„A létezés édes érzése”: Az érzékenység filozófiai elméletei a XVIII. századi Franciaországban

The article examines eighteenth-century French philosophical conceptions of sensibility through the notions of “inner sensation” (sentiment intérieur) and the “feeling of existence” (sentiment d’être). It argues that sensibility did not function as a unified doctrine but rather as a set of distinct theoretical models articulating different forms of pre-reflective self-awareness. The analysis focuses on Malebranche’s distinction between ideas and sentiment intérieur, the latter limiting self-knowledge to the immediate awareness of one’s mental states. Claude Buffier’s rejection of the Cartesian cogito in favor of an irreducible, intimate feeling of existence gives an empiricist turn to the Malebranchian initiative and represents an early form of common-sense philosophy. Lelarge de Lignac radicalizes the concept of sens intime by claiming that the self can experience its own existence independently of all sensory content, especially in meditative states. His position is contrasted with Condillac’s sensualist account, which identifies the feeling of existence with the presence of sensory states rather than with pure self-presence. The article concludes by showing how Rousseau transforms these philosophical debates into an affective framework, presenting the “sweet feeling of existence” as a foundational source of happiness beyond pleasure and pain.

Keywords: sensibility, inner sensation (sentiment intérieur), enlightenment psychology, French enlightenment, eighteenth-century Malebranchism
Kulcsszavak: érzékenység, belső érzékelés (sentiment intérieur), felvilágosodás kori pszichológia, francia felvilágosodás, XVIII. századi malebranchizmus

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