to pass, Pernstein lighted the fuse of the weapon. After the explosion the Walloons invaded the fortress, who were followed by Benedek Pogrányi's 500 hajduks from Esztergom, and by the 200 chosen German riflemen of Johann Baptista Pezzen. Moreover, as a diversion, an additional contingent of 300 Hungarian infantrymen attacked the western side of Tata with ladders. The well-organised assault carried out unusually at night could not be resisted by the small number of Ottoman forces called to the defence. Most of the defenders were slaughtered and the rest who survived the attack fled to the tower of the castle. The Christians launched an attack against the tower only at dawn: they bombarded it and led

⁵ ÖStA FHKA, AHF, Pr. Exp. B. No. 494, fol. 477r, 14 June 1596; Pr. Prag Exp. B. No. 496. fol. 166v, 26 June 1596. ÖStA KA, HKR, Pr. Exp. Bd. 198, fol. 13r, No. 82, 23 June 1597; Pr. Exp. Bd. 198, fol. 394v–395r, No. 15, 4 January 1597; Pr. Exp. Bd. 198, fol. 565r, No. 11, 11 July 1597; Pr. Reg., Bd. 199, fol. 2r, No. 3, 1 February 1597; Pr. Reg., Bd. 199. fol. 5r, No. 2, 2 April 1597; Pr. Reg., Bd. 199. fol. 11v, No. 143, 26 June 1597.

⁶ Tóth, *A mezőkeresztesi csata*, pp. 186–262.

⁷ Kelenik, "Tata helye", pp. 59–76 and 47–48.

⁸ Karl von Mansfeld wanted to use a weapon during the 1595 siege of Esztergom which had worked in the battles of the Netherlands. He planned to "endeavour to implode and destroy" the Párkány gate of the Viziváros. *Mansfeldische Histori, Schlacht vnd herzliche Victoria in Ungern...* (s.l., 1595), fol. 6r; Istvánffy, *Magyarok dolgairól*, p. 198.

charges against it from multiple sides. They took it soon and killed its defenders or took them prisoners.⁹ Some of them became enthusiastic on account of the successful attack and thought if they had an army double the size of the troops who participated in the Tata assault (6–7,000 mercenaries), then they could retake Győr, as the success of the Christian caused great terror among the Turkish.¹⁰

Although Pernstein earned great fame and renown with the attack, he could not hold his position as *Obrist-Feldzeugmeister*. His position was taken over by another, not less apt warrior, Ruprecht von Eggenberg.¹¹ Pernstein was then ordered to set up an infantry regiment.

THE RECRUITMENT AND MUSTER OF THE PERNSTEIN INFANTRY REGIMENT, AND ITS MARCH TO THE BATTLEFIELD

The emperor or, less frequently, the orders of the Austrian or imperial provinces commissioned renowned and war-experienced peers¹² to recruit and set up mercenary companies of varying manpower which fought as part of the military force of the Habsburg Empire in the 16th century and the first half of the 17th century. As has been pointed out above, Pernstein met all of these criteria. The documents assigning him to hire 3,000 infantrymen were issued not long after the success at Tata, on 4 June 1597, by the Aulich War Council (*Hofkriegsrat*).¹³ Although at the end of the 16th century various mercenary troops were hired and later disbanded through a series of personal bargains in the military forces of the Habsburg Empire, but at the level of the documents necessary for issuing these mandates, in the case of the infantry (as well as in the cavalry) a worked-out and well-designed form or scheme had already been in use.

The first type of document included the patent or *Bestallungsbrief* (letter of commission) issued for the *Obrist*, which enlisted the instructions and tasks that were needed to set up the regiment. Pernstein's patent ordered to hire infantrymen for six months instead of the commonly agreed three months. Moreover, if need be, they had to stand in arms for a longer period. The hired unit was ordered to a set location of muster, and the calculation of their military pay started at the day of the muster. Its sum amounted to 4 Rhenish florins "in line with the old custom". Those who had been hired had to purchase (or supplement) their weapons, and pay for their food and accommodation. In order to prevent abuses and because of

⁹ ÖStA HHStA, Hungarica, Fasc. 130, fol. 11–17. ÖStA FHKA, AHF, Pr. Prag Exp. B. No. 514, fol. 40v, 13 February 1598; Pr. Reg. B. No. 516, fol., 41r, 24 February 1598; Pr. Reg. B. No. 516, fol. 56v, 6 March 1598. For its edition as regesta, see: Jedlicska Pál, *Adatok Erdődy báró Pálffy*, pp. 622–625. For the analysis of the events, see: Kelenik, "Tata helye", pp. 51–54 and 56–57.

¹⁰ ÖNB, Fuggerzeitung Cod., 8970. fol. 559r–560r.

¹¹ ÖStA KA, HKR, Pr. Reg., Bd. 199, fol. 11v, No. 143, 26 June 1597.

¹² In his book published in 1588, Daniel Wintzenberger argues that the assigned person has to be a count or a baron on the basis of the *Bestallung* (commission) issued by Emperor Charles V in 1543. Wintzenberger, *Beschreibung einer Kriegsordnung*, p. 22.

¹³ ÖStA KA, Best. 537/1597.

the various monetary units used in the empire, the exchange rates of the florin / florins was set (1 florin = 15 *fillér* (ca. shilling) = 60 krajcár (ca. deniers / pennies)). In case the soldier's pay was not settled because of the enemy or other reason, the emperor asked for the mercenaries' patience. After a successful siege or battle, the month that had begun had to be paid to the members of the regiment. At the end of the campaign, if the emperor did not request the continuation of the regiment's service, the mercenaries were dismissed and were paid a half month's military pay. The *Bestallungsbrief* also stipulated that those who had been hired had to serve in accordance with the instructions and orders of the emperor or the warlord substituting the monarch – on land or sea – with the full or half regiment, battalion, group, or as the battle situation required. Further instructions were detailed in the *Artikelbrief* (letter of provision) upon which the mercenaries took an oath. The *Bestallungsbrief* was authenticated by the seal and signature of the emperor.¹⁴

The second type of document includes the record of *Bestallung* (commission) known as *Bestallungsverzeichnis* (catalogue of commission) in which the assistants of the *Obrist*, its closest crew, the *prima plana* or *Erste Platt*¹⁵ and the *Hauptmann* as well as the assistants' pay were defined and listed. In general, the latter was not expressed in money, but the product of multiplication of a mercenary's monthly pay was given. It meant that the *Obrist* was paid the wage that was worth seventy-five times more than a hireling's pay; in other words, the *Obrist's* pay was a monthly 300 florins. The *Bestallung* record issued for Pernstein, however, contains that the *Obrist* and his own crew had to be paid 800 florin per month, while his deputy, the *Obristleutnant* had to be paid 300 florinsflorin for the same period.¹⁶

The *Bestallung* record of Pernstein precisely defined the wage of the officers leading the battalions too. Accordingly, a monthly pay of 250 florins were paid to the *Hauptmann*, 40 florins to his deputy (*Leutnant*) and 60 florins to the ensign (*Fähnrich*).¹⁷ The monthly pay of the other officers serving in the *prima plana* amounted to 232 florins.¹⁸

It has to be noted that both the *Obrist* and his deputy were interested in increasing the monthly pay of the *Hauptmanns*, since in the first two battalions the *Obrist* and his deputy held the position of *Hauptmann*. In the case of Pernstein it is also known that he managed to negotiate an extra income for himself. The *Obrist* asked for alimentering two additional positions in every battalion in a way he requested. It meant that he could dispose of these soldiers' pay too. What is more, it was the Aulich War Council that interceded in the matter with the emperor in July 1597, on behalf of Pernstein.¹⁹ Additionally, it cannot be ruled out either that this sum was meant as compensation for the incompletely paid wage of the *Obrist-Feldzeugmeister*, because it had not been fully paid by the end of July.

¹⁴ ÖStA KA Best. 537/1597

¹⁵ Neither "Staat der hohen Ämter", nor "prima plana" has a Hungarian equivalent.

¹⁶ ÖStA KA Best. 537/1597

¹⁷ ÖStA KA, Best. 537/1597.

¹⁸ ÖStA KA, HKRA, Prag 1597 No. 9.

¹⁹ ÖStA KA, HKR, Pr. Reg., Bd. 199, fol. 14r, No. 115, 15 July 1597.

It was also registered in the *Bestallung* record which province paid for the whole expenditure of the regiment, or if it should be paid from the fund raised by the Holy Roman Empire for the purpose of fighting against the Turks. In the case of Pernstein, the wages of the mercenaries were meant to be paid from the fund collected by the Moravian orders for the purpose of fighting against the Turks.²⁰

The third type of document involves those capitulations and agreements which defined the mode of organisation of the German and Walloon–French–Lorrainian infantry troops. In the first phase of the Fifteen Years' War these documents contained the number of the battalions of the regiment to be raised, and the ratio of the musketeers, shooters and double-pay mercenaries who were enrolled in those units. In addition to this, it also disposed of how the hirelings should be equipped with arms and how they should be replaced. Moreover, it detailed the amount of advance payment the mercenaries should get as well as it defined the exact location of the muster and its expected beginning. A capitulation from the Aulich War Council was also handed over to Pernstein. The document testifies about three very important regulations regarding the setup of the regiment. On the one hand, the venue of the muster was set as Brno, while the end of July was appointed as its time. The hirelings had to be warned about not harassing and encumbering the inhabitants of the city and its neighbourhood. Moreover, the Aulich War Council assigned one and a half million florins for the *Laufgeld* (advance payment) which the hirelings had to live on in the period between the recruitment and the muster.

On the other hand, the document defined the composition of the battalions. In accordance with it, the double-pay mercenaries could hire 120 mercenaries among those who wielded a pike or a halberd or a broadsword, and who wore breast- and backplate as well as a helmet in battle, while 80 mercenaries as musketeers, and 85 hirelings as plain shooters. The latter included the *prima plana* of the battalion that had 15 soldiers in it. Thus, a battalion consisted of 300 mercenaries in total.

Thirdly, the document detailed additional extra incomes. It was necessitated by the fact that the Obrist had to take care of the appropriate arms and equipment, so the Aulich War Council raised an extra sum of 4000 florins for this purpose. Furthermore, when setting up every battalion, an additional 400-florins allotment (*Vorlehen*) had to be disbursed. This type of acquittance was offered for managing the period (occasionally several months) between two wage payments for soldiers at the expense of the next month's wage.²¹

Today Pernstein's recruitment patent (*Werbepatent*) cannot be found in the *Kriegsarchiv* in Vienna, but he must have been in possession of one, on the basis of which the *Hauptmanns* of the hireling or the commissioned could start recruiting the given unit or regiment at the assigned venue. The document contained the name of the recruiting officer, the number of battalions to be recruited, and the size of the unit. Also, it named the cause of the campaign, and the fact that the mercenaries were meant to be recruited by the emperor for the purpose of fighting

²⁰ ÖStA KA, Best. 537/1597.

²¹ *Ibid.*

against the Ottoman Empire. The employer asked the leaders of the imperial province or town concerned to support the work of the recruiters not only while hiring but also at the muster and marching to the theatre of war too, obviously, for the appropriate payment. The imperial assembly at Worms in 1495 obliged the ruler to ask for permission from the authorities of the territory designated for recruitment. If the *Hauptmann* in charge of recruiting could not produce such a document, then he was arrested and deported.²²

The other document that was handed over to Pernstein but has become unavailable since then was the so-called *Artikelbrief*. As one of the elements of Maximilian I's military reform at the end of the 15th century, this type of document was introduced to ensure the discipline of the *Landsknechts* (German-speaking mercenaries). In its original form, it was a bilateral treaty, since it contained not only regulations for mercenaries but also obligations for the person who hires the mercenaries. During the 16th century, the *Artikelbrief* became a collection of unilateral military penal code, from which the rights of the soldiers were removed.

In the Fifteen Years' War, the *Artikelbrief* compiled by Lazarus von Schwendi and accepted by the imperial assembly of Speyer in 1570 was used when swearing in the hired infantry after the muster.²³ The document consisting of 74 articles was designed to maintain discipline and order in the camp. It debarred hirelings from intemperance, gambling, harassing the population, missing sermons, brawling, using weapons without permission, leaving their designated post, missing alarms, keeping contact with the enemy, theft, and plundering mills and bakeries. In addition to this, the *Artikelbrief* also disposed of what should be done with the loot and the prisoners, the compulsory acceptance of designating the accommodation, and that among the mercenaries only those could travel with baggage who were unwell. Only the wives of the hirelings could stay in the camp, other, libertine women had to leave. In most of the cases, if the mercenaries violated any condition set forth in the document, they had to suffer the death penalty.

However, the *Artikelbrief* included other instructions too. Similarly to the *Bestallungsbrief*, the 10th point defined the wage of those hired: a monthly 4 florins, in other words, a daily 15 *fillérs* (shillings) or 60 *kreuzers* (deniers). In exchange for that the emperor who hired them required and demanded that the double-pay soldiers or those who joined battalions with firearms should have full weaponry and armor always in top shape,²⁴ and be well-versed in battle. In the case of the musketeers and simple shooters, the document emphasised that if they proved to

²² ÖStA HHStA MEA, Ma Fasc. 4. A document without a folio number.

²³ For the formation and development of the *Artikelbrief*, see: Möller, *Das Regiment der Landsknechte*, pp. 31–51; Pálffy, *Katonai*, pp. 28–29.

²⁴ One of the points appended to the *Artikelbrief* prepared by Schwendi richly described the armaments and equipment of the soldiers of a 400-member battalion. In accordance with this point, 100 armoured infantrymen should have had long pikes and pistols. 50 soldiers had to wield broadswords and halberds, as well as each should have been equipped with a pistol. Moreover, 50 mercenaries among the double-pay soldiers had to fight only with pikes. In addition to this, shooters were required to wield helmets and rapiers by the prescription. Janko, *Lazarus Freiherr von Schwendi*, p. 211; Kelenik, “A kézi löfegyverek jelentősége”, p. 84.

be unacquainted with using their weapons while on guard or in battle, then death penalty should be meted out on them. In addition to this, the mercenaries were required to wear an overcoat or coat in order to protect themselves and the firearms of those who were equipped with them from cold and rain. In the 3rd, 47th, 48th, 49th, and 50th article of the *Artikelbrief*, the ruler obliged the assignee not to damage him with any abuse during either the musters or on the battlefield.²⁵

The recruitment and organisation of the Pernstein regiment had already begun when the documents were compiled. The *Hofkammer* (Court Chamber) of Prague received a reminder on 23 May, that it should inform the leader of the Moravian province, Ladislav Berka *Landeshauptmann* about the regiment.²⁶ Six days later, on 29 May, he sent his instruction. According to this, on the one hand, Berka had to take measures at the designated place of the muster to prepare for receiving the mercenaries. On the other hand, he had to pay 3,000 *koronas* (crowns) to Pernstein or the person assigned by him for the *Laufgeld* of those hired.²⁷

The recruitment and the acquisition of the armaments and equipment of the infantrymen commenced, since it had to be taken care of not by the mercenaries, but by the *Obrist*. Pernstein asked for *Passbrief*, that is, permission, which was eventually granted to him, at the *Hofkammer* of Vienna on 20 June, to acquire and transport these items.²⁸ It seems that the chamberlains in Prague supposed that they had acquired more from the military equipment than what the regiment actually needed. Therefore, they ordered the *Landeshauptmann* on 23 July, to equip 600 infantrymen, who were paid and sent by the Moravian orders and stationed in Fülelek (present day Fil'akovo, in Slovakia), from the remaining stocks of Pernstein's mercenaries.²⁹ However, Berka's letter dated to 30 July, testifies that the battalion was supplied with gunpowder and lead (*Kraut und Lot*) by the city of Brno.³⁰

Furthermore, the expenses meant to finance the regiment were started to be collected that was a serious challenge for the various court and feudal governmental authorities. The office of *Hofkammer* responsible for issuing and expediting military affairs (*Kriegsexpedition*) reminded the chamberlains of Prague in June 1597, what kind of expenses they may encounter from the recruitment to the first muster: the *Vorlehen* (agreed loan) negotiated in advance and the *Lauf-* and *Liefergeld* (operation and supply cost).³¹ The latter was a daily allowance meant to finance the troops' waiting at the location of the muster before the commencement of the muster.

²⁵ ÖStA KA, Best. 464/1593; ÖStA HHStA MEA, Reichstagakten, Fasc. 57, fol. 88v–100v; Lünig, *Corpus juris militaris*, pp. 70–75; Meynert, *Geschichte der K. K. österreichischen Armee*, pp. 54–60; Janko, *Lazarus Freiherr von Schwendi*, pp. 198–211.

²⁶ ÖStA FHKA, AHF, Pr. Prag Exp. B. No. 504, fol. 101v, 23 May 1597.

²⁷ ÖStA FHKA, AHF, Pr. Prag Reg. B. No. 507/508, fol. 125r, 29 May 1597.

²⁸ ÖStA FHKA, AHF, Pr. Wien Exp. B. No. 502. fol. 471v, 20 June 1597; Pr. Wien Reg. B. No. 510, fol. 161r, 20 June 1597.

²⁹ ÖStA FHKA, AHF, Pr. Prag Reg. B. No. 507/508, fol. 199r–v, 23 July 1597.

³⁰ ÖStA FHKA, AHF, Pr. Prag Exp. B. No. 504, fol. 159r, August 1597.

³¹ *Ibid.*, fol. 124r, June 1597.

The *Court Chamber (Hofkammer)* of Prague took steps to resolve the matter. In his letter dated to 11 June, Berka already pointed it out to governmental authorities that Hans Georg Vogl had already sent 30,000 florins from the taxes collected by the Moravian orders, so the money necessary for the *Laufgeld* of Pernstein's regiment was already at their disposal.³² When this information became known to the Prague chamberlains, they reminded the master of military expenses, Michael Zeller, to send one of the officers of this office to Berka who was in charge of Moravian tax affairs, and to the local provincial judge (*Landesrichter*), Jan Haugwitz, in order to receive the sum that had already been collected. From this sum, a *Vorlehen* worth of 4,000 florins had to be distributed to each battalion in a way that this sum was to be later deduced from the second- and third-month wages of soldiers. In addition to this, the officeholder of the master of military expenses was obliged to disburse the *Liefergeld* from this received sum, too, among those waiting for their muster in Brno.³³

On the same day, the Court Chamber of Prague sent messages to Haugwitz and Berka informing them about the same, with the addition, on the one hand, that the first-month wage of the regiment, for which they devoted 34,000 florins, had to be prepared. On the other hand, until the arrival of Zeller's officer, they had to disburse the *Liefergeld* among the hirelings.³⁴

The chamberlains of Prague issued another instruction on 2 July. It ordered Berka, Haugwitz, and the Moravian Vice-chamber (*Unterkammer*) to command Andrea Seidl, the officer of the tax-collecting authority (*Rentdiener*), to deliver the additional 3,718 florins meant to finance the Pernstein regiment (and the recruitment and first-month wage of further 500 mounted shooters and 5,000 hussars hired by the Moravian orders too) to the master of military expenses in Vienna upon acknowledgement of receipt.³⁵ This sum assigned to pay the *Lief-ergeld* had to be repaid later, because they were not financed from the Turkish aid, but from taxes levied for other reasons.³⁶ Moreover, they had to report the muster as well as the circumstances of the disbursement to the Prague Chamber.³⁷ On the very same day, Archduke Maximilian was informed that the Moravian orders dispatched Zacharias Eißenteter to survey the muster of Pernstein's infantry.³⁸

Those who had been hired appeared in ever greater numbers in the city of Brno and its vicinity which had been assigned as the location of the muster. At the same time, on the one hand, the head of the Moravian province endeavoured to collect the sum needed to pay the first-month wage of the Pernstein regiment. It is known from an instruction dated to 16 July, and written to Haugwitz and the head of the

³² Ibid, fol. 131v, July 1597.

³³ ÖStA FHKA, AHF, Pr. Prag Reg. B. No. 507/508, fol. 153v, 21 June 1597.

³⁴ Ibid, fol. 161r–v, 21 June 1597.

³⁵ Ibid, fol. 174r, 2 July 1597.

³⁶ In order to supplement this, money was allocated from the (purchase) tax of beer levied as regalia in the districts of Olomouc and Brno. Ibid, fol. 316r, 22 October 1597; Ibid, fol. 329r, 5 November 1597.

³⁷ Ibid, fol. 174r, 2 July 1597.

³⁸ Ibid, fol. 175v, 2 July 1597.

Moravian Vice-chamber, Niklas von Hradik as the dispensers of collecting and managing the Turkish aid that they had to give the money still missing from the first-month salary of the regiment to Friedrich von Žerotín and Berka.³⁹ The Court Chamber of Prague informed the master of military expenses on 20 July, that it ordered its officer, Niklas Knoblach, in possession of 10,000 florins to survey the muster of Pernstein's infantrymen.⁴⁰ They wanted to avoid the raiding and plundering of the countryside with disbursing the money.⁴¹ In his letter dated to 28 July, and related to this matter, Berka informed the Court Chamber of Prague what sum of money was transferred to those hirelings who had appeared so far.⁴² However, the damage done to and in Brno from the muster of the regiment to its departure was still quite significant. According to an instruction compiled by the Prague chamberlains on 10 October, the sum of the damage was 402 florins, 21 kreutzers, and 3 denarii, which had to be reimbursed for the citizens.⁴³

In the meantime, already in July, the Aulich War Council ordered Christof von Egg to survey the muster of the regiment.⁴⁴ So, in addition to plodding away at collecting the missing money to pay the first-month wage of the soldiers, Berka had to help von Egg's work too.⁴⁵

The muster commenced on 1 August, in the premediated way in Brno, but it did not happen without inconvenience. On the one hand, the sum of the monthly pay differed in the case of the double-pay soldiers, the musketeers, and occasionally, the shooters too.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, fol. 191v, 16 July 1597.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, fol. 191v, 6 July 1597; *Ibid.*, fol. 197r, 20 July 1597.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, fol. 191v, 16 July 1597.

⁴² ÖStA FHKA, AHF, Pr. Prag Exp. B. No. 504, fol., 158r, August 1597.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, fol. 210r, October 1597; ÖStA FHKA, AHF, Pr. Prag Reg. B. No. 507/508, fol. 304v, 10 October 1597.

⁴⁴ The Aulich War Council ordered Hans Graf to act as muster clerk serving under Egg. *Ibid.*, fol. 336v, 18 November 1597.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, fol. 207v, 30 July 1597.

Name of the Hauptmann of the battalion	120 double-pay soldier	80 musketeers	85 shooter	<i>prima plana</i> (15 persons)	Total
Johann von Pernstein <i>Obrist</i>	1796 florins	715 florins	516 florins	582 florins	3,609 florins
Leonhard Ehrgott <i>Obristleutnant</i>	1672 florins	777 florins	516 florins	582 florins	3,547 florins
Centurius Pflueg	1687 florins	743 florins	510 florins	582 florins	3,522 florins
Peter Recodius	1797 florins	798 florins	510 florins	582 florins	3,687 florins
Jonas Schlieben	1747 florins	787 florins	510 florins	582 florins	3,626 florins
Arnold von Heiden	1717 florins	762 florins	510 florins	582 florins	3,571 florins
Georg Welser	1858 florins	773 florins	516 florins	582 florins	3,729 florins
Hans von Eichen	1603 florins	782 florins	510 florins	582 florins	3,477 florins
Alex Arnoldi	1766 florins	788 florins	516 florins	582 florins	3,652 florins
Georg von Kollonich	1647 florins	782 florins	510 florins	582 florins	3,548 florins
Total:					36,486 florins

It can be seen from the table that in the case of the shooters, fewer allotment was paid in four battalions with 516 florins (the battalion of the *Obrist* and its deputy, Georg Welser and Alexander Arnoldi), while in further six battalions the allotment was decreased with six florins. However, in the case of the double-pay soldiers and musketeers no accordance similar to the above mentioned one can be found. All this can be explained by the fact that mercenaries hired in this category included numerous persons who had already served in Hungarian or other battlefields many times, or they could demand higher wages due to their social prestige and formerly held high position. These people serving in these battalions could represent their interest with such force that the assigned commissioner was obliged to accept their demands, and fix the sum of the monthly pay in a differentiated manner. Due to this, the monthly costs of the regiment increased from the originally planned 34,000 florins to 36,486 florins.⁴⁶

Moreover, Egg took issue with the *Obrist* himself. The instruction handed over to the commissioner stipulated that the emperor intended to employ the mercenaries for three months in line with the old German custom. Contrary to this, Pernstein held to the half year period agreed in the *Bestallung*. The protracted negotiation was finally resolved by the *Obrist* loudly stating that he was willing to take an oath (that is, to enter into service) only for the already determined six-month

⁴⁶ ÖStA KA, HKRA, Prag 1597 August, No. 9.

service. The commissioner of the muster had no other option but to accept Pernstein's demand.⁴⁷

Thus, the tenacity of the *Obrist* caused another unforeseen problem. The Turkish aid collected by the Moravian orders by the beginning of August for the muster was insufficient to pay for the first-month wage of the mercenaries. This was communicated by Berka to the chamberlains of Prague in his letter dated to 5 August.⁴⁸ Precisely 4,000 thalers were missing, for the raising of which the Court Chamber of Prague ordered Haugwitz and Hradki to obtain a loan that would be paid back from the sums which would later arrive as further Turkish aid.⁴⁹ In September 1597, Pernstein's insistence that six months should be served resulted in that the court should have raised wage for three additional months.⁵⁰ The Court Chamber of Prague ordered Berka on 28 September to spend the 24,000 thalers gained from the taxes paid after beer-houses and other taxes on financing the Pernstein infantrymen and the Walloon cavalrymen as well as shooters.⁵¹

However, Pernstein's mercenaries had already been located near Győr. After the muster, the regiment began its march to the Hungarian theatre of war through Lower Austria. The Aulich War Council gave mandates to Bernhard von Puchheim and Dionisi Knozer to escort the mercenaries to Pozsony (present day Bratislava, in Slovakia) and from there to Komárom (present day Komarno, in Slovakia), while taking heed to avoid any affray, heist or loot.⁵²

THE PERNSTEIN INFANTRY REGIMENT IN BATTLE

The army of Archduke Maximilian left the camp in Óvár (present day Mosonmagyaróvár, in Hungary) on 9 August 1597, and began the siege of Pápa on 23 August, that was given up by the Ottoman defenders a week later in return for their free passage.⁵³ After the successful offensive, the main army of the Christians returned to Hédervár situated next to the Danube. In the Hédervár camp, the leaders of the Christian army discussed the possible future directions of continuing the campaign. The opportunity to attack Buda, Székesfehérvár, or Veszprém was raised too.⁵⁴ Eventually, however, on the basis of the news he had received, on 4 September, Archduke Maximilian decided to lead his undermanned army agais

⁴⁷ Ibid, No. 10.

⁴⁸ ÖStA FHKA, AHF, Pr. Prag Exp. B. No. 504, fol. 161r, August 1597.

⁴⁹ ÖStA FHKA, AHF, Pr. Prag Reg. B. No. 507/508, fol. 207v, 30 July 1597; Ibid, fol. 219r, 5 August 1597.

⁵⁰ Ibid, fol. 270v, 6 September 1597.

⁵¹ Ibid, fol. 289v, 28 September 1597.

⁵² ÖStA KA, HKR, Pr. Reg. Bd. 199, fol., 284r, No. 148, 22 August 1597.

⁵³ Pálffy, *A pápai vár*, pp. 63–81; Tóth, *A mezőkeresztesi csata*, pp. 269–271.

⁵⁴ Banfi, "Gianfrancesco Aldobrandini", p. 224.

Győr, since he counted that it is sufficient to seal off the also undermanned Ottoman army from the supplies and they would give up the strategic location bestowed on them because of famine.⁵⁵

The Christian army reached Győr on 9 September and began to encircle the fortress. Archduke Maximilian ordered additional infantry and cavalry units as reinforcement to the camp. According to a report jotted down on 10 September in Győr, the arrival of Pernstein's regiment was expected in the next few days.⁵⁶ The diary of Giorgio Basta informs the reader that infantrymen arrived in the vicinity of Révfalu on 13 September, on the left bank of the Danube in the Szi-getköz. They could not cross the river on this day, because the pontoon bridge had not been constructed yet. This was finally finished on 14 September.⁵⁷

The infantrymen of Pernstein did not remain in the vicinity of Győr for too long. It was decided that they had to banish the Ottoman army of Szentmárton that threatened the Christian camp. Archduke Maximilian sent Pernstein's regiment, 1,000 mounted shooters of Seifried von Kollonich,⁵⁸ and 200 Hungarian cavalrymen of Ferenc Nádasdi to attack the castle. Upon seeing the approaching Christian troops, the defenders fled to Csesznek.⁵⁹ As a consequence of this, after leaving more than 200 cavalrymen and infantrymen behind, the attackers returned to the camp encircling Győr.

Archduke Maximilian ordered the infantrymen of Pernstein, some cavalrymen and four falconettes to Újváros on 17 September in order to incapacitate the defenders to get reinforcements from this side either.⁶⁰ However, the small army could cross the River Rába and encamp next to the Rivel Rábca only on the following day.⁶¹ Afterwards, they started to prepare their drill trenches and ramparts opposite the *Bécsi kapu* (Vienna Gate) which were reinforced night and day, and thus they endeavoured to reach the watertrench. In the meantime, Pernstein had a high-standing gun-site constructed, where the cannons they brought were placed.⁶²

The defenders had a guard at the *Bécsi kapu* that was reinforced with field cannon. They kept the new Christian ramparts under heavy fire with their rifles and the cannon.⁶³ A report sent from Vienna on 27 September, communicated the news of the death of Rudolf von Kinsky. On 19 September, Kinsky and Pernstein were laying in bed next to each other. A projectile shot from a mortar or a howitzer from the fortress hit the stud on the top of Pernstein's tent, and the ball then fell

⁵⁵ ÖNB, Fuggerzeitung Cod. 8970, fol. 321v–322v, 317r, 296r, 293r–v, 277r–v, 286r–v, and 244r–v; ÖStA KA, Alte Feldakten 1597-9-30; OSzK, Kt., Fol. Ital., 64; Kelenik, "Egy fogoly török", pp. 71–77; Ortelius, *Chronologia*, fol. 132v; Hegyi, *A török hódoltság várai*, pp. 1495–1496.

⁵⁶ ÖNB, Fuggerzeitung Cod. 8970, fol. 309r–310r.

⁵⁷ OSzK, Kt., Fol. Ital., 64.

⁵⁸ Pálffy, *A pápai vár*, p. 58.

⁵⁹ OSzK, Kt., Fol. Ital., 64.

⁶⁰ OSzK, Kt., Fol. Ital., 64.

⁶¹ OSzK, Kt., Fol. Ital., 64.

⁶² ÖNB, Fuggerzeitung Cod. 8970, fol., 229r–230v, 235r–v, and 286r–v; Ortelius, *Chronologia*, fol. 135v–136r.

⁶³ Ortelius, *Chronologia*, fol. 136r.

on the head of Kinsky. It splitted his skull and part of the brainwater leaked away, but Kinsky was still alive then, and the medics tried to bandage it. However, this did not help, and he died soon, on 22 September.⁶⁴

Somewhat later, Pernstein died, too, which was reported by Istvánffy in the following way:

“And it came to pass on the 28th day of Saint Michael’s month that when Prestensky left for visiting the ramparts and cannons, and wanted to mount a horse, and had spent some time without being on guard, the enemy targeted him from the bastion and hit him with a grand iron ball, killing him instantly.” [“S történék Szent Mihály havának 28. napján, hogy mikoron Prestensky az sáncokat és álgúkat látogatni indulván, lóra akarván ülni, és őrizkedés nélkül valami keveset mulatozna, az ellenségtől az bástyáról mintegy célra arányoztatván, egy igen nagy vasgolyóbis arányozva találásával, mindjárást elszaggatván elveszne.”]⁶⁵

Therefore, the Hungarian Livius dated Pernstein’s death to 28 September. Contrary to this opinion, according to Basta, who resided in the camp, Pernstein lost his life two days later, on 30 September. Basta described the circumstances of Pernstein’s death differently. He stated that in the afternoon of that day, Pernstein departed with his 40 shooters to that island which is located between the River Rábca and the Danube, in front of the Várbástya (Castle Bastion) in order to scout the area. The *Obrist* wanted to launch an attack against the fortress from this location. When the besieged discovered Pernstein in the Island, they attacked him. Although the infantrymen retreated in a very orderdly manner, yet 16 shooters among them perished. Moreover, Pernstein, when he wanted to whirl away on horseback, was shot on his shoulder and died.⁶⁶

Finally, upon hearing the news of the Ottoman army’s approach, Archduke Maximilian ordered his troops to move to Szigetköz.⁶⁷ Most of the Christian army crossed the river by the evening of 3 October, and then set up their camp one and a half mile from Győr. Basta’s diary informs us that the remaining infantrymen of Pernstein could not join the main forces immediately, as the besieged dammed up the River Rába by constructing an earthen rampart. A cavalry unit was sent to help those being caught in the trap with the order to retreat to the direction of Óvár.⁶⁸

Although the regiment has not been mentioned by the sources anymore, it is certain that Pernstein’s mercenaries were present in the Christian army led by Archduke Maximilian that moved to Vác passing by Esztergom and took part in the Vác-Verőce battle fought between 2 and 9 November too.⁶⁹ This is alluded to by the report of Zacharias Geizkofler, *Reichspfenningmaister* (in Hungarian:

⁶⁴ ÖNB, Fuggerzeitung Cod. 8970, fol. 241r–242r; OSzK, Kt., Fol. Ital., 64.

⁶⁵ ÖNB, Fuggerzeitung Cod. 8970, fol. 229r–230v; Istvánffy, *Magyarok dolgairól*, p. 282.

⁶⁶ OSzK, Kt., Fol. Ital., 64.

⁶⁷ ÖNB, Fuggerzeitung Cod. 8970, fol. 219r–v.

⁶⁸ OSzK, Kt., Fol. Ital., 64.

⁶⁹ Tóth, *A mezőkeresztési csata*, pp. 276–278.

birodalmi fillérmester) dated to 10 October, and addressed to the Court Chamber of Prague, in which Geizkofler discussed the status of the infantries of Pernstein and Hans Reinhard von Schönberg as well as the Walloon infantry.⁷⁰

THE DISBANDING OF PERNSTEIN'S REGIMENT

In accordance with the emperor's intention, the unit was disbanded (*Abdankung*) when the period of recruitment expired. Then, the surviving mercenaries were paid off, disarmed, and their flag was torn off from the flagstaff, thus indicating the end of their service. However, this did not go so smoothly in practice. The court sent Zacharias Geizkofler and Bartolomäus Pezzen in November 1597, to arrange the muster and disbanding of the remaining 1200 infantrymen of the Pernstein regiment.⁷¹ Nevertheless, for two reasons they were hindered in complying with their mandate. On the one hand, the sum collected by the assistance of the Moravian orders and intended to finance the muster and retirement did not arrive. On the other hand, the mercenaries showed no willingness to participate in this occasion, because, in accordance with the mandate of the emperor, their regiment would have been disbanded only after a 4-month service. Therefore, the infantrymen demanded that they serve their full 6-month term set out in their *Bestallung*. They referred to the fact that they would have condoned their recruitment for 4 months. This was, however, refused by the commissioners assigned to the muster, as they claimed that the emperor could not pay more than the wage for 4 months and a half-month sum for the mercenaries' resignation.

Another problem was caused by the fact that, as has been mentioned above, the majority of the double-pay soldiers were mustered with a very high wage. Thus, the commissioners tried to convince the soldiers as well as the officers to sign an *Accorodo* that was about paying a 4-and-half month sum. They refused to comply, but the muster commenced eventually on 1 December 1597. The parties agreed that after the deductions had been made, 43,806 florins had to be disbursed among the mercenaries as a compensation for the missing 3-month wage, and among the *Hauptmann* an additional sum of 600 florins for their compliance.⁷²

Notwithstanding this agreement, raising 44,406 florins meant a considerable problem for the court. As the Turkish aid of the Moravian order, the total sum of which was 77,128 florins and 13 kreutzers,⁷³ did not cover the costs of setting up the regiment, the 4-and-half-month wage of the soldiers, and other expenses, thus additional resources had to be found to finance these costs. The reply the Court Chamber of Prague gave to Lazarus Henkel on 27 November 1597, showed that, among others, they hoped to get a 50,000-florins loan from him to pay for the discharge of the regiment.⁷⁴ However, it is known that the whole sum was not

⁷⁰ ÖStA FHKA, AHF, Pr. Prag Exp. B. No. 504, fol. 214v, 22 October 1597.

⁷¹ ÖStA FHKA, AHF, Pr. Prag Reg. B. No. 507/508, fol. 341r, 29 November 1597.

⁷² ÖStA KA, HKRA, Prag 1597 Dezember, No. 9.

⁷³ ÖStA FHKA, AHF, Pr. Prag Reg. B. No. 516, fol. 76r, 18 March 1598.

⁷⁴ ÖStA FHKA, AHF, Pr. Prag Reg. B. No. 507/508, fol. 340r, 27 November 1597.

available even at the beginning of the following year, since it is clear from the reply of the Prague chamberlains sent to Henkel on 30 January 1597, that he did not pay in 30,000 florins from the total sum of the loan.⁷⁵ As a consequence of this, Berka was forced to acquire a loan of 28,000 thalers from the Moravian Tax Revenue Office (*Rentamt*).⁷⁶

It is worth shortly looking at the further fate of those mercenaries who remained alive. It is known from the reports of Johann Eustach von Westernach, Imperial Chief War Commissioner (*Reichskriegskommissar*), and Geizkofler that in June 1598, at the Krems muster of Johann Friedrich von Mörsburg's regiment the hired mercenaries were not satisfied with the wage agreed in the original *Bestallung*. The more experienced soldiers among the double-pay ones wanted seven, six, but at least five wages (28, 24 and 25 florins) for their services. Notwithstanding this demand, Westernach and Geizkofler, who were delegated to the muster, managed to negotiate a decrease to two, two and a half, three, and four wages, and distributed these sums among the battalions. Thus, it came to pass that the designated sum for the monthly wage of the regiment consisting of 3,880 persons increased to 44,137 florins. Those dissatisfied with the agreed wage, however, left the place of the muster, referring to the fact, among others, that in the previous year they got higher pays in Pernstein's regiment.⁷⁷ In hope of a better wage, these soldiers moved to the muster location of the corps of Hans Preiner zu Stübing and Hermann Christof von Russworm. The *Reichspfennigmeister* and Chief War Commissioner pointed out nonetheless that most of them could be mustered for a lower sum of payment, as the best among them had already been selected out by Mörsburg.⁷⁸ Contrary to this, in June 1598, the delegated commissioners reported about the muster of the regiment recruited by Russworm that almost all of the officers and mercenaries were there who had previously served under Pernstein.⁷⁹

INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSION

The above investigated show that in line with the fashionable histories of regiments in the 19th–20th century, it is possible to examine the recruitment, armament and everyday lives of mercenaries in service of the Habsburg Empire at the turn of the 16th–17th century. Obviously, the scarcity of available sources means a bottleneck for researchers, but the endeavour is not impossible nonetheless. Each and every such case study brings us closer to understand the operation, problems, and hardships of the military organisation of the age.

⁷⁵ ÖStA FHKA, AHF, Pr. Prag Reg. B. No. 516, fol. 17v, 30 January 1598.

⁷⁶ ÖStA FHKA, AHF, Pr. Prag Reg. B. No. 516, fol. 49r, 2 March 1598.

⁷⁷ ÖStA KA, HKRA, Prag. 1598 Juni, No. 18.

⁷⁸ *Idem*.

⁷⁹ ÖStA KA, HKRA, Prag. No. 16.

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The Burden of Authority – The Preparations for the Ambassadorial Mission to Constantinople of Baron Johann Ludwig von Kuefstein in 1628^{2*}

INTRODUCTION

To place this essay in context, it is worthwhile to begin the elaboration of the topic with a brief but suggestive introductory note. The quote below is the text of an oath by a true turncoat diplomatic “expert”, who was an interpreter, informer and, actually a spy. Marino Tudisi (Tudišević) from Dubrovnik, who was employed as an interpreter and confidant, recited the following words before the entrance into Constantinople of the ambassadorial mission of 1628–1629, pledging his loyal service to the Habsburg ambassador Baron Johann Ludwig von Kuefstein:

“I, Marino Tudisi, honouring God and the saints do solemnly take a vow at the request of his excellency the free Baron Lord Johann Ludwig von Kuefstein to His Majesty the Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand II, our most honourable lord (to his appointed spokesman during the time of the diplomatic mission sent to the Sublime Porte). I firmly give my word and pledge to God and our Lord Jesus Christ’s immaculate Mother, the Blessed Virgin Mary, all the angels, God’s saints, and my Christian faith that in every negotiation in which his excellency makes use of my services so that I can be of use to his sacred spokesman and show my faith, I will fervently perform my work and labours. Lest I say anything at all of those matters that they have ordered to be confidential I [understood as directly] in the name of his reverent excellency [understood as or others] the spokesman for his reverent majesty, will not give any kind of indication. I will safeguard everything solemnly and loyally in the depths of my immaculate heart. Help me God, and these holy

* This article has been written within the framework of the work of the MTA–SZTE Research Group of the Ottoman Age (Eötvös Loránd Research Network). The research has been supported by the National Research, Development and Innovation Office (NRDI) (Nemzeti Kutatási, Fejlesztési és Innovációs Hivatal) through a grant (Thematic Excellence Programme (Tématerületi Kiválósági Program) 2020, NKFIH-1279-2/2020) of the Interdisciplinary Centre of Excellence (University of Szeged), the Department of Medieval and Early Modern Hungarian History (Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Szeged), MTA–SZTE Research Group of the Ottoman Age (Eötvös Loránd Research Network). János Szabados’s work has been supported by the New National Excellence Programme (Új Nemzeti Kiválósági Program, code nr. ÚNKP-20-4-II) of the Ministry for Innovation and Technology (Innovációs és Technológiai Minisztérium) from the source of the National Research, Development and Innovation Fund, via the NRDI. This paper is an enlarged, revised and, as well, updated version of the earlier published study in Hungarian: Brandl, – Szabados, “A megbízás terhe”.

Gospels of God. I have taken this vow most loyally on 21 November 1628, proclaiming it before his Excellency's confessor, Father Petrus Lubich, and Elias Seeauer, who have read through the pledge themselves. At Pontepiccolo."³

The vulnerability of Baron Kuefstein and the diplomatic mission is exemplified by the fact that Tudisi was so undependable that he had to bear evidence of his loyalty under oath. His services were indispensable from the viewpoint of the mission since knowledge of the Ottoman Turkish language could be considered essential in Habsburg–Ottoman diplomacy. At the same time, based on the surviving sources, it is not at all by chance that his vow took place at Pontepiccolo,⁴ prior to entering Constantinople. After all, he was not just a confidant of Kuefstein, but also maintained outstanding relations with other magistrates.⁵ According to his statement, he had admittance to the divan of the pasha of Buda and regularly reported to Venetian diplomats. This is just exacerbated by the fact that he is referred to as a personal agent of Count Michael Adolf von Althan in the sources uncovered up to now and not a loyal subject of the emperor. In addition to this, based on documents reviewed of the Aulic Chamber, he did not have an imperial letter of commission or pay, and even Althan himself noted to Baron Kuefstein that Tudisi followed his orders.⁶

THE FOCAL POINTS OF THE ARTICLE

This brief episode also clearly casts light on the difficulties for diplomatic missions going to Constantinople. Thus, it is not surprising that in the present article

³ “*Ego Martinus Tudisi ad requisitionem excellentissimae domini dominationi Joannis Ludovici libero baronis a Kuefstain, Sacratissimi Romani Imperatore Ferdinandi II. Domini Nostri Clementissimi [pro tempore ad Portem Ottomanicam oratoris] in conspectu Dei et Sanctorum Eius, sancte promitto ac per Deum intemeratam Matrem Domini N. Jesu Christi Beatissimam Virginem Mariam omnesque angelos et sanctos Dei, perque meam fidem Christianam firmiter me obligo. Ac juro me in omnibus illis negotiis, in quibus illustrissimae suae excellentiae meis servitiis ut suae Sanctissimae Maiestatis orator usurus sit, vel uti voluerit fidelem ac industriam operam navaturum neque quidquam ex iis quae mihi a Sua Illustrissima Excellentia Domino inquam Suae Maiestatis oratore n[omine] n[omine] secreto commissa fuerint ullo signo manifestaturum unquam, sed omnia sancte fideliter atque intemerate in cordis arcano conservaturum. Ita me Deus adjuvet et haec sancta Dei Evangelia. Hoc juramentum fidelissime praestitum est 21. die Novembris anno 1628 in praesentia illustrissime suae excellentiae eisdemque confessarii referendi Domini Patris Petri Lubich et Eliae Seeaueri, qui ipsi hoc perlegit. In Pontepiccolo.*” ELTE EKL, G4, Tom. V, pag. 547. The sentence “Help me God, and these holy Gospels of God” has been translated according to the English translation of the Profession of the Tridentine Faith (1564). Cf.: Schaff, ed., *Bibliotheca Symbolica*, vol. 2, pp. 208–210.

⁴ Pontepiccolo (Küçükçekmece) is a district of present-day Istanbul, which located in the European side of the city.

⁵ Tudisi's network of political relationships is quite complicated. For instance, he is mentioned as a loyal confidant of Count Michael Adolf von Althan. This information is strengthened by the Transylvanian envoy Mihály Tholdalagi, who precisely stated the same in his diary. Salamon, *Két magyar diplomata*, p. 161.

⁶ For a summary of Tudisi's activities, see: Brandl – Szabados, “A Janus-arcú diplomata”, pp. 85–102.

we are introducing the complex framework in which Baron Johann Ludwig von Kuefstein had to act as a “*homo novus*” of Habsburg–Ottoman diplomacy, deploying means of both trust and the exertion of pressure.

First, following the findings up to this point, we will outline the details of the political and diplomatic environment with consideration of the events during the ambassadorial mission. In connection with this, the extraordinary source materials that are presented as one of the most important parts of the paper should be stressed. This extensive source material makes it possible for us to discuss in principle the available documentary materials of Habsburg–Ottoman diplomatic missions to the fullest possible extent. Established on this, we will outline the relationships of Kuefstein and his entourage in the following section, in which the problems of the attempts at asserting influence, the vulnerability, and the duties indicated by the emperor will be examined. Due to the complexity of the subject, we will only concentrate on the first half of the diplomat’s diplomatic mission, from the emperor seeking him out (18 November 1627) to the arrival of the delegation in Constantinople (18 November 1628).⁷ The focal point of the present work is placed primarily on the examination of the diplomatic background work in preparation for the mission and the continuous court, political and social pressure surrounding this. In accordance with all this, we are seeking an answer to the question of which direction did the influence come from, what perceptible form did it take during the ambassador’s activities and how was he able to manage it. Baron Kuefstein’s vulnerability to the wartime relationships and the political circles in the court can be observed, and together these forced him to allow room for designs that differed from his own. It can also be seen how those mentioned came into conflict with social expectations and in the end, the diplomat’s intentions.

From this it can be seen obviously, that in addition to the imperial orders, there were several individuals with influence in the court that wanted to assert their own will, so he was significantly at the mercy of individuals with a broader understanding of the Ottoman Empire or who knew the Turkish language. In addition, the selection of the members of the delegation was also a challenge to him, and the aforementioned “lobbying activities” in connection with this can also be observed. Therefore, it can be shown in advance that the outlining of the system of diplomatic connections for a mission is also able to examine numerous general social phenomena and show the efforts of various factions to assert their interests.

⁷ The letter, which requests him to take part in the mission, was written by Anton Wolfradt, Abt von Krebismünster on behalf of the monarch, and was sent from Prague on 18 November 1627. ELTE EKL, G4 Tom. V. pag. 1–4; the detailed chronology of the mission was made on the basis of his final report (*Finalrelation*) which had been written about the mission. See: Kuefstein, K. G., *Studien zur Familiengeschichte*, vol. 3, pp. 259–279; Certain works were utilising the diplomatic journal through the perspective of cultural history, see Teply, *Die kaiserliche Großbotschaft*.

THE POSSIBILITIES FOR EXAMINATION

A significant majority of research on diplomatic history presents a global perspective that looks at the issue from above. This is because in many cases the prominent political individuals decide on the actual shaping of the events (e.g. the palatine, the leadership of the Aulic War Council, etc.).⁸ However, at the same moment, a significant part of the diplomatic work and the carrying out of actions are performed by members of the lower-middle apparatus, whose roles and activities can only be grasped with a perspective of history from below.⁹ However, these individuals sometimes achieve a more significant role and can be forced to make independent decisions due to the specific arrangement of the events. This often contributes to certain important decisions not being made, thus in the case of the Treaty of Szőny, it was precisely the decisions that could not be agreed upon during the 1627 negotiation period or even later that were not decided (e.g., the joint problem of Vác and Bolondvár, the affiliation of submitted villages, the duration of the treaty, etc.).¹⁰

By examining the history of a peace negotiation or series of diplomatic events from this perspective, it is also possible to get a glimpse into the restricted environment and social system of relationships. Since the temporal and spatial contexts are reduced, the researcher may work with a significantly broader basis of sources, so a type of microhistorical and textological perspective and methodology. Naturally, this can only be employed if a unique source environment is available so that the lives and assignments of individual diplomats can be examined in depth.

⁸ It is possible to find examples for those works, which combines and amalgamates the use of this type of “macro” and “micro” or “organisational” and “individual” perspective and methodological toolbar even in the diplomatic history work of a single author, for the latter see: Kármán, *Erdélyi külpolitika*; Kármán, *A Seventeenth-Century Odyssey*; As an example of the latter, it is possible to mention the process of the 1627 Peace Treaty of Szőny that forms the basis of the mission, in which the Aulic War Council and the palatine played important roles. Brandl, et al., “Válogatott források”; Brandl et al., “Kommunikáció és híráramlás”.

⁹ The historical perspective of “people’s history” or “history from below” spread primarily based on the works of Lucien Febvre and then E. P. Thompson, and the subject of investigation swung in the direction of simple people. The new trends in diplomatic history, including the roles of individuals, is well summarised in: Strohmeier, “Trendek és perspektívák”, on the issue of “actor-centrism” in particular, see: pp. 182–84; Recent works concerning this topic, see: Cziráki, “„Mein gueter, väterlicher Maister””; Marton, “Péter Koháry’s Life”.

¹⁰ For these issues, see: Brandl, et al., “Válogatott források”, pp. 155–156, 165, 167, 171–173, 175–176, 181, 183, 188 and 190–191; a particularly good example of this is the Ottoman capture of Vác or the destruction of Bolondvár which was in the hands of the Ottoman. The problems surrounding these fortresses ended in a mutual discord, which could not be solved either in the Treaty of Gyarmat in 1625, in the first Treaty of Szőny in 1627, in the second Treaty of Szőny in 1642, or even in the Treaty of Constantinople of 1649. The question of these fortifications was mentioned in the article 2 of the 1625 Treaty of Gyarmat, cf.: Gévyay, *Az 1625-diki május 26-dikán költ gyarmati békekötés cikkelyei*, p. 9; article 2 of the 1627 Treaty of Szőny, cf.: Gévyay, *Az 1627-dik évi september 13-án kelt szőnyi békekötés cikkelyei*, p. 12; article 4 of the 1642 treaty of Szőny, cf.: Majláth, *Az 1642-ik évi szőnyi békekötés*, p. 76–82, 400; article 4 of the 1649 Treaty of Constantinople, cf.: Szilágyi, *Rozsnyay Dávid*, Budapest, 1877, p. 175.

HISTORICAL ENVIRONMENT – OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEACE

In the series of Habsburg–Ottoman peace treaties, the 1627 Treaty of Szőny can be considered distinct from numerous aspects. Although the two empires tried to look at the other an equal political entity and continue the traditions of 17th-century peace treaties,¹¹ these negotiations present numerous new characteristics. The ceremonial framework and the process of ratification that had only been partially worked out previously are better defined by the parties, while at the same time a significant portion of the differences arose due to the specific political situation.¹²

The most important element of this special political environment for both sides was the effort to avoid war on multiple fronts. While Vienna was constrained by the everyday events of the Thirty Years' War,¹³ the Ottoman Empire not only had to face internal conflicts (the rebellions in the Crimean and in Anatolia), but also external enemies (the conflict with Safavid Persia).¹⁴ In part arising from this is that the political roles of powers living in the shadow of the empire increased, so Transylvania under the leadership of Prince Bethlen was able to exert a particularly important influence over events.¹⁵ It is precisely this seething political situation that made the peace important to other European powers as well. The convergence of high politics at Constantinople was also able to have a serious effect on the activities of the ambassador since the French, English, and Dutch envoys made intrigues against Kuefstein at the Sublime Porte.¹⁶

On the other hand, the result of the political situation was that the peace negotiations moved from the level of the emperors to the level of the “local leaders”. In this sense, the palatine of Hungary (Miklós Esterházy), the pasha of Buda (Mürteza), and the prince of Transylvania (Gábor Bethlen) were able to decide on numerous issues in the process of their joint negotiations, even though the latter could only influence the bargaining process informally. The result of this was that

¹¹ For this issue, see: Ernst D. Petritsch, “Zeremoniell bei Empfängen habsburgischer Gesandtschaften”; Strohmeyer, “Die habsburgisch-osmanische Freundschaft”; Strohmeyer, “The theatrical Performance of Peace”.

¹² For the description of the ceremony: Péter Koháry to István Pálffy, Komárom, 30 August 1627, or Gerhard von Questenberg to Ferdinand II, Komárom, 31 August 1627, Brandl, et al., “Válogatott források”, pp. 175–176, 178.

¹³ For a summary of the Thirty Years' War, primarily from the religious aspect, see: Schilling, *Konfessionalisierung und Staatsinteressen*, pp. 508–538; For the events, see: Gindely – Acsády, *Bethlen Gábor és udvara*, pp. 186–230; Franzl, *Ferdinand II*, pp. 222–239; Schilling, *Konfessionalisierung und Staatsinteressen*, p. 525; Höbelt, *Ferdinand III*, pp. 46–53; Hengerer, *Kaiser Ferdinand III*, pp. 64–72.

¹⁴ Römer, “The Safavid Period”, pp. 189–350, especially: pp. 266–68; Savory, *Iran under the Safavids*, Cambridge – London – New York – New Rochelle – Melbourne – Sidney: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 85–91; Marton, “A Dissertation in Preparation”, the manuscript's pp. 3–5.

¹⁵ For Gábor Bethlen's indirect influence over the peace negotiations in Szőny, see: Salamon, *Két magyar diplomata*, passim; Brandl, et al., “Válogatott források”, pp. 157–58, 178–188, 193; For the course of the negotiations, also see: Marton, “„Szőnyből tudatjuk...”.

¹⁶ For the politics controversies of the envoys of the different states, see: Kuefstein, K. G., *Studien zur Familiengeschichte*, vol. 3, pp. 261, 267–269 and 275.

the treaty became a kind of “Hungarian internal matter”, but only on the level of practical diplomacy.¹⁷ Nevertheless, the influence of the hawks in the groups of elites from both empires can be said to be significant, since the possibility of a war on multiple fronts thereby became enticing. Political actors are found on both sides that either became doves during the peace process (the palatine and the pasha of Buda),¹⁸ or continuously represented a stance against peace (Bethlen, Althan),¹⁹ without even mentioning the foreign powers that had a clear interest in the outbreak of a Habsburg-Ottoman conflict (England, Holland, France).²⁰

THE PERSONA OF KUEFSTEIN IN HISTORIOGRAPHY

Serious professional interest has surrounded the diplomatic and political activities of the baron and later count, Johann Ludwig von Kuefstein, even without wide-ranging knowledge of the family and diplomatic correspondence that comprises the backbone of a unique source basis.

Several significant elaborations of Kuefstein’s life and career have already been published, but as will be seen, the inclusion of the materials held in Budapest will be essential to clarifying his profile in the future. A biography of the diplomat was compiled by one of his descendants, Karl Graf von Kuefstein, at the beginning of the 20th century.²¹ He was familiar with the ambassador to Constantinople based on the final report that closed his diplomatic mission and the records of the Aulic War Council. Later, Karl Teplý expanded our knowledge by utilising the ambassador’s journal and numerous documents held at the Archives of the Province of Upper Austria in his research. Relying on these documents and the artistic works created in connection with the diplomatic mission, he shed new light on the topic

¹⁷ By this, it should be understood that a significant portion of the actual negotiations took place between the Palatine of Hungary, the Pasha of Buda, and the Prince of Transylvania. It is also necessary to underline, that through the mediation of lower-level diplomats the former Kingdom of Hungary served as the site for these negotiations. This may be linked to the fact that Hungarian diplomatic activity on an imperial level also strengthened significantly by Miklós Esterházy holding the post of palatine and the effects of the Thirty Years’ War. Cf.: Hiller, “A Habsburg diplomáciában játszott magyar szerep”; However, it is important to note that the negotiating commissioners and even the palatine requested the opinion of the imperial court in every case. Brandl et al., “Kommunikáció és híráramlás”, pp. 123–124.

¹⁸ For the evaluation of the palatine’s opinion in connection with the Ottomans, see: Hiller, *Palatin Nikolaus Esterházy*, pp. 61–62; For Mürteza’s military campaign of 1626 and his orders on the signing of the treaty, see: Jászay, “A’ szőnyi béke”; Thallóczy et al., *Török-magyar oklevéltár: 1533–1789*, pp. 218–220; For the career of Mürteza, see: Sudár, “The Story of Mürteza Pasha”.

¹⁹ Gindely – Acsády, *Bethlen Gábor és udvara*, pp., 201–214; For Althan as the advocate for the (Catholic) Christians living in the Ottoman Empire, see: Tóth, “Athanasio Georgiceo”, p. 838, 848, 858; Molnár, “Végvár és rekatolizáció”.

²⁰ For the English, see: Roe, *The Negotiations of Sir Thomas Roe*, pp. 798–825; For the French, see: Hámori Nagy, “Források Bethlen Gábor két francia diplomatájáról”, 83–103; For the Dutch, see: Groot, *The Ottoman Empire*, p. 122.

²¹ Kuefstein, K. G., *Studien zur Familiengeschichte*, vol. 3, pp. 88–163, 239–300.

in the area of cultural history.²² The former employee of the Library and Archives of Eötvös Loránd University, Regina Donáth also published documents from his estate, but not in connection with the mission to Constantinople.²³ Harald Tersch collected the journals of the diplomat as documents presenting his personal, self-testimony as a type of review,²⁴ and Thomas Winkelbauer briefly presented Kuefstein's life in connection with typifying the careers of converts.²⁵ More recently, Klára Berzeviczy studied the journal, analysing the ceremony of the diplomatic mission.²⁶ It can be clearly seen that the works cited here only tried to evaluate the mission, based upon a single segment of the available source material. At the same time, for a detailed evaluation, it is necessary to compare the sources and study them in a complex manner, which can only be achieved through the joint evaluation of the documents. This is particularly true for the three completely parallel documentary materials (reports, journal entries, and correspondence), which supplement and interpret the information of one another. Based on the investigations up to now, it is possible to gain a great deal of information in connection with the life of the diplomat and his documentary legacy.

KUEFSTEIN'S LIFE AND DOCUMENTARY LEGACY

Baron Johann Ludwig von Kuefstein was born in 1582 and began a diplomatic career following his studies at university. He actively participated in contemporary politics as a Lutheran nobleman and mediated between the monarch and the protestant estates on several occasions as a diplomat. Then in 1627, he converted to Catholicism and after this, he earned the honourable duty of the ambassadorial mission to Constantinople. Following his return home, in 1630 he was appointed governor (*Landeshauptmann*) of Upper Austria, a post that he occupied until his death.²⁷

Due to his active political life, he left a considerable amount of archival documents for posterity, a large portion of which are held today at the Archives of the Province of Upper Austria.²⁸ Karl Graf Kuefstein did compile the biographies of his family members. Exactly on the basis of these archival sources as well on the copies of the reports on his forefather's ambassadorial mission to Constantinople of 1628–1629. The aforementioned biographer also utilises the appendices of this

²² Teply, *Die kaiserliche Großbotschaft*; a large portion of the works of art created about the ambassadorial mission are currently held in the collections of the Osmanenmuseum in Perchtoldsdorf, Karl Teply also provides information about them, *ibid.*, pp. 58–135.

²³ Donáth, “A diplomáciai titkosírás”; Idem, “Egy törökkori forrásgyűjtemény”; Idem, “Iratok a westfáliai békekötés történetéhez”, pp. 239–252.

²⁴ Tersch, “Hans Ludwig von Kuefstein”.

²⁵ Winkelbauer, *Fürst und Fürstendiener*, pp. 128–129.

²⁶ Berzeviczy, “Fragen des Zeremoniells während einer Gesandtschaftsreise”.

²⁷ For Kuefstein's biography and activities, see: Kuefstein, K. G., *Studien zur Familiengeschichte*, vol. 3, pp. 230–300; For the circumstances of his conversion, see: Winkelbauer, *Fürst und Fürstendiener*, pp. 128–129.

²⁸ OÖLA, HAW, Archivalien, Aktenband (AB) 18, Nr. 4., AB 26 Nr. 9; AB32 Nr. 14; HS Bände 1–29.

diplomatic mission which can be found in Vienna.²⁹ However, besides this, a considerable portion of Kuefstein's correspondence was also found in Budapest at the Library of the Eötvös Loránd University presumably through the diplomat's son, Gotthilf Kuefstein, who joined the Jesuit order.³⁰ This latter collection of documents with outstanding value as a source has been given little attention up to now,³¹ despite the fact that a detailed investigation of this unique material could enrich our knowledge of both political and cultural history. The full correspondence written during his diplomatic mission can be found in the fourth and fifth of the volumes to be detailed below. These were organised in part chronologically and in part based on their arrival through the postal system, but it cannot be determined whether these are the work of Kuefstein or his secretary. Due to the unique nature of this bequest, it is worthwhile here to provide a brief description of its content.³²

The first book of this documentary bequest of fourteen volumes (Tom. I–XIV) contains the results of Kuefstein's literary activities – for example, translations – and the documents of his early diplomatic activities performed as a Lutheran politician, but a description of China can also be found here. In the second volume, it is possible to read copies of the documentary materials from envoys that had previously been to the Ottoman Empire – Ludwig von Molardt and Johann Jakob Kurz von Senftenau – probably to prepare for his mission to Constantinople. The third volume contains the family correspondence written between 1622 and 1640, however, letters dated between 1632 and 1640 are not amongst the documents. In the fourth and fifth can be found Baron Kuefstein's correspondence written during his diplomatic mission to Constantinople, the former containing issues of lower political relevance and the latter may have served as the basis for writing both his journal and his final report. In the sixth volume, the minutia of the accounting for the financial matters of the diplomatic mission can be read, which may pique the attention of those interested in the micro perspective of economic history. The seventh book deals with correspondence between 1639 and 1643, that was for the most part with family, but also has a smaller portion of official letters – for example, an imperial decree and his draft response. In the eighth is his correspondence from the year 1643, and the ninth, which is in a quite bad condition, collects his family letters from between 1643 and 1645. In the following (Tom. X), it is possible to read the official correspondence of the diplomat from 1646–1647. The 11th volume encompasses his correspondence from the year 1648, which is the material that Regina Donáth selected from for her article,³³ but the correspondence

²⁹ ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, (Turcica) Kt. 112. Bd. 1., 2.

³⁰ ELTE EKL, G4 Tom. I–XIV; For the provenance of the volumes, see: Donáth, “Egy törökori forrásgyűjtemény”, p.194.

³¹ Regina Donáth, the former employee of the Eötvös Loránd University Library and Archives, was the first who published on the documents of this collection. Donáth, “A diplomáciai titkosírás”; Idem, “Iratok a westfáliai békekötés történetéhez”; The volumes were also mentioned by György Hölvényi in connection with literary history. Hölvényi, “Nochmals”.

³² We would like to thank to András Péter Szabó for drawing our attention to this outstandingly important collection of sources.

³³ Donáth, “Iratok a westfáliai békekötés”, p. 251.

also extends to documents related to Constantinople as well. The next (12th) volume contains the primarily official correspondence from between 1650 and 1652, while the 13th has these documents from between 1653 and 1655. The final volume (Tom. XIV) is a group of documents that contains the correspondence from between 1652 and 1656, and as a point of interest, it can be mentioned that based on the content of the letters, Kuefstein was also provided with a great deal of information related to the Hungarian frontier at this time from Vienna. From the information here, it can also be determined that the diplomat's correspondence preserved at Budapest can truly be considered a unique collection of sources, which naturally can only be properly evaluated when compared with other contemporary sources.

THE THEORETICAL POSSIBILITIES FOR AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE SOURCES OF AN AMBASSADORIAL MISSION TO CONSTANTINOPLE

To understand an ideal source environment for a diplomatic journey to Constantinople by a Habsburg envoy, we must outline the theoretical framework for the possibilities of the sources. Even though this cannot ever be fully achieved, it can be used as a point of reference during the identification of the sources. An outstanding opportunity for this is offered by the extraordinarily broad source basis that can be studied in connection with the ambassadorial mission of Johann Ludwig von Kuefstein. Although the ideal outlined here only depends in part on the materials from other ambassadorial missions, it still clearly demonstrates the general basis of sources for envoys in the 17th century. We have divided these source materials into three categories during our investigations: 1) the ambassador's own documentary materials; 2) official correspondence related to the mission with his employer and the authorities; 3) documents not issued by the mission or the employer but in effect parallel sources.

1) The ambassador's own documentary materials

In an ideal situation, the documentary materials of the ambassador would be comprised of numerous important and traditional elements. In the first half of the 17th century, envoys often kept diplomatic journals, which were dominated by daily events. In addition to these, due to the constant maintenance of contact, the most characteristic documents in the case of ambassadorial missions were the reports and the final report (*Finalrelation*) at the end of the mission. These often were a version of the earlier reports and the journal set in an official form, which in many cases also included the more important documents that had been created during the mission as appendices.³⁴ A significant portion of the envoy's materials are

³⁴ In the case of Johann Ludwig von Kuefstein there is an outstanding range of sources, which encompasses all three categories mentioned here. The diplomat's final report is available at the ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I. (Turcica) series with its appendices (instructions, correspondence with Habsburg and Ottoman officials) organized into two volumes. ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I. (Turcica) Kt. 112. Bd. I, II; The diary on the diplomatic mission to Constantinople can be found in Linz,

comprised of the incoming and outgoing correspondence maintained during the diplomatic trip, as well as the registration of financial accounts created during the mission. These supplement the letters that comprise the personal or family estate of the envoy and possibly the traces of literary activities (translations, writings). Although the latter are not directly linked to his diplomatic activities, they still disclose numerous details about the personality of the envoy and the circumstances of his mission.³⁵

2) Official correspondence related to the mission with his employer and the authorities

The documents we can list in the second category are those that come directly from the emperor through the Aulic War Council or its functionaries (its president, members of the Aulic War Council, the resident ambassador in Constantinople, etc.). The most important of these are the documents addressed directly to the ambassador, so his letter of appointment, the general orders and special orders, made in connection with delicate matters.³⁶ This also includes the correspondence with various officials subordinated to the Aulic War Council, such as documents arriving from interpreters or captains of castles. It is also possible to list here the items from other authorities acting on behalf of the emperor, thus the letters sent

under the reference code HS. 16 of the OÖLA, HA W, Archivalien; These types of documentary materials are also available in the case of other envoys from other missions in the first half of the 17th century, for example the correspondence and diplomatic report during the mission of Hermann Czernin in 1616–1617 (ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I (Turcica) Kt. 104., 105., 106., passim; ÖStA KA, HKR, KzLA, Kt. 56. Nr. 17, fol. 1–38); Ludwig von Molardt's reports and correspondence from his mission of 1619–1620 (ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I (Turcica), Kt. 107, 108; in duplicate: ELTE EKL, G4 Tom. II, pag. 63–482); the documentary materials from the diplomatic mission of Johann Rudolf Puchheim (ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I (Turcica) Kt. 113. Bd. I, II, III); the correspondence and diary of Hermann Czernin's ambassadorial mission of 1644–1645 (SOA v Třeboni, JH/RAČCh Kt. 48–54; Franz Tischer, *Zweite Gesandtschaftsreise des Grafen Hermann Czernin von Chudenic nach Constantinopel im Jahre 1644.*, (Neuhaus, 1879)); the correspondence and final report of Johann Rudolf Schmid's ambassadorial mission of 1650–1651 (ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I (Turcica) Kt. 123, 124, passim); the correspondence of every diplomatic mission was registered in the record books of the Aulic War Council. ÖStA KA, HKR, Prot. Bde. 260–261, 271–272, 290–293, 302–304; in the case of Kuefstein, one-line excerpts can be found in the record books and a few drafts of letters addressed to the court have also survived in copies. Cf.: ELTE EKL, G4 Tom. V, passim., ill. ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I (Turcica) Kt. 112, Bd. II.

³⁵ In the case of Kuefstein, the documentary materials are scattered. However, the majority of his correspondence related to his diplomatic mission to Constantinople is held in Budapest, where his translations can also be found: ELTE EKL, G4 Tom. I, IV, V, VI; In the case of other envoys, we have no knowledge of documents not closely linked to the diplomatic mission; so, for example, according to our knowledge, Hermann Czernin did not pursue literary activities similar to Kuefstein, Johann Rudolf Puchheim's family archives are wanting, and even in the case of Johann Rudolf Schmid, it was only his escort, Johann Georg Metzger that left notes behind: Huemer, „„Copy & Paste“ im Reisebericht der Frühen Neuzeit?"; About the journals of Kuefstein and Metzger, see: Huemer, „Von „knobloch und zwieffel“ zu den „bulgarischen weibspersohnen“.

³⁶ From amongst these documents the letter of appointment (instructions, etc.) preserved in the diplomatic correspondence can be pointed out as an example, and these types of documents can be found in the ELTE EKL, G4 Tom. V.

by the treasuries or the Palatine of Hungary. These are supplemented by the series of documents sent by the emperor but not addressed to the ambassador, which for the most part was for Ottoman dignitaries. Naturally, the most important document is the ratified copy of the peace treaty, and the arbitrary alteration of its contents represented an outstanding problem for many ambassadorial missions.³⁷

3) Documents not issued by the mission or the employer but in effect parallel sources

The parallel materials not directly linked to the documents of the diplomatic mission can provide significant insight into the reconstruction of events that do not otherwise appear in the aforementioned sources. It is possible to divide this group into two parts according to the viewpoint of the documents. (3a) There are, on the one hand, general diplomatic source materials about the mission (parallel diplomatic reports, diplomatic correspondence of other countries affecting the mission, e.g., Transylvania, Venice, England, etc.),³⁸ (3b) and on the other hand, those documents that only deal with the general objectives of the mission in part. These, in general, are petitions from various subjects of the Ottoman Empire or issues affecting the Christian faith (schisms, Franciscans, Jesuits, saints' relics)³⁹ or even delicate issues not of a political nature that have not been settled by previous diplomatic missions (e.g. personal debts of previous envoys).⁴⁰ Naturally, in terms of financial matters, there is an abundant amount of source material available at the archives of the Aulic Chamber.⁴¹

A database of the documentary materials of the 1627 Szőny peace process has been organised jointly by the colleagues of the MTA–SZTE Research Group of the Ottoman Age (Eötvös Loránd Research Network), which encompasses nearly

³⁷ The intentional differences in treaty versions had already led to problems since the first treaty between the two empires; the best-known case occurred on the occasion of the Treaty of Zsitvatorok: Bayerle, "The compromise at Zsitvatorok"; Nehring, "Magyarország és a zsitvatoroki szerződés"; For the Habsburg–Ottoman peace treaties, see: Papp, "Az Oszmán Birodalom", pp. 86–99, 91, 95–96; For the problems during the peace negotiations at Szőny in 1642, see the article by Krisztina Juhász in the present volume.

³⁸ Beside the great powers mentioned earlier, other parallel source materials have also survived, such as the Venetian diplomatic reports: Óváry, *Oklevéltár*, pp. 439–448, 693–784; or the Transylvanian correspondence: "Toldalagi Mihály levelei", pp. 248–258.

³⁹ An outstanding example of this is the case of the Franciscans from Sopron that accompanied Kuefstein, who were searching for the grave and remains of John of Capistrano and wanted to seek out relics; we are informed of this recurring topic through numerous letters; they were supported by Ferdinand II (e. g. ELTE EKL, G4 Tom. V. pag. 407–410), The baron even negotiated with Mürteza Pasha on the matter of the friars (ELTE EKL, G4 Tom. V. pag. 429–430.); to our knowledge, they were not successful.

⁴⁰ A good example of this is the debt of Michael Starzer that will be dealt with below. Michael Adolf von Althan to Johann Ludwig von Kuefstein, Prague, 23 February 1628, ELTE EKL, G4 Tom. IV, fol. 128–129.

⁴¹ ÖStA FHK, Sammlungen und Selekte Reichsakten Kt. 302 (Faszikel 185A) fol. 205–290.

2,000 items.⁴² A considerable portion of the collected material – nearly half – is comprised of correspondence arising during the diplomatic mission of Baron Kuefstein. A total of 846 letters between 18 November 1627 and 8 December 1629 can be linked to Kuefstein's mission in the material that has been processed so far. Of these, the diplomat appears as the addressee in 580 and as the sender in 266.⁴³ From these data, it can be determined that although many drafts are contained in the documents held at the Eötvös Loránd University Library and Archives, not all of the baron's responses can be found amongst the letters at our disposal. The missing ones can presumably be discovered in the archives of the addressees, which would demand further diversified research.

THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE DIPLOMATIC MISSION

Baron Johann Ludwig von Kuefstein received the honourable request from the emperor Ferdinand II on 21 November 1627, that he lead the ambassadorial mission taking the ratified version of the Treaty of Szőny signed on 13 September 1627, to Constantinople.⁴⁴ At first, the diplomat did not want to take the assignment, but then finally following personal negotiations with representatives of the monarch's court, which was at that time in Prague, began the organisation of the diplomatic mission that placed a great burden and responsibility on him.⁴⁵ Since there arose differences in content in connection with the Ottoman version of the peace treaty,⁴⁶ the prescribed exchange of envoys on the border could not take place until the issue was clarified, even though the baron had set off in July 1628. The aforementioned ceremony was finally conducted on 26 September, at the Habsburg–Ottoman frontier between Komárom and Esztergom. Then, Kuefstein went on to Constantinople, and the Ottoman envoy, Recep Pasha continued his journey towards Vienna. Following Kuefstein's long (about 1 week) visit with the pasha of Buda, the mission continued relatively smoothly and their entry into Constantinople was on 25 November. Due to the political situation – the hostile states made the negotiations more difficult and for a certain time he could not even leave his house – Kuefstein only set off back for Vienna 9 months later, on 18 August

⁴² The database reflects the status of the research as of September 2018. For more detail on the database and the distribution of correspondence during the peace process, see: Brandl et al., „Kommunikáció és híráramlás”, pp. 121–124.

⁴³ However, it is necessary to note that in the case of numerous documents there is uncertainty in terms of whether they actually functioned as letters. We only included these in part in the database.

⁴⁴ See the citations of footnote 5.

⁴⁵ For the negotiations, see: Teply, *Die kaiserliche Großbotschaft*, pp. 18–21; For the theoretical preparations of Kuefstein, see: Cziráki, „„Mein gueter, väterlicher Maister””, passim.

⁴⁶ For an overview of the problems of the treaty versions, see the following unnamed document: Anonymous description of the incorrect Turkish treaty version. s.l., s.d. 1628(?), ELTE EKL, G4 Tom. V. pag. 63–64; For the remedying of the problem, see: Brandl – Szabados, „A Janus-arcú diplomata”, p. 90.

1629, and he only arrived after another ceremonial exchange of envoys on 8 December.⁴⁷

THE CONTACTS OF KUEFSTEIN AND HIS ENTOURAGE – EFFORTS AT INFLUENCE AND THE ASSERTION OF INTERESTS

Kuefstein conducted correspondence with numerous individuals during the preparations for his diplomatic mission and during the journey. Here it is only possible to touch upon a few important individuals in detail in connection with the preparations for the mission and the journey to Constantinople, but his diplomatic correspondence included numerous characteristic groups. He conducted extensive correspondence not only with the Aulic Chamber and Aulic War Council, but also with various officials (captains-general and castle captains) and agents that assisted in his mission, such as in connection with the exchange of envoys, and were only subordinates to the Aulic War Council in part.⁴⁸ A portion of his letters logically come from the palatine, who played an important role⁴⁹ in the local matters of the peace negotiations (for example, the conducting of the negotiations at Szécsény and Buda⁵⁰), while Kuefstein conducted the correspondence between the empires. On the basis of this, it can be understood that he corresponded with numerous Ottoman officials as well, since the clearing up of the remaining issues fell to him, which included such matters as the duration of the treaty. The Ottomans would have supported peace for 25 years, but in the end, there was no agreement in this matter.⁵¹ Numerous objectives of his mission met with similar “success” as the issues of Vác or the duration of the treaty, while at the same time the peace was successfully ratified. In the following, emphasis is placed upon the correspondence that took place during the preparations for Kuefstein’s journey and that with the individuals that played a part in the preparations.

One of the most important people that Kuefstein corresponded with prior to his journey was the former resident ambassador in Constantinople, Michael Starzer (1610–1622),⁵² who he would have liked to bring with him on the trip, but this was not possible. However, their correspondence served the ambassador greatly,

⁴⁷ For the chronology of the diplomatic mission, see: Kuefstein, K. G., *Studien zur Familiengeschichte*, vol. 3, pp. 259–279; Těplý, *Die kaiserliche Großbotschaft*, pp. 26–54.

⁴⁸ It is possible to mention as an example the 40 letters that the captain-general of Komárom, Ernst von Kollonitsch, wrote to him on the matters of the exchange of envoys or other events in the period between 5 December 1627 and 21 December 1629, ELTE EKL, G4 Tom. V. passim.

⁴⁹ Miklós Esterházy sent a total of 7 letters to Kuefstein, for the most part in connection with the diplomat’s Hungarian escort and matters affecting the Kingdom of Hungary. Cf.: ELTE EKL, G4 Tom. IV and V, passim.

⁵⁰ For the negotiations at Szécsény and Buda, see: Stessel, “Adatok” 1–2; Marton, “On the Question of the Negotiations”; Marton, “„Az mint Isten tudnunk adja””; Marton, “Péter Koháry’s Life”; Marton, “A Dissertation in Preparation”.

⁵¹ Gerhard von Questenberg to Johann Ludwig von Kuefstein. Vienna, 18 August 1628, ELTE EKL, G4 Tom. V. pag. 141–152; for the lack of success of the negotiations, see: Juhász, “...gyümölcse pedig semmi nem volt”.

⁵² Spuler, “Die Europäische Diplomatie in Konstantinopel”, p. 330.

not only was he able to gain knowledge of the individuals involved in eastern diplomacy and their problematic affairs from the letters, but he also was able to receive fresh news of grand European politics from him in Prague. Kuefstein received a total of 36 letters from the former resident ambassador between 16 December 1627 and 17 June 1628,⁵³ but the responses are only known in part (presumably a portion of them can be found in the archival heritage of Starzer in the city of Sopron, which we have not yet had the opportunity to view).⁵⁴

The second significant individual of Habsburg–Ottoman diplomacy was Count Michael Adolf von Althan,⁵⁵ who was a constant participant in peace negotiations between 1606 and 1625 and it seems he strove to exert an influence on the composition of the diplomatic mission. He would have liked to have at least one of his men go along with Kuefstein. Sebastian Lustrier, the resident ambassador in Constantinople (1623–1629) at that time, could be considered one of his confidants. Althan and Lustrier were not necessarily set on the signing of the treaty either.⁵⁶

Baron Kuefstein had to face numerous difficulties when preparing for the diplomatic mission, such as the raising of finances or the compensation for the aforementioned inexperience. Only one of these will be dealt with in detail here, the selection of the personnel of the delegation, which is connected with the latter issue. Based on the data, it seems that during the selection of the staff, the fractional battles related to attitudes towards the Ottomans also played a role. During this, the supporters of peace included the president of the Aulic War Council, Rambaldo Collalto, the member of the Aulic War Council, Gerhard von Questenberg, and Johann Rudolf Schmid, and the people urging war were the elderly Melchior Klesl,⁵⁷ who had already been removed, the similarly elderly Michael Adolf von Althan and Sebastian Lustrier,⁵⁸ who was part of his group. Michael Starzer's role in this fractional battle has not yet been clarified. From the correspondence, it can be seen that both parties tried to gain Kuefstein's trust. In the future, it is worth discussing the areas of intersection that have proved to be uncertain based on the correspondence. These were the selection of the translator, the steward, and the

⁵³ The letters can be found at the Eötvös Loránd University Library and Archives: ELTE EKL, G4 Tom. IV. passim. The number was obtained from our database containing the correspondence of the Treaty of Szőny. Cf.: Brandl et al., „Kommunikáció és híráramlás”, p. 108; For the knowledge transferred by Starzer, see: Cziráki, „„Mein gueter, väterlicher Maister””, pp. 60–61.

⁵⁴ The estate can be found under the following reference code: MNL GyMSL SL, XIV/69.

⁵⁵ For Althan's life and activities, see: Winkelbauer, *Fürst und Fürstendiener*, pp. 134–140; Molnár, „Végyvár és rekatolizáció”.

⁵⁶ This is shown by Lustrier's reports on the subject, according to which they should take advantage of the Ottomans' other engagements and initiate an attack against them. Sebastian Lustrier to Ferdinand II, Constantinople, 25 and 30 May 1627, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I. (Turcica) Kt. 111. Konv. 1, fol. 56, 67 and 65–66.

⁵⁷ For the anti-Ottoman policies in the 1610s represented by Klesl, see: Cziráki, „Szemelvények”; Cziráki, „Erdély szerepe”; For Klesl's removal: Cziráki, „Habsburg–Oszmán diplomácia a 17. század közepén”, pp. 838–839.

⁵⁸ Lustrier stressed the importance of the war in his letter written to the emperor. Cf.: the citations in footnote 56.

diplomatic secretary, as well as the choosing of experts that were included in the entourage, which had significant social prestige.

ON THE QUESTION OF APPOINTING THE INTERPRETER

Due to what has been mentioned and to Kuefstein's nature as a "homo novus" in connection with Habsburg–Ottoman diplomacy, the diplomat was in a quite dependent situation. It was for just this reason that it would have been necessary for a reliable person to go with him who was at home in the diplomatic labyrinth of the Ottoman Empire. Rational objectives guided the selection of the baron's delegation, but he was forced to compromise on some issues, which naturally had an impact on the success of the mission.

One of the most important positions from the perspective of the diplomatic mission was that of the translator since without this it was impossible in practice to communicate with the Ottomans. For this objective – even though Kuefstein originally wanted to bring the imperial interpreter, Michel d'Asquier, with him⁵⁹ – in the end he brought the interpreter from Győr, Ernst Házy, and Marino Tudisi, who was one of Count Althan's men from Dubrovnik and who the diplomat brought through the intercession of the count. The former's strength was more with the written word, while the latter proved to be more apt at verbal negotiations.⁶⁰

Thus, Marino Tudisi, who was mentioned at the beginning of the article, was one of the individuals that Kuefstein did not bring along of his own accord. Tudisi had been at the court of the pasha of Buda since 1622, as the agent of Michael Adolf von Althan. Since there is no information about him in the documents of the Aulic Chamber, presumably he was a private employee of the count. This is also reinforced on one occasion by Mihály Tholdalagi, and Althan himself talks about him to Kuefstein as if he owes obedience to the count.⁶¹ The man from Dubrovnik disappears from the documentation of the mission for reasons that are not yet known at the end of January 1629.⁶² This may be related to the oath of loyalty noted above, or to the fact that in the spring of 1628 a suit was filed against him in Prague or that the secret correspondent in Buda, Tomaso Orsini, was expelled by the pasha of Buda, Mürteza, and appeared in Constantinople in January 1629.⁶³

THE PROCESS OF HIRING OF THE STEWARD

The second important post was that of the steward, and Kuefstein first asked Michael Starzer to fill this position – in all certainty due to the experience he had

⁵⁹ OÖLA HAW, HS 16, fol. 10r; For d'Asquier's life and activities, see: Hamilton, "Michel d'Asquier".

⁶⁰ OÖLA HAW, HS 16, fol. 45.

⁶¹ "[...] *also ist er* [viz. Tudisi] *von mir bevolcht* [...]" Michael Adolf von Althan to Johann Ludwig von Kuefstein, Vienna, 11 September 1628, ELTE EKK G4 Tom. IV, fol. 354–355.

⁶² For Tudisi's activities in detail, see: Brandl – Szabados, "A Janus-arcú diplomata", pp. 85–93.

⁶³ For more details on this topic, see: Ibid, p. 91; Szabados, „*Ih awer befleise mih*", p. 51.

accumulated while being the resident ambassador in Constantinople – but he naturally placed conditions, for example in terms of the staff.⁶⁴ However, the greatest impediment proved to be that the former permanent envoy had left a rather large debt behind in both Constantinople and during his visit to Buda following that, so Ferdinand II did not allow him to travel back to the Ottoman capital.⁶⁵ After this, Count Althan recommended a person for this post as well, Paulo Mazza, who was also from Dubrovnik and previously would have delivered the copy of the Treaty of Gyarmat to Constantinople, but he was not allowed to travel past Buda. The objection in relation to him was his bourgeois origin, because based on certain information he had previously worked as a furrier, so they did not allow him to go on to Constantinople in 1625 either.⁶⁶ Although Mazza verified with witnesses that he was not a furrier,⁶⁷ he still did not get the position of steward. Starzer also recommended a certain Francesco Mazzafano from Parma.⁶⁸ However, in this case, Kuefstein did not listen to the incoming suggestions but selected his own steward, Hans Albrecht Pollender,⁶⁹ for the position, so in this issue – since presumably, it was irrelevant from the perspective of the peace process – he was able to choose freely.

THE APPOINTMENT OF THE DIPLOMATIC MISSION'S SECRETARY

The position of secretary had an exceptional role in the case of ambassadorial missions to Constantinople because in many cases the envoys entrusted their secretaries with performing sensitive or confidential tasks (this is also evidenced by

⁶⁴ For Starzer's response to Kuefstein's request, see: Michael Starzer to Johann Ludwig von Kuefstein, Prague, 16 December 1627, ELTE EKL, G4 Tom. V. pag. 31–38; for more details on this topic, see: Cziráki, „Mein gueter, väterlicher Maister”, pp. 60–81. passim.

⁶⁵ Johann Rudolf Schmid to Johann Ludwig von Kuefstein, Prague, 26 January 1628, ELTE EKL, G4 Tom. IV, fol. 53–54; Michael Starzer to Johann Ludwig von Kuefstein, s.l. (Prague?), s.d. (January 1626?) ELTE EKL, G4 Tom. IV, fol. 74–75; Cf.: Těplý, *Die kaiserliche Großbotschaft*, p. 24.

⁶⁶ For Althan's recommendations, see: Michael Adolf von Althan to Johann Ludwig von Kuefstein, Prague, 9 February 1628, ELTE EKL, G4 Tom. IV, fol. 98–99; Michael Adolf von Althan to Johann Ludwig von Kuefstein, Prague, 23 February 1628, ELTE EKL, G4 Tom. IV, fol. 128–129; For Mazza's previous matter and regarding his bourgeois origins, see: Michael Adolf von Althan to Johann Ludwig von Kuefstein, Prague, 11 March 1628, ELTE EKL, G4 Tom. IV, fol. 72; For Mazza's previous role, see: Michael Starzer to Johann Ludwig von Kuefstein, Prague, 19 February 1628, ELTE EKL, G4 Tom. IV, fol. 116–119; Schmid also mentioned the incident in 1648. Cf.: Cziráki, „Habsburg–Oszmán diplomácia a 17. század közepén”, p. 851.

⁶⁷ For the document written by the witnesses, see: The testimony of Giovanni Paulo Damiani, Matteo Sturani, Marino Tudisi, Simon Lukschich, Péter Horváth, Giovanni Caspar Michel against the bourgeois origins of Paulo Mazza Prague, 10 March 1628, ELTE EKL, G4 Tom. IV, fol. 154.

⁶⁸ Michael Starzer to Johann Ludwig von Kuefstein, Prague, 19 February 1628, ELTE EL G4 Tom. IV, fol. 116–119.

⁶⁹ Polender was employed by him from 2 August 1628, OÖLA HAW, HS 16, fol. 451. See also: Těplý, *Die kaiserliche Großbotschaft*, p.24; Cf.: Cziráki, „Ruha teszi a követet?”.

later missions⁷⁰). It seems that Kuefstein urged the introduction of this position in connection with these kinds of diplomatic missions. The diplomat had a rather particular opinion of Johann Rudolf Schmid,⁷¹ who was originally placed as his secretary, according to which he did not know Latin and was not able to write a proper draft, so he would not readily recommend him for the position of resident ambassador.⁷² Schmid sent a total of 16 letters in connection with the preparations for the diplomat's journey, in which he informed him of the events at the court.⁷³ Kuefstein's arguments were not verified by reality, because concerning the Ottoman Empire it was not primarily the abilities he criticised that played an important role, but instead his language skills (German, Italian, Turkish) and his proficiency at negotiating with the Ottomans. Schmid proved to be an outstanding expert in these matters, as is evidenced by his diplomatic career.⁷⁴ Finally, only two "normal" secretaries – Elias Seeauer and Franz Mossmüller⁷⁵ – went with Kuefstein, so he could not count on expert support in Turkish matters.

THE SELECTION OF EXPERTS

An important place was afforded amongst the members of the entourage to the experts responsible for the health of the ambassador and the provisioning of the diplomatic mission, as well as painters that saw to the visual recording of the journey. According to the sources, it seems that Kuefstein selected the personnel qualified for the aforementioned categories based on applications and recommendations. In the case of certain functions, several applicants came forward and submitted a kind of "professional résumé". This is seen in the case of the painter Hans Genningen for example, who submitted his application,⁷⁶ in addition to this, Valentin Mülner,⁷⁷ who was recommended by Starzer, also accompanied him and

⁷⁰ For example, Hermann Czernin's secretary, Erasmus Constantin Sattler, performed a rather confidential task during the diplomatic mission. Johann Friedrich Metzger was also entrusted with similar tasks during the time of the ambassadorial mission of Johann Rudolf Schmid (1650–1651). Cf.: Szabados, „*Ih awer befeise mih*”, p. 67; Idem, *Die Berichte Hans Caspars*, p. 48.

⁷¹ Ferdinand II to Johann Ludwig von Kuefstein, Prague, 5 January 1628, ELTE EKL, G4 Tom. IV. pag. 69–72; cf.: Teplý, *Die kaiserliche Großbotschaft*, p. 24.

⁷² "...darunter auch der Rudolff Schmidt, so mitgehen solle, einer ist, vonn(?) in deme selbigen weder Lateinisch, Hungerisch reden, noch schreiben, auch kein formliches teutsches concept machen khan, waiß ich nicht, wie er einen secretarium, oder künfftigen residenten per forza vertretten solle." Johann Ludwig von Kuefstein to Gerhard von Questenberg. Komárom(?), 1 September 1628, ELTE EKL, G4 Tom. IV, fol. 229–230.

⁷³ Johann Rudolf Schmid's letters to Johann Ludwig von Kuefstein from Prague between 8 January and 5 April 1628, ELTE EKL, G4 Tom. IV. passim.

⁷⁴ For Schmid's life, see: Meienberger, *Johann Rudolf Schmid*; Cziráki, "Habsburg–Oszmán diplomácia a 17. század közepén", passim.

⁷⁵ Teplý, *Die kaiserliche Großbotschaft*, p. 24.

⁷⁶ Hans Genningen to Johann Ludwig von Kuefstein, s.l., s.d. (1628) ELTE EKL, G4 Tom. IV, fol. 214–215.

⁷⁷ Michael Starzer to Johann Ludwig von Kuefstein, Prague, 17 June 1628, ELTE EKL, G4 Tom. IV, fol. 279–280.

may have been an assistant to the other painter, Franz Hörman.⁷⁸ Bartholomeus Brundtl applied for the position of chef,⁷⁹ but Michael Funckh obtained the job ahead of him,⁸⁰ but unfortunately lost his life on the way.⁸¹ Wilhelm Birkman accompanied Kuefstein as an apothecary, since he was recommended by a relative, Arnoldus Birkman, for the mission, who the diplomat hired.⁸² Thus, on the basis of what is outlined here, Kuefstein had full authority to make decisions in terms of the staff.

CONCLUSIONS

From what is outlined in this essay, it emerges clearly how incredible the source basis for Johann Ludwig von Kuefstein's diplomatic mission is and what a complex mass of problems it is to trace the motivations of the various individuals. Although we did not have an opportunity to discuss every issue in detail, from the descriptions it is still apparent how many and what kind of factors influenced the composition of an ambassadorial mission to be sent to the Ottoman Empire, and thus its success as well. It is not by chance that these factors indirectly led to the partial failure of the mission. Although it was not possible to go over this in the present article, none of the other objectives appointed by the emperor was successfully accomplished besides the acceptance of the ratification. It is our opinion that the complex mass of problems outlined here also precisely contributed to this. These included the state of war and the fractional political battles arising from this as well as the envoy's lack of preparedness and the deficiencies of the diplomatic apparatus.

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⁷⁸ Teply, *Die kaiserliche Großbotschaft*, p.59.

⁷⁹ Bartholomeus Brundtl to Johann Ludwig von Kuefstein, s.l., s.d. (1628) ELTE EKL, G4 Tom. IV, fol. 211.

⁸⁰ OÖLA HAW, HS 16, fol. 454.

⁸¹ Wolf Leuthkauff to Johann Ludwig von Kuefstein. Belgrade, 13 January 1629, ELTE EKL, G4 Tom. IV, fol. 450–451.

⁸² Arnoldus Birkman to Johann Ludwig von Kuefstein, Vienna, 18 January 1628, ELTE EKL, G4 Tom. IV, fol. 25; Arnoldus Birkman to Johann Ludwig von Kuefstein, Rossatz(?), 5 February 1628, ELTE EKL, G4 Tom. IV, fol. 77–78; Arnoldus Birkman to Johann Ludwig von Kuefstein, s.l., 2 February 1628, ELTE EKL, G4 Tom. IV, fol. 82–83; Wilhelm Birkman to Johann Ludwig von Kuefstein, s.l., s.d. (arrived 17 March 1628), ELTE EKL, G4 Tom. IV, fol. 182–183.

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On the Margins of the Second Treaty of Szőny

*Data for the History of the Signing of the Treaty of Szőny in 1642**

INTRODUCTION

In this article, I will present some data on the peace treaty known as the second treaty of Szőny and the process of its signing. Although research into historical peace treaties, and especially examinations focusing on Habsburg–Ottoman peace treaties within this topic, cannot be considered a novel phenomenon in the study of history, it has received increased attention in recent years.¹ The treaty that is the topic of the present examination is also organically integrated into the research project based on an overarching study of sources that is being conducted by the MTA–SZTE Research Group of the Ottoman Age, Eötvös Loránd Research Network (ELKH) aimed at analysing Habsburg–Ottoman peace treaties and the publication of the critical edition of the treaties. The choice of subject is also justified by the fact that the data from the historical literature as well as sources publications dealing with the subject are significantly supplemented by the examined, relevant source materials of the Hungarian and foreign archives. The systematic review of the antecedents to the signing of the treaty and the events of the peace process are included in my publication, followed by the presentation of an exchange of letters that straddles the line of official and private correspondence. I consider this correspondence to be a kind of guiding thread, through which I direct attention in the latter part of the article to the individual problem areas arising in

* This article has been written within the framework of the work of the MTA–SZTE Research Group of the Ottoman Age (Eötvös Loránd Research Network). The research and the writing of this paper have been supported by the Ministry of Human Capacities (Emberi Erőforrások Minisztériuma) through a grant (code nr. 20391-3/2018/FEKUSTRAT; TUDFO/47138-1/2019-ITM) The research has also been supported by the National Research, Development and Innovation Office (NRDI) (Nemzeti Kutatási, Fejlesztési és Innovációs Hivatal) through a grant (Thematic Excellence Programme (Tématerületi Kiválósági Program) 2020, NKFIH-1279-2/2020) of the Interdisciplinary Centre of Excellence (University of Szeged), the Department of Medieval and Early Modern Hungarian History (Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Szeged), MTA–SZTE Research Group of the Ottoman Age (Eötvös Loránd Research Network). I would hereby like to give thanks for the valuable assistance provided during the writing of this paper by the research group leader Sándor Papp, and my PhD supervisor Sándor László Tóth. Furthermore, my thanks also go to Gergely Brandl, Csaba Göncöl, Tibor Martí, Gellért Ernő Marton and János Szabados for their useful pieces of advice and help concerning the collection of sources. This paper is an enlarged, revised and, as well, updated version of the earlier published study in Hungarian: Juhász, “A második szőnyi béke margójára”.

¹ See more (non-exhaustive collection): Espenhorst, *Frieden durch Sprache?*; Espenhorst – Duchhardt, *Frieden übersetzen in der Vormoderne*; Strohmeyer, “Trendek és perspektívák”; Cziráki, “„Mein gueter, väterlicher Maister””; Papp, “A pozsareváci békekötés”; Szabados, “Habsburg–Ottoman Communication”; Marton, “A Dissertation in Preparation”; Tóth, “Vasvár előtt”; Idem, “The Circumstances”; Sz. Simon, “A szülejmáni béke”; Cervioğlu, “The Peace Treaties”.

connection with the treaty and will attempt to present other details of the negotiations through the analysis of these.

A brief survey of the historiography and source materials of the 1642 Treaty of Szőny cannot be avoided in the introduction to my work. This treaty fits into the series of Habsburg–Ottoman peace treaties signed during the 17th century, and naturally has not escaped the attention of earlier research. The first monographic elaboration of the topic having been written by Béla Majláth, at the end of the 19th century.² His work is at the same time a collection of sources, since in addition to providing a detailed overview of the history of the peace negotiations, the author also published a substantial cartulary comprised of 116 documents from the source materials employed. Although similar summaries about the history of the peace treaty have not been made besides this book, which represents an unavoidable point of departure for examinations related to the topic, researchers in the 19th and 20th centuries did contribute documents related to the publication of sources for the more thorough understanding of the process of the peace negotiations of 1642.³ Good examples of the increase of interest in the subject are the works that have appeared in the last couple of years that publish the most recent results from research related to the treaty either in part or in full.⁴ Although the publications just briefly cited here employed a broad basis of Hungarian and foreign sources, further documents can be found amongst the relevant source materials that provide a more nuanced understanding of the process and circumstances of the signing of the treaty than has been developed to this point.⁵

ANTECEDENTS

The so-called Long Turkish War which also known as the Thirteen (or Fifteen) Years' War (1591/93–1606) that was accompanied by great destruction is considered a crucial event of turn of the 17th century by historians from several aspects.⁶ The Peace of Zsitvatorok (1606) that ended the war fundamentally defined the development of Habsburg–Ottoman diplomatic relations in the first half of the 17th century, although it only created a relatively peaceful period on paper, as in reality military actions, raids and even the taking of villages that were violations of the

² Majláth, *Az 1642-ik évi szőnyi békekötés*.

³ Ráth, “Gróf Esterházy Miklós”; Fekete, *Türkische schriften*; Jedlicska, *Eredeti részletek gróf Pálffy-család okmánytárához*; Hiller, *Palatin Nikolaus Esterházy*.

⁴ Tusor, „*Irom kegyelmednek...*”; J. Újváry, “Nemzeti identitás”; Juhász, “Esterházy Dániel és Esterházy Miklós”; Idem, “...gyümölcse pedig semmi nem volt”; Idem, “A második szőnyi béke margójára”.

⁵ With no attempt at being comprehensive, the following can be mentioned: MNL OL, E 174; MNL OL, P 108; MNL OL, P 123; EPL, AS, AR, Classis V; EPL, AS, AR, Classis X; SNA, EcsI; ÖStA HHStA, Pálffy-Daun Familienarchiv.

⁶ Sándor László Tóth has primarily studied the events of the Long Turkish War, and amongst his publications on the subject, I will point out the following summary work: Tóth, *A mezőkeresztesi csata*; For the most recent work on the Long Turkish War with an approach from military organisation and logistics, see: Bagó, *A császári – királyi mezei hadsereg*; For the devastation caused by the Long Turkish War, see: Pálffy, *A Magyar Királyság*, 351–359.

peace occurred unabated.⁷ However, the series of differences of opinion did not lead to a renewed wartime conflict, at least until the 1660s. The settling of relations between the two parties in a peaceful manner was attempted several times, as a result of which treaties that took the 1606 Peace of Zsitvatorok as a basis were made at Vienna in 1615–1616⁸, at Komárom in 1618,⁹ at (Hidas)gyarmat in 1625¹⁰ and at Szőny in 1627.¹¹ Four of these peace treaties, together with the Peace Treaty of Szőny in 1642, fall into the fourth category of Habsburg–Ottoman peace treaties from a chronological and methodological point of view. A common feature of these peace negotiations is that they took place under the direction of local Ottoman dignitaries (including the Pasha of Buda) and the Palatine of the Kingdom of Hungary, in Hungarian venue, on the common borderland, near Komárom. The negotiations went mostly in Hungarian and in Turkish, and the transcriptions were made in Hungarian, Latin and in Ottoman–Turkish, ratified by the rulers of both empires.¹² In addition to all of these, the changes in internal and external politics that took place in the meantime had an impact on the situation of both empires.¹³

The actual political situation of the time made the maintenance of peaceful relations justified for both sides. In connection with the Habsburg Monarchy, it is enough simply to refer to the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) that absorbed their attention, and which seemed to have a slight chance to end in 1637. This circumstance was created by the death of the Holy Roman Emperor (1578–1637) and King of Hungary (1619–1637) Ferdinand II in February and then the accession to the throne of his son, Ferdinand III (1637–1657).¹⁴ However, the fighting only ended about ten years later, which contributed to the increasingly exhausted Monarchy trying to ease pressure to the east and avoid an open, armed conflict with the Ottomans.

The Ottoman Empire did not only have to face up to its serious internal problems,¹⁵ but also came into conflict again with Safavid Persia in the middle of the 1630s. This conflict stretched back to the 16th century and was renewed regularly. It was finally ended by the treaty of Zuhab signed in the spring of 1639, as a result of which Baghdad and Mesopotamia both returned to Ottoman control.¹⁶ Almost a year later, there was a change in rulers at the head of the Ottoman Empire, and following the death of Murad IV (1612–1640), his younger brother Ibrahim I (1615–1648) followed him on the throne as Ottoman sultan (1640–1648).¹⁷

⁷ For the damage, see: Illik, “Török dúlás a Dunántúlon”; Idem, *Minden nap háború*.

⁸ Salamon, *Két magyar diplomata*, pp. 265–273.

⁹ Ibid, pp. 274–278.

¹⁰ Jászay, “A’ gyarmati béke”; Gévay, *Az 1625-diki május 26-dikán költ gyarmati békekötés cikkelyei*.

¹¹ Gévay, *Az 1627-dik évi szeptember’ 13-án kelt szőnyi békekötés’ cikkelyei*; Jászay, “A’ gyarmati béke”, pp. 167–274; Salamon – Szalay, *Galántai Gróf Eszterházy Miklós*, vol. 2; Salamon, *Két magyar diplomata*.

¹² Papp, “Az Oszmán Birodalom”, pp. 91.

¹³ Marton, “A Dissertation in Preparation”, the manuscript’s pp. 4–5.

¹⁴ Hengerer, *Kaiser Ferdinand III*, pp. 125.

¹⁵ Kerekes, “Tradicionális birodalom”.

¹⁶ Römer, “The Safavid Period”.

¹⁷ Majláth, *Az 1642-ik évi szőnyi békekötés*, p. 11.

Miklós Esterházy (1582–1645),¹⁸ who filled the post of palatine that was the highest feudal rank in the 17th century,¹⁹ continuously informed Ferdinand III about the state of the country, indicating that the aforementioned series of disturbances on the part of the Ottomans could possibly lead to the open violation of the peace. After the ruler and his advisors realised the existing conditions, which held a danger to the entire Monarchy, Ferdinand III ordered the arming of the border fortresses on 25 April 1640. Only a couple of days had passed when on 1 June the ceremonial diplomatic mission of Sultan Ibrahim I arrived to the Habsburg monarch. On the one hand, the envoy was assigned to announce the news of the new ruler ascending to the throne, and on the other hand to provide information on the further possibilities for the maintenance of the peace.²⁰

However, the situation was complicated by the fact that Ferdinand III delayed in sending the diplomatic mission going to the Sublime Porte whose task was to greet the new sultan and discuss the possibilities for peace. Following preparations of the delegation, which took months, the internuncius András Izdenczy (?–1659)²¹ finally set off on 17 March 1641 and stayed in Constantinople between 29 April and 5 July. During this time, he had one audience with the Sultan Ibrahim I, and three audiences with Kemankeş Kara Mustafa Pasha (1592–1644), the grand vizier (1638–1644). The first meeting with the grand vizier was preceded by a wait of six weeks, because in the meantime the pasha had suffered serious burns in a fire.²² András Izdenczy's 33-day diplomatic mission can be considered successful, since the Sublime Porte made promises for the redress of the grievances, the maintenance of the peace and the dispatch of the commission.²³ In this way, the diplomatic mission of András Izdenczy to the Sublime Porte can be considered an antecedent to the 1642 Treaty of Szőny. The development of the framework for the renewed Habsburg–Ottoman peace negotiations began soon after the return of the internuncius.

¹⁸ For the life and career of Miklós Esterházy, see: Toldy, *Esterházy Miklós munkái*; Salamon – Szalay, *Galántai Gróf Eszterházy Miklós*, vol. 1–3; Csapodi, *Eszterházy Miklós*; Hajnal, *Esterházy Miklós nádor lemondása*; Idem, *Az 1642. évi meghíúsult országgyűlés*; Péter, *Esterházy Miklós*; Pálffy, Géza, “Pozsony megyéből a Magyar Királyság élére”; Hiller, Palatin Nikolaus Esterházy; Martí, “Esterházy Miklós nádor”; Szabó, “Eszmék a nádori politika szolgálatában”; Marton, “„Az mint Isten tudnunk adja””.

¹⁹ Ember, *Az újkori magyar közigazgatás*, pp. 25–28; Körmendy, *Levéltári kézikönyv*, p. 88; Márkus, *Magyar törvénytár 1000–1895.*, vol. 5, p. 11; Pálffy, *A Magyar Királyság*, p. 392 and pp. 405–406; Lauter, “„Modus observandus...””, p. 189.

²⁰ Majláth, *Az 1642-ik évi szőnyi békekötés*, pp. 10–11.

²¹ András Izdenczy had also been asked to participate in the work of the delegation alongside Baron Johann Ludwig von Kuefstein when the 1627 Peace Treaty of Szőny was taken to the Sublime Porte, but he declined the offer. Later he also turned up as an envoy in Poland in 1638. Nagy, *Magyarország családai*, vol. 5, p. 271; Salamon – Szalay, *Galántai Gróf Eszterházy Miklós*, vol. 3, p. 328.

²² Majláth, *Az 1642-ik évi szőnyi békekötés*, p. 39; György Lippay to Miklós Esterházy, Regensburg, 2 July 1641, Tusor, “*Írom kegyelmednek...*”, doc. no. 71, pp. 75–76.

²³ For the report of András Izdenczy on the diplomatic mission to the Sublime Porte, see: Majláth, *Az 1642-ik évi szőnyi békekötés*, doc. no. 24, pp. 171–187.

THE PEACE PROCESS

The process of the signing of the so-called second Treaty of Szőny can be divided into several phases. The first, a kind of preparatory phase, can be calculated from the summer of 1641, when András Izdenczy made a personal report to Ferdinand III after returning from the Sublime Porte, and the Habsburg monarch received the letter of the Sultan Ibrahim I regarding the renewed peace negotiations.²⁴ During this period, agreements were made concerning designating the site of the negotiations, and in the end the site of the negotiations and the accommodations of the Ottoman commissioners was in Szőny, while Komárom was arranged for the Habsburg delegates.²⁵ The appointment of the commissioners also took place in parallel to this. During the negotiations, the Habsburgs were represented by the vice-chairman of the Aulic War Council, Baron Gerhard von Questenberg (1586–1646),²⁶ the bishop of Eger (1633–1666) and royal chancellor, György Lippay (1600–1666),²⁷ the chief justice of Hungary, Tamás Mikulich (1631–1645),²⁸ the captain of Szendrő, Gáspár Szunyogh (1639–1643)²⁹ and the aristocrat Dániel Esterházy (1585–1654).³⁰ Amongst these, it should be pointed out separately that Gerhard von Questenberg and Dániel Esterházy also had participated in the negotiations at Szőny in 1627, as members of the peace delegation. Thus, their previous diplomatic experience certainly played a role in their appointments.³¹ Presumably, György Lippay filled the position of the delegated commission chairman for the Habsburgs, or at least a parallel from the first Treaty of Szőny – where the Hungarian chancellor of the time, István Sennyey, was the chair – allows one to come to this conclusion.³² For the Ottomans, the kapıcıbaşı Osman Agha received the authority to conduct the negotiations, and alongside him was the timar defterdarı of Buda, Mehmed, the alaybey of Esztergom, Mustafa, the cavalry captain of Eger, Mustafa, and the agha of Kanizsa, Mustafa.³³

The commissioners appointed by the Habsburgs had waited since 10 December 1641, for the negotiations to begin, the first Ottoman cavalymen only arrived on

²⁴ Majláth, *Az 1642-ik évi szőnyi békekötés*, p. 55.

²⁵ Majláth, *Az 1642-ik évi szőnyi békekötés*, p. 67, 72 and 77; Jedlicska, *Eredeti részletek gróf Pálffy-család okmánytárához*, p. 322; György Lippay to István Pálffy, Komárom, 23 December 1642, Tusor, „*Írom kegyelmednek...*”, doc. no. 80, pp. 87–88.

²⁶ Kampmann, “Gerhard Questenberg”, vol. 21, pp. 43–44.

²⁷ For the most recent work on his life and activities, see: Tusor, „*Írom kegyelmednek...*”.

²⁸ György Lippay to Ádám Batthyány. Bécs, December 16, 1638. Tusor, „*Írom kegyelmednek...*”, doc. no. 41, pp. 42–43. According to Iván Nagy, Tamás Mikulich, who came from a Croatian family, filled the office of chief justice from 1625. Cf. Nagy, *Magyarország családai*, vol. 7, p. 498.

²⁹ Borovszky, *Szendrő vára*, p. 34.

³⁰ Esterházy, *Az Esterházy család*, pp. 175–178; Nagy, *Magyarország családai*, vol. 4, p. 93.

³¹ For their roles during the peace negotiations in 1627, see: Brandl, et al., “Válogatott források”, passim; Brandl et al., “Kommunikáció és híráramlás”, passim; Brandl, et al., “Kommunikation und Nachrichtenaustausch”, passim.

³² Cf.: the previous footnote.

³³ Majláth, *Az 1642-ik évi szőnyi békekötés*, p. 71 and 77. Cf.: ÖStA HStA, Türkische Urkunden, Karton 8., No. 16.

4 January the next year to survey the site. Based on the sources prior to the commencement of the negotiations as well as those appearing immediately after, great emphasis was placed on the mobilisation of their armies. Alongside the arming of the border fortresses,³⁴ the Ottomans arrived at the negotiations with about 600 cavalymen.³⁵ Dániel Esterházy provides information on the presence of a total of 600–700 cavalymen and about half as many infantrymen in Komárom and the nearby village of Mócsa,³⁶ and from him we know that there were 250 infantrymen with them at the negotiations.³⁷

The second major period of the peace process only commenced five days after the arrival of Osman Agha in Szőny, namely on 13 January 1642, with the beginning of the actual negotiations.³⁸ The letter of Jeromos Rausz provisor informs us that the first room of town hall in Szőny has been designated as the venue for the negotiations, where the Ottomans had taken various chairs and carpets before the opening of the negotiation. The crossed table in the hall separated the half of the Ottoman and the Habsburg (Hungarian) negotiators.³⁹

Within this, another two periods can be differentiated. The first lasted until 2 February 1642, when negotiations for peace took place in three sessions. However, the process was interrupted for a time due to the lack of authorisation for the Ottoman commissioners and the disputes surrounding the return of occupied villages. The second stage can be interpreted as a phase of more intensive negotiations that brought progress. During this time, the representatives of the two sides met a total of eight times. According to Dániel Esterházy's report, following the agreements on 20 March 1642, they wanted to write the peace document in three languages – Latin, Ottoman-Turkish and Hungarian – then certify these the next day with the signatures and seals of the commissioners of both sides.⁴⁰ At the same time, the settlement of several of the disputed issues (e.g. the situation of the castles built on the Croatian frontier) was assigned to the tasks of separate commissions or to ambassadorial missions. The final, closing phase of the peace process began in March of 1643, when the diplomatic mission of György Szelepcsényi

³⁴ Jedlicska, *Eredeti részletek gróf Pálffy-család okmánytárához*, p. 309.

³⁵ György Lippay to István Pálffy, Komárom, 10 January 1642, Tusor, „*Irom kegyelmednek...*”, doc. no. 84, p. 91; György Lippay to István Pálffy, Komárom, 10 January 1642, *Ibid*, doc. no. 85, p. 92.

³⁶ Dániel Esterházy to Miklós Esterházy, Komárom, 14 January 1641/1642, MNL OL, P 123, I/a fol. 171–174; Juhász, “Esterházy Dániel és Esterházy Miklós”, pp. 179–182.

³⁷ Dániel Esterházy to Miklós Esterházy, Komárom, January 18–19, 1642, MNL OL, P 123, I/a fol. 175–178; Juhász, “Esterházy Dániel és Esterházy Miklós”, pp. 183–186.

³⁸ György Lippay to István Pálffy, Komárom, 10 January 1642, Tusor, „*Irom kegyelmednek...*”, doc. no. 84, p. 91; György Lippay to István Pálffy, Komárom, 10 January 1642, *Ibid*, doc. no. 85, p. 92; Majláth, *Az 1642-ik évi szőnyi békekötés*, p. 79.

³⁹ Jeromos Rausz to Commissioners, Szőny, 10 January 1642, MNL OL, X 725. EPL, AS, AR, Classis X., microfilm nr. 2648, (until November 1642) pag. 91–92.

⁴⁰ Dániel Esterházy to Miklós Esterházy, Komárom, 20 March 1642, MNL OL, P 123, I/a fol. 183; Juhász, “Esterházy Dániel és Esterházy Miklós”, p. 197; for the Latin and Hungarian versions of the peace treaty with the seals and signatures, see: ÖStA HStA, Türkische Urkunden, Kt. 8., No. 16.

(1595–1685) set off to the Sublime Porte.⁴¹ As a special envoy, he set off for the Sublime Porte again in the autumn of 1643 and on 9 December in Constantinople he handed over the copy of the peace treaty ratified by the Habsburg ruler.⁴²

THE EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN MIKLÓS AND DÁNIEL ESTERHÁZY

Already during comprehensive research into the sources for the 1627 Treaty of Szőny⁴³ a focal point for the network of relationships emerges, with Miklós Esterházy and Dániel Esterházy taking the leading roles. This same direction of communication appears during the process of signing the 1642 Treaty of Szőny as well, and this is a segment of both treaties that has not yet been explored. Taking the topic of the present article into account, in the following, I will examine the correspondence in connection with the so-called second Treaty of Szőny, highlighting the most relevant details from this. At the same time, I consider it important to refer to the fact that the analysis of this communication pathway does not only offer an opportunity in connection with the treaties individually, but also opens the possibility for a comparative analysis.⁴⁴ The examination of the letters that represent the main lines for the contemporary disclosure and flow of information is rather exciting in the light of the exchange of letters, if only from the perspective that through the personal information it is not only possible to get closer to the given individuals, but also to the current events.

One of the corresponding partners was Miklós Esterházy, who was born in 1583. His election by the estates at the Diet of Sopron in 1625 as the palatine of the Kingdom of Hungary, to the general satisfaction of the monarch Ferdinand II and the country, was a milestone in the development of his life and career. He contributed to the signing of two Habsburg–Ottoman peace treaties in under 20 years during his time as palatine.⁴⁵ The second main participant in the correspondence, Dániel Esterházy, was born on 26 July 1585, as the child of Ferenc Esterházy and Zsófia Illésházy. He was initiated as a Knight of the Golden Spur in 1618,

⁴¹ The delegation performed two tasks. On the one hand, negotiations took place on the 1642 Treaty of Szőny, and on the other hand Alexander Greiffenklau (?–1648) accompanied György Szelepcsényi to take over the post of imperial resident ambassador in Constantinople from Johann Rudolf Schmidt zum Schwarzenhorn (1590–1667). The uncovering and publication of the diplomatic reports of Alexander Greiffenklau is currently ongoing under the direction of Arno Stohmeyer, and the corpus that is being prepared will provide supplementary information about the history of the so-called second Treaty of Szőny.

⁴² For a description of the diplomatic mission of György Szelepcsényi, see: Takáts, *A régi Magyarország*, pp. 196–206.

⁴³ Within the framework of the project of the MTA – SZTE Research Group of the Ottoman Age (ELKH), Gergely Brandl, Csaba Göncöl, Krisztina Juhász, Gellért Ernő Marton and János Szabados are developing a database that up to this point contains nearly 2,000 documents concerning the 1627 Treaty of Szőny that is continuously expanding. For more on this work, see: Brandl et al., “Kommunikáció és híráramlás”.

⁴⁴ The Esterházy brothers remained in constant contact with one another, and the corpus of their extensive correspondence can now be found dispersed amongst source publications and Hungarian as well as foreign archives.

⁴⁵ For summaries related to his life and career, see: footnote 12.

achieved the rank of baron one year later, and then became an advisor of the royal chamber at the 1625 Diet at Sopron.⁴⁶ As has been mentioned previously, he also accepted a role as a negotiating commissioner for the 1642 Treaty of Szőny, which was due not only to his experience, but also to his family connections, since Dániel Esterházy was the younger brother of the palatine by two years.

Two factors are worth pointing out when explaining the motivation for examining the correspondence between the two Esterházy. One is the fact that in addition to maintaining contact with the commissioners sent to Szőny, the palatine Miklós Esterházy corresponded separately with Dániel Esterházy during the negotiations. However, it must also be noted that Miklós Esterházy's network of connections presents a different picture during the 1642 negotiations than it did in 1627. After all, during the time of the so-called first Treaty of Szőny no contact can be registered between the palatine and the Habsburg commissioners (with the exception of Dániel Esterházy).⁴⁷ At the same time, it should also be noted that in 1642 the palatine had a direct communication link with the chancellor György Lippay, who was the chairman of the Habsburg commission according to my hypothesis. All of this is interesting, because according to the most recent research findings, during the peace negotiations at Szőny in 1627, only indirect contact can be shown between him and István Sennyey, the chancellor and the chairman of the negotiating commission at that time. In addition, it is also worth pointing out that the flow of information between Miklós Esterházy and Dániel Esterházy also contains interesting data because the nature of their relationship has some significance beyond the official, palatine–commissioner relation, due to their family ties.

According to my current knowledge, the letters from the correspondence in question can be found in the family archives of the Esterházy, the National Archives of Hungary and the Slovak National Archive.⁴⁸ In terms of the extent of the correspondence comprising the period of three months that has been analysed, it can be stated that in the present phase of research the two letters that have been published⁴⁹ can be supplemented by a further seven,⁵⁰ which include six occasions

⁴⁶ A comprehensive elaboration of the life of Dániel Esterházy has not yet been made, for information on his life, see: footnote 23.

⁴⁷ Brandl et al., “Kommunikáció és híráramlás”, p. 123.

⁴⁸ MNL OL, P 123, I/a; MNLOL, E 174, box 3, item 7; SNA, EcsI box 48.

⁴⁹ Miklós Esterházy to Dániel Esterházy, Nagyszombat, 22 January 1642, Majláth, *Az 1642-ik évi szőnyi békekötés*, doc. no. 72, pp. 320–321; Miklós Esterházy to Dániel Esterházy, Sempte, 28 February 1642, Majláth, *Az 1642-ik évi szőnyi békekötés*, doc. no. 98, pp. 370–371.

⁵⁰ Dániel Esterházy to Miklós Esterházy, Komárom, 14 January 1641/1642, MNL OL, P 123, I/a fol. 171–174; Juhász, “Esterházy Dániel és Esterházy Miklós”, pp. 179–182; Dániel Esterházy to Miklós Esterházy, Komárom, 18–19 January 1642, MNL OL, P 123, I/a fol. 175–178; Juhász, “Esterházy Dániel és Esterházy Miklós”, pp. 183–186; Dániel Esterházy to Miklós Esterházy, Komárom, 29 January 1642, MNL OL, E 174, box 3, item 7, fol. 427–430; Juhász, “Esterházy Dániel és Esterházy Miklós”, pp. 187–190; Dániel Esterházy to Miklós Esterházy, Komárom, 19 February 1642, MNL OL, P 123, I/a fol. 179–180; Juhász, “Esterházy Dániel és Esterházy Miklós”, pp. 190–192; Miklós Esterházy to Daniel Esterházy, Komárom 20 February 1642, SNA, EcsI box 48, fol. 1–2; Juhász, “Esterházy Dániel és Esterházy Miklós”, pp. 193–195; Dániel Esterházy to Miklós Esterházy, Komárom, 5 March 1642, MNL OL, P 123, I/a, fol. 181–182; Juhász, “Esterházy Dániel és Esterházy Miklós”, pp. 195–196; Dániel Esterházy to Miklós

when Dániel Esterházy was the sender and three when it was Miklós Esterházy. Insomuch as the intensity of the exchange of correspondence cannot only be concluded by the number of surviving letters, it is also necessary to count documents whose existence is only indicated by references made to them in the surviving writings, and these are present in most of them. In these cases, the sender–addressee relationship can be clearly determined, we can conclude the approximate date of writing and perhaps there is some indication of certain elements of the content as well. By taking these items into account, the frequency of correspondence is altered somewhat. Since in the nine surviving letters, there are eight occasions of a reference to another piece of correspondence, it can be stated with certainty that there were at least 17 letters that were written and arrived at their destination. Of these, the palatine Miklós Esterházy was the author on 8 occasions and Dániel Esterházy on 9 occasions,⁵¹ so it appears that the responses are linked to one another sequentially and the communication was continuous and mutual between the sender and addressee.

If we want to place the letters on a timeline of the negotiations, 8 can be identified in the first period (14 January – 2 February 1642), and 9 in the second period lasting until 23 March 1642. There is an incorrect date on one of the documents (14 January 1641). The content of the letter aids in determining its proper date, from which it is clear that it was written in the year 1642.⁵² The incorrect year was probably due to habit, since the letter was written at the beginning of the year. There is a long, nearly three-week, interval that appears between 29 January and 19 February 1642, when there are no letters or references to letters being sent that can be found. There may be several reasons behind this, and two of these definitely played a role. One was that there were no talks between the Habsburg and Ottoman commissioners between 2 and 18 February 1642, and as a result of this, there were no significant events that were worth reporting.⁵³ It should also be mentioned as a second reason that it is probable that during this period Miklós Esterházy and Dániel Esterházy met in person as well. The occasion for this may have been provided by an unfortunate family event, namely the funeral of István, Miklós Esterházy's eldest son from his first marriage,⁵⁴ which took place on 4 February 1642,

Esterházy, Komárom, 20 March 1642, MNL OL, P 123, I/a fol. 183; Juhász, “Esterházy Dániel és Esterházy Miklós”, p. 197.

⁵¹ In addition to the letters that are mentioned, there is the possibility that there are also undiscovered documents that may be included in this correspondence.

⁵² Dániel Esterházy to Miklós Esterházy, Komárom, 14 January 1641/1642, MNL OL, P 123, I/a fol. 171–174; Juhász, “Esterházy Dániel és Esterházy Miklós”, pp. 179–182.

⁵³ Majláth, *Az 1642-ik évi szőnyi békekötés*, p. 103.

⁵⁴ István Esterházy died in Vienna on 4 July 1641, as the result of an illness. His death and funeral were noted by Dániel Esterházy in the family journal he maintained, which contains reminiscences going back to 1567 and contemporary entries from 1634. This also provides the information that this was not the only death in the first half of 1641 that overshadowed the life of Miklós Esterházy. His wife, Krisztina Nyáry lost her life on 1 February 1641, not long after bringing their son Ferenc into the world (17 January 1641). Révay, “Az Esterházy-család”, pp. 357–362. For an analysis of the journal, see: S. Sárdi, “Az önmegörökítő Esterházy Pál”

at Nagyszombat (present day Trnava, in Slovakia), a city that was connected to the family in several ways.⁵⁵

Date	Sender – Addressee	Letter/Reference
before 14 January 1642	Miklós Esterházy to Dániel Esterházy	Reference
Komárom, 14 January 1642	Dániel Esterházy to Miklós Esterházy	Letter
before 18 January 1642	Miklós Esterházy to Dániel Esterházy	Reference
Komárom, 18 January 1642	Dániel Esterházy to Miklós Esterházy	Letter
before 22 January 1642	Dániel Esterházy to Miklós Esterházy	Reference
Nagyszombat (Trnava), 22 January 1642	Miklós Esterházy to Dániel Esterházy	Letter
26 January 1642	Miklós Esterházy to Dániel Esterházy	Reference
Komárom, 29 January 1642	Dániel Esterházy to Miklós Esterházy	Letter
Komárom, 19 January 1642	Dániel Esterházy to Miklós Esterházy	Letter
before 20 February 1642	Dániel Esterházy to Miklós Esterházy	Reference
Sempte (Šintava), 20 February 1642	Miklós Esterházy to Dániel Esterházy	Letter
before 28 February 1642	Dániel Esterházy to Miklós Esterházy	Reference
Sempte, 28 February 1642	Miklós Esterházy to Dániel Esterházy	Letter
before 5 March 1642	Miklós Esterházy to Dániel Esterházy	Reference
Komárom, 5 March 1642	Dániel Esterházy to Miklós Esterházy	Letter
before 20 March 1642	Miklós Esterházy to Dániel Esterházy	Reference
Komárom, 20 March 1642	Dániel Esterházy to Miklós Esterházy	Letter

The correspondence of Miklós Esterházy and Dániel Esterházy (14 January – 20 March 1642)

The primary purpose of the letters examined was the provision of information. Their tone was highly personal and confidential, and it can be stated from their nature that they were balanced on the border between official and private correspondence, which was clearly due to the multifaceted relationship of the two correspondents. This duality flows over into the topics as well. The subject of every one of the surviving documents is politics, represented exclusively by the peace negotiations, but at the same time, while reading the letters, researchers find themselves suddenly in the middle of a family matter that needs to be resolved.

“EITHER WE SHOW OR DO NOT TO THEM THE DIPLOMAS”⁵⁶

A quite interesting and at the same time complex area of questioning unfolded during the study of the literature related to the 1642 Treaty of Szőny and the source base at my disposal – including the correspondence between Miklós and Dániel Esterházy that is being examined here. This developed around the previous treaties and other documents that comprised the starting point for this negotiation, and

⁵⁵ Miklós Esterházy to György Lippay, Kismarton, 24 December 1641. MNL OL, X 725. PL AS AR Classis X. 2648. tekercs, (1641) pag. 331–332.

⁵⁶ The quoted text in Hungarian: “[...] vagy mutattuk, vagy nem nekik az diplomákat [...]”. Dániel Esterházy to Miklós Esterházy, Komárom, 19 February 1642, MNL OL, P 123, I/a fol. 179–180; Juhász, “Esterházy Dániel és Esterházy Miklós”, pp. 190–192.

the trouble was apparent not only during the negotiations, but also already during the preparations for them.

During the formation of the framework for the Habsburg–Ottoman peace negotiations, so already during the autumn of 1641, the Hungarian Chancellery received a mandate to seek out and prepare the letters and documents necessary for the negotiations. The palatine Miklós Esterházy himself made efforts to recover the documents that were not found at the chancellery, so he hurried to his own archives at Kismarton (present day Eisenstadt, in Austria) to look for them. The palatine also sent out a call to the counties to compile a list of the damages and grievances caused by the Ottomans since the treaty of 1627.⁵⁷ In connection with the latter, Dániel Esterházy in his letter of 14 January 1642, took issue with the fact that neither the counties of Zala, Veszprém and Győr, nor Vasvár had not sent the documents requested, and that none of the delegates of the counties that had arrived the necessary documents.⁵⁸

The disorganised and even chaotic circumstances that surrounded the previous Habsburg–Ottoman peace treaties represented an even weightier problem. It is worthwhile to start the list with the most recent, the 1627 Treaty of Szőny. In connection with this, it is worth referring to the opinions of Miklós Esterházy that he drafted in the autumn of 1641⁵⁹ and February of 1642.⁶⁰ In these, the palatine made the observations that are here only outlined in broad strokes, according to which in truth there was no peace treaty that was in force. After all, the last valid treaty had expired in 1636, and although in 1627, the Treaty of Szőny had been established, it had not been ratified and he considered the later negotiations related to the period of validity of the treaty to have been abandoned.⁶¹ Miklós Esterházy had a key role in the establishment of the first Treaty of Szőny as well, and his opinion that he stated several times is interesting because although there had been further talks about the duration of the peace, the ratification of the first Treaty of Szőny had in fact occurred. This was linked to the name of Baron Johann Ludwig von Kuefstein (1582–1656), whose mission had taken place in the period between December of 1627 and December of 1629.⁶² Even amongst the previous Habsburg–Ottoman peace treaties, whose forwarding had been urged beforehand, the

⁵⁷ Majláth, *Az 1642-ik évi szőnyi békekötés*, pp. 60–61.

⁵⁸ Dániel Esterházy to Miklós Esterházy, Komárom, 14 January 1641/1642, MNL OL, P 123, I/a fol. 171–174; Juhász, “Esterházy Dániel és Esterházy Miklós”, pp. 179–182.

⁵⁹ Miklós Esterházy proclaimed his opinion in the matter of the peace negotiations on 11 November 1641. The text of the Latin opinion was published in print. Majláth, *Az 1642-ik évi szőnyi békekötés*, doc. no. 64, pp. 231–260. In all likelihood, the Hungarian language opinion that the palatine could find at the Batthyány family archives formed the basis of this, which Zsuzsanna J. Újváry analysed in her article. J. Újváry, “Nemzeti identitás”.

⁶⁰ For Miklós Esterházy’s opinion of 28 February 1642, see: EPL AS AR Classis V. Nr. 431, pag. 1–6. For the publication of the opinion, see: Juhász, “...gyümölcse pedig semmi nem volt”.

⁶¹ Majláth, *Az 1642-ik évi szőnyi békekötés*, doc. no. 64, pp. 231–260; J. Újváry, “Nemzeti identitás”; Juhász, “...gyümölcse pedig semmi nem volt”.

⁶² For the mission of Johann Ludwig von Kuefstein in more detail, see: Brandl – Szabados, “A megbízás terhe”.

copy of the 1627 Treaty of Szőny was the first that arrived to the Habsburg commissioners assigned to the negotiations. It was certainly already there on 12 February 1642, while Michel d'Asquier (1598–1664), chief interpreter for eastern languages in Vienna (1625–1664) was entrusted with bringing the rest.⁶³ The representatives of the Habsburg party planned to show the requested “diplomas” to the Ottomans on 20 or 21 February 1642. According to Dániel Esterházy, there would be no harm if the documents in question were not to arrive in time, because the kapitány clearly informed them that they were not willing to give back the villages.⁶⁴

The 1606 Peace Treaty of Zsitvatorok also caused confusion from several aspects. On the one hand, it is known from current research that treaties with differing texts on significant points were made at Zsitvatorok, and both sides considered their own version to be the basis for negotiation.⁶⁵ The second, perhaps less well-known fact is contained in the letter dated 24 February 1642, from the archbishop György Lippay to the palatine Miklós Esterházy. In the letter, the archbishop first referred to the differing versions of the treaty of Zsitvatorok and that they still had not found the document. He then continued with a surprising statement, according to which, “*az Situatoroki diplomat magunk mi fasificaltuk etc., az többit pennara nem bizhatom* [we ourselves falsified the diploma of Situatorok [Zsitvatorok] etc., and the rest I cannot entrust to the pen]”.⁶⁶ György Lippay’s statement allows the conclusion that perhaps a forged Hungarian language version was also made in addition to the forged Turkish language copy of the treaty. The forging of the treaty of Zsitvatorok raises numerous further questions. Of these, it is enough simply to ask, who made the forgery, when and why was this done, and what differences does it contain in comparison with the original version. In the present case, insomuch as I have not found a source that provides substantive information in connection with this, it is only further research in this direction that could provide a satisfactory answer to these questions.

The Treaty of Vienna in 1615–1616 also caused concern, since it still had not yet been found and provided to the negotiating commissioners by 24 February, or one month before the conclusion of the talks.⁶⁷ Lines that also grab one’s attention are contained in the postscript of the response of palatine Miklós Esterházy’s letter to the urging of Dániel Esterházy, dated 28 February 1642, “*P.S. Emlékezik kegyelmed az bécsi pacificatiórul is levelében, hogy originalibus én nálam volna,*

⁶³ Dániel Esterházy to Miklós Esterházy, Komárom, 29 January 1642, MNL OL, E 174, box 3, item 7, fol. 427–430; Juhász, “Esterházy Dániel és Esterházy Miklós”, pp. 187–190; For the life and career of Michel d’Asquier, see: Alastair, “Michel d’Asquier”.

⁶⁴ Dániel Esterházy to Miklós Esterházy, Komárom, 29 January 1642, MNL OL, E 174, box 3, item 7, fol. 427–430; Juhász, “Esterházy Dániel és Esterházy Miklós”, pp. 187–190.

⁶⁵ For the history of the Peace Treaty of Zsitvatorok in 1606, see: Nehring, “Magyarország és a zsitvatoroki szerződés”; Bayerle, “The Compromise at Zsitvatorok”; Papp, Sándor, “A zsitvatoroki békéhez vezető út”; Idem, *Török szövetség – Habsburg kiegyezés*; For examples and copies of the Treaty of Zsitvatorok signed on 11 November 1606, see: MNL OL, P 108, Rep. 71. Fasc. 26a.

⁶⁶ György Lippay to Miklós Esterházy, 24 February 1642, Tusor, „*Írom kegyelmednek...*”, doc. no. 92, pp. 97–99.

⁶⁷ György Lippay to Miklós Esterházy, 24 February 1642, Tusor, „*Írom kegyelmednek...*”, doc. no. 92, pp. 97–99.

a ki úgy vagyon, hogy in paribus vagyon nálam, de az originált nem láttam, s nem is mutatták nekem, de ha szintén meg volna is, ahhoz, bár ne bizzanak, mert szintén úgy falsificálva vagyon az mint az többi [P.S. Your Grace recalls in your letter that the original of the peace of Vienna would be in my possession, whereas it is a copy that I have, but I have not seen the original, and it has not been shown to me, but even if I had it, I would not trust it because it would be falsified like the others.]”⁶⁸

It is quite apparent from the above examples that the situation of the Habsburg commissioners was fundamentally impacted and frustrated by the serious problem that even at the end of February 1642 they did not have access to authentic versions of the previous Habsburg–Ottoman peace treaties that would have represented a proper basis of reference. Although according to the evidence of Dániel Esterházy’s letter, the 1627 document from Szőny was in the possession of the commissioners by 19 February 1642,⁶⁹ the lines written by Miklós Esterházy in connection with the falsification of the copies of the peace treaty raise the issue of its authenticity as well.⁷⁰ In my opinion, assistance would be provided in reconstructing this by the thorough examination of the documentary materials from the peace of 1606, and the following treaties and peace negotiations, as well as the integration of other groups of sources into the research, and the work on this has already begun.

OTHER DETAILS OF THE CORRESPONDENCE

Details reveal themselves through the letters of Miklós Esterházy and Dániel Esterházy that are only partially related to the diplomatic events, since they also provide data on the theatre of everyday, ordinary life. For example, the correspondence provides information on the state of health of the commissioners and one can learn how all this had an impact on the process of negotiations. Already before the actual commencement of negotiations (14 January 1642), Dániel Esterházy was unwell. In the postscript dated 19 January of his letter written to his brother on 18 January 1642, he provides information about aches in his head, shoulders, neck and back that had lasted almost two weeks but did not want to go away, and which he tried to alleviate with both medications and bloodletting.⁷¹ The experienced Gerhard von Questenberg, who was then in his 56th year, was struggling with more serious health problems. He complained of his painful legs and based on the symptoms that appeared,⁷² there were probably abscess on them. Various doctors and

⁶⁸ Miklós Esterházy to Dániel Esterházy, Sempte, 28 February 1642, Majláth, *Az 1642-ik évi szőnyi békekötés*, doc. no. 98, pp. 370–371.

⁶⁹ Dániel Esterházy to Miklós Esterházy, Komárom, 29 January 1642, MNL OL, E 174, box 3, item 7, fol. 427–430; Juhász, “Esterházy Dániel és Esterházy Miklós”, pp. 187–190.

⁷⁰ Miklós Esterházy to Dániel Esterházy, Sempte, 28 February 1642, Majláth, *Az 1642-ik évi szőnyi békekötés*, doc. no. 98, pp. 370–371.

⁷¹ Dániel Esterházy to Miklós Esterházy, Komárom, 18–19 January 1642, MNL OL, P 123, I/a fol. 175–178; Juhász, “Esterházy Dániel és Esterházy Miklós”, pp. 183–186.

⁷² „Questenberg uram nem igyekezik talám még el innen, az lába miatt doctort akar...” [“Mr. Questenberg perhaps will not hasten from here, he wants a doctor due to his leg...”] (Dániel

healers came to him to treat this while the negotiations were proceeding. István Pálffy, who at that time held the position of captain-general of Érsekújvár⁷³ (present day Nové Zámky, in Slovakia) and the mining region, sent his doctor to Gerhard von Questenberg,⁷⁴ but in addition to this, a doctor named Pál Gaiger and two barbers treated him,⁷⁵ and they even wanted to have a doctor brought from Pozsony (present day Bratislava, in Slovakia).⁷⁶ It seems that the condition of the Habsburg commissioner was not satisfactory later either, since near the end of February 1642, Dániel Esterházy also tried to intervene, as a result of which the palatine Miklós Esterházy sent István Barbély with two or three new Christians, or anabaptists to Komárom, so he could recover as soon as possible.⁷⁷ Gerhard von Questenberg's health also had an impact on the process of the negotiations, since the next "face-to-face" time with the Ottoman commissioners also depended on this, as was noted in one of the letters of the younger Esterházy.⁷⁸

The latter example also seems to support the fact that the leadership role amongst the Habsburg commissioners during the peace talks was played by Gerhard von Questenberg, who had the greatest amount of experience. However, all of this also created some tension, and the letters of Dániel Esterházy regularly evidence the offence he felt due to the precedence of Gerhard von Questenberg. The younger brother of the palatine objected on more than one occasion that the Ottoman side often only sent the documents to Questenberg, and only addressed the commissioners of the Habsburgs at the end.⁷⁹ Giving voice to this on one occasion, they emphasised in their messages from the chief interpreter Michel d'Asquier that "*nálunk az comes elsőbb s böcsüsebb status* [for us count is the title

Esterházy to Miklós Esterházy, Komárom, 18–19 January 1642, MNL OL, P 123, I/a fol. 175–178; Juhász, "Esterházy Dániel és Esterházy Miklós", pp. 183–186.); "...Questenberg uramhoz, mivel beteges lábaira..." ["...to Mr. Questenberg, since for his unwell legs..."] (Dániel Esterházy to Miklós Esterházy, Komárom, 29 January 1642, MNL OL, E 174, box 3, item 7, fol. 427–430; Juhász, "Esterházy Dániel és Esterházy Miklós", pp. 187–190.); "...tegnap az lábára sok pustulákat mondá rajta, hogy fakadtak az más éjjel..." ["...he told yesterday that many pustules burst on his leg that at another night ..."] (Dániel Esterházy to Miklós Esterházy, Komárom, 29 January, 1642. MNL OL, E 174, box 3, item 7, fol. 427–430; Juhász, "Esterházy Dániel és Esterházy Miklós", pp. 187–190.)

⁷³ Pálffy, "Kerületi és végvidéki főkapitányok", p. 271.

⁷⁴ Jedlicska, *Eredeti részletek gróf Pálffy-család okmánytárához*, p. 330.

⁷⁵ Dániel Esterházy to Miklós Esterházy, Komárom, 29 January 1642, MNL OL, E 174, box 3, item 7, fol. 427–430; Juhász, "Esterházy Dániel és Esterházy Miklós", pp. 187–190.

⁷⁶ Dániel Esterházy to Miklós Esterházy, Komárom, 18–19 January 1642, MNL OL, P 123, I/a fol. 175–178; Juhász, "Esterházy Dániel és Esterházy Miklós", pp. 183–186.

⁷⁷ Dániel Esterházy to Miklós Esterházy, Komárom, 29 January 1642, MNL OL, E 174, box 3, item 7, fol. 427–430; Juhász, "Esterházy Dániel és Esterházy Miklós", pp. 187–190; Miklós Esterházy to Dániel Esterházy, Komárom, 20 February 1642, SNA, EcsI box 48, fol. 1–2; Juhász, "Esterházy Dániel és Esterházy Miklós", pp. 193–195.

⁷⁸ Dániel Esterházy to Miklós Esterházy, Komárom, 29 January 1642, MNL OL, E 174, box 3, item 7, fol. 427–430; Juhász, "Esterházy Dániel és Esterházy Miklós", pp. 187–190.

⁷⁹ Dániel Esterházy to Miklós Esterházy, Komárom, 14 January 1641/1642, MNLOL, P 123, I/a fol. 171–174; Juhász, "Esterházy Dániel és Esterházy Miklós", pp. 179–182; Dániel Esterházy to Miklós Esterházy, Komárom, 29 January 1642, MNLOL, E 174, box 3, item 7, fol. 427–430; Juhász, "Esterházy Dániel és Esterházy Miklós", pp. 187–190.

with priority and greater esteem]”,⁸⁰ also indicating the tension between Miklós Esterházy and Questenberg.

Although Miklós Esterházy was not personally at the site of the talks during the negotiations, his brother constantly urged him to come at least to the nearby Érsekújvár.⁸¹ The palatine’s expeditious remark to all of this was quite revealing, „Az mi az én Uivárban való menetelímet illeti, nem tudhatom mint érkezhessen reá, mert igen debilis vagyok, s más az, hogy gyümölcset sem látom, miért kellettnek oda mennem [As regards my move to Uivár [Érsekújvár], I do not know if I am able, because I am quite weakling, and in addition, I see no reason why I should go there.]”.⁸² Miklós Esterházy’s opinion on the development of the talks is quite apparent from the lines quoted, and he clearly saw that the peace could only come about at the cost of serious concessions from the imperial side.

Details also arise during the processing of the correspondence of the two Esterházy families that do not touch upon the peace negotiations at all, but were merely included in the letters connected to the talks. Thus, here the matter of the marriage of two young members of prominent families must be mentioned, namely that of Baron János Amadé (1610–1654)⁸³ and Judit Esterházy.⁸⁴ The marriage, inasmuch as it involved two related families and their members that were fourth cousins, ran into difficulties and a dispensation was needed to settle the obstacles to it. The archbishop of Esztergom, György Lippay and the palatine Miklós Esterházy both made efforts to intercede. According to evidence from the Royal Books (*Libri Regii*), the monarch Ferdinand III issued the marriage permit on 10 July 1641,⁸⁵ and then two days later György Lippay let Miklós Esterházy know that he would soon send Baron Amadé’s consensus (consent) and would strive to have the Roman (Papal) dispensation granted as well.⁸⁶ On 30 August, the palatine sent the “genealogy” and asked György Lippay to have the nuncio continue to help.⁸⁷ In the sources I have used, the matter only comes up again in January of 1642, when Dániel Esterházy informs Miklós Esterházy that Farkas Esterházy, the brother of the girl planning on being wed, had set the date for the nuptials on 16 February. However, the dispensation that had been requested had not yet arrived

⁸⁰ Dániel Esterházy to Miklós Esterházy, Komárom, 14 January 1641/1642, MNLOL, P 123, I/a fol. 171–174; Juhász, “Esterházy Dániel és Esterházy Miklós”, pp. 179–182.

⁸¹ Dániel Esterházy to Miklós Esterházy, Komárom, 29 January 1642, MNLOL, E 174, box 3, item 7, fol. 427–430; Juhász, “Esterházy Dániel és Esterházy Miklós”, pp. 187–190.

⁸² Miklós Esterházy to Daniel Esterházy, Komárom, 20 February 1642, SNA, EcsI box 48, fol. 1–2; Juhász, “Esterházy Dániel és Esterházy Miklós”, pp. 193–195.

⁸³ The Amadé family came from the Gutkeled clan. János Amadé had extensive family estates in the Csallóköz region. His father, Lénárd Amadé, was loyal to the Habsburg emperor, receiving the title of baron, and his mother was Orsolya Geczeli of Korpona (present day is Krupina, in Slovakia), who also brought great property to the marriage. Nagy, *Magyarország családai*, vol. 1, p. 27; Gálos, *Báró Amadé László*, pp. 8–9.

⁸⁴ Judit Esterházy’s father was the brother of Miklós and Dániel Esterházy, Gábor Esterházy, who died in 1626, and her mother was Mária Derssffy. B. Révay, “Az Esterházy-család”, p. 358.

⁸⁵ MNLOL, A 57 (*Libri regii*), vol. 9, pp. 377–378.

⁸⁶ Hajnal, *Az 1642. évi meghíúsult országgyűlés*, pp. 59–61.

⁸⁷ Hajnal, *Az 1642. évi meghíúsult országgyűlés*, pp. 103–107.

and it was doubtful whether it would be received by the appointed date, so the matter had to be expedited not only by the archbishop, but also by the nuncius.⁸⁸ I found a single reference in the literature that the wedding was finally concluded in 1646,⁸⁹ so the information above was merely data related to the antecedents to the marriage.

In my article, following the presentation of the antecedents and circumstances of the 1642 Treaty of Szőny, I have considered the main focus of my examination to be a single direction of communication (the correspondence of Miklós Esterházy and Dániel Esterházy) from the not at all simple network of contacts related to the so-called second Treaty of Szőny. I have presented data and supplementary information not only related to the treaty, but also to the Esterházy brothers and the broader history of the Esterházy family based on the analysis of the letters included in the research, supplemented by other relevant sources. The most complex area of issues is represented without doubt by the difficulties that developed surrounding the peace treaties, which at the same time are partial results of ongoing research, thus clearly indicating the directions that call for further, more thorough examination.

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⁸⁸ Dániel Esterházy to Miklós Esterházy, Komárom, 29 January 1642, MNLOL, E 174, box 3, item 7, fol. 427–430; Juhász, “Esterházy Dániel és Esterházy Miklós”, pp. 187–190.

⁸⁹ Esterházy, *Az Eszterházy család*, p. 88.

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SZABOLCS HADNAGY

A Campaign Against Two Enemies Simultaneously?*

The 1658 Military Venture of the Ottomans

INTRODUCTION

The 1658 Ottoman campaign led against Transylvania has been represented in history textbooks as a military operation in which the Ottoman Empire regulated one of its vassals. However, as has been pointed out by a number of studies,¹ contemporary events involved a Venetian aspect. The military operation was organised at the beginning of the above-mentioned year against the republic, and its direction was modified only later, in light of the Transylvanian events and the escalating Celālī rebellions in the eastern half of the empire. The documents pertaining to the food supplies of the Ottoman army testify that the plan of an offensive against Venice was not dismissed; in other words, there may have been a double campaign too. In the following I examine this question from the perspective of Ottoman military leadership with the help of the documents relating to the events of 1658 and the organisation of food supplies of the campaign.

As for the Venetian issue, this war between the republic and the Ottomans between 1645 and 1669 for the possession of Crete is related to overland events of the Dalmatian theatre of war. Venice dominated the region until 1653–1654, and then it transferred its main military operation to the sea, and aimed to gain control over the Dardanelles. They came closest to achieve it in the summer of 1656, when under the leadership of the commander of the Venetian fleet, Barbaro Badoer, they occupied the islands of Tenedos and Limnos, after they had defeated and destroyed the Ottoman fleet in a sea battle near the Dardanelles, and had practically blockaded the strait. As a consequence of these events, in the mid-September of

* This article has been written within the framework of the work of the MTA–SZTE Research Group of the Ottoman Age (Eötvös Loránd Research Network). The writing of this paper has been supported by the Ministry of Human Capacities (Emberi Erőforrások Minisztériuma) through grants (code nr. 20391-3/2018/FEKUSTRAT; TUDFO/47138-1/2019-ITM). The writing has also been supported by the National Research, Development and Innovation Office (NRDI) (Nemzeti Kutatási, Fejlesztési és Innovációs Hivatal) through a grant (Thematic Excellence Programme (Tématerületi Kiválósági Program) 2020, NKFIH-1279-2/2020) of the Interdisciplinary Centre of Excellence (University of Szeged), the Department of Medieval and Early Modern Hungarian History (Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Szeged), MTA–SZTE Research Group of the Ottoman Age (Eötvös Loránd Research Network). I would hereby like to give thanks for the valuable assistance provided during the writing of this paper by the research group leader Sándor Papp, who was my PhD supervisor as well. This paper is an enlarged, revised and, as well, updated version of the earlier published study in Hungarian: Hadnagy, “Az 1658. évi oszmán hadjárat”.

¹ B. Szabó – Sudár, “„Independens fejedelem az Portán kívül””, pp. 987–988; B. Szabó, “II. Rákóczi György”, pp. 232–233; Papp, “II. Rákóczi György”, pp. 148–149.

1656, Köprülü Mehmed Pasha gained the position of grand vizier (1656–1661), who started to consolidate the affairs of the empire with a firm hand. First, he managed to avert the immediate danger, namely the rebuilt Ottoman fleet retook the two above mentioned islands in the following year.²

Besides these troop movements, the Ottomans prepared for landed military operations in Dalmatia and taking castles in 1657 with the intention of luring the Venetians away from the sea. However, their enterprise proved an utter failure due to the disorder and rivalry of provincial forces in the region. The Beylerbey of Bosnia, Seydi Ahmed endeavoured to take Split in June 1657, without success. The military action led against Kotor, which was launched at the end of July under the command of Hisim (Varlac) Mehmed, the Sanjak-bey of Shkodra, did not yield any success either because of the “machinations” of ‘Alī Çengizāde, the Sanjak-bey of Herzegovina, who was bribed by the Venetians and, moreover, was personally motivated and interested in the fall of Varlac.³

Meanwhile in 1657 the Ottomans encountered problems in Transylvania as well. The prince, György II Rákóczi (1648–1660) invaded Poland as an ally of the Swedish in order to claim the Polish crown. However, Rákóczi did not ask for permission from Istanbul to proceed with this military operation, so the prospective punishment was carried out by the Porte. Crimean Tatars captured a sizeable part of the Transylvanian army, and Rákóczi was forced to relinquish his power. In November, a new prince, Ferenc Rhédey was the supreme leader of Transylvania (1657–1658), so it seemed that the problem was solved. This also gave way to preparing for the landed operation against the Venetians in the following year.

AGAINST VENICE

At the beginning of 1658, irrespective of the Transylvanian events, the Ottomans were preparing against the Venetians this time with their main military forces, drawing the conclusions of previous year’s failure. Once again, they planned an offensive on land, but, besides the military routes used so far, they wanted a surprise attack on the republic from the direction of Friuli. It meant that they intended to trespass the territory of the Habsburg Monarchy, so, for instance, they would have marched through the estates of Miklós Zrínyi, the Ban of Croatia (1646–1664), while the Tatars would have stepped on the territory of the monarchy from the outskirts of Kanizsa. This solution was raised when planning the Dalmatian military enterprise in the previous year, but the Habsburgs turned down the inquiry to use their territory.⁴

² Setton, *Venice, Austria, and the Turks*, p. 184, 186 and 189; Eickhoff, *Venedig, Wien und die Osmanen*, pp. 138–139.

³ Madunić, *Frontier Elites*, pp. 63–69; Sudár, Balázs: “A hódoltságú pasák”, p. 894.

⁴ The report of the Habsburg resident ambassador in Constantinople, Simon Reniger, Edirne, 6 January 1658, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 129, Konv. 1, fol. 7r–19r. Conf.: Papp, “II. Rákóczi György”, pp. 148–149 and 164; Szilágyi, *Erdélyi országgyűlési emlékek*, vol. 11 (in the following: Szilágyi, *EOE*, vol. 11), pp. 348–350; B. Szabó–Sudár: “„Independens fejedelem””, p. 981.

The Venetians endeavoured to make peace with the Ottomans, who in turn demanded Candia, further islands near Anatolia, the castle of Klis, and war reparations. These quite serious demands that were hardly acceptable for the opponent indicate that at any rate the Turkish were preparing for war. They summoned the military forces of Rumelia and Anatolia to Edirne on 21 March, the spring equinox, and moreover, rumours had it that the Sultan, Mehmed IV (1648–1687) wanted to accompany the army as far as Bosnia. This rumour might have originated from the order issued on 22 January 1658, stipulating that the *kazās* situated in the outskirts of Edirne should bring food contributions in kind (*sürsāt*) to the sultan (and his army) to the field of Edirne.⁵

The Venetians replied to the Turkish demands at the end of February, but the standpoints could not be reconciled, since both parties held on to Crete. Venice did not intend to renounce Candia, though the republic showed willingness to pay 50,000 thalers as annual tax, and an additional sum of 200,000 thalers to the sultan, and two years later they also promised to pay an annual sum of 100,000 thalers. Instead of the fortresses of Chania and Rethymno, the Venetians would have handed over the islands of Tinos and Paros, and they offered another city instead of Klis.⁶

Meanwhile, in February–March 1658, the Turkish had already started to construct bridges over the Rivers Sava and Drava, and they had also begun to prepare the food supplies in Belgrade. Due to the sapping of the territories north of Belgrade, the region witnessed a rise in costs, but even so because of the mild winter it seemed that it was unnecessary to transport so much wood, flour, and forage for the animals to the region. At this time, it could be assumed that the primary aim of the army led by the sultan is to attack some Venetian territory, mostly Kotor or another Dalmatian fortresses (Zadar, Sibenik, Klis, or Split).⁷

However, the Turkish did not call off their foray from the direction of Friuli, and upon this matter they constantly vexed the Habsburg resident in Constantinople, Simon Reniger.⁸ Moreover, insisting on a higher level of official inquiry, they even sent an envoy to Vienna. The Habsburgs regarded the planned Ottoman operation as violating the peace, which could have created wartime circumstance for them in the Italian region. They did not want any “turmoil”, as they needed peaceful times because of the prolonged election of the emperor due to the machinations of French diplomacy that was very solicitous to prevent the Habsburg House from

⁵ The report of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 6 January 1658, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 129, Konv. 1, fol. 7r–19r; BOA MAD 2998, pp. 43–47; BOA D.MKF 27493, pp. 6–10.

⁶ The report of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 28 February 1658, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 129, Konv. 1, fol. 143r–v and 147r–149v.

⁷ The report of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 13 February 1658, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 129, Konv. 1, fol. 66r–79v; The Privy Council to the Emperor, Vienna, 17 March 1658, *Ibid.*, fol. 229r–238r.

⁸ For more information on Simon Reniger, see Zsuzsanna Cziráki’s article in this volume. Furthermore, see: Cziráki, “Habsburg–Oszmán diplomácia a 17. század közepén”. Reniger’s systematic reports within the framework of the project “Everyday Life and Imperial Politics during the Time of the Köprülü Restoration” (OTKA (NKFI) project nr. 109070; principal investigator: Sándor Papp); Papp, “Egy Habsburg-követ”.

remaining on the Holy Roman throne. Finally, by April 1658, the plan to attack the republic from the direction of Friuli was dismissed, and the envoy had to return with a neutral answer with regard to the existing peace.⁹

The grand vizier, Köprülü Mehmed Pasha, hoisted his flag on 25 March, and thus the Ottomans officially declared war. On 29 March, the Kapudan Pasha set sail with thirty galleys and ten further ships were planned to be sent after him or in the direction of Tenedos; moreover, the Ottomans even considered continuing the siege of Candia. All this, however, rather served to distract the Venetians, and it followed from this situation that their real target would be Kotor or Dalmatia.¹⁰

AGAINST VENICE AND/OR TRANSYLVANIA

The direction of the offensive became clear on 9 April 1658, when Yusuf Müteferrika from Belgrade was ordered to prepare the quarters (*menzil*) along the Belgrade–Zadar route. The order also revealed that the Ottomans had been preparing against the Venetians earlier too, and the offensive against Zadar was now in the actual phase of preparation.¹¹

The plans were altered by the events in Transylvania nonetheless. Although the affairs in Transylvania seemed to be settled since the end of 1657, yet everybody was aware at the Porte that the Transylvanians only tried to elevate the situation by electing Rhédey as prince, but in fact they still supported Rákóczi who regarded himself as prince due to his wealth and power. Therefore, the Turkish put pressure on the orders, and started to demand the handover of Jenő (Borosjenő, present day Ineu, in Romania) and some other nearby palisades referring to the alleged assurance of Prince Gábor Bethlen (1613–1629). Moreover, the doubling of their annual tax was also mentioned, and ‘naturally’ the expulsion of Rákóczi and his sons from the principality, and in case it would not happen, the revocation of their right to freely elect their prince.¹² What the Ottomans could achieve was that they gave endorsement to Rákóczi’s claim on once again assuming control over the country, since the Transylvanians did not consider the objection against the person of Rákóczi yet, but they rather envisioned the violation of the borders of Transylvania, the abrogation of their franchise, in other words the transgression of the alleged (but practically non-existent) the so-called “*Ahdnāme of*

⁹ The reports of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 6 January (fol. 7r–19r), and 13 February 1658 (fol. 66r–79v), ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 129, Konv. 1; The Privy Council to the Emperor, Vienna, 17 March 1658, *Ibid.*, fol. 229r–238r.

¹⁰ The reports of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 10 March 1658 (fol. 219r–220r), Constantinople, 12 March 1658 (97v–98v), Constantinople, 1 April 1658 (fol. 98v–100r), ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 129, Konv. 1; Edirne, 3 April 1658 (pp. 380–382), Edirne, 8 April 1658 (pp. 383–384), *EOE*, vol. 11.

¹¹ BOA MAD 2998, p. 103; BOA D.MKF 27491, p. 9 and 11.

¹² The reports of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 6 January (fol. 7r–19r), and 19 March 1658 (fol. 241r–244v), ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 129, Konv. 1.

Süleymān”.¹³ On 22 January, at the Diet of Szászmedgyes (present day Mediaș, in Romania) they took an oath of allegiance to Rákóczi, which was also taken by Rhédey on 29 January.¹⁴

Meanwhile, the Köprülü Mehmed Pasha set out to reinforce Turkish positions in opposition to Rákóczi that mostly affected the eastern borders of the principality. The Romanian voivodes were summoned to Edirne at the end of 1657, and according to some opinions, on account of their participation in the campaign against the Venetians, but in fact the Ottomans wanted to levy further food taxes on them (partly in relation to the campaign as well), and the voivodes had to face being accounted for having supported Rákóczi. Fearful of repercussions, the voivode of Wallachia, Constantin Șerban (1654–1658) did not want to be admitted to the presence of the sultan, as a consequence of which a new voivode, Mihail Radu (Mihnea III, 1658–1659) took the oath of allegiance on 26 January 1658, who was inaugurated to his office, as if he were a beylerbey. Șerban fled to Transylvania, and thus Rákóczi lost one of his allies.¹⁵

A similar fate awaited the other voivode, Gheorghe Ștefan, who was the Voivode of Moldavia (1653–1658). Instead of him, the sultan appointed Gheorghe Ghica (1658–1659) on 18 March, who was already in his sixties and quite reluctant to assume this position. After his dismissal, Ștefan fled toward the direction of Transylvania. In addition to this, the Turkish ordered the Tatars of Crimea now on more than one occasion to be prepared at the borders of Transylvania, and simultaneously, they sent a message to the Transylvanians: if they remove Rákóczi from power, then their country is not demoted to the status of Romanian voivodship.¹⁶

The Transylvanians utterly refused to comply with the *fermān* (royal mandate) that had been sent three times, and they could not convince Rákóczi, who abided by his power, to abdicate. As a consequence, according to history writers, on 13 April, the Ottomans decided to intervene in Transylvanian affairs, though no official document has been uncovered so far that substantiates this claim. It seems

¹³ The alleged “*Ahdnāme of Süleymān*” was a forged document compiled on the basis of a 1528 peace treaty between the Polish and the Ottomans. Papp, “Hungary and the Ottoman Empire”, pp. 70–76; Cf.: Sándor Papp’s article in this volume.

¹⁴ The acts passed at the Diet of Szászmedgyes, 24 January 1658, *EOE*, vol. 11, pp. 350–354; Ferenc Rhédey’s oath of allegiance to György II Rákóczi, Szászmedgyes, 29 January 1658, *Ibid*, p. 357; György II Rákóczi to the Country, s.d., s.l., MNL OL, E190, 30/7447.

¹⁵ The reports of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 12 January (fol. 40r–v), and 13 February 1658 (fol. 66r–79v), ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 129, Konv. 1; B. Szabó – Sudár, “„Independens fejedelem az Portán kívül””, p. 987.

¹⁶ The reports of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 12 January 1658 (40r–v), Edirne, 13 February 1658 (fol. 66r–79v), and Edirne, 19 March 1658 (fol. 241r–244v), ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 129, Konv. 1; The report of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 3 April 1658, *EOE*, vol. 11, pp. 380–382. The Ottomans did not entirely trust the recently elected Romanian voivodes either. This mistrust was mostly expressed in the case of Radu who frequented the governmental circles of Constantinople and after his appointment made contact with not only the Habsburgs but the Venetians as well in order to create an anti-Turkish coalition. Moreover, after a while Rákóczi could gain information from the Porte thanks to Radu. Păun, “Belső ellenségek”, p. 70; B. Szabó – Sudár, “„Independens fejedelem az Portán kívül””, p. 992; Andreescu, “The Relations”, pp. 166–168.

that the Turkish hesitated regarding the campaign, and the following day they informed Reniger that the peace with the Habsburgs should be maintained and war ought to be started against Venice and Transylvania.¹⁷

Irrespective of these developments, the people of Transylvania was offered the possibility of appeasement, if they send Rákóczi and the two dismissed voivodes, who fled to Transylvania, to the Porte. The Ottomans regarded Transylvania as a supplementary theatre of war, and in case of intervention, they reckoned that the Ottoman army could be divided at Belgrade: one part could march against the Venetian interests, while the other part could carry out manoeuvres in Transylvania, supported by the Turks from Buda, Eger, Temesvár (present day Timișoara, in Romania), and Silistra, by the Tatar Khan and perhaps by the Cossacks. This part of the Ottoman army, even without the Tatars, could have numbered 25–30,000 soldiers, so even without the main army, it seemed sufficient to reckon with Rákóczi.¹⁸

As the next step of preparing for the campaign, the grand vizier solemnly entered into his encampment on 29 April 1658. According to Reniger's reports, the agha of the janissaries arrived on that day with 17,000 janissaries, who were stationed in the region of the Dardanelles.¹⁹ This number shows how well-informed the Habsburg resident was, as 18,786 soldiers are mentioned in an acquittance roll²⁰ that is sufficient to embark on a military enterprise of great magnitude, but seems to be too numerous to regulate a vassal state. However, far less janissaries participated in the campaign, approximately 6–7,000 soldiers²¹ that did not count immoderate for an intervention in Transylvania. (In comparison: approximately 10,000 janissaries were present in the 1663–1664 campaign.)²²

Generally, people expected the army to begin its march toward the end of May, but more cautious estimates did not rule out the end of June and that the grand vizier may spend the winter in Belgrade. Nevertheless, it seemed certain that the sultan would not accompany the army.²³

The delay might have been caused by the tardy assembling of the Anatolian part of the army. The reason for this tardiness was that the Celālīs rebelled against

¹⁷ The report of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 22 April 1658, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 130, Konv. 1, fol. 98r–108r; B. Szabó – Sudár, „„Independens fejedelem az Portán kívül””, p. 988; Hammer, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, vol. 6, p. 34; Behcetî, *Târîh-i Sülâle-i Köprülü*, 35a.

¹⁸ The report of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 3 April 1658, *EOE*, vol. 11, pp. 380–382; The report of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 8 April 1658, *ibid*, pp. 383–384; The report of Giovanni Battista Balarino, Pera, 11 April 1658, and a report from Edirne, 22 April 1658, Óváry, *A Magyar Tud. Akadémia*, p. 145; The report of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 22 April 1658, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 130, Konv. 1, fol. 98r–108r; B. Szabó, “II. Rákóczi György”, p. 234.

¹⁹ The report of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 19 May 1658, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 130, Konv. 1, fol. 137r–150v.

²⁰ BOA KK 1949, p. 51.

²¹ Hadnagy, “Az oszmán hadsereg”, p. 198.

²² Kolçak, “Yeniçeriler”, pp. 221–223; *idem*, “XVII. Yüzyıl Askerî Gelişimi”, p. 159.

²³ Johann Rudolf Schmid von Schwarzenhorn to Ken‘ân Pasha, Vienna, 27 May 1658 (fol. 161r–162v), and The report of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 28 May 1658 (fol. 164r–166r), ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 130, Konv. 1.

the person of the grand vizier who consolidated the empire with an iron fist and because of this; he did not enjoy great popularity. Notwithstanding this, the disgruntled Celālīs turned to the Pasha of Aleppo, Ābāza Hasan, who came from one of the most influential families of the age. Moreover, Ābāza Hasan sought the opportunity to quit scores with political circles of the Porte on account of the execution of his benefactor, Grand Vizier Ibşir Mustafa Pasha (1654–1655). Most of the governors of Anatolia joined him and Anatolian forces refused to march to Edirne unless the ruler removes the grand vizier from his position.²⁴

At the same time, the military route of Belgrade–Banja Luka–Knin–Zadar was designated, along which the supply lines were intended to be financed from *sürsāt* taxes of the vilayets of not only Belgrade and Kanizsa, but also of Buda and Temesvár. Nearly two-third of the food procured had to be accumulated in Belgrade, while one-third in the castles of Temesvár and its vicinity, and this latter part of the food had to be prepared for an immediate transport to Belgrade. In addition to this, it had to be reckoned with that, like the plans of 1657, the Turkish would attack more than one fortress in Dalmatia simultaneously, Zadar, Sibenik, Klis, or perhaps Split too.²⁵ It seems that the question of Transylvania could still be regarded as a supplementary military operation.

In the meantime, the solution of the Transylvanian problem started on a local level too. Setting out from his headquarters, the Pasha of Buda, Gürcī Ken‘ān (1655–1656, 1656–1658, 1658–1659, 1663) arrived in Szolnok with his army at the end of April 1658. From there, he travelled to Gyula. For the time being, however, he only reached and lodged in Mezőmegyer (near the castle of Gyula), but, as part of putting pressure on the locals, he ordered to harass Lippa (present day Lipova, in Romania) and the vicinity of the River Maros in the borderland.²⁶

The plan of Transylvanian intervention had caused friction between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans. Vienna considered the Ottoman’s demand on Jenő as an endeavour to change the borders of the principality and to violate the existing peace treaty. Because of this, in order to defend the Kingdom of Hungary, the Habsburgs planned to send a task force under the command of Prince Annibale Gonzaga, privy counsellor, to the western borders of the principality (though the available resources would have allowed for the recruitment of an army consisting of only several thousand soldiers), and they made arrangements to reinforce Kassa (present day Košice, in Slovakia). At the same time, the Ottomans feared a Habsburg intervention to help Rákóczi. Although the parties assured each other after March, many times that they would adhere to the conditions of the treaties, the

²⁴ The report of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 28 April 1658 (fol. 79r–v and 82r), and Edirne, 19 May 1658 (fol. 137r–150v), ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 130, Konv. 1; B. Szabó – Sudár, „„Independens fejedelem az Portán kívül””, p. 989.

²⁵ BOA MAD 2998, p. 140, 147 and pp. 159/1–2.

²⁶ Ferenc Gyulai to György II Rákóczi, Várad, 27 May 1658, MNL OL, E190, 30/7462, and *EOE*, vol. 11, pp. 393–395; Mihály Thúry to Mihály Teleki, Borosjenő, 4 May 1658 (pp. 178–179), and Borosjenő, 17 May 1658 (pp. 190–191), Gergely, *Teleki Mihály*.

frictions originating from mutual mistrust ceased with the onset of summer, since none of the parties were interested in transgressing the existing peace.²⁷

After the Transylvanians had not fulfilled the agreed conditions, the sultan gave an order to the Pasha of Buda on 10 June 1658, that if he ran out of the means to solve the problem, then he had to invade Transylvania. The military plan was given: Ken'ān Pasha would have attacked with the other border-zone Turkish troops from the direction of Temesvár, the Voivode of Wallachia along with the Pasha of Silistra from Wallachia, while the Voivode of Moldavia with the Khan of the Tatars would have done so from the direction of Moldavia.²⁸ The Pasha of Buda arrived in Gyula in early July, from where he departed in the second half of the month in accordance with the above-mentioned mandate. On 21 June, soldiers from Jenő raided his scouts, the unit of the Sanjak-bey of Gyula, as a consequence of which Ken'ān Pasha crossed the Maros and moved to Lippa. It seemed that he intended to besiege the castle of Jenő.²⁹ However, the arrival of one of the key actors of this plan, Mehmed IV Girāy, khan of the Crimean Khanate (1641–1644, 1654–1666) proved to be problematic. The major part of the Tatar army, which was supposed to have departed already in May, had to return because of the internal conflict of the Cossacks³⁰ and hence the security of the Crimean Khanate. After pouring oil on troubled waters, the Tatars rose and set off again only in the second half of June or in the first half of July, so their main army could not be expected to arrive until the beginning or the middle of August.³¹

The Ottoman army left Edirne on 24 June 1658 eventually, without the majority of the Anatolian army, because Ābāza Hasan Pasha completely refused to appear in Edirne. The exact objective of the campaign was unknown or at least not made public yet, but there were still rumours that grand vizier would spend the

²⁷ The Privy Council to the Emperor, Vienna, 27 March 1658, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 129, Konv. 1, fol. 261r–v and 269r–279r; Johann Rudolf Schmid von Schwarzenhorn to Gürcü Ken'ān Pasha, Vienna, 27 May 1658 (fol. 161r–162v), and the report of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 28 May 1658, (fol. 164r–166r), ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 130, Konv. 1.

²⁸ The report of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 24 June 1658, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 130, Konv. 1, fol. 182r–186v; Simon Szaplóczay to the citizens of Beszterce, Majszin, 3 June 1658, Hurmuzaki, *Documente privitoare*, vol. 15/2, pp. 1280–1281.

²⁹ Mihály Thúry to Mihály Teleki, Borosjenő, 22 June 1658, Gergely, *Teleki Mihály*, p. 214; György II Rákóczi to Zsuzsanna Lórántffy, Jánosd, 24 June 1658, MNL OL, E190, 30/7342.

³⁰ The disagreement between Ivan Vyhovsky, the successor of Bohdan Khmelnytsky (who deceased in August 1657) hetman (1648–1657), and his pro-Russian opposition (Martyn Pushkar, the polkovnik (colonel) of Poltava regiment and Yakiv Barabash, Otaman of the Zaporozhian Sich after B. Khmelnytsky's death) led to a military conflict. The Tatars helped Vyhovsky for sake of the security of the Crimea, and participated in the Battle of Poltava fought between the two parties that brought a Pyrrhic victory to the hetman on 11 June 1658. Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, p. 234; Plokyh, *Ukraine and Russia*, p. 276; Cf.: the entries of *Internet Encyclopedia of Ukraine*.

³¹ Constantin Postelnik to György II Rákóczi, Bucharest, 16 June 1658, MNL OL, E190, 37/9215; György Rákóczi to Zsuzsanna Lórántffy, Gyulafehérvár, 11 June 1658, MNL OL, E190, 30/7339; The report of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 28 May 1658, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 130, Konv. 1, fol. 164r–166r; The report of Giovanni Battista Ballarino, Edirne, 31 July 1658, Óváry: *A Magyar Tud. Akadémia*, p.148.

winter in Belgrade that could be interpreted as a sign of a longer military enterprise.³²

The intention to lead an offensive against Dalmatia was not dismissed either which is substantiated by the experience of the Habsburg envoy, Johann Friedrich Metzger, who was sent from Vienna to the Pasha of Buda. Metzger travelled from Buda to Lippa on 18–27 June 1658, and then he travelled from Buda to Baja by ship, crossed the River Tisza at Becse (present day Бечеј (Bečej), in Serbia), and finally met Ken‘ān Pasha at Lippa. While on his journey, Metzger heard that the Turkish built a pontoon-bridge over the Sava and the Danube, they dug wells at Valkóvár (present day Vukovar, in Croatia) and Tárnok (Felsőtárnok, present day Tovarnik, in Croatia), and they prepared locations suitable for encampment near Eszék (present day Osijek, in Croatia) and other places. On the basis of these pieces of information, Metzger drew the conclusion that the primary objective of the grand vizier is Dalmatia that was known among the Turkish soldiers too, but they were forbidden to speak about it to anybody on pain of death.³³ A similar conclusion was drawn by Julius Heinrich Wogin, the Habsburg envoy sent to the grand vizier one month later, who arrived in Belgrade on 12 August. During his journey, he gained pieces of information not only about the well-boring of the Turkish, but he personally witnessed wells and meticulously cleaned wells.³⁴

The Turkish army advanced at the “usual speed”, and it reached the first major rest area in Filibe (present day Пловдив (Plovdiv) in Bulgaria) already on 1 July. Meanwhile, according to the information the Habsburgs gathered, the grand vizier decided to march to Belgrade unconventionally without additional, major resting intervals, as Köprülü Mehmed Pasha gained unfavourable news, namely that Ádám I Batthyány, captain-general of the border zone across Kanizsa (1633/1637–1659) and Miklós Zrinyi, the Ban of Croatia vanquished the Pasha of Bosnia, and Rákóczi was besieging Temesvár. Although the latter news items proved to be unfounded hearsay, the Ottoman army’s forced march is also substantiated by a note in a rüznâmçe-defter (register of daily income and expenditure). This designated the 15-menzil distance between Sofia and Belgrade in 15 days, on the basis of which it can be assumed that the grand vizier may have received some bad news already in the vicinity of Sofia.³⁵

This was probably the report on the defeats of the Pasha of Buda at the hands of Rákóczi’s forces on 5 July. Rákóczi stayed in the castle of Jenő and in order to

³² The report of Giovanni Battista Ballarino, Pera, 21 June 1658, Óváry: *A Magyar Tud. Akadé-mia*, p. 148; The report of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 24 June 1658, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 130, Konv. 1, fol. 168r–170r.

³³ Johann Friedrich Metzger to Annibale Gonzaga, Szakálos, 16 July 1658, (fol. 27r–38r), and the report of Johann Friedrich Metzger on his visit to the Pasha of Buda, Vienna, 25 July 1658, (fol. 19r–26r), ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 130, Konv. 2.

³⁴ The report of Julius Heinrich Wogin, Kesekfalú, 5 September 1658, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 130, Konv. 2, fol. 126r–135r. For more information on Julius Heinrich Wogin, see: Szabados, “Egy tolmács diplomáciai küldetésben”.

³⁵ The report of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 1 July 1658, (fol. 1r–2r), and Edirne, 21 July 1658, (fol. 7r–9v), ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 130, Konv. 2; BOA KK 1949, p. 32.

draw the ‘attention’ of the Pasha of Buda away from the castle, he had the palisades at Arad set on fire. Ken‘ān Pasha saw this and left Lippa with his army, and clashed with Rákóczi’s forces at Pálülése (present day Păuliș (in Hungarian Ópálos), in Romania), but was defeated. Several dignitaries among the fleeing Turkish, including the Sanjak-bey of Esztergom and the Pasha of Temesvár drowned in the River Maros.³⁶ It seemed more and more probable that the Turkish forces along the border cannot solve the situation.

When designing the rest of the campaign, the grand vizier had to consider not only this defeat, but also the escalation of the Celālī uprising, because the resistance of Ābāza Hasan developed into open rebellion, and his army moved forward as far as Bursa. This may have been the cause why Köprülü Mehmed sent 2,400 janissaries from Sofia back to the capital in mid-July.³⁷

A mandate arrived on 14 July and issued that they had to come up with plans of moving into Transylvania in light of the actual situation, and to make further steps to lengthen and finalise the rest areas previously designated along the Belgrade–Lippa route towards Jenő as well as to supply them with food and to keep them prepared.³⁸ However, even at this point it did not seem evident in which direction the army would begin its march at Belgrade, and the soldiers only knew that they move to Zadar or Transylvania.³⁹

Many dignitaries supported the war against Dalmatia at the sultan’s court, namely that Köprülü Mehmed Pasha should settle the Venetian affair once and for all, and they regarded the case of Transylvania as marginal. However, purportedly, all of them agreed that, whatever happens, the grand vizier must return victorious, lest he should lose his head.⁴⁰

AGAINST TRANSYLVANIA

The Ottoman army arrived in Belgrade on 26 July, where it spent a bit more than two weeks. The turning point regarding the objective of the campaign came about on 6 August, when the grand vizier received a message from Edirne via a haseki or one of the confidants of the sultan that he ought to complete his mission within 40 days and return home. Köprülü Mehmed was ordered to return home because of the ever-spreading uprising of Ābāza Hasan, as the Pasha of Aleppo had extended his rule to the whole of Anatolia by this time; moreover, Topal Sarı

³⁶ György II Rákóczi to Zsuzsanna Lórántffy, Gyula, 11 July 1658, MNL OL, E190, 30/7348; Bethlen, *Erdély története*, pp. 35–36; Kraus, *Erdélyi krónika*, p. 311; Szakály, *Szalárdi János*, pp. 411–413; Doberdoi Bánlaky, *A magyar nemzet*, vol. 16, p. 118; Szabados, “Adalékok”, pp. 292–319.

³⁷ The report of Marin Görög, s.l., 21 July 1658, MNL OL, E143, 14. t, fol. 88 and *EOE*, vol. 11, pp. 405–406; The report of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 21 July 1658, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 130, Konv. 2, fol. 7r–9v.

³⁸ BOA MAD 2998, p. 157/1; BOA D.MKF, 62/67.

³⁹ The report of Marin Görög, s.l., 21 July 1658, MNL OL, E143, 14. t, fol. 88 and *EOE*, vol. 11, pp. 405–406.

⁴⁰ The report of Giovanni Battista Ballarino, Edirne, 8 August 1658, Óváry: *A Magyar Tud. Akadémia*, p. 148.

Ken‘ān Pasha, who had been sent to stop him in mid-July, also joined forces with him. The rebels demanded the heads of Köprülü Mehmed and the grand mufti who issued fatwa on them, and they threatened to set Scutari (Üsküdar) and Constantinople on fire unless their demand was fulfilled.⁴¹

The content of the message sent to the grand vizier is not known exactly, but if Transylvania was named as the matter to be taken care of, then it can be interpreted as an order. If no concrete direction was set, then the expanding uprising and the deadline make it evident what the real objective of the campaign was. The castle of Jenő, and in other words, Transylvania became the new target, as the problem was more acute here than elsewhere, but at the same time it seemed to be manageable in the given time frame; moreover, Köprülü, who had already gathered a lot of enemies, needed some kind of success in order to keep his position.

Pressed by time, the grand vizier also thought about reconciliation with Rákóczi (even if presumably only seemingly), and invited the prince to his camp so that Rákóczi could beg for mercy, who, however, refused to appear in front of the pasha, because he was informed by his Turkish supporters that the grand vizier was soon to be dismissed. The invitation might have been a ruse either, since Köprülü (due to his antipathy toward the person of the prince too) wanted to bring the prince to the sultan, and Rákóczi’s capture might have been a tangible result, if there had not been enough time to carry out a successful military campaign. It was after this that they decided that they would demand the food tax in kind (*sürsāt*) already in money from the other sanjaks of the Bosnia vilayet, and it was then that they ordered to beylerbey of Bosnia, Seydī Ahmed to accompany the army, who was originally commissioned, like the Pasha of Kanizsa, for military operations in Dalmatia.⁴²

In the following days the army “moved” to the area south from Pancsova (present day Панчево (Pančevo), in Serbia), and they waited for the news about the Tatars there. On 11 August, they started to transport the equipment of the janissaries to Temesvár, and on 15 August, the army also set off to that location, after the news about the incursion of the Wallachians reinforced with the Tatars had arrived.⁴³

Contrary to various rumours, Köprülü Mehmed Pasha arrived in Temesvár only on 20 August, whence he departed with his army towards Jenő on 24 August,

⁴¹ The report of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 5 August 1658, (fol. 64r–67v), and the report of Simon Reniger, Edirne, August 1658 (presumably after 11 August), (fol. 101r–102v and 105r) ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 130, Konv. 2; The report of Giovanni Battista Ballarino. Edirne, 1 November 1658. Óváry: *A Magyar Tud. Akadémia*, pp. 149–150; Hammer, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, vol. 6, p. 37.

⁴² The report of Julius Heinrich Wogin, Kesekfalu, 5 September 1658, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 130, Konv. 2, fol. 126r–135r; Szilágyi, *Rozsnyai Dávid*, pp. 170–173; B. Szabó – Sudár, “„Independens fejedelem az Portán kívül””, p. 992; Bethlen: *Erdély története*, pp. 176–180; Hadnagy, “Köprülü Mehmed”, pp. 109–110. Formerly as the Pasha of Eger, Köprülü had bad relations with Prince György Rákóczi I (1630–1648), and from that point on he held grudges against the Rákóczi family.

⁴³ The report of Julius Heinrich Wogin, Kesekfalu, 5 September 1658, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 130, Konv. 2, fol. 126r–135r; Silahdar, *Silahdar Tarihi*, vol. 1, p. 123; BOA MAD 2998, p. 157/2; BOA KK 1949, p. 41.

since he received news about the Tatars led by Mehmed IV Girāy. The Khan did not follow the original plans and invaded the territory of the principality not from Moldavia but from the direction of Wallachia through the Bodza Pass (present day Buzău Pass, in Romania) on 19 August. As part of a pincer movement, the Turkish party moved into the vicinity of Arad, arrived near Jenő on 27 August, and began the preparations for the siege of the castle.⁴⁴

The siege started on 30 August, the defenders, led by Captain László Újlaky, capitulated after a few days, and the Turkish occupied the dilapidated castle of Jenő without fight on 2 September. Then, in the name of the sultan, Köprülü Mehmed Pasha appointed Ákos Barcsai among the members of the delegation that had just arrived from the principality as the new prince on 14 September (disregarding the freedom of the Transylvanians and customary law). In addition to this, the annual tax of Transylvania was raised to 40,000 golden forints and the Transylvanians had to contribute to the war costs with an additional sum of 500,000 thalers as well as the castles of Lugos (present day Lugoj, in Romania) and Karánsebes (present day Caransebes, in Romania) had to be handed over to the Turkish. The principality was in a new situation; it was almost demoted to the status of Romanian voivodeships that was represented by not only the form of the appointment, but also by the fact that Barcsai was appointed not by an *ahdnāme* but very probably only by a *berāt*.⁴⁵

Although Rákóczi could not be neutralised, but the 1658 campaign ended relatively successfully for the Turkish, since they could occupy a couple of far-from-formidable fortresses. The grand vizier depicted this result as a triumph of tremendous magnitude in order to keep his position, but in fact he was also lucky in achieving this, because allegedly, the Ottomans had not known the size of the enemy forces, and if the Transylvanians had properly prepared for the defense of Jenő, then under the pressure of time, the Turkish army may not have sufficient time to seize the castle. According to the Turkish prisoners of Rákóczi, the defenders of the castle should have persisted for six days and then an entirely new situation would have emerged.⁴⁶

CONCLUSIONS – DOUBLE CAMPAIGN?

On the basis of what have been said so far, the direction of the 1658 Ottoman campaign underwent several modifications due to the change of circumstances. While modifying the objectives of the campaign, there were many signs suggesting that quite unconventionally, a double campaign may be an option as well. The original plans of attacking Venice was overwritten by Rákóczi's return, and the prince's

⁴⁴ The report of Julius Heinrich Wogin, Kesekfalú, 5 September 1658, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 130, Konv. 2, fol. 126r–135r; The report of Giovanni Battista Ballarino, Edirne, 1 November 1658, Óváry: *A Magyar Tud. Akadémia*, pp. 149–150; B. Szabó, “II. Rákóczi György”, p. 251.

⁴⁵ Papp, “II. Rákóczi György”, pp. 168–169; Papp, “Amikor a nagyvezír választott”, pp. 128–129.

⁴⁶ György II Rákóczi to Zsuzsanna Lórántffy, Várad, 5 September 1658, MNL OL, E190, 30/7369.

resistance made the Turkish consider a war against Transylvania parallel to the Venetian one. However, when designating the real target, different viewpoints emerged in the court of the sultan too, so practically they tried to solve the two problems simultaneously. They calculated that while the Turkish troops near the borders (those that were under the command of the Pashas of Buda, Temesvár, Eger, and Silistra), the armies of the two Romanian voivodeships and the Tatars with occasional Cossack or Polish assistance would be able to deal with the Transylvanian issue, the main Ottoman army could attack Venetian interest through Dalmatia.

They contributed great importance to the latter until the last moment. The deployment and supply line had already been made by the end of May, and they thought that the *sürsāt* of the vilayets of Temesvár and Buda would also contribute to supply the quarters along the route. Moreover, Belgrade was intended to serve as a hub for the storage of the majority of the food acquired. Similarly, to the 1657 plans, they would have attacked three or four castles (Zadar, Sibenik, Klis, and Split) simultaneously that may explain the initially high number of janissaries (18,786 soldiers) too.

At the beginning of July, due to the worsening of the Transylvanian situation, it seemed that the local forces were not able to solve the Rákóczi issue. It was then that they finalised the plan of the main army's invasion of Transylvania, which was seen necessary in light of the above said because the Tatars were considerably lagging behind schedule due to the internal conflicts of the Cossacks, and the newly appointed voivodes could not be trusted either. After his arrival in Belgrade, the grand vizier who was in a politically tight situation wanted to make a decision by pondering the evolved situation. His decision was finally enforced by the order recalling him because of the Celālī uprising. Regarding the acute situation, he had to solve the issue of Transylvania, and, as Giovanni Battista Ballarino, the Venetian Secretary at Constantinople, wrote in one of his reports in early October, the uprising overthrew the plans devised against Dalmatia.⁴⁷

It was also planned that the grand vizier should spend the winter in Belgrade, which was rumoured even before the beginning of the campaign, and which was later substantiated too.⁴⁸ The circumstances of levying and using the taxes (*nüzül*, *iştirā*) covering the costs of acquiring food may also indicate this or a presumably prolonged or winter campaign: both of these taxes were collected in kind in the sanjaks along the Danube, most of which was intended to be stored in Belgrade. Approximately two-third of it was not used, and around half of it was reshipped to the Danube ports, as was the case with almost the entire stockpile purchased from the Kanizsa vilayet.⁴⁹ These amounts might have covered the winter stay in Belgrade or the food supply of a winter campaign. If there were such ideas, they could not have been realised because of the Celālīs.

⁴⁷ The report of Giovanni Battista Ballarino, Edirne, 7 October 1658, Óváry: *A Magyar Tud. Akadémia*, p. 149.

⁴⁸ The report of Simon Reniger, Edirne, 25 September 1658, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 130, Konv. 2, fol. 171r–172v.

⁴⁹ BOA MAD 2998, p. 144 and 158.

In relation to what have been said thus far, the *rúznámçse* documents may bear relevance too. When documenting the incomes and expenses of the campaign, they indicated them with the expression of “*der sefer-i hümayün*” (“on the grand lord’s campaign”) as well, which was in some cases supplemented with naming the territory against which the campaign was launched. Until the beginning of August, only the words of “*Rümeli*” (“Rumelia”) or “*garb*” (“west”) appear in the documents related to the 1658 campaign (in 1657 the word “*garb*” can be read regarding the military enterprises against Dalmatia and Kotor), which may also indicate that the primary aim or main theatre of war of the campaign would have been Dalmatia. The expression “*Erdel*” (“Erdély”) had appeared in a note dated to 2 August for the first time, and then after 6 August until the end of the campaign only this word is mentioned.⁵⁰ In other words, the campaign against Transylvania (Erdély) was unambiguously named so from that day on when the messenger from Edirne brought the message for the grand vizier to solve the issues within 40 days. Consequently, the *rúznámçse* documents serve as points of reference if one intends to judge when the Transylvanian intervention was given priority ultimately.

Last but not least, let me quote from one of the great contemporary opponents of the Ottomans, the excellent general and scholar of the art of war, the above mentioned Miklós Zrínyi, whose opinion might also be used as an argument for the possibility of the double campaign: “I wonder, however, that the Turkish start two wars simultaneously. It has not been known in our history so far, their religion does not allow for it either, and sensibly no politics can endorse it. Maybe, they do not call the Transylvanian issue war, and hope and imagine that their ambition can be satisfied at their own pleasure and without peril.”⁵¹

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⁵⁰ BOA KK 1947, pp. 80–114; BOA KK 1949, pp. 6–50; BOA KK 1950, pp. 6–62; BOA D.BRZ 47/1–3 and 10–12; 48/1 and 13–14.

⁵¹ In Hungarian: “Csodálkozom azonban, hogy a török egyszerre két háborúba kezd. Ilyesmiről nem tud történelmük, és vallásuk sem engedi, meg a józan politika sem vallja. Lehet, hogy ezt az erdélyi ügyet nem nevezi háborúnak, s azt reméli és képzei, hogy nagyravágását kénye- kedve szerint és veszedelem nélkül kielégítheti.” Miklós Zrínyi to János Rucsecs, s.l., 1658, Kovács, *Zrínyi Miklós*, pp. 707–710.

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ZSUZSANNA CZIRÁKI

Ambassador or Rogue?

*The Labyrinth of Habsburg Diplomacy in the Light of a Murder in Constantinople**

INTRODUCTION

Previously, I have extensively researched in the Viennese archives about the circumstances surrounding the appointment of the Habsburg resident ambassador in Constantinople, Simon Reniger (1649–1665). Right from the very beginning, the difficulties in the appointment of Reniger piqued my interest, including the fact that the diplomatic mission began with a huge financial deficit prior to the new envoy beginning his service. When Reniger was dispatched to Constantinople in 1649, it came after three decades of costly war and was in the middle of a general lack of funds that predominated at the Habsburg treasury. At this time, an embarrassingly large amount, 10,000 florins,¹ was sent to the Sublime Porte simply because it was necessary to repay the mountain of debt that his predecessor Alexander von Greiffenklaus zu Vollraths (1643–1648) had left behind after dying in Constantinople in 1648. How was it possible for the resident ambassador to compile such a debt in just a few years of service? Considering the history of the diplomatic mission, it would not have been considered unusual for the diplomats in Constantinople to take out loans of varying amounts to bridge hard times. They managed to deal with issues of liquidity this way arising from the temporary drying up of the financial resources that trickled irregularly from Vienna. However, this was not the case here. In the autumn of 1646, the resident ambassador Greiffenklaus had committed a murder in Constantinople, and despite his efforts to keep it quiet, it quickly leaked out. The incident did not only lead to the ambassador being imprisoned, but also stirred up a minor diplomatic storm in Habsburg–Ot-

* This article has been written within the framework of the project “Everyday Life and Imperial Politics during the Time of the Köprülü Restoration” (OTKA (NKFI) project nr. 109070; principal investigator: Sándor Papp), as well as of the MTA–SZTE Research Group of the Ottoman Age (Eötvös Loránd Research Network). The research has been supported by the National Research, Development and Innovation Office (NRDI) (Nemzeti Kutatási, Fejlesztési és Innovációs Hivatal) through a grant (Thematic Excellence Programme (Tématerületi Kiválósági Program) 2020, NKFIH-1279-2/2020) of the Interdisciplinary Centre of Excellence (University of Szeged), the Department of Medieval and Early Modern Hungarian History (Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Szeged), MTA–SZTE Research Group of the Ottoman Age (Eötvös Loránd Research Network). András Oross (Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Hofkammerarchiv) and Balázs Lázár (Kriegsarchiv) aided me in my archival work in Vienna related to the subject, and I would like to give thanks to Luis Tercero Casado for the Spanish archival data. The archival research necessary to complete the article was made possible in part by a fellowship in Vienna from the Collegium Hungaricum.

¹ This amount represented the full operational budget for the diplomatic mission for about 3 years.

toman relations. Following Greiffenklau's botched crime, he was only able to secure his freedom by paying out huge amounts of bribes. Since in theory the Holy Roman Emperor had vouched for the ambassador, it seemed to be a good idea to finance his release. However, in the end the creditors did not see a single kreuzer of the money until after Greiffenklau's death, or even until 1649 when the special envoy Johann Rudolf Schmid² arrived, having been entrusted with setting up Simon Reniger as resident ambassador and settling the Greiffenklau debt alongside many other duties.³

Before familiarising ourselves with the incident itself, I would like to address the question why I think this murder is more than just a colourful story from the east. On the one hand, the analysis of the events provides valuable details about the service of a lesser-known Habsburg ambassador. In general, the rather scanty literature up to this point in connection with the activities at the Sublime Porte of the Habsburg resident ambassador in Constantinople, Alexander Greiffenklau, emphasises two aspects. The first is the diplomatic ineptitude of the envoy and the second is the disgrace of the murder committed against the victim being discussed, who I shall now name, Don Juan de Menesses.⁴ In terms of Greiffenklau's professional qualifications, it must be stated that no comprehensive work has been written analysing and evaluating his period as ambassador with proper thoroughness based on the factual materials in the archival sources, so it would be rash to flog the resident ambassador for the time being.⁵ The harsh value judgment of posterity, according to which Greiffenklau must have been a lousy diplomat because he was hard-headed, violent and a drunkard, is shaky because the above description was true of many envoys in Constantinople. The fact that the work of two outstanding resident ambassadors – Johann Rudolf Schmid (1629–1643) and Simon Reniger (1649–1665) – bookend his activities at the Sublime Porte may factor into the unfavourable judgment of him. Since the careers of these two envoys were longer and there are more abundant surviving sources on them – so they are better researched – it is easy to fall into the trap of evaluating Greiffenklau as having

² Johann Rudolf Schmid zum Schwarzenhorn (1590–1667), was the resident ambassador to the Sublime Porte from 1629–1643, was internuncius in 1649 and grand ambassador in 1650. For an overview of Schmid's career and the contemporary diplomatic terminology, see: Meienberger, *Johann Rudolf Schmid*; Strohmeyer, "Kategorisierungsleistungen und Denkschemata in diplomatischer Kommunikation", pp. 21–30.

³ For more detail, see: Cziráki, "Habsburg–Oszmán diplomácia a 17. század közepén"; Aulic War Council excerpts from the reports from Constantinople by Johann Rudolf Schmid between 30 April and 2 June 1649, ÖStA HHStA, StAbt, Türkei I, Kt. 121, Konv. 1, fol. 60–81; Johann Rudolf Schmid to Ferdinand III, Edirne, 13 August 1649, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 121, Konv. 1, fol. 224–232; Johann Rudolf Schmid's opinion on Greiffenklau debts, s.l., 29 May 1648, ÖStA FHKA, Hoffinanz Ungarn, Kt. 417 (1648.04–1648.06.), fol. 163–169.

⁴ Cf.: Hammer, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, vol. 3, p. 249.

⁵ The publishing of Alexander Greiffenklau's diplomatic reports, which is proceeding under the direction of Arno Strohmeyer at the University of Salzburg, will certainly provide greater momentum for this research. Recently on the activity of Greiffenklau: Strohmeyer: "Religion – Loyalität – Ehre", pp. 165–181; Würflinger, "Die Verschlüsselung der Korrespondenz des kaiserlichen Residenten in Konstantinopel".

been overshadowed by Schmid and Reniger. All of this is intensified by the fact that his predecessor in the office – Johann Rudolf Schmid – had a dislike of Greiffenklaus from the moment they met, and he did not even try to conceal his poor opinion of him.⁶ The significance of Schmid's antipathy was not minor, since the disfavour of this key expert official on eastern affairs of the Aulic War Council could not be swept under the rug by any circumstances. The question of how his personality fit in with the patron-client network of the Aulic War Council and even the entire Hofburg is also of interest in examining the background to Greiffenklaus's isolation, and without this understanding, the activity of a mid-level diplomat on par with him cannot be understood.

It is not the goal of this essay to examine the networks within the court, but I would like to provide an idea of the role of these relationships in diplomatic life through a few symptomatic examples. After all, one does not have to dig particularly deeply into the documents before finding Greiffenklaus's enemies. His relationship with the grand ambassador Hermann Czernin was markedly tense, and they had several conflicts in 1644–1645 at the Sublime Porte.⁷ The aforementioned Schmid – and his ally, the chief interpreter for eastern languages in Vienna, Michel d'Asquier – also worked against him completely overtly. This influential diplomatic advisor clearly took satisfaction when Simon Reniger, who without any doubt was Schmid's client, landed up in the post of ambassador following the death of Greiffenklaus.⁸

In addition, the issue of the Menesses murder similarly beckons for caution. On the basis of earlier works, it is possible to form an image that Greiffenklaus stooped to this awful deed due to his temper without seriously thinking it through, again simply strengthening the image of the “bad diplomat” for posterity (however, this was not an unprecedented incident, since a few years earlier the oft-mentioned Schmid had attempted to use poison to get rid of a rival of his friend and ally d'Asquier. The victim Vincenzo Bratutti was reported to have been too greatly renowned as an interpreter).⁹ However, if we unravel the fabric of the archival sources, we are confronted with connections that go far beyond a single individual. Based on the incident, it is possible to gain a glimpse into the mechanisms of Habsburg world diplomacy and the details of the complicated interplay between the two branches – Spanish and Austria – of the ruling family. Thus, in the following I will attempt to examine the conclusions that can be made in con-

⁶ Johann Rudolf Schmid to Heinrich Schlick, Vienna, 20 July 1648, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 120, Konv. 2, fol. 158–161.

⁷ Cf.: Czernin, *Zweite Gesandtschaftsreise*, p. 65 and 70; The Turcica collection of the HHStA abounds with dossiers bearing evidence to the discord between the two. Without trying to be comprehensive, see: Alexander Greiffenklaus to Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 22 December 1645, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 119, Konv. 1, fol. 438–442; Alexander Greiffenklaus to Franz Ulrich Kollowrat, the chairman of the Aulic Chamber, Constantinople, 30 July 1645, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 119, Konv. 1, fol. 446–451.

⁸ Cf.: Cziráki, “Habsburg–Oszmán diplomácia a 17. század közepén”, pp. 848–854.

⁹ Hiller, “A tolmácsper”; Meienberger, Peter, *Johann Rudolf Schmid*, p. 112.

nection with the relations between Vienna and Madrid during an extremely interesting period, the final years of the Thirty Years' War, in the light of this scandal in Constantinople. However, before making wider-ranging conclusions, we should familiarise ourselves with the details of this murder that befit a detective novel.

THE MENESSES INCIDENT

Don Juan de Menesses first appears in Greiffenkalu's reports in November 1645. The resident learned of his arrival on the basis of the news that leaked out from the entourage of the grand vizier.¹⁰ According to this, Menesses had been captured at the beginning of autumn on an English ship arriving from Livorno where he was seen as a spy, and so they handed him over to the kadı of İzmir. According to the kadı, the prisoner was a noble knight from Madrid and had stated he was an envoy of the Spanish king. The prisoner demanded that they provide him with an escort and send him off to Constantinople immediately, because he had an important assignment with the sultan.¹¹ Already at that time, the suspicion arose that he only produced this story because he wanted to escape punishment – or at least this was suggested by the fact that he had not spoken of any kind of mission previously to the other passengers on the ship. In the end, the perplexed kadı provided him with an escort of two Turks and an interpreter, who accompanied him over an extended journey by land and sea to Constantinople. The news of the “envoy” arrived at the Sublime Porte well before the man himself, and doubt also arose in the grand vizier in connection with Menesses's supposed mission during this long wait.¹²

In the meantime, Greiffenklau learned through his informants that the newcomer had sailed to Gallipoli, and then from there had continued over land. He did not bring up the topic at the Sublime Porte, since interest in him had clearly subsided there. However, Menesses finally rolled up to the capital on 30 October 1645 after all, and his arrival fundamentally disrupted relations at the Sublime Porte. He stayed at an ordinary house in Galata and quickly hired a Jewish interpreter. He then made a connection with the grand vizier's “favourite Jewish courtier” and through him got a message to the grand vizier that he had an offer for the sultan that would bring even the Christians to a fever. During all of this, Menesses's arrangements in Constantinople were accompanied by quite a bit of publicity. The people of Galata marvelled at the mysterious Spanish envoy, women, children, passers-by and all sorts of curious people listened with mouths agape to the stories of the loquacious newcomer. However, adversaries also soon appeared, since there were scuffles and other violent events around him on a daily basis according to the imperial diplomatic reports. One way or another, Menesses definitely succeeded in drawing attention to himself, and he purposefully got closer

¹⁰ Grand Vizier Salih Pasha (1645–1647).

¹¹ Sultan Ibrahim (r. 1640–1648).

¹² Alexander Greiffenklau to Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 2 November 1645, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 119, Konv. 1, fol. 382–385, and its duplicate, fol. 386–391.

to the decision makers of the Sublime Porte by building upon the colourful cavalcade of genuine and false reports. With unprecedented self-assurance he depicted how the curious inhabitants of the area “harassed” him, so prior to the anticipated negotiations he requested more worthy accommodations – and received them at the house of the grand vizier’s aforementioned Jewish confidant.¹³

Greiffenklau kept a close eye on the developments throughout, and found out that Menesses had not arrived with a letter of commission, as was the custom, which he had supposedly lost in İzmir. Furthermore, it was suspicious that he had marched into the city alone, without an interpreter or servants. The Habsburg ambassador, now proceeding with considerable thoroughness, provided an outstandingly precise description of the man in question. He was an unusually shaven man of small stature and Christian customs who was about 60 years of age, but it was apparent that he was not nearly as aristocratic as he wanted to seem. Considering all of this, an atmosphere of uncertainty surrounded the newcomer. Greiffenklau himself was only certain about one thing in connection with him, he was not who he said he was.¹⁴

It also soon came to light that Menesses did not have much money. To the troublesome question of why, as an envoy of the Spanish king, he did not make contact with the Habsburg resident ambassador, he only replied that what he had to say was of a confidential nature and it was not for anyone but the sultan. Greiffenklau had found out in the meantime on the basis of reports from his informants in Vienna that Menesses was actually working against Spanish interests, and thus he then intervened with the grand vizier so that they would not take this self-styled envoy seriously. The resident ambassador’s misgivings were further increased by the fact that information obtained from Portuguese, Sicilian and Spanish Jews confirmed the reports that stated Menesses was using malicious trickery against the Spanish crown.¹⁵

Following the initial interest, the Menesses affair was pushed into the background of Greiffenklau’s surviving reports to Ferdinand III at the end of 1645 and beginning of 1646. However, we do know that he corresponded on this topic separately with the Aulic War Council, as well as with the envoy of the Spanish king in Vienna, the Duke of Terranova, in which particular emphasis was given to the protection of the American interests of the Spanish Monarchy.¹⁶ However, the correspondence from the Habsburg resident ambassador starting in the autumn of 1646 became far less often than it had previously. It was not the contemporary

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Alexander Greiffenklau to Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 2 November 1645, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 119, Konv. 1, fol. 382–385, and its duplicate, fol. 386–391; Alexander Greiffenklau to Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 28 November 1645, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 119, Konv. 1, fol. 395–401, 402–406 and 407–412; Alexander Greiffenklau to Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 13 February 1646, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 119, Konv. 2, fol. 10–21.

¹⁶ Alexander Greiffenklau to Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 13 February 1646, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 119, Konv. 2, fol. 10–21.

postal service or loss over the years that lay in the background of the lack of reports, but instead, Greiffenklau had been arrested on 31 October 1646.¹⁷ He landed up in prison for two months for something that qualified as a serious crime for both Christians and Muslims, premeditated murder.¹⁸

In the end, the sources that had dried up resume, starting in the spring of 1647, now discussing the murder that had taken place. On the basis of the subsequent reports related to the matter that encompassed a time of about one year (autumn of 1645 – autumn of 1646), it is possible to know that the resident ambassador's efforts at undermining Menesses were successful and he really did get him sent to prison, but he was not completely successful in eliminating him. After all, the grand vizier did negotiate with the "envoy", who resented the fact that he could not come before the sultan. However, he did relate that he had brought news from America about an island called Madon.¹⁹ He had supposedly received strict orders to reveal the precise goal of his mission only to the sultan, and additionally he suggested that he could bestow new countries and fabulous treasures, including rich gold mines, on the potentate.²⁰ Originally, he said he would have had a letter of commission as well, if his Arab interpreter that had fled had not ridden off with it along with many other things. The interpreter that assisted in the meeting with the grand vizier – who the translator for the imperial diplomats, Nicusio Panaiotti,²¹ had gotten to well beforehand – stated that Menesses was crazy and not a word of his should be taken seriously. Perhaps due to this as well, Menesses was sent back to jail,²² while in the meantime new reports leaked out little by little about his vague proposal. According to these, there were Christians, Jews and pagans²³ all amongst the inhabitants of the island, but even the imperial interpreter Panaiotti, who had gotten close to the prisoner in disguise, was not able to find

¹⁷ Dujčev, *Avvisi di Ragusa*, p. 91.

¹⁸ Alexander Greiffenklau to Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 27 March 1647, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 120, Konv. 1, fol. 20–25. On the 7th of May 1647, he describes that he was freed on 27 December 1646 after he paid the "ransom" from the loan taken out from the grand vizier, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 120, Konv. 1, fol. 38.

¹⁹ Alexander Greiffenklau to Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 27 March 1647, ÖStA HHStA, Kt. 120, Konv. 1, fol. 20–25.

²⁰ The report of the imperial interpreter Nicusio Panaiotti about the death of Don Juan de Menesses, Constantinople, 6 May 1647, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 120, Konv. 1, fol. 49/3–4.

²¹ Alternatively, Panagiotis Nikousios, a Greek Phanariot interpreter. He was a prominent figure amongst the professional interpreters in Constantinople in the second half of the 17th century. His career began in 1645 as an imperial interpreter, and later he became the chief interpreter of the Sublime Porte. Cf.: Damien, "Panagiotis Nicousios and Alexander Mavrocordatos"; Hering, "Panagiotis Nikousios als Dragoman der kaiserlichen Gesandtschaft in Konstantinopel"; Cziráki, "Language Students and Interpreters".

²² He was definitely still in captivity on 22 December 1645. Cf.: Alexander Greiffenklau to Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 2 December 1645, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 119, Konv. 1, fol. 425–430, 431–437.

²³ In a later report, Greiffenklau cites Menesses as having said that the inhabitants of the island were all Jewish. Alexander Greiffenklau to Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 28 November 1645, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 119, Konv. 1, fol. 395–401, 402–406 and 407–412.

out the precise location of the island.²⁴ In the end, the resident decided that it was time to get rid of the bothersome stranger, and so resorting to what seemed to be the easiest solution, he tried to poison him three times. However, none of these attempts met with success, because the victim was able to get the antidote in time on every occasion.²⁵

The only consequence of Greiffenklau's attempts was that the danger became perfectly clear to Menesses, so he continued to fight for his life with every trick he had up his sleeve. First, he had to arrange to be freed from captivity. He managed this through the method commonly employed in the empire of the sultans; he "became a Turk", or rather converted to Islam. In addition, he established relationships with a few renegade expatriates in the entourage of the grand vizier, who certainly saw the opportunities in his promises of dizzying wealth. His new friends took him in so that he could write his memoranda to the grand vizier and the sultan from "safe surroundings". These contained extensive descriptions of the Spanish Indies, the sea route there, the gold and silver mines that could be found there and in particular about the Madonians, who had no other desire on earth than to be the subjects of the Ottoman emperor.²⁶

As the interpreter Panaiotti later noted in summary, after all of this the "master resident" came to the decision that he would finally wipe out the troublemaker at what he believed to be the secure premises of the imperial embassy. Unnamed Catholic priests in Galata – most probably Franciscan friars who were traditionally well-connected to the imperial embassy – also gave their blessing to this risky plan, thus, resolving the problem of "conscience" related to it. A renegade expatriate chiaus named Mustafa was convinced to abet in the perpetration, and he helped lure Menesses to the house of the resident ambassador in Galata. The ruse was that Mustafa promised an evening of wine drinking to the freshly converted Menesses, who was bridleing at the injunction against alcohol, at the house of an English merchant – in reality Greiffenklau's residence. The slightly transparent plan surprisingly worked. After the chosen victim arrived, the resident ambassador sent the staff to the interpreter Panaiotti's house, who knew of the plan, so that none of them would accidentally learn of the assassination or let things slip by accident. Only he remained in the house, as well as the aforementioned Panaiotti and the earlier apprentice interpreter Natale di Paulo, who was at that time a courier in the employ of the Aulic War Council. Following a bit of a scuffle, it was the latter that delivered the final blow to the victim. After the deed had been done, the perpetrators temporarily hid the body in a room, and then buried it on the grounds of the house at two in the morning. They were able to keep the matter secret for a total of two days, when the staff that had returned in the meantime

²⁴ It is not clear which island this might have been, or whether it was an actual place at all or if it was just disinformation. I have not yet been able to find a trace of it in 17th century atlases. Cf.: Blaeu – van der Krogt, *Atlas maior*.

²⁵ Nicusio Panaiotti's report on the death of Don Juan de Menesses, Constantinople, 6 May 1647, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 120, Konv. 1, fol. 49/3–4.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

discovered traces of blood at the site of the crime. However, the biggest problem was that one of the perpetrators, Natale di Paulo, panicked and in his fear was constantly hanging around the site where Menesses was buried until it became suspicious and the curious household staff finally dug up the corpse. After this, news spread like wildfire that a dead body had been found in the vicinity of the Habsburg resident ambassador's house. After a while, the kadı of Galata looked into the matter and – considering the significance of the participants – the entire machinery of the Ottoman judiciary went into gear, and the main motor of this was the grand vizier. They interrogated Greiffenklaus and his associates and threw them in prison. From there they were only able to get out by paying a ransom that was covered by large loans that hung over the finances of the Habsburg diplomatic mission for years to come. During this time, the Ottoman leadership made sure that the affair would create an enormous international scandal. The incident contributed to postponing the extension of the Habsburg–Ottoman peace treaty that had been on the threshold of completion, and also altered the communication between the emperor and the sultan. Before long, it led to the dismissal of Greiffenklaus and the appointment of a new resident ambassador – Simon Reniger – following long negotiations.²⁷

THE DIPLOMATIC PLAYING FIELD OF THE SPANISH MONARCHY IN CONSTANTINOPLE

The topic of the Menesses murder raises interesting questions from several aspects, which cannot be covered completely within the context of this essay. For the time being, we must be satisfied with posing the question that I touched upon in the introduction: how did the diplomatic machinery of the Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs work together in this special situation. The key motif of the murder is after all the fact that Menesses contradicted Spanish interests with what he was saying. In hindsight, it is not possible to know for sure what the extent of the truth was in his proposal and where the fantasy began. However, it is clear that the Spanish king and the entire Habsburg dynasty judged his presence in Constantinople to be a threat and decided to eliminate him. The collaboration of the two powers in this instance is particularly interesting because the Spanish crown – in a manner unlike what was common in this period – depended entirely on the set of tools available to their Austrian relatives.

Spain at this time did not maintain any kind of regular relations with the Ottoman Empire, so it did not have a diplomatic mission in Constantinople. Following the agreement to split power between the brothers – Ferdinand and Charles – to establish a worldwide empire, the eastern front on land belonged by the right of the Hungarian crown to the sphere of interest of the Austrian party, which also

²⁷ For more detail on the consequences of the Menesses murder, see: Cziráki, “Habsburg–Oszmán diplomácia a 17. század közepén”; Veltzé, “Die Hauptrelation des kaiserlichen Residenten in Konstantinopel”, pp. 57–170, especially: pp. 60–61; Hammer, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, vol. 3, pp. 279–280.

possessed the title of Holy Roman Emperor. Despite this, the events in Constantinople were of note on the Iberian Peninsula in the time of Charles V and Philip II, since the North African front and the advances in the area of the Mediterranean Sea that put Italy in fear kept the Spanish interest in the east alive.²⁸ However, following the great clashes on sea and on land of the 16th century, the network of informants in the eastern Mediterranean fell apart during the reign of Philip III (1598–1621), or rather was reorganized. In place of their own spy service, intermediaries provided the reports. This process was clearly characterised by the circumstance that they no longer even had the need for an interpreter of eastern languages (dragoman) in Madrid.²⁹ In this situation, the main font of information arriving from Constantinople as well as from the entire Ottoman Empire could not be any other than the Austrian relatives. Through the Ottoman wars of central Europe, the Austrians were linked by innumerable threads to the Ottoman Empire, and despite breaks of varying length had maintained a diplomatic mission at the seat of the sultan since the middle of the 16th century.³⁰

In the 1640s, the Ottoman-Habsburg relationship had become stable, at least in the sense that both empires had an interest in maintaining the treaty signed in 1606.³¹ Although the mutual frontier continued to cause both sides to rattle their sabers due to the regular raids, the occasional skirmishes still did not change the fact that diplomats had the leading role in shaping the relationship between the emperor and the sultan for nearly sixty years. This was a radically new situation compared to the 16th century, and this was primarily due to the two powers' other concerns – the Thirty Years' War and the French headway in Europe, and the Asian rebellions and war in Crete in the east. Special diplomatic missions to continue the peace became regular occurrences between the two imperial seats, which since 1627 meant the extension of the Treaty of Szőny multiple times.³² The Habsburg side – based on the 16th century precedents – in addition had a permanent envoy (resident ambassador) at the Sublime Porte to maintain constant contact with the monarch and to reconcile possible disputes quickly. Constantinople also held a prominent position as a centre of information amongst the world's great cities at that time, so the duties of the resident ambassador encompassed collecting

²⁸ Davies, *The Golden Century of Spain*, pp. 93–102; Gürkan, Emrah Safa, “Espionage in the 16th Century Mediterranean”, pp. 200–220.

²⁹ Conde Pazos, “La embajada turca en Madrid”, p. 11; Veronelli – Labrador Arroyo, *Diario de Hans Khevenhüller*, pp. 17–19; Davies, *The Golden Century of Spain*, pp. 171–175 and 241–256; Millán – Visceglia, *La monarquía de Felipe III*, vol. 4, pp. 1453–1454.

³⁰ For more on this, see amongst others: Teply, *Kaiserliche Gesandtschaften*; Nehring, *Adam Freiherrn zu Herbersteins Gesandtschaftsreise*; Nehring, *Adam Wenner*; Hiller, “A Habsburgok török diplomáciája”; Papp, *Török szövetség – Habsburg kiegyezés*, p. 221.

³¹ Marton, “A Dissertation in Preparation”, the manuscript's pp. 3–5; Papp, “Az Oszmán Birodalom”; Strohmeyer, “The theatrical Performance of Peace”.

³² Brandl et al., “Kommunikáció és híráramlás”; Idem, “Kommunikation und Nachrichtenaus-tausch”; Idem, “Válogatott források”; Brandl – Szabados, “A megbízás terhe”; Cervioğlu, “The Peace Treaties of Gyarmat (1625) and Szőny (1627)”; Juhász, “A második szőnyi béke margójára”; Marton, “„Szőnyből tudatjuk...””; Idem, “On the Question of the Negotiations”, pp. 80–81; Idem, “Péter Koháry's Life”.

information through a very carefully established intelligence network as well. This information would be forwarded without delay to the imperial court, or more precisely the Aulic War Council, where the threads of eastern diplomacy came together and where the data was evaluated, and necessary decisions were prepared.³³

The Turkish war and everything that it entailed – thus eastern diplomacy – was eminently a matter for the Austrian Habsburgs in the 17th century, who when necessary then handed over information to their Spanish relatives. This was the state of affairs during the reign of Philip IV (1621–1665) as well, although it seems that the news from Constantinople was hardly noticed by the decision makers of the Spanish crown. The attention of King Philip was naturally engaged with the European war being conducted in alliance with his uncle Ferdinand II (1619–1637) and then with his cousin and brother-in-law Ferdinand III (1637–1657). This was precisely so that Spanish interests would be asserted as much as possible in the aggregation of conflicts ravaging the Holy Roman Empire. The Spanish government was focused mainly on the Netherlands, northern Italy and the French advances in connection with this. Thus, starting from the renewal of the Dutch war in 1621, its primary interest was that its will should be asserted in the heart of the continent, at the Viennese court of its relatives near the fighting. At the same time, the Spanish financial resources that were believed to be inexhaustible and their additional troops had become essential to the Austrian Habsburgs, who were in a hard-pressed situation. The wartime symbiosis of the two branches of the dynasty was clear, and this proved to be effective enough for a long time, despite low points that occurred on occasion. It was no accident that the constant demand of their antagonists at peace negotiations that interrupted the fighting from time to time was to end the Spanish–Austrian collaboration, which took place *pro forma* in the Peace of Westphalia.³⁴

Researching the backdrop to the Menesses murder, an obvious starting point is to examine the techniques of the Spaniards to assert their interests in Vienna, which in any case is an inexhaustible topic of the literature dealing with the era. In connection with the system of relations that has been widely discussed by historians, I would only like to point out here that the Spanish influence, which had been of varying intensity, again strengthened at the Hofburg starting in 1631 when another marriage between the Spanish and Austrian branches reinforced the unity of the dynasty.³⁵ The sister of the Spanish king, Maria Anna (María Ana) arrived in Vienna with a large entourage – including her Capuchin confessor Diego de

³³ Meienberger, Peter, *Johann Rudolf Schmid*, pp. 15–34; Hiller, “A Habsburgok török diplomáciája”; Höbelt, *Ferdinand III*, pp. 359–371; Hengerer, *Kaiser Ferdinand III*, pp. 260–277; Strohmeyer, “Die habsburgisch-osmanische Freundschaft”, pp. 223–238; Regele, *Der österreichische Hofkriegsrat*, p. 16.

³⁴ Stradling, *Philip IV and the Government of Spain*, pp. 129–150; Höbelt, *Ferdinand III*, pp. 173–182; Hengerer, *Kaiser Ferdinand III*, pp. 70–72, 101–110; Ernst, *Madrid und Wien*; Rohrschneider, *Der gescheiterte Frieden von Münster*, pp. 32–91; Alcalá-Zamora y Queipo de Llano, “La política exterior del reinado”, pp. 177–198.

³⁵ Höbelt, *Ferdinand III*, pp. 53–55; Hengerer, *Kaiser Ferdinand III*, pp. 86–90; Monostori, “Diego Saavedra Fajardo”, pp. 32–48.

Quiroga, one of the most outstanding Spanish diplomats – and her household remained dominated by Spaniards even after her wedding.³⁶ Thus, the “Spanish party”³⁷, which had been present in fact in the life of the Austrian Habsburgs since the time of Ferdinand I, gained strength through the installation of the infanta in Austria and this served as the bridgehead of the Spanish crown in central Europe. In this sense, it contributed as an indispensable means when necessary at any given time for the Spanish king to force his Austrian relatives into the shackles of Charles V’s “universal monarchy” that traditionally prioritised Spanish interests.³⁸

If we take stock of Diego Velázquez’s painting of “infanta María” made in 1630 before the wedding, not an iota of doubt remains that Ferdinand III’s wife entered both the marriage and politics as a full partner. In this work of one of the most talented painters at depicting character in the history of art, it is a disciplined young lady looking at us. Her gaze exudes resolve, calm and assurance provided by poised intellectual abilities.³⁹ Contemporaries also commented on her favourable qualities and further emphasised that she had an extraordinarily great influence on Ferdinand III, who in any case had sensitive nerves and was prone to depression. Characteristic symptoms of this were often brought about by crises, causing him to seek refuge in the sickbed.⁴⁰

Maria Anna seemingly envisaged her role in politics to be a well-prepared ruling partner with her husband, alongside with activities of patronage and representation that were typical of the empresses of the period.⁴¹ All of this is supported by numerous examples, in particular the correspondence of Maria Anna and Ferdinand that abounded with political topics.⁴² The most important of these from the perspective of our subject was that the empress was regularly invited to the meetings of the highest decision making forum, the Privy Council, and she was in direct contact with influential Spanish diplomats as well as with her brother Philip

³⁶ Cf.: The payrolls of the court of Maria Anna (1635, 1640), ÖStA HHStA, Obersthofmeisteramt, Sonderreihe, Kt. 76, Konv. 5, sin. fol.; The payrolls of the court of the empress Maria Anna, 1638, ÖStA HHStA, Spanien, Varia, Kt. 11/b (1635–1641), fol. 189–191.

³⁷ For the sake of simplicity, I am using the older terminology even though more recent literature has pointed out that due to a lack of synchronised action and unified structure amongst the “party members”, the term “Spanish party” (“facción española”, “spanische Partei”) does not really encompass the truth and sounds decidedly anachronistic. Cf.: Marek, *La embajada española*, pp. 40–52.

³⁸ Ernst, *Madrid und Wien*, pp. 8–33; Tercero Casado, “A Fluctuating Ascendancy”, pp. 1–3; Marek, *La embajada española*, pp. 9–11.

³⁹ Velázquez, Diego, *Maria de Austria, Reina de Hungría* (oil on canvas, 1630), Madrid, Museo del Prado, (<https://www.museodelprado.es/coleccion/obra-de-arte/doa-maria-de-austria-reina-de-hungria/1e61408f-ef2d-498b-a719-289a1fbd91ff>), accessed: 20 June 2020.

⁴⁰ Hengerer, *Kaiser Ferdinand III*, p. 125; Tercero Casado, “A Fluctuating Ascendancy”, p. 2; Marek, *La embajada española*, pp. 134–135.

⁴¹ For female roles in early modern diplomatic context, see: Keller, Katrin, “Frauen – Hof – Diplomatie”, pp. 33–50.

⁴² The letters of Empress Maria Anna are edited by Christian Standhartinger under the supervision of Katrin Keller and Andrea Sommer-Mathis at the Austrian Academy of Sciences and will be published in the near future.

IV.⁴³ The relationship between the two of them could also presumably have been impacted by the fact that Ferdinand and his style of governing was often considered “soft” in Madrid court circles. The followers of the Catholic king made efforts to suppress influence conflicting with Spanish interests – primarily considerations for the Bavarians and the German empire – as much as possible in the environment of the easily manipulated emperor.⁴⁴

In addition to the empress, the Spanish diplomatic mission in Vienna constituted another important hub of power and information in asserting their interests. The diplomatic office of the Spanish crown in Austria during the period in question could already look back on a significant history, since it had operated as the central European citadel of Spanish interests since 1558.⁴⁵ In addition to everyday politics, the envoys – during the time of the events in question, the man filling the post was the Duke of Terranova⁴⁶ – also played an important role in the expansion and maintenance of the network that linked the Spanish ruler as a patron with courtiers in the entourage of the emperor as clients. These clients agreed to participate in asserting Spanish interests in central Europe for estates and annuities or other advantages in prestige.⁴⁷ The efforts of the two branches of the Habsburg family to link the nobility of the courts in Madrid and Vienna through the establishment of family ties played into the hands of the envoy in building up the network of clients. Through the networks of family ties and clients, influential aristocratic families such as the Harrachs, the Dietrichsteins, the Khevenhüllers and the Lobkowitzes belonged to the “Spanish party” during the reign of Ferdinand III, and in certain cases, the emperor’s head chamberlain and chairman of the Privy Council Maximilian Trauttmansdorf also performed significant services for Philip IV.⁴⁸

The empress, Spanish diplomats and well-positioned pro-Hispanic followers that received appanage from the Catholic king moved every stone so that information affecting the Spanish crown would get to Madrid as soon as possible, and

⁴³ Sommer-Mathis, “María Ana de Austria”, p. 153.

⁴⁴ The evaluation of the situation by the Venetian delegation in Madrid is outstandingly telling in terms of this. It discusses in particular how little esteem Ferdinand III had at the Spanish Court. Cf.: The Final Report of the Envoy of the Venetian Republic in Madrid, Venice, 8 February 1649, in, Firpo, *Relazioni*, pp. 182–183.

⁴⁵ Marek, *La embajada española*, p. 10.

⁴⁶ Diego de Aragón, Duke of Terranova (1596–1663). He was a Spanish duke from a Sicilian family and was Philip’s envoy at the imperial court between 1646 and 1648. Cf.: Ferdinand III’s letter of confirmation for the assignment of the Duke of Terranova to Vienna (draft), Linz, 24 December 1644, ÖStA HHStA, Spanien, Diplomatische Korrespondenz, Kt. 31, Mapped 538, fol. 1–2; For more detail, see: Keller – Catalano, *Die Diarien und Tagzettel*, pp. 220–221.

⁴⁷ The current literature interprets the permanent Spanish envoy as a “broker”, who linked the patron and innumerable distant clients. See: Marek, *La embajada española*, p. 39; For more on the diplomatic network of Philip IV, see: Ochoa Brun, “Los embajadores”, pp. 199–233.

⁴⁸ As a result of the complexity of the central European Habsburg Monarchy, this network did not only include German, but also Czech nobility and Hungarian aristocrats to a lesser extent. Cf.: Evans, *The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy*, p. 48; Martí, “Az aranygyapjas lovag”; Marek, *La embajada española*; Winkelbauer, *Österreichische Geschichte 1522–1699*, vol. 1, pp. 85–86; Oross – Martí, “La administración pública”.

they were even able to secure the measures demanded by the given situation at the Hofburg. Considering the above context, it was entirely clear that Greiffenklau and his colleagues did not undertake the murder of Menesses on their own, but were following orders, behind which we can suspect close-knit diplomatic machinery operating between Madrid and Vienna comprised of official and unofficial components. Although no directive ordering a murder has yet been found, an image emerges from the scattered data of why and how it was considered worthwhile to eliminate this agent of dubious origins that had popped up in the sultan's court.

Why Habsburg diplomacy did not just consider Menesses a harmless adventurer and why they dealt with him at all is apparent from the state of the Spanish crown of the 1640s. Spain during the reign of Philip IV had already passed its zenith of power, which amongst other factors manifested in the increasing dissolution of the Iberian Peninsula that was influenced by French manipulation. The Castilianisation and centralisation of this diverse country stalled, serious structural problems weakened public administration and both the economy and society were overburdened by irresponsible financial management and corruption, which was only made worse due to the burden of the war being fought in central Europe. Even the efforts at reform by the Count-Duke of Olivares⁴⁹ were not able to reverse the adverse processes, and rebellions reared their heads on the peninsula accompanying the spreading crisis.⁵⁰ The defining conflict of the 1640s was the uprising against the Spanish king in Catalonia, which even after 1648 fanned the flames of Spanish–French animosity for years. The situation in Portugal was extremely serious as well, where during Habsburg rule local interests had been similarly sacrificed to Spanish imperial conceptions. The country had fell under Habsburg rule in 1580, but this government representing the preferences of Castile was outstandingly unpopular. Later, in 1640, the Portuguese dispossessed Philip IV of his control and elected their own ruler.⁵¹ Naturally, the Spaniards did everything they could in the interest of reacquiring the country, but their efforts were without permanent result. During this fierce animosity, the Portuguese, who were allied with the French, were not picky about the means they used to weaken their opponent's position.⁵²

Thus, for the full investigation of the context of the events it is necessary to include the background information found in the correspondence of Philip IV stating that this Menesses talking about the American colonies was actually a Portuguese agent and was only passing himself off as Spanish because this gave him the best chance to make it across the Mediterranean and to the sultan's court.⁵³ All

⁴⁹ Don Gaspar de Guzmán y Pimentel, conde-duque de Olivares (1587–1645). Favourite of Philip IV and prime minister to the king between 1622 and 1643.

⁵⁰ Davies, *Spain in Decline*, pp. 6–7 and 23–54.

⁵¹ John IV (Bragança), king of Portugal, r. 1640–1656.

⁵² Davies, *Spain in Decline*, pp. 43–47; Disney, *A History of Portugal*, vol. 1, pp. 212–228; Monostori, “Diego Saavedra Fajardo”, pp. 65–70.

⁵³ Letter of the Spanish king Philip IV to Count Oñate [Íñigo Vélez de Guevara], Madrid, 6 November 1650, AHNM, Consejo de Estado, sf. Leg. 2871.

of this is only underscored by the fact that the “envoy” travelled incognito and without escort. This by itself made the authenticity of his mission questionable, particularly in light that the actual Spanish–Ottoman contacts known from the period were performed through the maintenance of the necessary ceremonial framework.⁵⁴ Also speaking against Menesses working for Spain was that he had not sought out contact with the Habsburg resident ambassador in Constantinople, although this would have been an obvious step, with the 1650 mission to Constantinople of the actual Spanish commissioner Alegreto Alegretti serving as a sufficient example.⁵⁵

Although not in an entirely consistent manner, the question of the American gold and silver mines come up time after time in the reports of Menesses’s “secret mission”. It was not by chance that this subject struck a nerve with the Habsburg monarchs. Spain had been pressed into an increasingly defensive stance in its colonies in the face of its English and Dutch rivals, even though the empire’s large-scale enterprises – particularly military – depended directly on the amount of precious metals brought in from America. Clearly, the Portuguese were also quite aware of this, so it is not surprising that they were trying to undermine the power of the rival Spanish king on this point. The committed Portuguese diplomats at this time had appeared in every significant centre of power in Europe and were agitating against the Catholic king, even though the Spanish representatives were able to parry one diplomatic blow after another.⁵⁶ What is more, at this time Spain was already sitting at the negotiating table in Westphalia and was successfully fighting to isolate the delegates arriving from the new Portuguese king.⁵⁷ In this

⁵⁴ Alexander Greiffenklau to Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 2 November 1645, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 119, Konv. 1, fol. 382–385 and its duplicate, fol. 386–391; Conde Pazos, “La embajada turca en Madrid”.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*; the instructions of Ferdinand III to the Habsburg ambassador in Constantinople Simon Reniger, Vienna, 28 January 1650, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 122, Konv. 1, fol. 45–50; Aulic War Council extract from Simon Reniger’s report dated 3 April 1650 to Ferdinand III, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 122, Konv. 1, fol. 87–89; Simon Reniger’s report to Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 3 April 1650, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 122, Konv. 1, fol. 113–116, 117–120 and 124–135; Simon Reniger’s report to Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 30 April 1650, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 122, Konv. 1, fol. 196–198; Instructions of Ferdinand III to Simon Reniger, Constantinople, 5 May 1650, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 122, Konv. 1, fol. 199–204; Simon Reniger’s report to Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 6 May 1650, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 122, Konv. 1, fol. 205–208; Simon Reniger’s report to Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 7 June 1650, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 122, Konv. 1, fol. 235–236; In a not particularly surprising manner, Alegretti, who was from Dubrovnik, began his service as the court chaplain of Maria Anna, where he obviously came into contact with high-ranking diplomats as well. After the death of the empress, he applied to join the imperial service. His experience in Vienna certainly contributed to his later hiring in Madrid. Cf.: The court payrolls of the empress Maria Anna, 1638, ÖStA HHStA, Spanien, Varia, Kt. 11/b. (1635–1641) Fol. 189–191; See also the note with the title “Memoria de lo que pretenden las criadas y criados de su Mayestad la Emperatriz nuestra Señora que haya gloria” on the orders affecting the court of Maria Anna following the death of the empress in May of 1646, ÖStA HHStA, Obersthofmeisteramt, Sonderreihe, Kt. 76, Konv. 6., sin, fol.

⁵⁶ See footnote 51, and in addition: Céspedes del Castillo, “Brasil y los Reinos de Indias”.

⁵⁷ Monostori, “Diego Saavedra Fajardo”, p. 70.

light, it is easy to imagine that Menesses did represent Portuguese interests at the Sublime Porte, the objective of which would have been to awaken an interest in America in the Ottoman Empire. However outlandish this idea seems, it could not have been completely imagined out of thin air, since on this issue even Greiffenklaus himself observed that on the basis of his experiences, the Ottomans would have been willing to embark on an “American adventure”, and even the obvious inadequacy of their fleet would not hold them back.⁵⁸

However, how was it possible from Madrid to stave off these kinds of fantasies in Constantinople? The answer is obvious: through Vienna. The Habsburg defeats in the European war and the pressure of the hostile powers brought about the feeling in contemporaries that the days were numbered for the close cooperation of the dynasty. Despite this, it seems that the Spanish diplomatic machinery in Vienna was still operational at the time of the appearance of Don Juan de Menesses, at the end of 1645 and beginning of 1646. An important factor from the perspective of our topic is that the network of Spanish clients was also present in the Aulic War Council, which was responsible for eastern diplomacy and could be considered the “overseeing body” of the Habsburg resident ambassador in Constantinople.⁵⁹ We also know that the Habsburg ambassador in Constantinople received orders to defend Spanish interests and various useful news from several sources, from the Spanish envoy in Vienna directly and indirectly through the Aulic War Council. It is worthy of note that in the final years of the war, the Spanish envoy himself took charge of informing his colleague in Constantinople about the military events occurring on the continent and the progress of the negotiations. At the same time, he requested that the activities of the enemies of the Casa de Austria at the Sublime Porte be kept under close observation.⁶⁰ Nevertheless, the latter request was not considered unusual, since the resident ambassadors had long kept note of the manoeuvres of the French, English and Dutch at the Sublime Porte,

⁵⁸ Alexander Greiffenklaus to Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 28 November 1645, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 119, Konv. 1, fol. 395–401, 402–406 and 407–412; Alexander Greiffenklaus to Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 13 February 1646, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 119, Konv. 2, fol. 10–21.

⁵⁹ The Spanish also counted on the prestigious vice-chairman of the Aulic War Council Gerhard Questenberg, who had an enormous amount of experience with Ottoman matters. Marquis Francesco di Carreto di Grana’s (the emperor’s envoy in Madrid) report to Ferdinand III, on the discussion with Don Francisco de Melo, Madrid, 13 June 1646, ÖStA HHStA, Spanien, Diplomatische Korrespondenz, Kt. 33. Mappa 567, fol. 56–57; Wenzel Eusebius Lobkowitz, Duke of Sagan was also in the closest pro-Spanish circle and was a member of the Aulic War Council. The duke had prestigious Spanish relatives through his grandmother (María Manrique de Lara y Mendoza) and had a rich pro-Spanish network of connections. Winkelbauer: *Ständefreiheit und Fürstenmacht* 1, pp. 84–85.

⁶⁰ The matters generally were limited to learning of, reporting on and reacting to anti-Habsburg initiatives. The latter meant that the ambassador would strive to thwart the initiative using diplomatic means of negotiation at the Sublime Porte. On rarer occasions, there were examples of the ambassador having to intervene actively in the events. Cf.: Alexander Greiffenklaus to Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 2 November 1645, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 119, Konv. 1, fol. 382–385 and its duplicate, fol. 386–391.

and reports were made of possible sources of danger to the Casa de Austria that came to their attention.⁶¹

However, it was genuinely extraordinary that from the moment of Menesses's appearance Greiffenklau referred to the secret correspondence with the Duke of Terranova conspicuously often. After his release from prison, Greiffenklau stated directly in a letter to the duke that the emperor should be informed of everything in person that was in the report given to Terranova on the events.⁶² He also wrote down in black and white that the "incident that had occurred" took place in the interest of the dynasty. Since he could not refer to this reason before the Ottoman authorities, he had no other choice than to arrange for his own release by paying serious bribes. Greiffenklau expected the court to repay the loans he took out for his release and in addition requested his recall, since following these events he was completely compromised at the Sublime Porte.⁶³ Furthermore, the situation was also aggravated by other circumstances. After all, in the middle of the money shortage squeezing the Ottoman government, the grand vizier, who was considered extremely greedy, used the knowledge that had leaked out about the murder and the related debt to blackmail the resident ambassador. He also tried to exert pressure through him on the court in Vienna so that he could get them to agree to his demands for amendments that had come up during the extension of the aforementioned Treaty of Szőny.⁶⁴

Alongside all of this, the financial difficulties that followed the murder cast a rather bad light on the Spaniards. After all, it can be seen from the comments of the resident ambassador that the Spanish envoy in Vienna who had collaborated in the organisation of the murder had promised to recompense Greiffenklau for

⁶¹ See footnote 29. The communication directed through intermediaries in Vienna was also made necessary by the great distance between Madrid and Constantinople. In the reports of the later resident ambassador, Simon Reniger, this reason is stated explicitly: Simon Reniger to Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 3 April 1653, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 122, Konv. 1, fol. 101–112.

⁶² Alexander Greiffenklau to Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 1 February 1647, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 120, Konv. 1, fol. 8–9; Alexander Greiffenklau to Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 21 February 1647, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 120, Konv. 1, fol. 10–12.

⁶³ Alexander Greiffenklau to Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 21 February 1647, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 120, Konv. 1, fol. 10–12; Presumably informing in person was a typical form of conduct in this confidential matter, perhaps also owing to the fact that the Menesses affair hardly appears in the surviving archival materials in Vienna – the HHStA, HKA and KA. Every indication points to the hub of information in Vienna being the Duke of Terranova. With this understanding, further data related to this topic may be found in Spanish archives. In addition to all of this, it is necessary to note that certain evidence suggests that there were documents related to the Menesses murder in Vienna as well. According to a note in a protocol book from 1647, the Aulic War Council removed the materials touching upon the Greiffenklau–Menesses incident in 1666. The succinct reference did not extend to why the matter came up again and where the materials related to it were taken. There is not a trace of the missing sections in the surviving documents of the War Council. Cf.: ÖStA KA, ZSt, HKR, HR Protokollbücher, 1647 Prot. Exp, fol. 455v.

⁶⁴ It was primarily the one-time gift of 200,000 thalers that came up. The report of the courier Johann Dietz on his journey to Constantinople. s. l. 6 May 1647, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 120, Konv. 1, fol. 49/5–51.

the expenses of the action. However, Madrid later refused to cover the ever-increasing debts.⁶⁵ On the one hand, this is understandable, since Spanish diplomacy obviously wanted to avoid even the impression that it had anything to do with the unpleasant incident. However, on the other hand, there was the imperial court, which had been put in an extraordinarily awkward position by the operation that had gone awry. It should also be taken into consideration that while the mutual intent for peace is clearly seen in retrospect, this was not nearly as obvious to contemporaries. It may have seemed the situation was at a breaking point and could have led at any point to the renewal of war in Hungary, so they did not want to burden the Habsburg–Ottoman relationship, which could never have been called friendly, with unnecessary disputes.⁶⁶ In this situation, the imperial court had no other choice than to try to calm the diplomatic storm as quickly as possible and shoulder the considerable expenses that arose from Greiffenklau's actions.⁶⁷

CONSEQUENCES

Therefore, it is possible to state without any doubt that the Menesses murder had a political motive. This assertion holds true even if based on the scanty and often contradictory information it is not possible to reconstruct word for word precisely what Don Juan de Menesses was offering at the Sublime Porte. Nevertheless, the reports from the Austrian information network to Vienna and forwarded on to Madrid through the Spanish envoy there proved clearly sufficient to arouse the suspicion of the Spanish government. In the difficult external and internal political circumstances outlined above, the decision of Madrid could not be anything other than to eliminate the dubious Menesses, who according to Greiffenklau's reports knew too much about America and the route there and was willing to share this with the Ottomans. The Habsburg resident ambassador in Constantinople was given a key role in this operation because he was the closest to the fire. Thus, he not only became indispensable in the gathering of information, but

⁶⁵ The Aulic Chamber, which was entrusted with finding the necessary resources for payment, was also informed about the previous promises of the Spanish envoy but received a negative response. Cf.: The report of the Aulic War Council to the Aulic Chamber. s. l. 9 May 1648, ÖStA FHKA, Reichsakten, Fasz. 186, Konv. 1, fol. 436; There is an itemised listing of Greiffenklau's debts – not just those related to the Menesses murder – and their payment in Johann Rudolf Schmid's: "Nota von der Greiffenclau (seeliger) in Constantinopel hinderlassenen und von mir dagefundenen schulden..." ÖStA FHKA, Reichsakten, Fasz. 186, Konv. 1, fol. 602–606; Ferdinand III also entrusted his envoy in Madrid in vain to collect the debt that arose in Constantinople due to Menesses at the Spanish court, as this never took place according to the information available. Cf.: Ferdinand III to Francesco de Carretto, Marquis of Grana, Vienna, 30 September 1648, ÖStA FHKA, Reichsgedenkbücher 487 (1644–1650), Fol. 520r – 521v.

⁶⁶ As occurred in the 1660s. Cf.: Czigány, "A furcsa háborútól a nagy háborúig".

⁶⁷ Alexander Greiffenklau to Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 27 March 1647, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 120, Konv. 1, fol. 20–25; Nicusio Panaiotti's letter to Johann Dietz, Constantinople, 7 December 1647, ÖStA FHKA, Reichsakten, Fasz. 186, Konv. 1, fol. 365–366; Nicusio Panaiotti's letter to Johann Dietz, Constantinople, 5 December 1647, ÖStA FHKA, Reichsakten Fasz. 186, Konv. 1, fol. 367; Cf. in addition: Cziráki, "Habsburg–Oszmán diplomácia a 17. század közepén", pp. 862–863.

also in carrying out the murder that was most possibly planned in Madrid. It was naturally necessary to have the cooperation of the War Council in Vienna for this as well. Therefore, for Spain, which at this time had very little means of action in eastern affairs, the infrastructure available to its Austrian relations in Constantinople came in handy and it did not tarry in taking advantage of this.

In examining the consequences of the incident, it should not be forgotten that the significance of the Menesses murder is dwarfed by the larger conflicts of the period – in particular the final phase of the Thirty Years' War as well as the emerging Ottoman-Venetian war for control of Crete. Despite this, it is my view that the affair can provide interesting details about the history of relations not only between the two Habsburg branches, but also between the Habsburgs and the Ottoman Empire. This is on the one hand due to its documentation of the collaboration of the Habsburg dynasty in an unusual environment – Constantinople – during a period that the literature traditionally considers a time when Spanish–Austrian cooperation was waning. In truth, 1646–1648 was clearly a period when Spain and Austria were drifting apart, with Spanish influence continuously diminishing in Vienna due to the pressure from the successes of French diplomacy, as well as Swedish/Protestant military advances. All of this was made worse by the “Spanish party” in the Hofburg being weakened by the death of the empress Maria Anna on 13 May 1646, the gradual elimination of her household and the reorganisation of Spanish diplomacy in Vienna in conjunction with this. Accordingly, it is particularly edifying that while the negotiating parties at Westphalia were working to separate the Austrians and Spaniards as quickly as possible, they were still able to synchronise their interests and actions through the old channels of the family's diplomacy.⁶⁸

Alongside this, it is not possible to cover up the fact that the joint operation did not succeed perfectly by any means. By taking a closer look at the events, it is clear that the two parties – the Spanish and Austrian branches of the dynasty – were thoroughly disappointed by the collaboration. Vienna obviously resented the fact that not only had the emperor's reputation in Constantinople been endangered during the events, but also in the end they had to settle the steep bill arising from the murder themselves. Even though Madrid achieved its objective in the end with the elimination of Menesses, it was dissatisfied with the quality and frequency of the information from Constantinople through the mediation of Vienna. The Hofburg was able to take advantage of its better position to gain information in its own interest, which in general was only counterbalanced with difficulty by the supplementary reports obtained by the members of the “Spanish party” in Vienna.⁶⁹

⁶⁸ Tercero Casado, “A Fluctuating Ascendancy”, p. 3; Marek, *La embajada española*, pp. 138–139; Höbelt, *Ferdinand III*, pp. 265–292; Hengerer, *Kaiser Ferdinand III*, pp. 260–265; Rohrschneider, *Der gescheiterte Frieden von Münster*, pp. 299–406.

⁶⁹ Marquis Francesco di Carreto di Grana's (the emperor's envoy in Madrid) report to Ferdinand III on the discussion with Don Francisco de Melo, Madrid, 13 June 1646, ÖStA HHStA, Spanien, Diplomatische Korrespondenz, Kt. 33, Mappa 567, fol. 56–57; Simon Reniger to Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 3 April 1650, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 122, Konv. 1, fol. 101–112; Simon Reniger to Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 3 April 1650, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 122,

It is also certainly due to this odd situation that at precisely around this time the Spanish crown attempted to establish new, direct diplomatic relations with Constantinople. In examining the motivation for this, it is necessary to account for other factors in addition to the lack of information that came up on the agenda from time to time. Nor is it without consequence, for example, that the king of Spain, who came out of the negotiations at Westphalia with his authority in shreds – reviving the image of their role at Lepanto – wanted to prove to Europe that he was not indifferent to what was going on in the eastern section of the Mediterranean. The attack on the Venetian territory of Crete in 1645 stirred old fears in the people of the Mediterranean Sea, primarily on the Italian coasts where the Spanish crown also had interests.⁷⁰ In addition to the genuine traumas of the long-lasting Ottoman–Venetian conflict, French diplomacy also played a major role in influencing the mood in Italy. They proclaimed to everyone that the Habsburgs would abandon the parts of the peninsula under the dynasty’s rule before a “pagan” invasion that was on the threshold.⁷¹

Under these circumstances, the development of another, direct relationship in Constantinople would have been useful by all means, naturally alongside the maintenance of the Vienna–Madrid path of information. This was even more so because the sultan had shown interest in establishing contact with the Catholic king. In the shadow of the Cretan War, the reawakening Spanish–Ottoman interests that the Austrian Habsburgs wanted to avoid reached its zenith in essence in 1649–1650. Constantinople was the initiator, when in the autumn of 1649 a renegade expatriate named Ahmed Agha – who had a Spanish Jewish background – arrived in a delegation to Philip IV with the objective of regularizing the “friendly” relations of the two powers in an official agreement.⁷² The return delegation of the Spaniards took place one year later. Its leader was Alegretto Alegretti, who had been born in Dubrovnik and has been mentioned previously as one

Konv. 1, fol. 101–112; Simon Reniger to Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 3 April 1650, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 122, Konv. 1, fol. 196–198.

⁷⁰ Eickhoff, *Venedig, Wien und die Osmanen*, pp. 216–228.

⁷¹ Conde Pazos, “La embajada turca en Madrid”, p. 11; Considering the 1647 revolt of Naples, the Spanish worries over the French diplomatic manoeuvres in Italy were well-founded. Cf.: Davies, *Spain in Decline*, pp. 49–54; Spain by all means would have been interested in establishing peace on the seas as soon as possible, particularly in that it would have been able to direct the peace negotiations between Venice and the Ottoman Empire as “peacemakers”. It took steps in this direction, including through the Habsburg ambassador in Constantinople. The collaboration of the Spanish–Austrian diplomatic machinery included the efforts of the Duke of Terranova, the Spanish envoy in Vienna, working together with Count Rabatta – the emperor’s envoy in Venice – as well as through the active participation of the resident ambassador Greiffenklau at the Sublime Porte, to make sure the future negotiations would be mediated by Spain, not by France, which also wanted to play this role. Cf.: Alexander Greiffenklau to Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 8 May 1646, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 119, Konv. 2, fol. 67–73.

⁷² Conde Pazos, “La embajada turca en Madrid”, pp. 11–12; Excerpt from Simon Reniger’s report, Constantinople, 4 September 1649, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 121, Konv. 1, fol. 238–239; Instructions of Ferdinand III to Simon Reniger, Vienna, 28 January 1650, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 122, Konv. 1, fol. 41–43.

of the players in the court of the empress Maria Anna. The subject of the agreement in question was constituted of propositions from the Ottoman side,⁷³ none of which came to anything,⁷⁴ but Alegretti did not go home empty handed. As an important part of his mission, he made steps to remedy old grievances of the Spanish crown and made an agreement with a dependable informer in Constantinople – none other than the interpreter of the Austrian Habsburg diplomatic delegation, Nicusio Panaiotti – to send reports to Madrid in the future about the Sublime Porte.⁷⁵ Furthermore, the Spanish royal court was not only making an effort to improve information gathering, but also took care to make their own translations of documents written in Ottoman Turkish, again depending on just its Austrian relatives. The aforementioned Vincenzo Bratutti arrived from Vienna after all, who due to his constant rivalry with the opinion leaders of the Aulic War Council chose employment in Madrid that promised to be more tranquil and made a fine career as an interpreter of eastern languages and as a diplomat in Spain.⁷⁶

If we look at the brief but rather spectacular role and scandalous death of Don Juan de Menesses in its wider context, considering the internal relationships of the Habsburg family, it is possible to see in the tiniest detail how the diplomatic gears between the two branches of the dynasty engaged, and sometimes jammed. This incident also shows that being oriented in eastern affairs was significant to both branches of the Habsburgs, naturally to differing degrees due to their positions. The French efforts to undo the unity of the dynasty that came to the forefront time and again at the negotiations for the Peace of Westphalia did not come to pass at all in the case of eastern diplomacy, because the family connections still worked, even if a slight weakening can be observed in the internal dynamics. After 1648, the situation changed again in terms of the representation of Spanish interests in Vienna. Although the ink had barely dried on the treaties signed at Westphalia, the unity of the Habsburg dynasty was reinforced by another marriage – between

⁷³ The imperial court also had precise information about the draft treaty presented by the Ottomans in Madrid. In return for an official peace treaty, the sultan offered to provide free and unperturbed access to pilgrims of all Christian nations to the Holy Land, to rein in the pirates of the Mediterranean Sea and – depending on measures in the same spirit by the Spanish king – to stave off further actions aimed at taking captives. Furthermore, he would accept the Spanish king's role as a mediator in disputes between the Sublime Porte and the European Christian powers, primarily in connection to the war with Venice. Instructions of Ferdinand III to Simon Reniger, Vienna, 28 January 1650, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 122, Konv. 1, fol. 41–43.

⁷⁴ Alegretti calmed the obviously apprehensive imperial resident ambassador many times that he had no reason for worry, in truth the Spanish king had absolutely no intention of signing a treaty with the sultan. Simon Reniger to Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 6 May 1650, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 122, Konv. 1, fol. 205–208.

⁷⁵ Panaiotti harped upon the considerable expenses that were accrued during the Menesses affair to Alegretti. See: The letter of the Spanish king Philip IV to the Count of Oñate [Íñigo Vélez de Guevara], Madrid, 6 November 1650, AHNM, Consejo de Estado, sf. Leg. 2871; Conde Pazos, “La embajada turca en Madrid”, pp. 12–15; Incidentally, Alegretti made this kind of offer to Reniger, the Habsburg envoy himself, who rejected it and then reported in detail about the events to the emperor. Simon Reniger to Ferdinand III, Constantinople, 3 April 1650, ÖStA HHStA, Türkei I, Kt. 122, Konv. 1, fol. 196–198.

⁷⁶ Hiller, “A tolmácsper”, pp. 213–214.

Philip IV and archduchess Maria Anna (Mariana) – and at the same time the influence of the Spanish party in the court at Vienna also strengthened again.⁷⁷ In terms of the eastern projection of Habsburg diplomacy in the years following the European war, in the end Spain's inroads towards Constantinople in 1649–1650 do not contradict this tendency. As is adequately shown in the diplomatic reports of the new Habsburg envoy Simon Reniger that are cited in this essay, the main representative of the interests of the Spanish king at the Sublime Porte continued to be the resident ambassador of the empire.

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⁷⁷ Tercero Casado, “A Fluctuating Ascendancy”, p. 14.

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KUTSE ALTIN

Letters from Tayyib Gökbilgin's Personal Archives: László Rásonyi*

INTRODUCTION

From today's perspective, it seems possible to suggest that the late Ottoman Empire witnessed a remarkable process of transition, and even though it was an era of numerous obstacles and rather troubling times, it also allowed new opportunities and trends to emerge. Tayyib Gökbilgin (1907–1981), who was among the distinguished scholars of Ottoman studies, was born in an empire where such momentous transformations appeared constantly. He was a student of *Medrese*; he experienced his early stages of schooling in the educational institutions of the Ottoman Empire. He read and wrote in Ottoman Turkish (the language of the empire), and also learned Arabic and Persian grammar. Because of the constant conditions of war, he had to take a brief break in his education, but the same conditions made him aware of the changes and the challenges in the late Ottoman society. It is quite clear that a critical feature that distinguishes Gökbilgin from later Ottoman studies experts is that he could capture the nature of Ottoman society, literature, and culture in its last period. He had his secondary education at Trabzon Dâru'l-muallimin (Trabzon Teaching School), and earned a teaching diploma when the teaching schools were recognised as institutions that provided training for the first teachers of the young Republic of Turkey, the unarmed soldiers of the nation who would eliminate the ignorance and educate the society that had just faced the catastrophe of the continuous wars.

He was appointed as a teacher in 1929, and he taught in various village schools in Anatolia for almost seven years. The year 1936 was a turning point for him; the Faculty of Language, History, and Geography (*Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi*) was established at the University of Ankara. After the foundation of the Faculty, upon the request of Afet İnan – who was a historian, scholar and one of the adopted children of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk – the graduates of teacher schools who currently teach at that time also got accepted.¹ Thus, Tayyib Gökbilgin could also enrol in the Faculty and had begun his university life in the Department of Hungarian. While the Faculty of Language and History was founded, Hungarian

* This paper based on the fourth chapter of my forthcoming PhD dissertation. However, it was reformulated and formatted for this publication. The writing and publishing of the recent paper have been supported by the National Research, Development and Innovation Office (NRDI) (Nemzeti Kutatási, Fejlesztési és Innovációs Hivatal) through a grant (Thematic Excellence Programme (Tématerületi Kiválósági Program) 2020, NKFIH-1279-2/2020) of the Interdisciplinary Centre of Excellence (University of Szeged), the Department of Medieval and Early Modern Hungarian History (Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Szeged), MTA–SZTE Research Group of the Ottoman Age (Eötvös Loránd Research Network).

¹ İnan, “Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesinin Kuruluş Hazırlıkları Üzerine”, p. 11.

was included in the faculty's scope upon the wish of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The Faculty was established to create a scholarly institution to study Turkish language, history, and geography not only to understand the inner dynamics of the Turkish nation but also to determine the contributions of Turkish civilisations to human history. Accordingly, the Hungarian studies department was established to investigate the common historical characteristics of the Turkish and Hungarian nations. In general, the primary subjects of Hungarian studies consisted of themes such as the ancient history of the Hungarians, the common ancestors, ethnogenesis, and kinship of the early Hungarians and Turks.²

Gökbilgin was among the first students of Professor László Rásonyi. Professor Rásonyi graduated from the Pázmány Péter Catholic University with a degree in history in 1921, after received his doctorate in Turkish philology. He was a student of Turkologist Gyula Németh, Hungarologist Zoltán Gombocz, and Orientalist–Turcologist Johann Wilhelm Max Julius Bang-Kaup. Between 1921–1935, he worked as a deputy director, and later director at the library of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. In 1934, he was invited by the newly established the Turkish Language Association to Ankara. He presented a paper about the linguistic and historical issues of medieval Turkish–Hungarian contacts. In 1935, László Rásonyi was invited to the Faculty of Language, History, and Geography to establish the Department of Hungarology, and as a lecturer at the request of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.³

The primary focus of this article is to give some examples from the letters that were sent by the first head of the department of Hungarian studies, László Rásonyi, to his first student and then later colleague Gökbilgin. These letters I cited below are a part of the big collection of the semi-organised personal archive of Tayyib Gökbilgin, which has been curated by his son Altay Gökbilgin and shared with us.⁴ However, before presenting the details of this correspondence, it would be more accurate to start with the questions of what is a personal archive, what makes personal papers different from other forms of archival material, and what can the function of ego-documents be?

Personal archives are documents that are not secured under the control of any public institution and highly individual. They have not been classified through any kind of official selection; they are disorganised compared to state archives, and the process and standardisation of the organisation of the documents vary according to personal choices, or institutional practices and capabilities, if the collection has been donated to or bought by an institution. Personal archives are not only related to people's jobs and official activities but are also the most explanatory sources in terms of the subjects' daily lives and relationships. The questions of how to gain access to them, approach them and evaluate them varies according to

² Güngörmüş, "Hungarológia", pp. 26–27; Kakuk, "Az Ankarai Egyetem", p. 116.

³ Çoban, "Rásonyi László", pp. 459–460; Kakuk, "Az Ankarai Egyetem", pp. 116–118.

⁴ I would here like to thank Altay Gökbilgin for sharing with me and with my supervisor (Prof. Dr. Sándor Papp) this outstandingly important collection of sources.

almost every personal archive to be researched. This is because each personal archive is created in line with unique human experiences and reflects these experiences from the individual's own perspective. Personal papers provide some facts (like a birth certificate or a college diploma) about the individual, but also offer insights about the opinions, rationalisations, working methods, emotional relationships, family dynamics, interests, networks, travels, and other aspects of the individual's life. In a way, personal archives can be evaluated as an “*identity kit*”: *materials reflect and describe the owner*”.⁵ As Caroline Williams states, public archives “*contribute primarily to knowledge about infrastructures, contexts and frameworks of business, society and politics*” and personal papers give us the opportunity to make “*biographical, prosopographical, occupational and genealogical study at a personal and collective level*.”⁶

The purpose of a structuring personal archive can be to store the documents and to reassess them when and/or if it is necessary. However, the main point of personal archiving can be evaluated as building a legacy that is typically considered being unique and irreplaceable; sharing this legacy and the mine of information/knowledge/wisdom it contains; preserving materials that are deemed to be crucially important and that have a place in the collective memory; providing evidence of past actions; and transferring identity and/or cultural values that have been laboriously created over the years.

As one can easily guess, Tayyib Gökbilgin was passionate about archives; therefore, his personal collection is quite vast. Some of the documents in his personal archives are related to the real estate of the family, some of them contain lecture notes, and some of them are official documents showing his activities at the university and at the Turkish Historical Association. However, we can clearly state correspondences constitute the important majority of the collection. The personal archive of Tayyib Gökbilgin is an excellent collection for examining his socio-intellectual and institutional network. These letters not only provide observations about Gökbilgin's personal and professional relationships but explain his underlying purpose for preserving the letters. The legacy that he chose to preserve was a part of his identity, his position in his field, and his connections with significant historians, intellectuals, and dignitaries of state, all in all, his place in the world.

Currently over twenty letters and postcards can be found in this collection that László Rásonyi sent to Tayyib Gökbilgin as well as to other people between the years of 1936 and 1981. The mood of the letters when László Rásonyi was the head of the department of Hungarian studies at the Faculty of Languages, History, and Geography is generally very positive. In these letters, he mentions the summer school in Debrecen, talks about organising the lectures, and ends his letters with good wishes for Tayyib Gökbilgin and his other friends at the department. One of the long documents found in the collection dates to 1939 and relates directly to

⁵ Kaye et al., “To Have and to Hold”, p. 279.

⁶ Williams, “Personal papers: Perceptions and Practices.”, p. 66.

Tayyib Gökbilgin's education. In this document (addressed to the Ministry of Education), Rásonyi politely asked for something additional regarding his students, besides his request for the summer courses in Hungary. He presented Eötvös József Collegium in Budapest as one of the best institutions of higher education in Europe, corresponding in qualifications and system with the École Normale Supérieure in Paris. The most distinguished Hungarian scholars and Turkologists graduated from Eötvös József Collegium, as did some Turkish scholars. Soon, it became a kind of tradition to have a Turkish student at this institution and he wanted at least one of his students to continue his education there for a year. While this opportunity already existed at Eötvös József Collegium, it had not yet been utilised. Therefore:

*"I kindly ask that Tayyib Gökbilgin, who is already a very good student, has made a very good impression on some Hungarian scholars in recent years, and has established important personal contacts in Budapest, be allowed to continue his education starting from the 1939-1940 academic year in Budapest at B.E.J.Coll. (...) Apart from Hungarian Studies, Tayyib studies early and modern history as a secondary major. The Hungarian and the Latin sources in Hungary on the period of the rise of the Ottoman Empire, between the 15th and 17th centuries, the chronicles, and all other documents, are completely unknown and unprocessed here. Since I am fully aware of Tayyib's talent and capabilities, I gave him the goal to examine them two years ago. I hope that in the future he will gain a position as a Turkish historian and archivist."*⁷

After Northern Transylvania (present day is a part of Romania) was ceded back to Hungary as a result of the Second Vienna Award (30 August 1940), László Rásonyi was appointed to the Kolozsvári Magyar Királyi Ferenc József Tudományegyetem Bölcsészeti-, Nyelv- és Történettudományi Kar (Royal Hungarian Franz Joseph University, Faculty of Arts, Language and History in Kolozsvár; (present day *Cluj-Napoca*, in Romania) by the Hungarian government and therefore he left Turkey in the autumn of 1942.⁸ However, his teaching position there did not last long, and he had to leave because of the Second World War.⁹ A letter within Gökbilgin's collection, written in Turkish and dated to 1946, provides some information about this period:

⁷ Extract. I believe this document was dictated by Rásonyi but written by Gökbilgin. Letter from László Rásonyi to an unknown deputy, 1939. *Document 1*, p. 2.

⁸ Discussion of the decision on László Rásonyi, see: Szegedi egyetemi jegyzőkönyvek, 2nd ordinary session, 28 October 1941, p. 9; sending the letter of decision to László Rásonyi's address in Turkey, see: Szegedi egyetemi jegyzőkönyvek, 6th ordinary session, 26 February 1942, p. 9; Çoban, "Rásonyi László", pp. 459–460.

⁹ A document showing that László Rásonyi was in Kolozsvár in May 1944, see: Szegedi egyetemi jegyzőkönyvek, 9th ordinary session, 25 May 1944, p. 1.

“My Dear Friend Tayyib,

Thank you very much for your letter and the actions you initiated on my behalf. Your lines are especially valuable during the instability of refugee life that has been going on for two years. In his letters to me, Hamit Koşay¹⁰ stated that the ministry of foreign affairs officially wrote on my behalf first to the Roman embassy and then to the Bern embassy in Switzerland. I also wrote to both Cemal Hüsnü Taray Bey¹¹ and Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu Bey¹². My departure for Turkey depends on their answers. We are again so grieved because of Kolozsvár. My wife's parents and brother have so much nostalgia for it and they are so on the edge that we almost returned. However, according to my colleague who wrote to me, going back to Hungary would not be good for me while the Russians are there. In my new book, which I left at the printing house, I was a more determined proponent of Turkishness than before. Now I have only one desire: the opportunity to work productively. I also work here a lot. I prepared a chrestomathy of English literature for the Hungarian refugees, I taught English and Turkish, then Turkish and Eastern European history. I would like to publish the history of the Turkic peoples in Turkey /in English and Turkish/ and a dictionary of Turkish Names. The rich library of the Türkiyat Institute there would have been extremely good for the completion of this work. I would go to İstanbul with the greatest joy, and this would also be good for my family. However, I do not know what the deputy minister will decide.”¹³

¹⁰ Hamit Zübeyr Koşay was born in a village named Tilençi Tomrek in Ufa province of the Idil-Ural region. He came to Istanbul in 1909 and studied at Dâru'l-muallim. In 1917, he went to Hungary and enrolled in the “paedagogium” in Budapest, where he trained as a secondary school teacher. He graduated in 1921. In the same year, he entered Eötvös Collegium and in 1923 he completed his dissertation entitled “Türk Silâh Adları” (The Names of Turkish weapons) under the supervision of the famous Turkologist Gyula Németh. Later he attended Willy Bang Kaup's lectures at the University of Berlin. In 1925, Koşay returned to Turkey and started his career in the Ministry of Education. He worked at the Bureau of Culture (Hars Dairesi), and later he served as a director of historical artefacts and libraries at the general directorate of Antiquities and Museums and the Ankara Ethnographical Museum. Koşay is known for his studies in archaeology, ethnology and philology. He directed one of the first excavations of the Turkish Republic, called the Ahlatlıbel excavation, in 1933. For more detail, see: Şakiroğlu, “Koşay, Hamit Zübeyr”, pp. 225–226.

¹¹ Cemal Hüsnü Taray (1893–1975) was working as the ambassador of Roma at that time, see: Başkaya, “Atatürk'ün Genç Diplomatı”, p. 673.

¹² Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu (1889–1974) was a writer, translator, journalist, diplomat, and parliament member. During this period, he was a diplomatic officer at the Bern embassy. See more: Polat, “Karaosmanoğlu, Yakup Kadri”, pp. 465–468.

¹³ “Aziz dostum Tayyib, Mektubunuzu ve benim için başladığımız hareketi çok teşekkür ederim. İki seneden beri devam eden mülteci hayatın kararsızlığında saturlarınız bilhassa kıymetlidir. Hamit Koşay bana yazdığı mektublarında dışişleri bakanlığının benim için evvela Roma büyükelçiliğine sonra İsviçrede Bern elçiliğine resmen yazdığını bildirdi. Ben de hem Cemal Hüsnü Taray beye, hem de Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu beye yazdım. Türkiyeye hareketim onların cevabına bağlıdır. Kolozsvár sebebiyle yine çok müteesiriz. Zevcemin ebeveyni ve biraderi için nostaljisi okadar büyük, sınırları okadar yorgundur ki az kaldı ki döndük. Fakat bir meslektaşımın bana yazdığına göre Macaristana dönmek Rusların orada bulunacağı zaman bana iyi olmayacaktı, Matbaahane de bıraktığım yeni kitabımda evvelkisinden de çok daha katı bir

The address where László Rásonyi sent this letter from was “*Hung. D.P. Camp Feffernitz VIII/7. Carinthia, Austria*”, meaning the Hungarian Displaced Persons Camp in Feffernitz, in Austria. After the Second World War, millions of people, including civilians, were displaced across Europe. *D.P.*, which stands for displaced person was a label given to the people who were displaced from their countries and who wanted to return. Luke Kelly stated that the Feffernitz Displaced Persons camp was “*in the British zone of Austria, hosting Hungarians displaced after the war and run by the Friends Ambulance Unit under the jurisdiction of the Red Cross and British authorities.*”¹⁴ As we can see from the letter I quoted above, László Rásonyi was one of the Hungarians who had to stay in this camp for a while. In another letter he sent to Tayyib Gökbilgin in 1948, he first writes how fortunate he was to re-continue their correspondence after a long break. He said that he had applied for a British visa but did not get any response. He added that since December the weather had been very cold, he received urgent telegraphs from his home, and he had to return to avoid any more suffering for his children. He mentioned that he had not been subjected to any political prosecution to that point, since he was not condemned for being a fascist, and he had found a position at the Balkan Institute in Budapest with the help of his friends. “*Naturally, all these matters are more difficult and even impossible to achieve today, since our country is getting closer to a dictatorship of the proletariat every day.*”¹⁵ He stated his mission was to give the institute a direction, as much as possible, that would improve Hungarian–Turkish friendship. This institute, he said, was the only institution that could help to develop such a relationship. He mentioned that he had prepared and delivered a report stating that although many Hungarian works had been translated into Turkish up to that point, there were very few works translated from Turkish to Hungarian. Besides that, he taught Turkish at two different levels and the attendees of the courses were double as many as any who were learning any of the Balkan languages. He stated that he did not yet have to join the communist party, since they have a special respect for university professors. Nevertheless, Rásonyi did not hesitate to express his concern for the future:

“For all these reasons, the discussions that you and Hamit Bey¹⁶ had for me with the ministry of education have helped me greatly and allowed me to take a breath of relief. If I will ever be subjected to prosecution one day and deprived of

şekilde Türklüğün taraftarı idim. Şimdi ancak bir isteğim var: produktif çalışmak imkânı. Burada da çok işliyorum. Macar mültecilerine İngiliz edebiyatının bir chrestomathia'sını yaptım, İngilizce ve Türkçeyi, sonra Türk ve Şarki Avrupa tarihini öğrettim. Türkiye Türk Halklarının Tarihini /türkçe ve İngilizce/ ve Türk Adları Lûgatını neşretmek istedim. Oradaki Türkiyat Enstitüsünün zengin kütüphanesi bu eserin tamamlanması için fevkalâde iyi olacaktı. En büyük sevinçle İstanbulu gidecektim, ailem için de iyi olacaktı. Fakat vekil beyin ne karar vereceğini bilmeyorum.” See: Letter from László Rásonyi to Tayyib Gökbilgin, 28 August 1946. *Document 2.*

¹⁴ Kelly, “Humanitarian sentiment”, pp. 387–406.

¹⁵ “*Tabiatıyla bugün bütün bu cihetler daha güçlkle temin edilebilir hatta imkansızdır, çünkü memleketimiz her gün proletardiktatörlüğe biraz yaklaşmaktadır.*” Letter from László Rásonyi to Tayyib Gökbilgin, 30 March 1948. *Document 3*, p. 1.

¹⁶ Viz., Hamit Zübeyr Koşay.

my salary, I continue to work with confidence, sure that my family and children will not starve. That is why I am very grateful to you, to Hamit Bey and to the deputy, to all of you."¹⁷

He continued his letter by discussing the difficulties of getting a passport. For example, a well-known physician and a former university professor, Ernő Balogh, was not able to receive a passport even though he was invited from İstanbul University and even though there was a Turkish ambassador who was acting as a mediator in this process. He concluded his letter by saying that especially these days he wished he were living in Turkey, and asked Gökbilgin to show the letter to Hamit Bey, but only to reveal its contents to old Turkish friends.

The further documents which can be found in the Gökbilgin collection, are dated to the 1960s, so, a gap can be recognised in the exchange of letters between Tayyib Gökbilgin and László Rásonyi concerning 1948 and the 1960s. Nevertheless, it is groundless to think that they did not have any correspondence between those dates, but these letters have probably gone missing over the years. However, in another letter dating back to 1961, we learn that Gökbilgin invited Rásonyi to conduct a long-term research project in Erzurum, but he again mentioned the hardships of obtaining a passport to travel.¹⁸ Rásonyi was invited to present a paper entitled, "Türk Halklarında Kadın Adları"¹⁹ in Göttingen and applied to get a passport but the application was rejected:

*"You can imagine my feeling when I was told on Aug. 3 that 'the request for a passport could not be completed at this time'. [...] I have become so exhausted due to the tension, disappointment, anger and suffering I have experienced."*²⁰

Rásonyi believed that the famous philologist, historian, Turkologist, and orientalist, Lajos Ligeti treated him like a second-class citizen, since he was denied a passport therefore, Ligeti did not have the courage to do a favour for him. He complained that only one signature by Ligeti, who at that time was the vice president of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, would have been enough, but he did not sign the documents. Nevertheless, he said that living in Ankara or Istanbul seemed so attractive to him, although he had some doubts about living in Erzurum, since he did not know how being there would affect his health. When he closed his letter, he mentioned that his former professor wanted to close down the 90-

¹⁷ "İşte bütün bu sebeplerle Hamit beyin ve Sizin maarif vekaletiyle benim hakkındaki görüşmeleriniz son derece imdadıma yetmiş ve benim geniş bir nefes almama sebep olmuştur. Şayet burada bir gün takibata maruz kalır ve maaşımdan mahrum edilirse ailem ve çocuklarımın aç kalmayacaklarına emin olarak şimdilik itimadla çalışmalarına devam ediyorum. İşte bu sebeple Size, Hamit beye ve vekil beye, hepinize çok minnettarım." Ibid, p. 2.

¹⁸ Letter from László Rásonyi to Tayyib Gökbilgin, 21 September 1961. *Document 4*, p. 1.

¹⁹ In English: The Names of Women in Turkic Peoples.

²⁰ "Képzelteti az érzésemet, mikor aug. 3.-án közölték velem hogy az "utlevél iránti kérés ezidőszert nem teljesíthető". [...] A sok izgalom, csalódás, mérgelődés, gond, amin keresztülmentem, megviseltek." Ibid.

year-old department just to avoid handing it over to Rásonyi, and warned that this matter should not be discussed with their colleagues ‘K.N.Gyuszi’ (Gyula Káldy-Nagy) and ‘Siyah’ (means black in Turkish, he refers to Lajos Fekete here). Then he mentions that Gyula Káldy-Nagy wanted to be a lecturer at the University of Ankara, but the former professor (Rásonyi did not give his name in his letter) had another person in his mind.²¹

Rásonyi retired in Hungary in 1962, but right after he received his retired status he went back to Ankara and started working at the Hungarian studies department again. A letter from this period begins as follows:

“The profoundly depressed nature of your letter and its deep tone of disappointment was also very gloomy for me. Yet afterwards I thought the things over. You wrote that you heard from Gy. H. that one of the secretaries of the embassy pronounced You as a spy. Well, I do not believe that Gy. H. heard such a thing at all. However, it is a fact that Gy. H. has many acquaintances in state organs at home [viz. in Hungary], and even here in Turkey in many places as well, and due to his being well-informed is almost admirable, nonetheless, I have to state that I found what he said to be total nonsense.”²²

Apparently, Tayyib Gökbilgin had heard from György Hazai²³ that there were rumours in Hungary that he (viz. Gökbilgin) was a spy, and he was very upset about this news and shared his feelings on this issue with Rásonyi. Rásonyi, on the other hand, tried to soothe him with these words:

“It is an absurdity that when You are the most outstanding and competent person among the few who are actively concerning with intensifying Turkish–Hungarian cultural relations, - that is to be found anyone at the embassy, either in the past or in the present, who would have made such an accusation about You. Whenever I talk to someone from the embassy, they always talk about You with great respect and sympathy. We know that, in the present-day world situation, even more than as usual, the embassy of small Hungary cannot have any other purpose than promote economic and cultural relations. Why would they want to discredit

²¹ Concerning this, see: *Document 4*, p. 2.

²² *“Levelének a mélységesen lehangolt volta és csalódott hangja nagyon [in the original: nagyon] lehangoló volt számomra is. De azután gondolkoztam a dolgokon. Irja, hogy H.Gy.től olyan értesülése van, amely szerint innen valamelyik követségi titkár Önt kémnek nyilvánította. Hát én egyáltalában nem hiszem, hogy H.Gy. ilyesmit hallott volna. Bármennyire is tény, hogy H.Gy.-nek minden állami szervnél vannak ismerősei otthon, s még itt Törökországban is sokféle,-, s ennek megfelelően szinte csodálatraméltó a jólérsültsége, mégis ki kell jelentenem, hogy azt, amit ő mondott, merő kitalálásnak tartom.”* Letter from László Rásonyi to Tayyib Gökbilgin, 11 August 1963. *Document 5*, p. 1.

²³ György Hazai (1932–2016) was a Turkologist, orientalist, university professor and the member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. At the time when these correspondences happened, he was a research fellow at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and also a visiting associate to full professor at Humboldt University. See: Németh, “A turkológia szolgálatában”, pp. 348–362.

that person to whom they can owe the most concerning the relationship with Turkey?"²⁴

Rásonyi thought that Hazai concocted this story, and if this was the case, Gökbilgin should not be taking the issue so seriously because he said Hazai "*fell into a discredit before scientific circles at home [viz. in Hungary], perhaps even to a greater extent than it is deserved.*"²⁵ He stated that in Turkey, they have an over-rated opinion about him. "*He is a smart man, but he should engage in more scientific studies that show serious results, than dealing with 'politics', namely with personal politics.*"²⁶

After trying to set things right and calm Gökbilgin, he mentioned his recent activities. He wanted to make a presentation at the Turkish Art History Congress in Venice about the Turkish vocabulary of carpet making. "[...] *beyond doubt, the Turkish vocabulary of carpet making is autochthonous /there are many verb-derivatives!/. This is the first step in the settlement which people can be associated with the beginning of carpet-making. – However, the trip will cost a lot and as a non-Turkish citizen, I would also have currency difficulties around buying the ticket.*"²⁷

The same vexing problem appears in another letter dated to September 1963. In the first part of it, he requests Gökbilgin's assistance because visa again could not be obtained. This time, the visa issue concerned Gyula Káldy-Nagy. Rásonyi continued the second part of the letter as follows, "*Now something on the other matter that causes You great bitterness. Once again, I express only my conviction that I do not believe what Hazai told because those who work in the embassy cannot be not so narrow-minded that to act against their own interest. That lie either had no purpose, only spontaneously wanted to harm Your protégés, namely*

²⁴ "Képtelenség, hogy akkor, amikor Ön a legkimagaslóbb és leghozzáértőbb személyiség azon kevesek között, akik aktívan törődnek a török-magyar kulturális kapcsolatok intenzívebbé tételével, - hogy akkor akadjon bárki is a követségen, akár a multban, akár a jelenben, aki Önre vonatkozólag az inkriminált kijelentést tette volna. Akárhányszor beszélek a követségiekkel, Önről mindig a legnagyobb tisztelettel és rokonszenvvel emlékeznek meg. Tudjuk azt, hogy a mai világhelyzetben még inkább, mint máskor, a kis Magyarország követségének nem is lehet más célkitűzése, mint hogy elősegítse a gazdasági és kulturális kapcsolatokat. Hát csak nem diszkreditálják épen azt a személyiséget, akinek török vonalon a legtöbbet köszönhetnek!" Letter from László Rásonyi to Tayyib Gökbilgin, 11 August 1963. Document 5, p. 1.

²⁵ "Azt hiszem, így kell felfogni az ügyet, s ha esetleg Hazai kitalálása az egész [in the original: egészn] nem kell komolyan venni, nem pusztán a fentebb kifejtettek miatt, hanem azért sem, mert ő az otthoni tudományos körök előtt talán még a megérdemelnél is nagyobb mértékben elvesztette a hitelét." Ibid, p. 2.

²⁶ "Jó feje van neki, de többet kellene neki komoly eredményeket felmutató tudományos munkával foglalkozni, mint "politiká" val, már tudniillik személyi politikával." Ibid, p. 2.

²⁷ "[...] a szőnyegelőállítás török szókinccse kétségbevonhatatlanul autochton /sok az igei derivátum!/. Ez az első lépés annak az eldöntésére, hogy milyen néphez kapcsolhatjuk a szőnyegelőállítás kezdeteit. – Azonban az ut sokba kerül és mint nem török állampolgárnak, valutáris nehézségeim is lennének a jegy megvásárlása körül." Ibid, p. 2.

*me and Káldy in Hungary, or else – I am referring here to Your conversation with Hazai – it was intended to discourage You from helping Hungarians.”*²⁸

This gossip had a greater impact on Gökbilgin than Rásonyi had expected. He said that he hoped that Gökbilgin did not mention his name in the conversation that he had with Hazai, because he was concerned that Hazai could use this information against him in Hungary. He added that if Gökbilgin wanted and if his name had not been mentioned before regarding this matter, he could talk with the ambassador for help.²⁹

After this date, there are short letters or postcards between Rásonyi and Gökbilgin in the collection that mention illnesses, acquaintances, everyday matters, and greetings (e.g., for holidays, New Years, etc.). In 1970, Rásonyi sent a letter, signed by his wife Piroska as well, from Ankara to Gökbilgin, expressing his condolences. As can be understood from this letter, Gökbilgin was in Budapest when his wife passed away.

“We were shocked to learn from Hamit Koşay that your beloved spouse finished her life on earth while you were in Pest.

We know that her condition was almost hopeless, but still, the news enlisted deep sympathy in us. On the one hand, we are very sorry for the deceased, she suffered a lot, because one of the greatest blessings of God, an easy death, was not granted to her. [...]

*However, one thing that may be of consolation is that you are a true Muslim, and there is perchance no other religion that educates its believers to accept God-Allah’s will as much as Islam does.”*³⁰

As far as we can see from Gökbilgin’s personal archive, after Rásonyi started his duty in Ankara, such extensive correspondence was replaced by short holiday- or New Year celebration cards. This was probably due to the fact that they were in the same country and could also reach each other through other means. To conclude, most of the examples we have here are not continuous letters written in response to one another. In this respect, it makes it difficult to follow the subjects

²⁸ “Most valamit a másik ügyről, ami Önnek nagy keserüséget okozott. Ujra csak azt a meggyőződésemet fejezem ki, hogy én azt, amit Hazai mondott, nem hiszem el, mert annyira még a követségiek sem lehetnek bornirtak, hogy a saját érdekük ellen cselekedjenek. Annak a hazugságnak vagy nem volt célja, csak [inserted above] spontán ártani akart az Önt pártfogoltjainak, vagyis Káldynak és nekem Magyarországon, vagy pedig – itt az Ön Hazaival való beszélgetésére utalok –, el akarta venni az Ön kedvét attól, hogy magyaroknak segítsen.” Letter from László Rásonyi to Tayyib Gökbilgin, 17 September 1963. *Document 6*, p. 1.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

³⁰ “Megdöbbenve értesültünk Hamit Koşaytól arról, hogy szeretett felesége befejezte földi életét, éppen akkor, amikor Ön Pesten volt. Tudjuk, hogy állapota csaknem reménytelen volt, mégis mély részvétet keltett bennünk a hír. Egyfelől a szegény megboldogult iránt, aki sokat szenvedett, mert nem adatott meg neki Isten egyik legnagyobb ajándéka, a könnyű halál. [...] Vigasztul szolgál azonban az, hogy Ön igazi muszlim és talán egyetlen nagy vallás sincs, amely olyan mértékben nevelné híveit Isten – Allah akaratában való belenyugvásba, mint az Islám.” Letter from László and Piroska Rásonyi to Tayyib Gökbilgin, 1 November 1970. *Document 7*.

and to construct continuous data. Even though this situation causes some confusion in readers mind we can clearly state that letters of Rásonyi in Gökbilgin's personal collection establish a very interesting and valuable picture to comprehend the difficulties encountered in a rather complicated period, the struggles of life, the work ethic and publication activities, individual perspectives of the social environment of the academicians. Moreover, evaluating these letters chronologically allows us to envision how the relationship between Gökbilgin and Rásonyi had developed. It gives us an opportunity to be able to observe how the teacher-student exchange in the first stage of their communication process transformed into the friendship of colleagues over time.

2.

Letter from László Rásonyi to Tayyip Gökbiçin, 28 August 1946
Personal Archive of Tayyip Gökbiçin, İstanbul.

Aziz dostum Tayyip !

Mektubunuzu ve benim için başladığınız hareketinizi çok teşekkür ederim. İki seneden beri devam eden mülteci hayatın kararsızlığında satırlarınız bilhassa kıymetlidirler.

Hamit Koşay bey bana yazdığı mektublarında dışişleri bakanlığının benim için evvelâ Roma büyük elçiliğine sonra İsviçrede Bern elçiliğine resmen yazdığını bildirdi. Ben de hem Cemal Hüsnü Taray beye, hem de Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu beye yazdım. Türkiyeye hareketim onların cevabına bağlıdır.

Kolozsvár sebebiyle yine çok müteessirim. Zevcemın ebeveyni ve biraderi için nostaljisi okadar büyük, sınırları okadar yorgundur ki az kaldı ki döndük. Fakat bir meslektaşımın bana yazdığına göre Macaristana dönmek Rusların orada bulunacağı zaman bana iyi olmayacaktı, Matbaahane de bıraktığım yeni kitabımda evvelkisinden de çok daha katı bir şekilde Türklüğün tarafı idim.

Şimdi ancak bir isteğim var: üretken çalışmak imkânı. Burada da çok işliyorum. Macar mültecilerine İngiliz edebiyatının bir chrestomathia'sını yaptım, İngilizce ve Türkçeyi, sonra Türk ve Şarkî Avrupa tarihini öğrettim. Türkiye'de Türk Halklarının Tarihini /Türkçe ve İngilizce/ ve Türk Adları Lügatını neşretmek isterdim. Oradaki Türkiye Enstitüsünün zengin kütüphanesi bu eserin tamamlanması için fevkalâde iyi olabilecekti. En büyük sevinçle İstanbula gidecektim, ailem için de en iyi olacaktı. Fakat vekil beyin ne karar vereceğini bilmeyorum.

Samimî dostlukla, refikanıza hürmetlerle

Feffernitz, 28.VIII.1946.

L. Rásonyi

Hung.D.P.Camp Feffernitz VIII/7.

Carinthia, Austria.

Küçük Hatice Umay'a çok saadet temenni, Size tebrik ederiz.

3.

Letter from László Rásonyi to Tayyip Gökbilgin, 30 March 1948
Personal Archive of Tayyip Gökbilgin, İstanbul.

Aziz arkadaşım Tayyip,

uzun bir zamandan sonra tekrar muhaberemizin teessüs ettiğine çok memnun oldum. Eğer emniyetle yazmak ve mektub göndermek mümkün olsaydı, şimdiye kadar çoktan yazmış olurdum. 1946-da aldığım mektubunuza hemen cevap vermiştim. Aynı zamanda Hamit beye, Roma ve Bern Türk elçilerine de birer mektup yollamıştım. Yola çıkmağa hazırlandım, fakat o zaman seyahatıma medar olacak ve İngiliz vizesini temin edebilecek hiçbir haber alamadığım için teşebbüsüm akım kaldı. Halbuki orada iken tanıştığım bir kaç İngiliz ile çok iyi münasebette idim, hatta aralarında bir kaç şimdiki de benimle mektublaşmaktadır.

1946 aralık ayında souk çok fazla olmakla diğer taraftan da evden müstacel telegraflar aldığım için ve çocukları souğa ve mahrumiyete duçar bırakmamak için eve dönmeğe mecbur oldum. O zamanki manzaraya göre Rusların Macaristanı kısa bir zaman içinde terk etmeleri kanaati hasıl olmuştu. Türkiyeden ise yeni bir havadis alamıyordum. Avusturyayı terk ettiğimizden bir müddet sonra bulunduğumuz kampa Innsbruck Üniversitesinden namıma bir dâvetiye gelmişti. Yazık ki bu fırsatla bir müddet daha orada kalarak Türkiyeye gitmek çaresini beklemeden eve gelmiş bulundum.

Şimdiye kadar burada siyasi bir takibata uğramadım, zira faşist olmak sıfatıyla bir kabahatım görülemedi; ben ancak Rusların önünden kaçtım. Arkadaşlarım delaletiyle maasımı devam ettirmeğe, hatta diğer bir arkadaşım tavassutiyle de yeniden teessüs eden B.Enstitüsünde vazife almağa muvaffak oldum. Tabiatıyla bugün bütün bu cihetler daha güçlkle temin edilebilir hattâ imkânsızdır, çünkü memleketimiz her gün proletardiktatürlüğüne biraz yaklaşmaktadır. Ben mümkün olduğu kadar B.E.-ne Türk ve Macar dostluğunu azamî nispetle geliştirecek bir istikamet vermeğe çalışmaktayım. Bu Enstitü bugün bu hususu temin edebilmek için biricik müessesemizdir. Kendi ismini neşriyatında asgarî derecede kullanıyor ancak B.E.perdesi altında çalışıyorum. Son aylarda 6 muhtelif makalemde Türk maarifi ve kültür müesseseleri, diğer 3 makalemde de Türk iktisat hayatının başlıca amilleri hakkında yazdım. - Şimdiye kadar bir çok Macar eseri türkçeye tercüme edildiği halde Türk edebî mahsullerinin aslâ yurdumuzda tanınmadığından şikayet ederek alâkadar makamlara bir muhtıra verdim. Bunun üzerine maarif nezareti B.E.-ne bir taslak hazırlaması vazifesini tevdi etti. - Bunun dışında iki dereceli Türk dili kursu devam ettiriyorum. Bu kurslarda muallim, mühendis ve tüccar olmak üzere 20 muhtelif kimse türkçe öğrenmektedir. Bu sayı diğer her hangi bir Balkan dilini öğrenenler sayısının iki mislidir. -

Büylece şimdilik bu şartlar altında ve K.partisine girmeye icbar etmelerine kadar burada kalmayı kendime bir borç saymaktayım. Şimdiye kadar hiç bir partiye girmedim ve üniversite hocalarına karşı bugüne kadar oldukça riayetkâr bulunuyorlar. Bir gün bunlara sıra gelmeyeceği tabii şimdiki temin edilemez. -1944-de hazırlanan ve macarca tab edilmek üzere matbaaya verilen Türk kavimleri tarihi adındaki eserim maalesef muhassardan sonra hariciyenin eline geçerek arşivlerinde muhafaza edilmekte bulunuyor, ki arasına uykusuz gece geçirmeme sebep oluyor. Çünkü bu kitabımda Türk ve şimalî komşusu tarihi münasebetleri oldukça mufassal malumat vermeğe çalışmıştım. Şimdiye kadar bu eserimi yanmış zannettim. Herhalde bir gün yeniden ele alınarak aleyhimde bir silah gibi kullanılması beni imhâ edebilecek kadar bir delil temin edebilir.



İşte bütün bu sebeplerle Hamit beyin ve Sizin maarif vekaletiyle benim hakkındaki görüşmeleriniz son derecede imdadıma yetişmiş ve benim geniş bir nefes almama sebep olmuştur. Şayet burada bir gün takibata maruz kalır ve maasımdan mahrum edilürsem ailem ve çocuklarımin aç kalmayacaklarına emin olarak şimdilik itimadla çalışmalarımdevam ediyorum. İşte bu sebeble Size, Hamit beye ve vekil beye, hepimize çok minnettarım.

Maalesef bugün pasaport temini son derece güç olduğundan seyahat imkânını hemen hemen ortadan kaldırmaktadır. Meselâ maruf bir hekim ve Bp.üniversitesinin eski profesörü bulunan Balogh Ernő İstanbul üniversitesine davet edildiği halde hatta Türk elçisinin tavassutüne mazhar bulunmasına rağmen dahi pasaport almağa muvaffak olamamıştı.

Bilhassa şimdi Türkiyede yaşamayı her halde çok arzu ederdim. Bu mektubumu Hamit beye göstermenizi ve muhtevasının ancak eski Türk dostarım arasında ifşa edilmesini rica ederim.

Şriften duyduğuma göre Moravcsik'in Byzantino-Turcica'sı son derecede pahalıdır. Türk parası ile 55 T.L.-dir. Fakat ben ikinci cildinin bir kitapevinde daha ucuz bir nüshasını buldum ve bunu Size göndereceğim. Birinci cildin de Prof.Moravcsiktan daha ucuz bir fiatla Size verilmesini tecrübe edeceğim. Fekete Layoşla ve Moravcsikla bu günlerde konuşacağım.

Ural ve İbrahime çok selamlarımı bildirmenizi dilerim. Sami veditğerlerin nerede buldukları hakkında malumat almağa çok sevincektim. Hakkınızda ve refikanızla çocuklarınız hakkında daha fazla tafsilat vermenizi çok rica eder selam ve sevgiler yollarım

Bp.,80, III,1948.

4.

Letter from László Rásonyi to Tayyib Gökbilgin, 21 September 1961
 Personal Archive of Tayyip Gökbilgin, İstanbul.

Kedves Barátom!

Nem irhattam eddig, mert nem tudtam volna semmi bizonyosat írni, s reménykedtem mindig, hogy 1-2 nap múlva már határozottan lehet majd írnom. Most már csaknem bizonyos, hogy reményeimnek vége. Szívesen mennék Erzurumba is, ha itt úgy intéznék a dolgokat, mint 1935-ben. Kivándorolnom nem lehet, mert a gyermekeim itt élnek és azokat nem engednék ki. Leila most érettségizés előtt áll és majd a zeneakadémiai felvételi vizsga előtt. Ezért a feleségem sem jöhetne velem 1962 szeptembere előtt. Ha pedig feleségem és Leila itt maradnak, szükséges, hogy itt továbbra is fizessék a nyugdíjamat, - a feleségemnek. Ez pedig csak úgy lehetne, ha kimenésemet itt is hivatalosan intéznék, mint 1935-ben. Ligetihez fordultam, de az ő révén semmi sem sikerült. Nem mer sikraszállni értem, mert attól félt, hogy én csak másodrangú állampolgár vagyok, mivel nem kaptam utlevelet Göttingenbe sem. Pedig az utlevél megtagadása teljesen szeszélyes dolog. A művelődésügyi minisztériumban ismerem az egyetemi ügyek fő osztályvezetőjét, de az meg épem most külföldön tartózkodik. Ezért egyelőre mindent ad acta kell tennem, s így nem marad idő arra, hogy török vízumot kapjak, ha netalán valami csoda révén mégis utlevelet kapnék.

Képzelteti az érzésemet, mikor aug. 3.-án közölték velem, hogy az "utlevél iránti kérés ezidőszerint nem teljesíthető". Már minden elő volt készítve és be volt pakolva a koffermem is. Még szerencse, hogy előadásom szövegét pár nappal korábban kiküldtem. Így azt Frau von Gaba in mint az altajisztikai szakosztály elnöke felolvasta és az anyag tetszését aratott /A nőnevek a török népeknél/. - Az utlevél megtagadása miatt fellebbeztem. A fellebbezés elintézése azonban nincs határidőhöz kötve és az a baj, hogy van egy elv, ami szerint annak, akitől megtagadták az utlevelet, félévig nem lehet utlevelet adni. Hát így reménytelenné vált mind a Tarih Kongresin való részvétel, mind az erzurumi ügy, még ha minden egyéb rendben lenne is. Talán másképpen alakult volna minden, ha már a göttingeni meghívást, illetve annak a bejelentését, hogy ők, a meghívó társaság vállalják a költségeket, - nem az én nevemre címezték volna, hanem az én nevemet megnevezve a M.T.A. elnökéhez címezték volna. Így ugyanis hivatalosan maga az Akadémia gondoskodott volna az utlevélről, viszont az én nevemre címzett levelekkel már csak ajánlást kaphattam az IBUSZhoz, s ott csak magánvállalkozásnak tekintették az ügyet és nem teljesítették a kérést. - A sok izgalom, csalódás, mérgelődés, gond, amin keresztülmentem, megviseltek. Nem is nyaralhattam az idén, s bizony -ha nem is vagyok beteg- fáradtan kezdem az őszt. A Tarih Kurumu meghívó levele is, amiben megírták, hogy "Sizin İstanbul- Ankara geliş-gidiş yol paranzla Ankara'daki ikamet masraflarınız Kurumca kargımanacaktır" - nem az Akadémia elnökéhez, hanem az én nevemre jött. Mikor erről Ligetinek beszéltem, mert ő volt akkor az Akadémia ügyvezető elnöke /az elnök távol volt/, és azt mondtam neki, hogy írjak Ankarába és kérni fogom Uluğ İğdemir beyt, hogy még egyszer írjon, de az elnök címére, Ligeti arra kért, hogy ne tegyem ezt, mert ő elintézi, hogy kimegyessek. Biztam benne és ime...nem tett semmit. Egyetlen aláírása kellett volna és a Kulturális Kapcsolatok Intézete minden korábbi elutasítás ellenére is meg tudta volna szerezni számomra az utlevelet, mert hiszen kevésbé azelőtt a művelődésügyi minisztériumtól kitüntetést, az Akadémia elnökétől /Rusznák Istvántól/ meg rendkívüli jutalmat kaptam a hoszsu és eredményes munkám elisméréseül. A minisztérium hajlandó is lett volna a Kult.Int.et utasítani az utlevél megszerzésére, csak Ligetitől kellett volna egy aláírás. -

A sok keserűségben az a vigasztalás, hogy Ön, Kedves Barátom és többi török barátom nem felejtettek el. Nagyon köszönöm az erzurumi meghívást és az a kérésem minden török barátomhoz, hogy tartsák meg

az irányomban való jóindulatukat 1968-ben is. Talán hosszabb előkészítés után sikerülne majd kimennem, ha újra meghívást kapnék valahová. Ha egyetemi meghívást kapnék, azt a Művelődésügyi Minisztériumhoz, vagy a miniszterhez, - ha pedig tudományos társulati meghívást kapnék, a M.T.A. elnökéhez kellene írni. Persze az én nevemet megnevezve, mert különben olyan valakit küldenének ki helyettem, akinek a személye kedvesebb a parti politikai szempontjából. De szívesen lennék most Istanbulban, akár négy-öt évre is, akár csak pár hétre is ebben a ragyogó szeptemberben. Erzurumban is szívesen lennék, de csak rövidebb időre, mert ott nem tudnám folytatni a most megkezdett munkámat. Ott még nagyon kicsi lehet a könyvtár, innen meg nem vihetném ki a saját könyvtáramat úgy, mint 1935-ben. Erzurumba a munka uttörő jellege és az eddig ismeretlen milieu vonzanak egy-két évre. Lehet, hogy hosszú időre is megszeretném ott az életet, de ezt nem tudom előre, mert már nem vagyok fiatal és nem tudom, hogy mennyire egészséges hely? Vérnyomásom normális, van egy kis agyvérzéségységem, szervi bajom nincs. Ankarában jól éreztem magamat, csak a lodosz volt kellemetlen áprilisban néha. Ankara is vonz. - Erzurumban régi barátom /40 évvel ezelőtt ismerkedtünk össze! H. Kogay lenne számomra nagyon kedves kolléga, de szívesen emlékszem B.S. Baykalra is. - Neki is most irok. - Megjelent most egy cikkem Stein Aurélról a "The New Hungarian Quarterly"ben; küldtettem belőle egy példányt az Ön címére. - Két új különnyomatot is küldök. - Hajdani professzorom meg akarja szüntettetni a saját jmmár kilencvenesztendősi tanszékét, nehogy én örökljem. Ebben hive neki Czeglédy is, akinek a sógora most lett a hariciye vekili. Ligeti viszont e kérdésben igen jól viseli magát, mert ragaszkodik ahhoz, hogy a tanszék megmaradjon. Erről persze Siyah kollégának előttr ne beszéljen K.N. Gyuszival. Gyuszi szívesen menne lektornak az ankarai egyetemre, s ez nagyon hasznos is lenne, de hajdani professzoromnak más jelöltje van. Kár, hogy nem személyre szóló volt a lektor meghívása. -

Hogy sikerült anatóliai útja? Talált-e szép anyagot? Remélem, kedves családja is egészséges. Nálunk a feleségemet nagyon megviselte anyósom hosszú haldoklása. Ő sem nyaralt semmit, igen fáradt, csak most kezd kissé rendbejönni. Elvesztette az itthoni munkáját, mert a munkaadója gyógyíthatatlan beteg lett. Szóval nagyon alaposan lecsökkent a jövedelmünk, annak ellenére is, hogy hetenként kétszer bejárnak az akadémiai könyvtárba, min szaktanácsadó. Feleségem rendbehozta a lakásunkat, s én is ismét intenzíven dolgozom. Ankarába szánt előadásomat is újból elővettem. Remélem, módjában lesz ismét eljönnie hozzánk, esetleg feleségestől is, vagy családostól.

Minden jót kíván és családjával együtt szívből üdvözl!

Budapest 1961 szept. 21.

Rásonyi László

5.

Letter from László Rásonyi to Tayyip Gökbilgin, 11 August 1963
 Personal Archive of Tayyip Gökbilgin, İstanbul.

Kedves Barátom!

Levelének a mélységesen lehangolt volta és csalódott hangja nagyon lehangoló volt számomra is. De azután gondolkodtam a dolgokon. Irja, hogy H.Gy. től olyan értesülése van, amely szerint innen valamelyik követségi titkár Önt kémnek nyilvánította. Hát én egyáltalában nem hiszem, hogy H.Gy. ilyesmit hallott volna. Bármennyire is tény, hogy H.Gy.-nek minden állami szervnél vannak ismerősei otthon, s még itt Törökországban is sokfelé -, s ennek megfelelően szinte csodálatraméltó a jólérsétsége, mégis ki kell jelentenem, hogy azt, amit ő mondott, merő kitalálásnak tartom. Képtelenség, hogy akkor, amikor Ön a legkimagaslóbb és leghozzáértőbb személyiség azon kevesek között, akik aktívan törődnek a török-magyar kulturális kapcsolatok intenzívebbé tételével, - hogy akkor akadjon bárki is a követségen, akár a múltban, akár a jelenben, aki Önre vonatkozólag az inkriminált kijelentést tette volna. Akárhányszor beszélek a követségiakkal, Önről mindig a legnagyobb tisztelettel és rokonszenvvel emlékezem meg. Tudjuk azt, hogy a mai világhelyzetben még inkább, mint máskor, a kis Magyarország követségének nem is lehet más célkitűzése, mint hogy elősegítse a gazdasági és a kulturális kapcsolatokat. Hát csak nem diszkreditálják éppen azt a személyiséget, akinek török vonalon a legtöbbet köszönhetnek! Ha az inkriminált kijelentés valaki részéről valóban elhangzott, ki és mi célból tette? Cui prodest? -mint a római jog velősen kérdezte. Ön itt hathatósan előmozdítja Káldy-Nagy tudományos törekvéseit és az enyémet is. Ön volt a legauthenticusabb tanuja a Káldy ellen Magyarországból indított intrikának a névyelen feljelentésekkel./Erről én annak idején az Ön levele alapján beszámoltam Ligetinek, s bár névről nem is esett szó, mégis ártalmára volt a hallgatólagosan gyanúsítotttnak. Nos, ha Ön diszkreditálva van, akkor csökken a gyanúsítotttal szemben kialakult ódiom és csökken az Ön támogatásának a magyarországi súlya.- Persze az is lehet, hogy nem is ilyen kiszámított intrikáról van szó, hanem csak egy féltékenységtől fűtött, bosszúságban mondott megdölgölatlan és határozatlan kijelentésről. Ha Ön elveszti a kedvét ahhoz,

hogy a jövőben a kulturális kapcsolatokat támogassa, éppen az intrikusnak a céljait fogja előmozdítani! Ha ez nem világos, majd megmagyarázom, ha találkozunk. Azt hiszem, így kell felfogni az ügyet, s ha esetleg Hazai kitalálása az egészen nem kell komolyan venni, nem pusztán a fentebb kifejtettek miatt, hanem azért sem, mert ő az otthoni tudományos körök előtt talán még a megérdemelnél is nagyobb mértékben elvesztette a hitelét. Itt többre becsülik őt. Jó feje van neki, de többet kellene neki komoly eredményeket felmutató tudományos munkával foglalkozni, mint "politiká"val, már tudniillik személyi politikával.

Holnap megyek a Tarih Kurumuba, hogy megkérdezzem, van-e fejlemény Kálj-Nagynak az Ön által ónáluk pártolt ügyében.

A nagy melegre való tekintettel a napokban 8-10 napra elmegyek Amaasrába. Azt mondják, hogy jóval hűvösebb, mint Istanbul és jóval olcsóbb is. A szemeszterkezdés előtt azonban elmegyek még Istanbulba is. Szándékomban volt felolvasást tartani a velencei török művtörténeti kongresszuson is, és pedig a arról, hogy a szőnyegelőállítás török szókinccse kétségbevonhatatlanul autochton /sokm az igei derivátum!/. Ez az első lépés annak az eldöntésére, hogy milyen néphez kapcsolhatjuk a szőnyegelőállítás ~~kezdet~~ kezdeteit.-Azonban az út sokba kerül és mint nem török állampolgárnak, valutáris nehézségeim is lennének a jegy megvásárlása körül. Majd itt fogom megjelentetni. Eredetileg a leányom munkája volt, de én még irtam hozzá.-

Kézcsókját küldi és egész kedves családjával együtt szívből üdvözlí

Rásonyi László

Uğur bey e Serhat Aziz bey
is Istanbulban vannak. Gyf
Az idare helyzetéből most semmi
sincs. A hónap végén majd me-
gint elmegyek a Tarih Kurumuba.
Nem lenne ejs, hogy Liget-
nél írjak arról a Hazai - ügyről z
Bak - ismétlem - kért én ilyen
fontosságú pontosságát hitelesíteni.

6.

Letter from László Rásonyi to Tayyip Gökbilgin, 19 September 1963
Personal Archive of Tayyip Gökbilgin, İstanbul.

Ankara, 1963 szept.17.

Kedves Barátom!

Remélem, utolsó levele óta már megtartotta az edirnei előadásokat, s azok jól sikerültek.

Ujra kéréssel alkalmatlankodom. Teszem ezt a Tarih Kurumu felkérésére. Az istanbuli Emniyet Müd. még mindig nem küldte el a Káldy Nagy vizumügyére vonatkozó aktát Ankarába. Nagyon kérjük az Ön beavatkozását abból a célból, hogy sürgősen küldjék el az irást, hogy itt azután a Hariciye intézkedhessék. Eddig hatszor voltam a Tarih Kurumunál ebben az ügyben és kétszer aminisztériumokban.

Most valamit a másik ügyről, ami Önnek nagy keserűséget okozott. Ujra csak azt a meggyőződésemet fejezem ki, hogy én azt, amit Hazai mondott, nem hiszem el, mert annyira még a követségek sem lehetnek bornirtak, hogy a saját érdekük ellen cselekedjenek. Annak a hazugságnak vagy nem volt célja, csak ^{spontán}ártani akart az Ön pártfogoltjainak, vagyis Káldynak és nekem Magyarországon, vagy pedig -itt az Ön Hazaival való beszélgetésére utalok-, el akarta venni az Ön kedvét attól, hogy magyaroknak segítsen.

Azt, amit én megérkeztemkor elmondtam Önnek, mint abszurd voltánál fogva mulatságosat mondtam el, s akkor nem is tett Önre különösebb hatást. Csak most, amikor Hazait a kérdéssel sarokba szorította és H. önvédelemből a követségre kente a dolgot, - volt Önre e dedikodunak nagy hatása. Remélem, hogy H.-val való beszélgetése kapcsán a nevémet nem említette, mert H. nagyon felhasználhatná otthon ellenem azt, hogy én jóbarátságából elmondtam Önnek, hogy milyen szármásra képesek egyesek. A követ még nem jött vissza. Ha már itt lesz és Ön óhajtja, és ha Ön az én nevémet nem említette H.-nak, én az úgyről beszélhetek a követtel is, azt hiszem hálás lenne. Vagy hagyjuk ezt akkorra, amikor Ön Ankarába jön?

Szives intézkedését kérve a Káldy-ügyben és válaszáat várva a Hazai-ügyben

igaz barátsággal üdvözli

Rásonyi László

7.

Letter from László and Piroska Rásonyi to Tayyip Gökbilgin, 1 November 1970
Personal Archive of Tayyip Gökbilgin, İstanbul.

Süstitelt Barátunk!

Ankara, 1970. nov. 1.

Megdöbbenve értesültünk Hamit Közaytól arról, hogy szeretet jeleséig befejezte földi életét, éppen akkor, amikor Ön Pester volt.

Südjük, hogy állapota csaknem reménytelen volt, mégis mély részvétet keltett bennünk a his. Ezzelöl a szegény megboldogult iránt, aki sokat szenvedett, mert nem adatott meg neki Isten egyik legnagyobb ajándéka, a hosszú halál. Másfelöl igen sajnáljuk Önt, kedves Tayyip és gyermekeit akik hitvestárs és anya nélkül maradtak.

Végaszül szolgái arában az, hogy Ön igazi muszlim és talán ezetlen nagy vallás síncs, amely olyan mértékben nevelni híveit Isten - Allah akaratában való belemegyasba, mint az iszlám.

Kérem, fogadj'a a mély részvét kifejezését ó-szinte barátaitól

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As an evaluation of the publications produced during the first four years of the existence of the MTA–SZTE Research Group of the Ottoman Age (ELKH) seems to be beneficial presenting the list of our various books, articles, dissertations, etc. Having established the Research Group, we had a solid requirement from our colleagues, following our everyday tasks, but concerning the topics of the Hungarian(Habsburg)–Ottoman diplomatic relations. We had a vision about the regular dynamic of the archival research, about the collection of the documents in Ottoman-Turkish, Latin, German, Serbian as well as in Hungarian, which are in the focal point of our research. Like as usual, in every case of historical research, a scientist is always ready to outline the first achievements, case studies. In addition, the historians cannot take a break from the former research immediately, so we collected a colourful kaleidoscope, the last years' harvest in the following list.

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* The bibliography has been written within the framework of the work of the MTA–SZTE Research Group of the Ottoman Age (Eötvös Loránd Research Network). The writing of this paper has been supported by the Ministry of Human Capacities (Emberi Erőforrások Minisztériuma) through a grant (code nr. 20391-3/2018/FEKUSTRAT; TUDFO/47138-1/2019-ITM), as well as by the National Research, Development and Innovation Office (NRDI) (Nemzeti Kutatási, Fejlesztési és Innovációs Hivatal) through a grant (Thematic Excellence Programme (Tématerületi Kiválósági Program) 2020, NKFIH-1279-2/2020) of the Interdisciplinary Centre of Excellence (University of Szeged), the Department of Medieval and Early Modern Hungarian History (Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Szeged), MTA–SZTE Research Group of the Ottoman Age (Eötvös Loránd Research Network). We would hereby like to give thanks for her useful pieces of advice and help provided during the writing of this paper.

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Summaries of the Articles

Sándor PAPP

Temporary Appointments by the Sultan – A New Method for Ensuring Succession in Transylvania before the Death of the Ruling Prince

The power structure of the Ottoman Empire was quite diverse, and the flexibility of their rule is shown by the fact that their system of autonomy in religion, communities and states survived up to the modernisation of the 19th century. In order to examine the individual areas not in isolation, but instead from the perspective of the empire, it is necessary to make a comparative analysis of similar structures. In the case of Transylvania, as a vassal of the Ottoman Empire, it will be analysed the sultan's temporary confirmation concerning two consecutive princes. The temporary confirmation was only bestowed upon the recipient an assurance of his right to inherit the throne prior to the death of his father, who was his predecessor. This type of legal action seems to be unknown in the case of other vassal states in the middle of the 17th century.

Zoltán Péter BAGI

The Story of Johann von Pernstein's regiment

On the basis of available groups of various sources, one can get an insight into the everyday lives of mercenaries who were employed in the service of the Habsburg Empire at the turn of the 16th–17th century (like in the case of histories of regiments which were fashionable in 19th–20th century). This study examines the history of the infantry regiment hired and led by Johann von Pernstein during the Long Turkish War (1591/93–1606). Although Pernstein's mercenaries served and fought in the Kingdom of Hungary in 1597 for just a few months. They took part in the unsuccessful siege of Győr (between 9 September and 3 October) and then in the battles in Vác-Verőce (between 2 November and 9 November). Because their Obrist Pernstein was killed on September 30, the regiment left without a leader, they were disbanded at the end of the expedition. Its members continued to serve in other new corps.

Gergely BRANDL – János SZABADOS

The Burden of Authority – The Preparations for the Ambassadorial Mission to Constantinople of Baron Johann Ludwig von Kuefstein in 1628

This paper attempts to explain the situation after the negotiation of the Treaty of Szőny (1627) between the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires. It focuses only on the ambassadorial mission of the Habsburgs led by Baron Johann Ludwig von

Kuefstein, which was sent to ratify the documents in Constantinople. It discusses the early period of the mission from the request of the emperor (18 November 1627) until the arrival of the delegation (18 November 1628) in the Ottoman capital. After briefly touching upon general surveys (historical context, historiographical and methodological problems, the chronology of the mission, etc.), the study describes the various problems that the baron had to face during the appointment of the personnel for the mission. Since many criteria for the offices and the officeholders raised political conflicts within the diplomatic environment of the court (and also could raise plenty of social problems), the baron had to compete with many obstacles as a “homo novus”. The impediments, the political situation and the pressure from the influential members of the “war party” and the “peace party”, predestined that many of the aims of the mission would never be accomplished. The main goal of the essay is to present a case study and draw a detailed picture of the ideal type of source material for the Habsburg diplomatic missions to the Ottoman Sublime Porte and to demonstrate the novel nature of the material for this well-researched topic. Due to this, it might offer unique opportunities in this field.

Krisztina JUHÁSZ

On the Margins of the Second Treaty of Szőny. Data for the History of the Signing of the Treaty of Szőny in 1642

Growing interest can be observed in recent research focusing on the peace treaties between the Ottoman and the Habsburg Empires. In the present study, I provide some additional data and information on the history of the so-called second Treaty of Szőny (1642). After the review of contemporary political scene and the antecedents to the peace talks, I exclusively highlight one node of the communication network during the second Treaty of Szőny. I present this communication channel through the letters of the members of the famous Esterházy family (Dániel Esterházy and his elder brother, Miklós Esterházy). The correspondence of the Esterházy with other people points out the major problems of the earlier treaties between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans, for example the conscious falsification of the texts of the treaties. In addition, it is possible to learn other interesting details about the negotiations.

Szabolcs HADNAGY

A Campaign Against Two Enemies Simultaneously? – The 1658 Military Venture of the Ottomans

The topic of this article is the Ottoman campaign against Transylvania in 1658, which aimed to remove the Prince of Transylvania, György II Rákóczi from his position, who had already been deposed for his unauthorised attempt to take the Polish crown, but still tried to maintain his power. The recently discovered sources

in Ottoman-Turkish concerning the army's food supplies put the whole issue into a different perspective. According to these sources the campaign was planned against the Dalmatian regions of the Republic of Venice, then slowly turned against Transylvania due to Rákóczi desperately trying to hold onto power, and culminated in the capture of the castle of Jenő and the appointment of Ákos Barcsai as Prince because of the Celālī rebellion that broke out in the Ottoman Empire. Due to this situation the Ottomans were planning a double camping, presented in this study together with the previously mentioned events, as a process in three separate parts divided by the turning points of the campaign's planning and execution process. The study discusses how the Ottomans planned to attack Zadar first with their whole army, and later only with their central armies, as well as how the regional army, then the full army led by Grand Vizier Köprülü Mehmed turned against Transylvania and Jenő.

Zsuzsanna CZIRÁKI

Ambassador or Rogue? The Labyrinth of Habsburg Diplomacy in the Light of a Murder in Constantinople

During an extensive research on the circumstances of Simon Reniger's appointment as Habsburg ambassador to Constantinople, a crime started to excite my interest. The offence had been committed during the term of the previous resident ambassador, Alexander Greiffenklau but it caused a lot of difficulties even at the time when Reniger came into office. Namely, in the autumn of 1646, Greiffenklau killed a certain Don Juan de Menesses, an adventurer of dubious origin, who – according to Habsburg informants – had been involved in conspiring against the dynasty within the Sultan's entourage. In my paper, I want to describe what led to Menesses's murder and what kind of consequences can be drawn on the basis of the crime as to the diplomatic cooperation between the Spanish and the Austrian lines of the Habsburg dynasty in the last years of the Thirty Years' War.

Kutse ALTIN

Letters from Tayyib Gökbilgin's Personal Archives: László Rásonyi

Tayyib Gökbilgin, who ranks among the founding fathers of Ottoman studies, was the first student of Faculty of Language, History, and Geography in Ankara, the new capital of the new state, where he began studying Hungarology as a student of László Rásonyi. The correspondences in Gökbilgin's personal collection offer a very interesting and valuable picture of a very complex period, in which the individual perspectives of scholars on the socio-political environment can also be traced. The aim of this article is to present the exemplary letters of László Rásonyi, the first head of the Department of Hungarology to his first student and later colleague Tayyib Gökbilgin in the context of the personal archive and first-person documents.

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This volume contains articles of the members of the MTA–SZTE Research Group of the Ottoman Age (Eötvös Loránd Research Network) and some dear colleagues, who work with us in a close contact. The articles are presenting the results of their own research.

The Research Group of the Ottoman Age was founded almost in 2017, and focuses on medieval and early modern Ottoman–Hungarian and Habsburg diplomatic history based on international examples. It has been greatly inspired by the influential research and publications of Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, who has written about Ottoman, Crimean Tatar, and Polish relations; and Hans Peter Alexander Theunissen, who presented the almost complete Venetian–Ottoman diplomatic contact based on the political and commercial treaties in his dissertation.

These works can be seen as precursors to the current project. In it, the texts of the peace treaties between the Ottoman Empire and the medieval Hungarian state, or later the Vienna-based Habsburg Monarchy that replaced it in eastern diplomacy, are processed from the first examples in the 15th century up to 1739.